Mpox: Public health management of human cases and associated human contacts in Canada

August 23, 2024

Summary of updates

August 23, 2024, update

Updates have been made to the last version (January 4, 2024) to:

January 4, 2024, update

Updates have been made to the previous version (February 23, 2023) to:

February 23, 2023, update

An update was made to the previous version (October 18, 2022) of this document to change the term "monkeypox" disease to "mpox" disease. This change aligns with the WHO's preferred nomenclature for the disease. The WHO recommended this change in November 2022 to help reduce stigma and other concerns associated with the previous terminology.

When referring to the virus itself, "monkeypox virus" (abbreviated to "MPXV") will be used throughout this guidance to align with the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses' (ICTV) terminology. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) will continue to monitor any changes to ICTV terminology and update guidance as needed.

October 18, 2022, update

Updates have been made to the previous version (June 21, 2022). They include the following changes:

On this page

1.0 Introduction

PHAC, in collaboration with provincial/territorial (PT) PHAs and other relevant federal government departments, has developed this document. It provides guidance to PHAs working at the federal/provincial/territorial (FPT) level in the event cases of mpox are suspected or confirmed within their jurisdictions.

As mpox is not endemic in Canada and the situation continues to evolve, this document also follows a precautionary approach, in order to prevent the long-term establishment of mpox in Canada.

At the time of this update, all cases in Canada are clade II, and most cases are a result of sexual transmission (although other modes of transmission also exist), occurring primarily among gay, bisexual and other men who have sex with men (gbMSM), especially those with multiple sexual partners. However, it is important to stress that the risk of exposure to the MPXV is not exclusive to any group or setting.

The strategy outlined in this guidance relies on case and contact management with the goal of outbreak containment, including among:

To achieve this, the objectives for this guidance include rapidly stopping chains of transmission to reduce the spread of mpox and mitigate the impacts in Canada. This will ultimately contribute to the overall goal of eliminating person-to-person transmission of mpox in Canada.

Guidance on diagnostic laboratory, specimen handling and transportation, clinical care, and infection prevention and control (IPC) measures in other settings (e.g., Canadian points of entry, health care settings, long-term care facilities) are beyond the scope of this document. More information on publications that address these topics can be found here: Mpox: Technical documents for laboratory personnel and health professionals.

This guidance is informed by the latest available scientific evidence, national and international epidemiological data and expert opinion. Although a significant volume of scientific literature has been published since the introduction of mpox into Canada, there are still several knowledge gaps on the transmission dynamics of MPXV. PHAC continues to apply an evidence-informed approach to its case and contact management guidance for mpox. We will adjust this document accordingly as new scientific information becomes available.

This guidance should be read in conjunction with relevant FPT and local legislation, guidelines, regulations and policies. It should be adapted to the local context as required.

PHAC has developed this document based on the Canadian situation. Therefore, it may differ from guidance developed by other countries.

2.0 Background

2.1 MPXV in humans

The agent

MPXV is part of the Poxviridae family. MPXV has two distinct genetic clades: clade I and clade II. Clade I is divided into two sub-clades (Ia and Ib). Clade Ia is more common among childrenFootnote 1Footnote 2, and has been reported as having a higher case fatality rate up to 10%, according to data from endemic regionsFootnote 3Footnote 4Footnote 5Footnote 6. Clade Ib is more common among adults and early evidence suggest it is less severe than clade IaFootnote 7. The case fatality rate for Clade II is approximately 0.1% to 3.6%, with cases occurring outside of endemic regions rarely being fatalFootnote 8Footnote 9.

Presentation in humans

The incubation period for human-to-human transmission is usually 7 to 10 days, but can range from 3 to 21 daysFootnote 10Footnote 11Footnote 12Footnote 13.

Mpox presents with either or both:

Asymptomatic mpox infections have been reported in non-endemic countries since the 2022 outbreak; however, it remains unclear how common asymptomatic cases areFootnote 14.

While mpox usually self-resolves in 2 to 4 weeks, severe cases can occur and may be fatalFootnote 15.

Transmission of mpox

MPXV can be spread to humans in 3 ways:

Mpox can spread from person-to-person through direct contact with lesions or scabs of a person with mpox. These lesions or scabs may be found on the skin or mucosal surfaces, such as:

It can spread through contact with bodily fluids of a person with mpox, such as:

The virus may spread through respiratory particles, such as from:

Although spread through the air is possible, current data continues to support a minimal role of spread through the air for clade I and II MPXV. However, this possibility should continue to be examined given ongoing viral evolutionFootnote 25.

