A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future

By Captain Bryce Simpson - December 26, 2022

Reading Time: 75 min  content from Canadian Army Journal

 

Introduction

The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) is, we are told, currently struggling to make sense of its role as one of the Army’s two manoeuvre arms due to “a marked departure from the Corps’ fighting doctrine, and thus a fundamental shift in the way armour is employed today.”¹ Some point to the effects of recent operations and their influence on the RCAC’s thinking and practices, asserting that “given how armour was employed unconventionally in Afghanistan, this would suggest that a generation of armoured leaders is missing the fundamentals of concentration, firepower, aggressiveness, shock action, and manoeuvre during all-arms operations.”² Indeed, the Corps’ purported predicament may go beyond simple doctrinal confusion about its present and future role, brought on by a perceived imbalance in light and heavy platforms, with some commentators pointing to an institution “suffering from an identity crisis.”³

Freudian-neuroses aside, those apprehensions are worth addressing, particularly as the Canadian Army as a whole embarks upon an ambitious program to design and implement Force 2025—the form and function of the Army of tomorrow.⁴ Consequently, this article will endeavour to address some of the more recent concerns posed by alarmed members and observers of the RCAC. Ultimately, it will make the case that the RCAC is far from requiring a fundamental reimagining of its forcegenerated capabilities and an associated revision of its doctrine proposed by some critics and that, instead, an application of the tried-and-true thinking and principles of armoured warfare reaching back to the beginning of its Corps can provide its members with a window into its future.

A Corps in (Perpetual) Crisis

First, we must dispel any notion that the Corps’ contentious state is somehow novel or unique to our present position in history.⁵ The post-Second World War RCAC was in a constant state of tension between its aspirational (and doctrinal) goals to maintain a heavy combat force consisting primarily of tanks and the reality of its fiscal limitations, which forced the Corps to adopt a hybrid structure with Canada-based light armour and European-based heavy forces.⁶ The end of the Cold War left the Canadian Army with this hybrid fleet of light armoured vehicles and tanks.⁷ The impending replacement of the main battle tank with a wheeled direct fire support vehicle provoked a groundswell of concern for the Corps’ future. From 1999–2005, there were no less than 15 prominent articles directly addressing the imperilled future of the Corps as a warfighting arm, including some directly questioning whether a requirement for a separate armoured corps even existed in a tankless Army.⁸ Then, as now, the debate over what the RCAC should do with a minority of tank subunits in a corps that was mostly equipped with light armour, or worse, in the event of reaching “a bleak, tankless future,” often took on existential proportions.⁹

The increasingly panicked tenor of the debate over armour in Canada slowed to a trickle almost overnight in the mid-2000s—a temporary armistice that we can credit to the Leopard 2 purchase, which reinvigorated the heavy end of the RCAC spectrum. Tanks, with their unique combination of firepower, mobility and the protection necessary to operate in close-combat against dug-in enemy positions, had once again proven their distinct relevance in an operational setting. Then-Major T. J. Cadieu, the first officer commanding (OC) of an Afghanistan-deployed tank squadron, argued that “by deploying tanks and armoured engineers to Afghanistan in October 2006 and supporting the acquisition of the Leopard 2, the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) has acknowledged the importance of maintaining heavy armour in a balanced force.”¹⁰ This apparent institutional acceptance of the need to continue to support a heavy armoured presence in the Army seems to have quelled concerns that the RCAC was on a fast-track to irrelevance or extinction, at least for a time.

A Resurgent Crisis: The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Today

The recent introduction of the tactical armoured patrol vehicle (TAPV) and still-to-be delivered light armoured vehicle (LAV) reconnaissance and surveillance system (LRSS) variant seems to have provoked a renewal of this doctrinal debate within the Corps over the best employment of non-tank forces.¹¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Halton speaks for many when he argues that the Corps must rebalance itself away from its current “overabundance” of medium-role reconnaissance forces by converting a significant proportion of subunits to the armour role, where they will utilize the current generation of armoured vehicles (such as the TAPV) in a “tank-trainer” role.¹²

