Domestic and Continental Security

On this page

• Continental Defence and NORAD Modernization
• Infrastructure and Procurement in the North
• CAF Footprint in the North
• Canadian Rangers
• Impact of Climate Change on CAF Ops
• Artificial Intelligence

Continental Defence and NORAD Modernization

(Includes lines on Over the Horizon Radar)

Key Facts

Details

NORAD Modernization Initiatives

• Work is currently ongoing to advance the following NORAD Modernization initiatives:

Arctic and Polar Over the Horizon Radar

The Arctic and Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar systems will provide early warning radar coverage and threat tracking from the Canada-United States border to the Arctic circle and beyond the northernmost approaches to North America, including the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

RCAF Air Weapons Control Overage Expansion (RACE)

RACE will replace and expand digital radio coverage to continue to provide Air Traffic Service Ground-Air-Ground communication for operators at both NAV CANADA control centres and as a priority service to the Canadian Air Defence Sectors.

Defence Enhanced Surveillance from Space Project (DESSP)

DESSP will strengthen the Canadian Armed Forces’ space-based surveillance capabilities, including of Canadian territory and maritime approaches, by investing additional funds to complete and augment the new state-of-the-art, space-based surveillance project announced in Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged.

Enhanced Satellite Communications Project – Polar (ESCP-P)

This initiative will enhance satellite communications in the Arctic through additional funding to complete and augment the polar communications project announced in SSE.

Future Combined Aerospace Operations Centre Capability

Modernization of the Canadian Combined Air Operations Centre to deliver an advanced, defended airpower Command and Control (C2) system. C2 will consist of personnel, process and equipment to plan, direct, monitor, control and coordinate domestic, continental and global operations 24/7/365.

Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile

New, advanced air-to-air missiles to ensure Canada’s fighter aircraft maintain the ability to engage threats from long ranges.

Advanced Short-Range Missile and Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile

New, advanced air-to-air missiles to ensure Canada’s fighter aircraft maintain the ability to engage threats from short and medium ranges.

Operational Training Infrastructure Enterprise Modernization

Modernization of the Canadian Armed Forces’ air operational training infrastructure.

Funding for NORAD Modernization

• NORAD modernization is a long-term project and the investments announced by the Minister of National Defence in June 2022 will support NORAD and the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) ability to protect Canadians against new and emerging aerospace threats to Canada and North America more broadly.
• Specific investments will include, among other initiatives, new Over the Horizon radar systems; command, control, and communications upgrades; additional air-to-air refueling aircraft; advanced air-to-air missiles for fighter jets; upgrades to CAF infrastructure in the North; and additional funding to complete and augment key space projects. Investments are broken down into 5 inter-related areas:
  1. Bolstering our ability to detect threats earlier and more precisely by modernizing our surveillance systems ($6.96B from fiscal year 22/23 - 41/42)
  2. Improving our ability to understand and communicate threats to decision-makers in a timely manner through upgrades to our command, control, and communications systems ($4.13B from fiscal year 22/23 - 41/42)
  3. Strengthening our ability to deter and defeat aerospace threats by modernizing our air weapons systems ($6.38B from fiscal year 22/23 - 41/42)
  4. Ensuring our Canadian Armed Forces can launch and sustain a strong military presence across the country, including in Canada’s North, through investments in new infrastructure and support capabilities ($15.68B from fiscal year 22/23 - 41/42)
  5. Future-proofing our capabilities to defend North America through investments in science and technology ($4.23B from fiscal year 22/23 - 41/42)

Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR)

• National Defence is currently assessing possible locations for Arctic OTHR sites in southern Ontario, including on and off Department of National Defence (DND) lands. As part of this work, we are reaching out to private landowners, Indigenous communities, other federal government departments, the Province of Ontario and local municipalities to determine their interest in selling land to DND for this project.
• We expect to have a decision on the final location of the Arctic-OTHR sites by spring 2024.
• Canadian OTHR initiatives will be fully integrated with U.S. OTHR initiatives to provide comprehensive surveillance of North American airspace.

Additional Canadian Contributions to NORAD

• Canada is responsible for maintaining and operating the Canadian portion of the North Warning System, a chain of radar stations stretching from Alaska to Labrador.
• 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD): Canadian NORAD Region headquarters in Winnipeg, Manitoba, provides operational command and control of assigned assets while the Canadian Air Defence Sector located in North Bay, Ontario provides tactical command and control of assigned assets for the Canadian NORAD Region.