It can also spread by coming into direct contact with personal items a person with mpox has used, including:

People with mpox may be contagious up to 4 days before the start of their symptoms, and the lesions remain contagious to the touch until the scabs have fallen and a new layer of skin appears.

For more information on the modes of transmission, clinical manifestations, diagnosis and treatment for mpox, refer to PHAC's Mpox: For health professionals web page. Information on mpox for the general public is also available, including:

2.2 Current status

There are two distinct lineages of MPXV: clade I and clade II. Both clades are endemic in Africa.

There continues to be an escalating outbreak of mpox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo associated with clade Ia MPXV. Escalation of this outbreak has been associated with the detection of a novel sub-lineage of clade I (clade Ib). There are increasing reports of confirmed and suspected mpox cases in other African countries, as well as countries outside of Africa. In response to this ongoing upsurge in cases, the WHO announced on August 14, 2024 that mpox constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).

Mpox cases continue to be reported within Canada and around the world, in both endemic and non-endemic countries. Mpox cases reported in Canada continue to be the result of clade IIb MPXV, based on genomic sequencing available to date.

While the risk of clade I importation into Canada is low to moderate, with a moderate level of uncertainty, PHAs and health care providers (HCPs) should remain vigilant. Early detection, diagnosis, isolation, and contact tracing would be key for the effective control of both ongoing local transmission of clade IIb, as well as potential emergence of clade I MPXV in Canada. No fatalities have been reported among mpox cases in Canada to date.

PHAC continues to work with PTs and international partners to actively monitor the situation. For up-to-date information, refer to PHAC's Mpox (monkeypox): Update web page.

For further details on mpox epidemiology in Canada, refer to PHAC's Epidemiological summary report: 2022-23 mpox outbreak in Canada

2.3 Mpox vaccination

Imvamune® is a licensed non-replicating third-generation smallpox vaccine. It is indicated for immunization against smallpox, mpox and related Orthopoxvirus infection and disease in adults 18 years of age and older determined to be at high risk for exposure. Vaccination is expected to protect against both clade I and clade II.

In consideration of ongoing local transmission, the need for national guidance on pre-exposure vaccination was noted. In May 2024 the National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI) provided interim guidance on the use of Imvamune® in the context of a routine immunization program.

NACI recommends that individuals at high risk of mpox should receive two doses of Imvamune® administered at least 28 days (4 weeks) apart.

Individuals considered at high risk of mpox exposure include men who have sex with men who engage in high-risk activities (e.g., multiple sexual partners, recent STI).

Regardless of gender or sex assigned at birth, the following populations are also considered at high-risk for mpox, and recommended 2-dose vaccination with Imvamune®: sexual partners of men who have sex with men engaging in high-risk activities, sex workers, as well as anyone who will be travelling to foreign countries with the intention of engaging in sexual activity in exchange for money (e.g., engaging in sex tourism).

NACI continues to recommend the use of Imvamune® as a post-exposure vaccination (also known and referred to as post-exposure prophylaxis) to individuals who have had high risk exposure(s) to a probable or confirmed case of mpox, or within a setting where transmission is occurring, if they have not received both doses of pre-exposure vaccination.

2.4 Proactive communications

PHAs may consider proactive, non-stigmatizing communication and outreach strategies to reach groups that may be at higher risk of exposure based on current epidemiological data. They should do so in collaboration with local community-based stakeholders and organizations.

In particular, PHAs may consider enhancing these types of communications during times where transmission may be expected to increase, such as during periods of increased:

PHAs may also find it beneficial to provide targeted messaging and advice on risk mitigation strategies for settings where activities may increase the risk of mpox transmission, such as sex-on-premise venues and congregate living settings, like shelters and correctional facilities. PHAs could also highlight that substance use (drugs and/or alcohol) may also impact individuals' assessment of risk and reduce adherence to safer sex practicesFootnote 26.

Information can be found at Mpox (monkeypox): How operators can reduce the risk of spread in community settings.

3.0 Public health management of cases

3.1 Case definitions and reporting

National case definitions for mpox have been established and are being used in this document. If PHA's suspect a case of mpox, they should follow their provincial, territorial or local reporting requirements. PHAC's mpox case report form is available at the following link: Mpox (monkeypox): For health professionals – Surveillance.

3.2 Public health activities for case management

The PHA's activities for case management should proceed as usual, regardless of the MPXV clade the case has been infected with.

