Key Issues Notes

Recommendation 1: Schedule Management Weaknesses [National Defence lead]

  • National Defence agrees with the Auditor General’s finding that we need to generate and maintain accurate and reliable shipyard schedules.
  • Transparency and accountability are essential in ensuring that these projects meet the needs of the Royal Canadian Navy and support the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).
  • That is why we committed through our Management Action Plan to work with other government departments – and directly with shipyards – to improve schedule management.
  • We are currently working with shipyards to gather improved data and performance metrics, so that industry and Government have a collective understanding of shipyard programmatic challenges.
  • This information, produced primarily by shipyards, will help us to anticipate and address problems before they arise, keeping schedules more on track.
  • We are also implementing a more disciplined reporting process so that industry and the Project Management Office are routinely presenting updates to the NSS Governance Committee.
  • Together, these initiatives will improve how we track and assess the progress towards the forecasted delivery schedule, supporting better decision-making and ensuring value for taxpayers.

Key Facts

  • Canadian Surface Combatant: $56-60B
    • First expected delivery: early 2030s [cutting steel on the first ship in 2023/2024]
    • Last expected delivery: late 2040s
  • Joint Support Ship: $4.1B
    • First expected delivery: 2023 (schedule under review as a result of cumulative COVID impacts)
    • Second expected delivery: 2025
  • Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships: $4.3B
    • First delivery: July 31, 2020
    • Last expected delivery for RCN: 2025
  • Naval large tugs: $121.12M
    • The National Shipbuilding Strategy has directly benefited Canadians by contributing over $17 billion to the economy since 2012.
    • Shipbuilding contracts will also have created or maintained over 15,500 Canadian jobs annually between 2012 and 2022.

Auditor General Report – Recommendation 1

Key Findings

  • Persistent shipbuilding delays: The federal fleet renewal experienced many delays in design and construction; federal fleet was not being renewed in a timely manner.
  • Schedule management weaknesses: While the government identified unreliable schedules as a risk for several projects, its efforts to address this risk were not always effective.
  • Fleet renewal: Government decisions during the audit period improved the prospects for timely renewal and put the NSS on a more viable path, but there is little room for further delay.

Recommendation 1 (DND, PSPC, DFO):

  • Obtain complete, current, and reliable schedules to support shipbuilding projects; and
  • Ensure that progress toward forecast targets and delivery timelines is monitored to enable timely decision making.

Details

OAG Report on National Shipbuilding Strategy – Corrective Measures Taken:

  • The OAG Report highlighted a number of corrective actions and key decisions made, which have placed the NSS on a more viable path:
    • The Government reviewed Seaspan’s corrective action plan developed in response to a 2018 expert third party assessment on the shipyard’s capacity and target state for the production of non-combat ships. This review allowed the NSS team to identify risks to attaining target state objectives. A similar assessment is underway for Irving.
    • A number of decisions were made to address risks, following considerable analysis, discussions with third parties, and interdepartmental collaboration. This has resulted in new delivery schedules based on more realistic assumptions. For example:
      • Measures, such as a longer construction period for the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS), have been established in order to maintain shipyard activity and workforce skills.
      • The construction schedule at Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards has been reordered to better match work capacity within the yard.
      • PSPC has launched a competition for a third shipyard to help meet workload requirements.
  • Measures were also taken to help ensure continued operations until new ships are delivered.

National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS)

  • On June 3, 2010, the Government announced Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (renamed the National Shipbuilding Strategy in March 2016).
  • In 2011, the Government selected Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards and Irving Shipbuilding Halifax Shipyard for the construction of large ships.
  • In February 2012, the Government of Canada signed long-term agreements, referred to as umbrella agreements, with the selected shipyards.
  • The National Shipbuilding Strategy Combat Package, which includes the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants (replacements for the frigates and retired destroyers), will be built by Irving Shipbuilding.
  • The Package also includes the Joint Support Ships for the Royal Canadian Navy, science research vessels, and Multi-Purpose Vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard to be built by Vancouver Shipyards.
  • In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been sustained media and Parliamentary interest in the potential for delays to the timelines for major shipbuilding projects under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.
  • During this time, we are working in close collaboration with our industry partners to keep our respective workforces safe, while still making progress on these important naval projects.

Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC)

  • National Defence is procuring 15 new Canadian Surface Combatant ships for the Royal Canadian Navy.
  • These ships will be able to deliver decisive combat power at sea and help Canada meet the naval challenges of the future. 
  • This project will help revitalize the Canadian shipbuilding industry, sustaining and creating thousands of high-skill jobs.
  • National Defence looks forward to cutting steel on the first ship in 2023/2024, with first delivery in the early 2030s.
  • Until the time of delivery, the Halifax-class frigates will remain operational, ensuring no capability gap.
  • National Defence will continue to carefully monitor timelines and work closely with industry to ensure the best value is provided to Canadians throughout the duration of this project.

If pressed on CSC project delays:

  • Building a new class of ships is complex, and project timelines evolve as engineering and production schedules are developed during the design phase.
  • As a result of work to adapt the design to Canadian requirements, industry has proposed revised project timelines.
  • The design phase is now expected to take four to five years, with construction beginning in 2023/2024.
  • Delivery of the first ship is now expected in the early 2030s, approximately 2-3 years later than previous estimates.  
  • In the meantime, National Defence will work with its partners to ensure the Navy has the fleet capacity required to support operations until the transition to its future fleet is complete.

Key Facts

  • National Defence Budget Estimate
    • $56-60 billion (without taxes)
  • Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) Estimate
    • 2021 PBO-CSC Report: $77.3 billion (with taxes) [up from $69.8 billion (with taxes) in 2019]
  • While the PBO cost model emphasizes weight, timelines, and taxes, National Defence’s model is based on actual known prices for equipment required to build the ships.
  • Delivery schedule
    • First ship delivery: early 2030s [cutting steel on the first ship in 2023/2024]
    • Last ship delivery: late 2040s

Auditor General Report – Recommendation 1

Key Findings

  • Schedule management weaknesses: Government efforts to address the risk of unreliable schedules not always effective.
    • OAG comments on CSC: it took more than 6 months after the start of the design phase for the Government to obtain a design schedule that could accurately track progress.
  • Persistent shipbuilding delays: The federal fleet renewal experienced many delays in design and construction; federal fleet was not being renewed in a timely manner.
  • Capabilities gap: National Defence and the Canadian Coast Guard implemented measures to maintain their operational capabilities until replacement ships are delivered, however there was little room for further delay.

Recommendation 1 (DND, PSPC, DFO):

  • Obtain complete, current, and reliable schedules to support shipbuilding projects; and
  • Ensure that progress toward forecast targets and delivery timelines is monitored to enable timely decision making.

Details

Canadian Surface Combatant Project

  • Canada’s new class of warship – the Canadian Surface Combatant – will replace and update the capabilities found in both the retired Iroquois-class destroyers and the Halifax-class frigates. This single class of ship will be capable of meeting multiple threats on the open ocean and the coastal environment.
  • The new warships will be able to conduct a broad range of tasks, including:
    • Delivering decisive combat power at sea, either independently or as part of a Canadian or international task group;
    • Supporting Canadian Armed Forces, and Canada’s allies ashore;
    • Conducting counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, interdiction and embargo operations for medium intensity operations; and,
    • Delivering humanitarian aid, search and rescue, and law and sovereignty enforcement for regional engagements.
  • In February 2019, Canada selected a design for the CSC that is based on the Type 26 frigate, adapted to meet the operational requirements of the Royal Canadian Navy, and Canada Canada’s prime contractor, Irving Shipbuilding, contracted Lockheed Martin Canada to provide the design and design team.
  • Canada is now working with Irving Shipbuilding, Lockheed Martin Canada, and their subcontractors to evolve the selected ship design and systems integration in preparation for build.
  • Early in 2019, Alion and Navantia, the two non-selected bidders on the Canadian Surface Combatant Request for Proposals filed for judicial reviews asking the Federal Court to set aside the decision that Lockheed Martin Canada was the selected bidder. In November 2019, Alion discontinued its applications for judicial review. The Department of Justice has carriage of the ongoing matters, which should not be publicly discussed as they are before the courts.