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Infrastructure and Procurement in the North

Including SECD Report

Key Facts

Details

Committee Study: Arctic Security Under Threat – Urgent Needs in a Changing Geopolitical and Environmental Landscape

• From March 2022 to April 2023, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs conducted a study of issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic, including Canada’s military infrastructure and security capabilities.
• The Committee tabled its report on June 28, 2023, and a Government Response is due by July 25, 2024. The Committee produced 23 recommendations, including considerations for the Defence Policy Update (see annex)

National Defence Initiatives to Enhance the CAF’s Ability to Operate in the North

• Participating in space-based global Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities through its contributions to the Medium Earth Orbit SAR system. National Defence is also building two SAR ground terminals in Canada and is providing SAR repeaters on a satellite system, greatly increasing the range in which emergency beacons can be detected.
• Enhancing Canada’s surveillance of northern approaches and northern presence through investments in Arctic and Polar-Over-the-Horizon Radar, space-based surveillance and communications capabilities, improvements to northern basing, and support capabilities that will extend the reach of the CAF as part of NORAD modernization.
• Throughout such initiatives and projects, National Defence is committed to engaging with Indigenous, provincial, and territorial partners to leverage their knowledge and expertise and to deliver on legal obligations and policy commitments.

Nanisivik Naval Facility

• In 2007, the Government announced its plan to convert the deep-water port at Nanisivik to a logistics hub, which will operate as a docking and refueling facility for the Royal Canadian Navy and other government vessels and serve to enhance the Navy’s presence in the North.
  • The construction of the Nanisivik Naval Facility in Nunavut is nearing completion. The primary role of the facility will be to refuel the Royal Canadian Navy’s Arctic and Offshore Patrol ships during the navigable season, while also continuing to provide the Canadian Coast Guard with refueling support and storage capacity for re-supply missions.
• The Auditor General’s report on Arctic Waters Surveillance noted that the Nanisivik Naval Facility (NNF) would not be equipped with heated fuel tanks, limiting its period of operation to approximately 4 weeks per year. The 2023 NDDN report “A Secure and Sovereign Arctic” recommended that the Government of Canada prolong the facility’s operating season.
  • As an Arctic facility, the operational year is usually from early August to as late as October, depending on ice-coverage and temperatures. As long as the waters are navigable and the facility is accessible, the site will be open to ships. There are a number of factors which contribute to the length of the facilities’ operating season.
  • The RCN have agreed with the Government of Nunavut to not break ice near the facility in order to protect community access to frozen waters and protect wildlife, therefore access is restricted to the RCN’s operational season, which is typically between four and six weeks.
  • As well, the NNF requires fuel to be shipped in at the start of the season and removed at the end of the season. The fuel barge cannot typically access NNF until early August because of ice coverage. Depending on the temperatures in late September, fuel may start to thicken as the fuel tanks and lines are not heated, limiting the Navy’s ability to use the fuel. At that point the fuel must be removed from the tanks.

Annex: SECD Recommendations

Recommendation 1
That the Government of Canada include, in the next defence policy, a section on Arctic security and defence. Recognizing that the international security environment is deteriorating, this section should outline how Arctic security and defence issues have evolved since the previous defence policy was released in 2017. As well, it should identify the Government’s plans to address – on an expeditious basis – threats to Canada, including to the Arctic, as well as new threats that could enter North America through the Arctic.

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Recommendation 2
That the Government of Canada provide an annual update about Canada’s Arctic-related security and defence priorities and plans. Such updates should be provided to relevant stakeholders, including the premiers of Canada’s provinces and territories, as well as the leaders of local Indigenous organizations and governments. When providing these updates, the Government should ensure that discussions with stakeholders relating to Arctic security and defence are both open and honest.

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Recommendation 3
That the Government of Canada continue to work with the Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States to identify ways to strengthen cooperation regarding Arctic security and defence issues.

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Recommendation 4
That the Government of Canada, in the next defence policy, outline Canada’s approach to deterring adversaries in the Arctic, including during the expected “gap period” between when adversaries could deploy new weapons systems and when the North American Aerospace Defense Command will have the technology to detect them.

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Recommendation 5
That the Government of Canada, during the development of the next defence policy, examine whether changes to Canada’s policy on ballistic missile defence are required.

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Recommendation 6
That the Government of Canada use existing or new institutionalized mechanisms to partner with Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, including to obtain their views about security and defence in the region. These partnerships should be undertaken in accordance with the Indigenous rights outlined in modern treaties as they relate to the use and management of land and resources.