At this time, there have been reports of reinfection cases of mpox globally, however, details remain limitedFootnote 27Footnote 28Footnote 29. As such, case management activities should also proceed as usual for reinfection cases.

Such activities may include:

3.3 Public health measures recommendations for suspected, probable and confirmed cases

When hospital-level care is not required, cases are recommended to isolate while they are contagious. The contagious period is typically from the start of symptoms until the lesions are completely healed (scabs have fallen off and wounds show evidence of epithelialization, such as a light pink/shiny pearl appearance). This typically takes 2 to 4 weeks, but may take longer.

The recommended PHMs should remain consistent, regardless of the MPXV clade the case has been infected with or if the case has previously had an mpox infection. Recommended PHMs are outlined as follows.

General recommendations for isolation

Cases should remain in isolation until deemed no longer contagious.

During the isolation period, cases should stay at home and away from others, and:

If the case must leave isolation to access urgent medical care, or for other such emergencies, they should:

Recommendations to reduce the risk of spread to household members

If the case lives with other people, they should isolate in a separate space (such as a private room for sleeping and washroom) whenever possible, especially if they have:

If isolating in a separate space or room from others in the household and use of a separate washroom is not possible, the case should maintain as much distance as possible from others, including during sleep (e.g., sleeping in separate beds). Cases should also clean and disinfect all surfaces and objects they have had contact with and immediately remove and launder used items (e.g., towels, clothes).

Cases should:

When sharing a space with others is unavoidable, cases should take the following measures:

Recommendations to reduce the risk of spread to animals (pets, livestock and wildlife)

Animals don't currently play a role in the transmission of mPXV in Canada. The current spread of mpox disease in Canada is a result of human-to-human transmission. However, humans can also spread the virus to animals, which could then spread it back to humans.

Many different animal species are susceptible to MPXV, especially rodent species such as squirrels and rats. However, the full range of animals susceptible to MPXV, particularly in North America, remains unknown at this time. One report from France in August 2022 suggests human-to-dog transmission of MPXV following infection in one dog after close contact with human cases in a household. However, there have been no further studies suggestive of human-to-dog transmission reported to dateFootnote 30. Consider measures to prevent any possible spread of the virus, to limit risk of creating an animal reservoir for this virus in Canada.

People with mpox should be advised they could possibly spread mpox to animals and to avoid contact with animals, including pets, livestock, and wildlife.

If this isn't possible, people with mpox should:

Recommendations for environmental hygiene

The risk of fomite transmission of MPXV remains difficult to characterize. In general, orthopoxviruses are known to be very stable in the environment and remain infectious for prolonged periods in scabs, especially in dark and cold environmentsFootnote 31Footnote 32Footnote 33. Materials contaminated with orthopoxviruses (such as clothes, paper, dust) can remain contagious for months to years if not disinfectedFootnote 31Footnote 32Footnote 33Footnote 34Footnote 35Footnote 36.

Some evidence has found persistent MPXV DNAFootnote 16Footnote 17Footnote 19Footnote 20Footnote 21Footnote 22Footnote 37, and in some cases potentially infectious virusFootnote 16Footnote 17Footnote 18Footnote 19, on surfaces and fabrics directly touched by cases. However, many unknown factors remain, including the viral load needed for transmission to occur and the stability of infectious virus on surfaces and fabrics in various environmental conditions. Some small experimental studies have shown that despite environmental stability, poxviruses can be inactivated when exposed to standard chemical disinfectants and temperature greater than 50° CelsiusFootnote 38Footnote 39Footnote 40Footnote 41.

In light of this, PHAs should advise cases and/or caregivers on proper environmental hygiene in the home, including recommendations for:

Detailed advice on environmental hygiene is available for cases and their caregivers on PHAC's website.

Post-recovery risk reduction

Live MPXV has been found in the body fluids (such as semen) of some cases for several weeks after their recoveryFootnote a. However, this has not been definitively linked with mpox spread. At this time, the WHO suggests condom use for cases 12 weeks post-mpox infectionFootnote 42.

As such, cases who have recovered (once scabs have fallen off and the wounds are epithelialized) should be advised by the PHA to use barrier protection (such as condoms, dental dams):

For additional information on barrier protection, consult PHAC's Sexually Transmitted and Blood Borne Infections (STBBI) Prevention Guide

3.4 Public health measures for caregivers at the home

Ideally, only one individual in the home should provide direct care to the case, if and when needed (referred to as the "caregiver"). HCPs entering the home to provide medical care should follow appropriate IPC protocols.