Joint Support Ships (JSS)

  • Canada’s Joint Support Ships (JSS) will provide crucial at sea replenishment capabilities to our naval fleet.
  • These ships will have military standard capabilities allowing the Navy to carry out sustainment activities in high-threat environments.
  • National Defence looks forward to the delivery of the first Joint Support Ship to the Royal Canadian Navy in 2023.
  • The government and Canadian industry continue to apply lessons learned and monitor progress of the ship build closely.
  • We will continue to work with government partners and industry to ensure the RCN has the fleet capacity it requires to accomplish its important missions.

If pressed on the MV Asterix:

  • The Asterix is an interim solution while the Joint Support Ships are built.
  • While it is not a long-term solution, it ensures that Royal Canadian Navy effectiveness and readiness is not compromised.

Key Facts

  • National Defence Budget Estimate
    • $4.1 billion (without tax)
    • $3.1B will be used to purchase the ships and initial spares;
    • $1.0B for supporting costs.
  • Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) Estimate
    • $4.1 billion (with taxes)
  • As the PBO Report notes, National Defence’s cost estimates are in line with the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s independent cost estimates.
  • Delivery schedule
    • First expected delivery: 2023 (schedule under review as a result of cumulative COVID impacts)
    • Second expected delivery: 2025
    • The government, through an agreement with the shipyard, made the joint decision to start the full construction of the first JSS ahead of the Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel.
  • Economic Benefits:
    • 3,900 jobs will be supported annually from 2020 to 2026.
  • Capabilities:
    • Equipped with systems to detect and protect against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
    • Full range of features and systems that enhance their survivability and allow them to fully integrate with other warships

Auditor General Report – Recommendation 1

Key Findings

  • Schedule management weaknesses: Government efforts to address the risk of unreliable schedules not always effective.
  • Steps to help sustain operations: Decisions will need to be made to sustain naval operations while waiting for the new JSS.
    • OAG report notes that according to post‑mission reports, the MV Asterix functioned as intended. However, the first new support ship will not be ready for operations until 2024 and the lease will end in 2023.
  • Capabilities gap: Interim capabilities are limited and cannot be extended indefinitely, and that there is little room for further delay.

Recommendation 1 (DND, PSPC, DFO):

  • Obtain complete, current, and reliable schedules to support shipbuilding projects;
  • Ensure that progress toward forecast targets and delivery timelines is monitored to enable timely decision making.

Details

  • The two new Joint Support Ships are intended to replace the Navy’s Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessels. They will provide at-sea support to naval task groups, limited sealift capabilities, and support to operations ashore.
  • In 2013, after a rigorous interdepartmental selection based upon affordability, capability, and risk, National Defence selected the German Berlin Class design for its Joint Support Ship project that offers the best value to Canada.
  • Public Service and Procurement Canada selected Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards as the prime contractor to build these vessels for the Navy.
  • A $2.4 billion contract for full-rate construction of the JSS was awarded to Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards in June 2020.
  • As of April 2021, 48 of the first ship’s 123 blocks are substantially complete, with a further 63 blocks under construction.
  • Construction of the second supply ship is scheduled to begin in late 2021, although certain long lead items have already been contracted for.

JSS Benefit to the RCN

  • The JSS is critical to the future of the RCN, and constitutes a vital and strategic national asset. The presence of replenishment ships increases the range and endurance of a Naval Task Group, permitting it to remain at sea for significant periods of time without returning to port for replenishment. The new JSS will have capabilities such as:
    • Underway support to Naval Task Groups: Underway support is best described as:
      • the re-supply of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and other supplies between ships at sea;
      • the operation and maintenance of helicopters;
      • the task group medical and dental facilities.
    • Sealift: JSS will be capable of transporting and delivering cargo both in support of task group operations and in support to operations ashore; and
    • Support to operations ashore: To meet a range of possibilities in an uncertain future security environment, the JSS will leverage its onboard facilities to support operations ashore, including anything from combat to humanitarian and disaster relief.
  • JSS capabilities:
    • Equipped with systems to detect and protect against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
    • Equipped with a full range of features and systems that enhance their survivability and allow them to fully integrate with other warships (e.g., have a combat management system, multiple weapons systems, an electronic support measures suite, and dual shafts for enhanced redundancy).
  • The JSS will provide Canada with a modern, task tailored, globally deployable, naval support capability that can provide support to the ships and aircraft of a naval task group at sea. It will be crewed by CAF personnel