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Recommendation 7
That the Government of Canada, through the National Search and Rescue Secretariat, establish – by 31 March 2024 – a permanent Arctic search and rescue roundtable. This roundtable should comprise representatives of federal, territorial and Indigenous governments, and of community-based organizations and government entities involved in search and rescue, including the Canadian Rangers. Its goals should include the development of a comprehensive Arctic search and rescue strategy.

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Recommendation 8
That the Government of Canada ensure that standards relating to the cruise ship sector in the Canadian Arctic complement management plans developed by Indigenous governments and organizations, and that such standards respect Indigenous lands, waters and people. As well, the Government should strengthen cooperation with Indigenous governments and organizations on issues pertaining to that sector in the Arctic, including in relation to vessel management and marine environmental protection.

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Recommendation 9
That the Government of Canada, in the absence of designated cruise ship border clearance facilities in the Arctic, review options for processing travelers entering Canada in the Arctic. Alongside the existing practice of dispatching border services officers to the port of arrival, the options reviewed should include the use of telecommunications. The Government should publish the results of this review by 31 December 2024.

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Recommendation 10
That the Government of Canada work with territorial, local and Indigenous governments and treaty rights holders to develop a framework and associated mechanisms that would result in a better understanding of the environmental impacts in the Arctic of current and planned activities pertaining to security and defence. This framework should outline measures to mitigate the impacts of permafrost thaw on infrastructure, regarding which consideration should be given to locating new security and defence infrastructure in areas less vulnerable to permafrost thaw. The Government should publish this framework by 30 June 2024.

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Recommendation 11
That the Government of Canada expeditiously implement Recommendations 16 to 20 in the June 2019 Special Senate Committee on the Arctic’s report entitled Northern Lights: A Wake-Up Call for the Future of Canada. By 31 March 2024, the Government should provide the Senate with information about actions taken to address these Recommendations, which a focus on science, Indigenous knowledge and environmental conservation.

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Recommendation 12
That the Government of Canada evaluate whether changes to the size, locations or nature of the Canadian Armed Forces’ presence in the Canadian Arctic are required. The Government should publish the results of this evaluation by 30 September 2024.

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Recommendation 13
That the Government of Canada conduct a thorough assessment of the Canadian Armed Forces’ infrastructure north of the 60^th parallel and its infrastructure in southern Canada that support Arctic operations. The goal of the assessment should be to identify infrastructure that requires immediate repairs and upgrades. The Government should publicly release the results of this assessment by 30 June 2025.

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Recommendation 14
That the Government of Canada expeditiously address challenges that are negatively affecting the recruitment and retention of Canadian Rangers. As part of these efforts, the Government should both ensure that the Canadian Rangers have adequate access to equipment and make necessary changes to their compensation.

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Recommendation 15
That the Government of Canada publish, by 30 June 2024, an update concerning the status of the Canadian Ranger enhancement program.

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Recommendation 16
That the Government of Canada develop a plan to support the well-being of members of the security and defence forces stationed in the Arctic, including the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Government should publish this plan by 31 March 2025.

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Recommendation 17
That the Government of Canada provide Parliament with ongoing updates about the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. These updates, which should occur at least annually, should include information about potential delays or difficulties in delivering related procurement projects on time and on budget, and about how challenges are being addressed.

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Recommendation 18
That the Government of Canada consider whether the two Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships procured for the Canadian Coast Guard should carry armaments in order to improve the protection of Canadian sovereignty, as well as secure the country’s Arctic coasts and waters.

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Recommendation 19
That the Government of Canada include, in its next defence policy, a section on underwater domain awareness and underwater threats. This section should outline a plan for expeditiously replacing Canada’s existing submarines with submarines that could operate better in the Arctic.

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Recommendation 20
That the Government of Canada make efforts to join the trilateral security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, known as AUKUS. In doing so, the Government should communicate the ways in which Canada could contribute to intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing.

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Recommendation 21
That the Government of Canada develop a plan for improving broadband Internet connectivity in the Arctic to meet both military and civilian needs. The options considered in developing the plan should include the use of satellites and fibre optic cables. By 30 June 2024, the Government should publish information about the amount of funds required to implement the plan, and the plan’s associated timelines.

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Recommendation 22
That the Government of Canada consider, for all infrastructure projects relating to the security and defence of the Canadian Arctic, the extent to which multi-purpose infrastructure would be appropriate.