The caregiver should not be someone who is at risk of more severe disease from mpox (e.g., individuals who are immunocompromised, individuals who are pregnant, young children).

The PHA should provide caregivers with instructions on how to reduce their risk of mpox infection. These may include:

Caregivers should self-monitor for signs/symptoms for 21 days since their last exposure to the case (refer to the following section on contact management for further details). If signs/symptoms develop, they should immediately isolate away from others, notify their HCP or local PHA and follow their instructions.

4.0 Public health management of contacts

4.1 Contact tracing

The purpose of contact tracing is to:

In Canada, local PHAs are responsible for initiating contact tracing. Once a case is identified, they assess the need to begin contact tracing using the epidemiological and clinical information provided.

In determining the need to initiate contact tracing, the following factors should be considered:

Previously, it was recommended that PHAs identify contacts who were exposed to an mpox case between the date of symptom onset and when their scabs fell off (with evidence of epithelialization). Based on the current evidence that pre-symptomatic transmission may occur, PHAs may consider extending contact tracing to certain contacts who were exposed to the case up to 4 days before their symptom onsetFootnote 11Footnote 13Footnote 44Footnote 45Footnote 46Footnote 47Footnote 48Footnote 49Footnote 50Footnote 51Footnote 52. This tracing may be done based on a risk assessment of the case's behaviour up to 4 days before their symptom onset. When assessing the risk, PHAs could consider whether the case had engaged in an activity with a greater risk of mpox transmission and/or visited a high-risk setting or event during this pre-symptomatic period. Refer to Table 1 on the classification of contacts by exposure risk level for a description and examples of high-risk exposure contacts.

The decision to trace contacts exposed to a case in the pre-symptomatic period will depend on whether PHAs are opting for a more rigorous contact management approach and if the necessary resources are available.

4.2 Risk assessment of contacts

It is recommended that all individuals who are contacts of a confirmed, probable or suspected case be rapidly identified and assessed by PHAs. Such assessment will determine their exposure risk level and the appropriate public health recommendations to follow.

To facilitate determining the public health recommendations, contacts are classified as either high, intermediate, or low risk according to their exposure in Table 1. This information is not intended to replace more personalized public health advice provided to contacts, which is based on clinical judgment and comprehensive risk assessments conducted by PHAs.

Depending on the PHA's approach to contact tracing (refer to the section on contact tracing), PHAs may classify a contact's risk of exposure to a symptomatic or a pre-symptomatic case.

Table 1: Classification of contacts by human to human exposure risk level
Exposure risk Description Possible examples
High Prolonged or intimate contact, including any of the following:
  • skin/mucosa to skin/mucosa contact with a case (regardless of the case's lesion location)
  • skin/mucosa contact with a case's biological fluids, secretions, skin lesions or scabs
  • skin/mucosa contact with surfaces or objects contaminated by a case's secretions, biological fluids, skin lesions or scabs
  • face-to-face interaction with a case, without the use of a medical mask by the case or contact
  • Sexual partner of a case
  • Household member living with a case
  • Young child who is breastfed by a case.
  • Roommate of a case in a congregate living setting (such as a group home, student residence, shelter, correctional facility)
  • Person having skin/mucosa contact with a case's used personal items (e.g., bedding, towels, clothing, lesion dressings, utensils, razors, toothbrushes, needles, sex toys)
  • Person having close/intimate interactions with a case in a setting (such as a sex-on-premise venue) or gathering (such as festivals and other large social or cultural events)
Intermediate
  • Any of the following:
    • limited or intermittent, close proximity exposure to a case without wearing adequate PPE for the type of exposure risk (such as medical mask and gloves)
    • shared living space where there are limited interactions with a case or their personal items
  • Person sitting next to a case on a plane or other mode of transportation
  • Person sharing close proximity workspace with a case for long periods of time
Low or uncertain
  • Any of the following:
    • very limited exposures to a case
    • consistently and appropriately using recommended PPE for the type of exposure risk (such as medical mask and gloves)
  • Person having brief social interactions with a case
  • Colleague not sharing a confined or close-proximity office space with a case
Acronyms
  • PPE: Personal protective equipment

Note: This guidance is focused on community settings. For HCPs who have had an exposure to mpox, follow occupational health and safety advice and/or refer to PHAC guidance on infection prevention and control of mpox cases in healthcare settings.

4.3 Public health activities for contact management

For both high- and intermediate-risk mpox contacts, during the 21-day period since the contact's last exposure to the case, PHAs may:

4.4 Public health measures recommendations for contacts

Recommendations in Table 2 apply for the 21-day period following the contact's last exposure to a known suspected (unless mpox is ruled out), probable or confirmed case.