Arctic And Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS)

  • The Royal Canadian Navy is currently undergoing the largest fleet modernization in decades, beginning with the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships.
  • These ships will support surveillance of our three oceans, international operations, and humanitarian assistance.
  • Progress is well underway to deliver six of these versatile vessels to the Royal Canadian Navy.
  • National Defence accepted delivery of the first ship last July.
  • We are pleased to announce that the second ship, HMCS MARGARET BROOKE, completed sea trails this month.
  • This ship is expected to be delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy this summer.
  • Ships three and four are currently in production, with first steel cut for ship five to take place this month.
  • Ship six production is expected to begin in June 2022.
  • The remaining vessels for the Royal Canadian Navy are expected to be delivered by 2025.
  • National Defence will continue to carefully monitor timelines and work closely with industry to ensure the best value is provided to Canadians throughout the duration of this project.
  • These modern vessels will help the Navy meet Canada’s defence and security challenges in the coming decades.

If pressed on AOPS project delays:

  • Building a new class of ships is complex, and there have been delays to our original delivery timelines for the first and second AOPS.
  • The schedules were difficult to predict because the AOPS is a new design, and is being built with largely new facilities, workforces, and processes.
  • Original timelines for the first ship were shifted to ensure rigorous inspections, tests and trials, and correcting any defects.
  • Lessons continue to be learned from the construction of the first ship, and are benefiting the construction of subsequent ships.

Key Facts

  • Estimated Budget: Up to $4.3 billion
  • Number of Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships ordered: 6
  • Built at: Irving Shipbuilding Inc., Halifax
  • Delivery schedule:
    • First vessel delivered: July 31, 2020
    • Last expected delivery for RCN: 2025
  • Capabilities:
    • Operate in the Arctic between July and October, providing a greater and longer CAF presence in the north.
    • Support domestic and international operations including anti-piracy, emergency response, and disaster relief.
  • Economic Benefits: Building ships at Irving Shipbuilding’s Halifax Shipyard supports more than 2,000 direct jobs annually at the shipyard over the next few years.
  • COVID-19 has posed challenges to scheduling and the costs of goods and services. The full impact is still being assessed, but there is a known delay of several months for subsequent ship deliveries.   

Auditor General Report

Key Findings

  • Schedule management weaknesses: OAG found that Government identified unreliable schedules as a risk for several projects but its efforts to address this risk were not always effective.
  • Persistent shipbuilding delays: The federal fleet renewal experienced many delays in design and construction; federal fleet was not being renewed in a timely manner.

Recommendation 1 (DND, PSPC, DFO):

  • Obtain complete, current, and reliable schedules to support shipbuilding projects; and
  • Ensure that progress toward forecast targets and delivery timelines is monitored to enable timely decision making.

Details

Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships Project

  • Strong, Secure, Engaged committed to the acquisition of five to six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships. In November 2018, the Government of Canada announced a decision to acquire a sixth vessel.
  • These vessels will be able to perform a wide variety of tasks, including:
    • Surveillance operations of Canadian waters;
    • Support of sovereignty operations;
    • International operations;
    • Humanitarian assistance, emergency response and disaster relief; and
    • Search and Rescue.
  • The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships will operate in the Arctic between June and October, providing a greater and longer Canadian Armed Forces presence in the North.

Post-Delivery Work

  • Since delivery in July 2020, the ship is undergoing normal post-acceptance work, including the outfitting and integration of onboard systems to meet RCN operational requirements.
  • This work is all part of a normal process to incrementally test the ship and its systems, rectify any deficiencies, gain experience sailing this first of class vessel, and ultimately build the proficiency and resiliency required for sustained operations here at home and around the globe.

Sea Trials

  • Under Navy command, HMCS HARRY DEWOLF continues to complete sea trials and gathering the data necessary to develop and refine operating procedures.
  • HMCS HARRY DEWOLF is conducting these trials while also providing operational surveillance and presence for the eastern maritime approaches of Canada.
  • HMCS HARRY DEWOLF is expected to enter into RCN service in summer 2021, once the crew has completed all of their required operational training.

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