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Recommendation 23
That the Government of Canada identify, for each ongoing and proposed security and defence project in the Arctic, the likely social and economic benefits for Arctic communities that would result. If such projects are unlikely to have such benefits, the Government should indicate other federal funding sources to meet the most urgent social and economic needs in the Arctic.

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CAF Footprint in the North

^* For additional information on NORAD Modernization.

^* For additional information on the Canadian Rangers.

Key Facts

Details

Operation NANOOK

• Op NANOOK is the Canadian Armed Forces’ signature northern operation with three strategic objectives:
  • First, to enhance and expand the CAF’s capabilities, footprint, and readiness.
  • Second, to preserve and safeguard Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.
  • Third, to develop interagency, intergovernmental, Indigenous, and multinational partnerships and interoperability.
• It is comprised of four comprehensive annual activities designed to exercise the defence of Canada and to secure our northern regions. These exercises take place from early Spring to late Summer, demonstrating the CAF’s presence and exercising Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

Operation NANOOK 2023

• Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT 2023. March 1 to 20, 2023. More than 200 CAF personnel worked together with armed forces members from Norway, Belgium, France, and the UK to conduct activities including joint long-range patrols, complex logistical support, and under-ice diving.
• Operation NANOOK-TUUGAALIK 2023. August 8 to September 29, 2023. A maritime exercise intended to build capability in the Arctic and interoperability with allies. In 2023, the U.S., Denmark, and France participated in the operation, including for the first time, a U.S. Navy submarine, the USS San Juan.
• Operation NANOOK-NUNAKPUT 2023. August 25 to September 9, 2023. A series of presence and surveillance activities in the Northwest Passage.
• Operation NANOOK-TATIGIIT 2023. October 24 to 28, 2023. Whole-of-Government emergency and disaster response exercise, planned and executed with territorial, federal, Indigenous, and community partners. This exercise took place in Whitehorse and this year’s iteration focused on an ice storm scenario.

International Cooperation

• National Defence is deepening strategic-level collaboration with like-minded Arctic Allies and partners.
• For example, Norway and Canada have signed a Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, which aims to enhance defence cooperation between our two countries, including in strategic surveillance and situational awareness in the Arctic.
• The Prime Minister also attended an annual meeting with Nordic Prime Ministers in Iceland on June 25-26, 2023, to strengthen ties with Nordic nations and address key mutual priorities, including Arctic security.
• The Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff (A-CHOD) is an annual Chiefs of Defence meeting to promote and support a secure and peaceful Arctic region through discussion of security-related topics, allowing the mutual exchange of information, advancing opportunities for collaboration and cooperation, and building common understanding and trust through transparent dialogue.
  • Participation in the A-CHOD forum is open to Arctic states that are committed to upholding the rules-based international order. In September 2023, the Chief of the Defence Staff attended the annual meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence in Oslo.
• Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) is an annual event co-chaired by Norway and the United States through USEUCOM, to promote regional understanding, dialogue, and cooperation among Arctic Security Forces, and enhance multilateral Arctic security and safety operations.
  • ASFR includes representatives from the seven like-minded Arctic states, as well as France, Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands as observers. The last in-person meeting took place in Turku, Finland in April 2023, with Commander Joint Task Force North attending as Canada’s senior representative.
• Defence Research and Development Canada is an active participant in the International Cooperative Program for Polar Research (ICE-PPR) with several Arctic nations, excluding the Russian Federation, to advance National Defence’s scientific knowledge of the evolving Arctic environment (e.g., sea ice, temperature, salinity, ambient noise levels) and to ensure continued effectiveness in defence capabilities, systems and platforms, and their adaptation for future Canadian Armed Forces operations.