Note: Along with determining exposure risk level, PHAs may further adjust PHM recommendations based on a thorough individual assessment of a contact's specific risk factors. For example, PHAs may consider if the contact:

Table 2: Incremental public health measures recommendations for human contacts based on exposure risk
Exposure risk Recommendations
For all exposures
  • Should be offered Imvamune® vaccination if they have not received it already and are
  • Can be permitted to continue routine daily activities, with some specific PHMs in place
  • Self-monitor for signs/symptoms
  • Practise proper hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette
  • Reduce the risk of transmitting mpox by having fewer sexual partners and using barrier protection during sexual activity (e.g., condoms, dental dams, gloves, clothing)
  • Not to donate bodily fluids or tissues, including blood and sperm.
  • Notify the PHA and isolate immediately if signs or symptoms develop
  • Alert any HCPs that provide medical care of the potential exposure
  • Be aware that travelling during the 21-day post-exposure period could lead to unforeseen consequences if signs/symptoms were to develop (e.g., the need to isolate abroad, seek medical attention and/or reschedule transportation, as well as the potential for additional financial costs)
For both intermediate- and high-risk exposure contacts
  • Along with the recommendations outlined in the previous section:
    • Avoid high-risk settings (e.g., congregate living settings, such as correctional facilities or shelters) and populations at risk of more severe disease (e.g., individuals who are immunocompromised, individuals who are pregnant, young children including infants)Footnote 6Footnote 15, where possible
      • If this is unavoidable, consider wearing a well-fitting medical mask in these settings or around populations at risk of more severe disease
      • For contacts who work in high-risk settings, refer to occupational health and safety advice or defer to the advice of their local PHA, based on a risk assessment
    • As a precaution to prevent possible spread to animals, avoid any close contact with animals
For high-risk exposure contacts
  • Along with recommendations outlined in both previous sections:
    • Wear a well-fitting medical mask whenever in a shared space with others, including household members
    • Refrain from sexual contact with others
    • Be especially vigilant when self-monitoring for signs/symptoms if working with populations at risk of more severe disease

5.0 Additional resources

6.0 Footnotes

Footnote a

Emerging evidence has documented the MPXV in seminal fluid, oropharyngeal and anorectal swabs among people with mpox infectionFootnote 51Footnote 52Footnote 53Footnote 54Footnote 55Footnote 56Footnote 57Footnote 58. The relevance of these findings for transmission is not yet known. At this time, PHAC has taken a precautionary approach to recommendations for barrier protection following infectionFootnote 39.

Return to footnote a referrer

7.0 References

References:

Footnote 1

World Health Organization. "Multi-country outbreak of mpox." https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-mpox--external-situation-report-35--12-august-2024 (accessed July, 2024).

Return to footnote 1 referrer

Footnote 2

Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. "Africa CDC Epidemic Intelligence Weekly Report." https://africacdc.org/download/africa-cdc-weekly-event-based-surveillance-report-august-2024/ (accessed July, 2024).

Return to footnote 2 referrer

Footnote 3

E. M. Bunge et al., "The changing epidemiology of human monkeypox—A potential threat? A systematic review," February 11, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0010141

Return to footnote 3 referrer

Footnote 4

J. H. McQuiston et al., "U.S. Preparedness and Response to Increasing Clade I Mpox Cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — United States, 2024," Centre for Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7319a3.htm, May 16, 2024, vol. 73. Accessed: June, 2024.

Return to footnote 4 referrer

Footnote 5

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, "Outbreak of mpox caused by Monkeypox virus clade I in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," April 5, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/outbreak-mpox-caused-monkeypox-virus-clade-i-democratic-republic-congo

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Footnote 6

World Health Organization, "Mpox - Democratic Republic of the Congo," 14 June 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON522

Return to footnote 6 referrer

Footnote 7

Democratic Republic of the Congo. "Rapport de la situation epidemiologique de la variole simienne (Mpox)." https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rapport-de-la-situation-epidemiologique-de-la-variole-simienne-mpox-en-rdc-sitrep-no-020-17-au-23-juin-2024 (accessed July, 2024).

Return to footnote 7 referrer

Footnote 8

S. Antinori, G. Casalini, A. Giacomelli, and A. J. Rodriguez-Morales, "Update on Mpox: a brief narrative review," Infez Med, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 269-276, 1 September 2023, doi: 10.53854/liim-3103-1.

Return to footnote 8 referrer

Footnote 9

M. E DeWitt et al., "Global monkeypox case hospitalisation rates: A rapid systematic review and meta-analysis," EClinicalMedicine, vol. 54, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.eclinm.2022.101710.

Return to footnote 9 referrer

Footnote 10

L. Ponce et al., "Incubation Period and Serial Interval of Mpox in 2022 Global Outbreak Compared with Historical Estimates," Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 1173 - 1181, 2024, doi: 10.3201/eid3006.231095.

Return to footnote 10 referrer

Footnote 11

F. Muira et al., "Time scales of human mpox transmission in the Netherlands," Journal of Infectious Diseases, 2023, doi: 10.1093/infdis/jiad091.

Return to footnote 11 referrer

Footnote 12

J. P. Thornhill et al., "Monkeypox Virus Infection in Humans across 16 Countries - April-June 2022," (in eng), N Engl J Med, vol. 387, no. 8, pp. 679-691, Aug 25 2022, doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2207323.

Return to footnote 12 referrer

Footnote 13

Z. J. Madewell et al., "Serial Interval and Incubation Period Estimates of Monkeypox Virus Infection in 12 Jurisdictions, United States, May-August 2022," (in eng), Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 818-821, Apr 2023, doi: 10.3201/eid2904.221622.

Return to footnote 13 referrer

Footnote 14

P. Satapathy et al., "Potentially Asymptomatic Infection of Monkeypox Virus: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis," Vaccines (Basel), vol. 10, no. 12, 2022, doi: 10.3390/vaccines10122083.

Return to footnote 14 referrer

Footnote 15

E. Beer, M and V. Rao, B, "A Systematic Review of the Epidemiology of Human Monkeypox Outbreaks and Implications for Outbreak Strategy," PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, vol. 13, no. 10, p. e0007791, 2019.

Return to footnote 15 referrer

Footnote 16

C. N. Morgan et al., "Environmental Persistence of Monkeypox Virus on Surfaces in Household of Person with Travel-Associated Infection, Dallas, Texas, USA, 2021," Emerg Infect Dis, vol. 28, no. 10, pp. 1982-1989, 28 October 2022, doi: 10.3201/eid2810.221047.

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Footnote 17

S. Gould et al., "Air and surface sampling for monkeypox virus in a UK hospital: an observational study," (in eng), Lancet Microbe, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. e904-e911, Dec 2022, doi: 10.1016/s2666-5247(22)00257-9.

Return to footnote 17 referrer

Footnote 18

K. Marimuthu et al., "Viable mpox virus in the environment of a patient room," (in eng), Int J Infect Dis, vol. 131, pp. 40-45, Jun 2023, doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2023.03.016.

Return to footnote 18 referrer

Footnote 19

F. Li et al., "Stability of mpox virus on different commonly contacted surfaces," Journal of Medical Virology, vol. 95, no. 12, p. e29296, 06 December 2023, doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/jmv.29296.

Return to footnote 19 referrer

Footnote 20

M. P. Muller et al., "Environmental Testing of Surfaces in the Room of a Patient With Mpox," Clinical Infectious Diseases, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 179-181, January 6, 2023, doi: 10.1093/cid/ciac654.

Return to footnote 20 referrer

Footnote 21

J. A. Pfeiffer et al., "High-Contact Object and Surface Contamination in a Household of Persons with Monkeypox Virus Infection - Utah, June 2022," (in eng), MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, vol. 71, no. 34, pp. 1092-1094, Aug 26 2022, doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm7134e1.

Return to footnote 21 referrer

Footnote 22

D. Nörz et al., "Evidence of surface contamination in hospital rooms occupied by patients infected with monkeypox, Germany, June 2022," (in eng), Euro Surveill, vol. 27, no. 26, Jun 2022, doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.Es.2022.27.26.2200477.

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Footnote 23

A. M. Tutu van Furth et al., "Paediatric monkeypox patient with unknown source of infection, the Netherlands, June 2022," (in eng), Euro Surveill, vol. 27, no. 29, Jul 2022, doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.Es.2022.27.29.2200552.

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Footnote 24

R. S. Salvato et al., "Healthcare Workers Occupational Infection by Monkeypox Virus in Brazil," in Preprints, ed: Preprints, 2022.

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Footnote 25

A. Beeson et al., "Mpox respiratory transmission: the state of the evidence," The Lancet Microbe, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. e277-e283, 2023, doi: 10.1016/S2666-5247(23)00034-4.