Cooperation with the United States in the Arctic

• JOINT PACIFIC MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER (JPMRC) is a U.S. Army exercise in Alaska that focuses on training in extreme cold weather environment and Northern conditions. JPMRC 24-2 occurred in Alaska in February 2024 and included Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force participation, enhancing cooperation between Alaskan units and our forces.
• Exercise ARCTIC EAGLE-PATRIOT is a regularly scheduled exercise that involves the response to a natural disaster with small task Arctic warfare events and last ran from February 23 to March 2, 2022, in Alaska. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) exercised Light Urban Search and Rescue capabilities and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence capabilities during this exercise.
• ICE CAMP (formerly ICEX) is a submarine under/through the ice operation, which took place this year in March 2024 in Alaska. The Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy worked with the U.S. Navy with the construction of a temporary ice camp by providing CC-138 Twin Otter support for the transportation of supplies and personnel into and out of austere locations on sea ice.
• Operation NOBLE DEFENDER is a recurring NORAD defensive operation that takes place throughout the year and has been ongoing since 2019. The latest iteration of Operation NOBLE DEFENDER took place from August 15 to September 10, 2023, in Alaska. In addition to NORAD’s fighter aircraft and other air assets, - last year’s operation included wider participation of Canadian and American military personnel.
• Exercise ARCTIC EDGE (EX AE) is a biennial exercise to demonstrate and refine joint Can-U.S. interoperability during Arctic Warfare Operations in a severely degraded Arctic environment. The CAF and Defence Research and Development Canada last participated in this exercise between February 28 and March 17, 2022. Planning is on going for Canada’s participation in the next serial from February 26 to March 8, 2024.

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Canadian Rangers

Key Facts

Details

• Canadian Rangers are currently considered trained upon enrolment. They receive no mandatory individual training. They also do not need to meet the CAF’s physical fitness standards.
• Canadian Rangers provide a range of support and services, including:
  • support to sovereignty operations;
  • assistance to domestic operations (including through Op LENTUS);
  • maintain a CAF presence in their local communities;
  • instruct, mentor and supervise the Junior Canadian Rangers, and
  • participate in and support events in their local communities.

Canadian Ranger Training

There are two optional Individual Training courses offered to the Canadian Rangers:

• Canadian Ranger Basic Military Indoctrination training that lasts 7 days and includes:
  • General Canadian Ranger service knowledge, CAF benefits, and administrative requirements;
  • Function as a patrol member and how to fire the Canadian Ranger service rifle, and;
  • Employ field craft and first aid.
• Canadian Ranger Patrol Leaders Course that lasts 8 days:
  • Leading a patrol and conducting patrol administration and small arms ranges.
• Common training for all Canadian Rangers include:
  • Safe handling and shooting of the C19 rifle;
  • Map reading and navigation;
  • First aid;
  • Communication;
  • Survival and fieldcraft; and
  • Small party tasks, including sovereignty patrols, support to a conventional force, and Ground Search and Rescue.

Employment

• The Canadian Rangers employed for force generation are funded by the Canadian Army for part-time, basic, individual, and collective training activities, such as:
  • Basic and routine local training
  • Individual Training and unmentored patrol activity
  • Collective patrol training
  • Compensated (Paid) on average 12 days per year

Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) Program

• The JCR program is a youth program. Under the Mentorship of the Canadian Rangers, the program provides young Canadians (ages 12 to 18) with Life Skills, Ranger Skills and Traditional Skills based on the culture and history of their local communities.

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Impact of Climate Change on CAF Ops

(Includes lines on Op LENTUS and on the Defence Climate and Sustainability Strategy)

Key Facts

Details

Operation LENTUS

• As per the Federal Emergency Response Plan, the CAF provides assistance when a province or territory requests federal support to deal with an emergency.
• Operation LENTUS is the CAF's response to natural disasters in Canada. This operation follows an established plan of action to support communities in crisis. This plan can be adapted to multiple situations. These might take the form of forest fires, floods, ice storms, or hurricanes.
• Canadian Armed Forces assistance complements and enhances provincial, territorial, and local resources with unique capabilities, including military personnel and equipment.
  • Based on the request for assistance, the CAF determines how many people to send, and what kinds of assets to send with them. In recent years, this has been anywhere from 15 to 2,600 members.
• The objectives of Operation LENTUS are:
  • To help provincial and territorial authorities;
  • To respond quickly and effectively to the crisis; and
  • To stabilize zones impacted by natural disasters
• Tasks performed under Operation LENTUS depend on the type of natural disaster; however, work commonly includes:
  • Filling, distributing, and placing sandbags.
  • Type III wildland firefighting.
  • Evacuating and transporting people.
  • Delivering aid to and checking-in on remote communities
  • Assessing infrastructure.
  • Distribute information to the public.
  • Planning and Operations Center functions.

2023 Deployments

• Over the course of 2023, Operation LENTUS spanned 131 consecutive days across 6 provinces/territories and involved the deployment of 2,135 members.
• The CAF provided evacuation support to communities in Ontario, Quebec, and the Northwest Territories.

Real Property (RP) Resiliency

• Detailed risk assessments of critical infrastructure will identify changes such as surface water levels, rainfall, wind. This will inform decisions about impacted buildings and infrastructure, Master Real Property Plans and major and minor capital projects.
• Defence has committed to assessing 20% of critical real property assets by 2027. Bases and wings identified as having a higher climate vulnerability will be prioritized for a detailed risk assessment. These risk assessments will identify changes, such as surface water levels, rainfall, and wind, and delineate which infrastructure is at risk.

DND/CAF Climate Resilience and Environmental Sustainability Science & Technology (CRESST) Strategy

• The CRESST is a departmental strategy publicly announced on November 6. 2023. The CRESST identifies ways in which science and technology efforts can help mitigate National Defence environmental impacts, while becoming more sustainable and climate resilient.
• Encompassing a long-term perspective, the CRESST provides a guide towards opportunities for collaborative partnerships, knowledge exchange, and targeted defence research within three strategic objectives set in the context of defence and security:
  1. Conduct research to enable climate change mitigation and environmental sustainability;
  2. Assess challenges, risks, and opportunities with the environment and climate change; and
  3. Conduct research to support climate change adaptation and resilience.
• The CRESST will also enable National Defence to leverage S&T efforts in contributing to departmental and Government of Canada climate change and sustainability targets and commitments – like those outlined in the DCSS.
• The DCSS and the CRESST demonstrate DND’s ongoing commitment to increase sustainability and resilience across our activities and operations. The DCSS will act as our guide, charting our way forward for the next four years, supported by the ongoing knowledge and relationships driven forward developed by the CRESST.

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Artificial Intelligence

Key Facts

Details

DND/CAF AI Strategy

• AI usage under the AI Strategy will prioritize sharing a common operating picture with AI-enabled allies to retain Canada’s credibility and relevance as a fighting force.
• The DND/CAF AI Strategy indicates that any AI or AI-Enabled technology will adhere to applicable Canadian and international laws on the use of AI and incorporate existing DND/CAF commitments to GBA Plus.
• AI usage will also adhere to DND/CAF instruments such as the targeting cycle, rules of engagement, and security and information management policies and guidelines.
• Future partnerships with industry, academia, and allies are a priority of the AI Strategy, including through Five Eyes, the Technical Cooperation Program, NATO, and the Pan-Canadian AI Strategy.

Oversight of DND/CAF AI Usage

• The DND/CAF AI Strategy indicates that AI utilization will adhere to Canadian and international law, applicable regulation, and Government of Canada policies such as the:
  • Voluntary Code of Conduct on the Responsible Development and Management of Advanced Generative AI Systems,
  • Guide on the use of Generative AI, and
  • Directive on Automated Decision-Making.
• AI adoption will also include DND/CAF commitments to integrate GBA Plus into operations, policies, and programs, risk management.
• DND/CAF will also respond to guidance from external review bodies such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC).

Cyber Threats and AI

• There are important cyber security and privacy considerations associated with many online platforms and applications, including AI tools. As part of its mandate, CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security monitors cyber security threats, including the potential risks of AI.
• AI can be used for problem-solving, learning, language processing, social media and data analytics, and AI tools can help with search optimization, logic, and deep learning. Although these fields and tools are all distinct, machine learning applications have unique vulnerabilities compared to traditional programming and these can be exploited by cyber threat actors, adding to the threat surface of the organizations that employ them.
• Threat actors could potentially leverage AI tools to develop malicious tools for nefarious purposes. This could include using these tools to craft authentic-looking phishing emails. This is why it remains important for Canadians and Canadian organizations to be aware of all cyber threats, including ransomware, phishing, and fraudulent online activities.

Allies’ AI Strategies

• Allies have recently published their own AI strategies, including the U.S. in November 2023, the UK in June 2022 and NATO in October 2021. Australia has also established a Defence AI Centre in 2018.
• Allies have broadly focused on establishing digital architectures that can support AI integration, while also maintaining human control over AI-enabled technologies.

International Collaboration

• Canada endorsed the U.S. Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy in November 2023. The Declaration aims to develop non-legally binding guidelines describing principles and best practices for the responsible use of AI in a military context. This includes a regular dialogue amongst endorsing states hosted by the US to exchange best practices.
• As part of follow on work, in March 2024 DND/CAF agreed to co-chair with Portugal three lines of effort within the Political Declaration Accountability Working Group which will examine policies and practices to enable and promote responsibility and accountability of personnel involved in or overseeing development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities.

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