Return to footnote 25 referrer

Footnote 26

Public Health Agency of Canada, "Reducing the Health Impact of Sexually Transmitted and Blood-Borne Infections in Canada by 2030: A Pan-Canadian STBBI Framework for Action," ed, 2018.

Return to footnote 26 referrer

Footnote 27

P. Álvarez-López et al., "Suspected case of monkeypox reinfection versus reactivation in a immunocompetent patient, Barcelona, 2022," International Journal of STD & AIDS, vol. 34, no. 9, pp. 649-652, 2022, doi: 10.1177/09564624231162426.

Return to footnote 27 referrer

Footnote 28

J. Golden et al., "Case of apparent mpox reinfection," Sex Transm Infect, vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 283-284, June 2023, doi: 10.1136/sextrans-2022-055736.

Return to footnote 28 referrer

Footnote 29

W. Jiang et al., "Breakthrough infection and reinfection in patients with mpox," Reviews in Medical Virology, vol. 34, no. 2, p. e2522, 13 February 2024, doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/rmv.2522.

Return to footnote 29 referrer

Footnote 30

S. Seang et al., "Evidence of human-to-dog transmission of monkeypox virus," (in eng), Lancet, vol. 400, no. 10353, pp. 658-659, Aug 27 2022, doi: 10.1016/s0140-6736(22)01487-8.

Return to footnote 30 referrer

Footnote 31

S. Essbauer, H. Meyer, M. Porsch-Ozcürümez, and M. Pfeffer, "Long-lasting stability of vaccinia virus (orthopoxvirus) in food and environmental samples," (in eng), Zoonoses Public Health, vol. 54, no. 3-4, pp. 118-24, 2007, doi: 10.1111/j.1863-2378.2007.01035.x.

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Footnote 32

F. v. Rheinbaben, J. Gebel, M. Exner, and A. Schmidt, "Environmental resistance, disinfection, and sterilization of poxviruses," in Poxviruses, A. A. Mercer, A. Schmidt, and O. Weber Eds. Basel: Birkhäuser Basel, 2007, pp. 397-405.

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Footnote 33

H. Rouhandeh, R. Engler, M. Taher, A. Fouad, and L. L. Sells, "Properties of monkey pox virus," (in eng), Arch Gesamte Virusforsch, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 363-73, 1967, doi: 10.1007/bf01241954.

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Footnote 34

R. W. Sidwell, G. J. Dixon, and E. McNeil, "Quantitative studies on fabrics as disseminators of viruses. I. Persistence of vaccinia virus on cotton and wool fabrics," (in eng), Appl Microbiol, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 55-9, Jan 1966, doi: 10.1128/am.14.1.55-59.1966.

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Footnote 35

R. W. Sidwell, G. J. Dixon, and E. McNeil, "Quantitative studies on fabrics as disseminators of viruses. 3. Persistence of vaccinia virus on fabrics impregnated with a virucidal agent," (in eng), Appl Microbiol, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 921-7, Jul 1967, doi: 10.1128/am.15.4.921-927.1967.

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Footnote 36

A. W. Downie, M. Meiklejohn, L. St Vincent, A. R. Rao, B. V. Sundara Babu, and C. H. Kempe, "The recovery of smallpox virus from patients and their environment in a smallpox hospital," (in eng), Bull World Health Organ, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 615-22, 1965.

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Footnote 37

B. Atkinson et al., "Infection-competent monkeypox virus contamination identified in domestic settings following an imported case of monkeypox into the UK," (in eng), Environ Microbiol, vol. 24, no. 10, pp. 4561-4569, Oct 2022, doi: 10.1111/1462-2920.16129.

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Footnote 38

I. Tanabe and S. Hotta, "Effect of disinfectants on variola virus in cell culture," (in eng), Appl Environ Microbiol, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 209-12, Aug 1976, doi: 10.1128/aem.32.2.209-212.1976.

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Footnote 39

W. K. Joklik, "The purification of four strains of poxvirus," Virology, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 9-18, 1962/09/01/ 1962, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0042-6822(62)90172-1.

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Footnote 40

G. Kampf, "Efficacy of biocidal agents and disinfectants against the monkeypox virus and other orthopoxviruses," (in eng), J Hosp Infect, vol. 127, pp. 101-110, Sep 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.jhin.2022.06.012.

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Footnote 41

G. Kampf, "Efficacy of heat against the vaccinia virus, variola virus and monkeypox virus," (in eng), J Hosp Infect, vol. 127, pp. 131-132, Sep 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.jhin.2022.06.008.

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Footnote 42

World Health Organization. "Mpox (monkeypox)." https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/monkeypox (accessed June, 2024).

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Footnote 43

A. Wieder-Feinsod et al., "Overlooked monkeypox cases among men having sex with men during the 2022 outbreak – a retrospective study," International Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 128, pp. 58-60, 2023/03/01/ 2023, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2022.12.014.

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Footnote 44

T. Ward, R. Christie, R. S. Paton, F. Cumming, and C. E. Overton, "Transmission dynamics of monkeypox in the United Kingdom: contact tracing study," (in eng), Bmj, vol. 379, p. e073153, Nov 2 2022, doi: 10.1136/bmj-2022-073153.

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Footnote 45

I. Brosius et al., "Presymptomatic viral shedding in high-risk mpox contacts: A prospective cohort study," (in eng), J Med Virol, vol. 95, no. 5, p. e28769, May 2023, doi: 10.1002/jmv.28769.

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Footnote 46

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Science brief : Detection and transmission of mpox (formerly monkeypox) virus during the 2022 clade IIb outbreak," (in eng), 2023. [Online]. Available: https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/124367.

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Footnote 47

World Health Organization, "Surveillance, case investigation and contact tracing for mpox (monkeypox): interim guidance, 22 December 2022," ed, 2022.

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Footnote 48

United Kingdom Public Health Agencies, "Principles for control of non-HCID mpox in the UK: 4 nations consensus statement," ed, 2023.

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Footnote 49

V. M. Ferré et al., "Detection of Monkeypox Virus in Anorectal Swabs From Asymptomatic Men Who Have Sex With Men in a Sexually Transmitted Infection Screening Program in Paris, France," (in eng), Ann Intern Med, vol. 175, no. 10, pp. 1491-1492, Oct 2022, doi: 10.7326/m22-2183.

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Footnote 50

N. Cassir et al., "Observational Cohort Study of Evolving Epidemiologic, Clinical, and Virologic Features of Monkeypox in Southern France," (in eng), Emerg Infect Dis, vol. 28, no. 12, pp. 2409-2415, Dec 2022, doi: 10.3201/eid2812.221440.

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Footnote 51

D. Moschese et al., "Isolation of viable monkeypox virus from anal and urethral swabs, Italy, May to July 2022," (in eng), Euro Surveill, vol. 27, no. 36, Sep 2022, doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.Es.2022.27.36.2200675.

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Footnote 52

I. De Baetselier et al., "Retrospective detection of asymptomatic monkeypox virus infections among male sexual health clinic attendees in Belgium," (in eng), Nat Med, vol. 28, no. 11, pp. 2288-2292, Nov 2022, doi: 10.1038/s41591-022-02004-w.

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Footnote 53

A. Reda et al., "Monkeypox viral detection in semen specimens of confirmed cases: A systematic review and meta-analysis," (in eng), J Med Virol, vol. 95, no. 1, p. e28250, Jan 2023, doi: 10.1002/jmv.28250.

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Footnote 54

N. Paran et al., "Monkeypox DNA levels correlate with virus infectivity in clinical samples, Israel, 2022," (in eng), Euro Surveill, vol. 27, no. 35, Sep 2022, doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.Es.2022.27.35.2200636.

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Footnote 55

D. Lapa et al., "Monkeypox virus isolation from a semen sample collected in the early phase of infection in a patient with prolonged seminal viral shedding," (in eng), Lancet Infect Dis, vol. 22, no. 9, pp. 1267-1269, Sep 2022, doi: 10.1016/s1473-3099(22)00513-8.

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Footnote 56

C. Suñer et al., "Viral dynamics in patients with monkeypox infection: a prospective cohort study in Spain," (in eng), Lancet Infect Dis, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 445-453, Apr 2023, doi: 10.1016/s1473-3099(22)00794-0.

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Footnote 57

A. Ma, J. Langer, K. E. Hanson, and B. T. Bradley, "Characterization of the Cytopathic Effects of Monkeypox Virus Isolated from Clinical Specimens and Differentiation from Common Viral Exanthems," (in eng), J Clin Microbiol, vol. 60, no. 12, p. e0133622, Dec 21 2022, doi: 10.1128/jcm.01336-22.

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Footnote 58

D. Hornuss et al., "Transmission characteristics, replication patterns and clinical manifestations of human monkeypox virus-an in-depth analysis of four cases from Germany," (in eng), Clin Microbiol Infect, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 112.e5-112.e9, Jan 2023, doi: 10.1016/j.cmi.2022.09.012.

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