The tank-trainer “resolution” to the apparent problem of a light-heavy mix in armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) platforms is not a new one. As Halton himself freely admits, the RCAC employed the Cougar in this fashion from the 1970s until the early 2000s, though of course these vehicles were not restricted to training and found themselves employed operationally throughout the 1990s.¹³ In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Coyote briefly replaced the Cougar in the “tank-trainer” role, with four four-car troops making up a direct fire support vehicle (DFSV) squadron.¹⁴ Those squadrons were widely referred to in the RCAC as “cavalry squadrons.”¹⁵ The creation of those cavalry squadrons in place of the previous tank-trainer squadrons attracted immediate criticism from serving armoured officers who emphasized that a squadron of nineteen Coyotes with 25-mm cannons contributed little in terms of capability to a brigade where infantry companies were equipped with the identically-armed (and better-armoured) LAV III.16 Indeed, the creation of these squadrons, which offered so little in terms of capability to the brigade fight, contributed to a situation where some commentators within the Army began to argue for the RCAC’s disbandment altogether.¹⁷ This utilization of light armour in a structural mirror image of a traditional tank squadron—and these squadrons eventually gaining the title of “cavalry”—is essential to understand current trends in RCAC thinking.

Following the extended reprieve from the internal debates of the 1990s–2000s, there has been a resurgence of a “cavalry concept” in RCAC thinking, with a diverse range of officers arguing for the adoption of a “cavalry” doctrine, structure, and mindset within the Corps.¹⁸ What precisely is entailed in the cavalry concept can be challenging to pin down. Many critics argue that there is simply a need for a “mentality shift” from the current focus on reconnaissance-by-stealth to fighting for information.¹⁹ More recent arguments favouring the concept have taken on more substance than a simple adjustment of the Corps’ psyche. They have specifically identified what they assert is a “cavalry gap” in RCAC doctrine. In a recent edition of this journal, Captain Matthew McInnes makes the case that there is an “unoccupied cavalry gap” in Canadian doctrine that formerly was “the exclusive domain of our Second World War armoured regiments, which illustrates the gravity of the current situation.”²⁰ Specifically, he argues that there is a doctrinal requirement for a force that is “responsible for the conduct of the traditional armoured cavalry tasks such as pursuit, raids, penetrations, aggressive (fighting) reconnaissance, and economy of force tasks”—tasks that neither “recce nor tank stream[s]” currently feel responsible to fulfill.²¹ McInnes’ solution to this cavalry gap rests on the notion of “platform neutrality,” with his proposed armoured cavalry subunits, regardless of equipment, being organized and trained along similar lines utilizing the four four-car troops of a traditional tank squadron.²² As currently expounded by its proponents, the Canadian cavalry concept is the logical outgrowth of the tank-trainer concept, which has been one of the recurring “resolutions” to the perpetual turmoil in the RCAC over the existence of a hybrid light-heavy equipment divide.²³ From the Cougar squadrons of the Cold War-era and continuing with the DFSV Coyote squadrons of the 1990s (known semi-officially as “cavalry”), the Corps may soon be welcoming the arrival of TAPV “cavalry squadrons” organized and trained to conduct the broad spectrum of armour tactics. However, despite the apparent inexorableness of the tank-parched RCAC continually returning to the same doctrinal “tanktrainer/cavalry” watering-hole, it is worth asking several questions. First, how do the employers of existing cavalry units worldwide define their tasks and equip them? Second, does Canada have a doctrinal requirement for those forces and, if so, do we have historical models of our own to fall back on? Third, does the Canadian cavalry concept as outlined above bear any resemblance to other countries’ cavalry forces? Lastly, what would be required to implement a Canadian cavalry concept? It is to these questions that this article shall now turn.

Armour’s Distinct Relevance

Before addressing modern cavalry directly, we must discuss it in relation to what we traditionally speak of as armour. Current Canadian doctrine defines armour’s role as being to “defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility,” with the overall concept of armour broken into two “capabilities”: tank elements and armoured reconnaissance.²⁴ Tank elements are extremely platformspecific and are characterized “by their mobility, firepower, and protection. Equipped with one of the most decisive weapons on the battlefield, tanks produce shock action through the violent application of (direct) firepower and mobility.”²⁵ Armoured reconnaissance elements, on the other hand, are not associated with a specific platform and “are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, and firepower. They can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.”²⁶ In current doctrine then, the RCAC has a series of armoured subunits: some tank squadrons, and some reconnaissance squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.”²⁷

Our closest allies are much narrower in their definition of armour, choosing to associate it only with the role and characteristics Canada currently ascribes to tank elements and eschewing the umbrella-term “armour” to describe their mounted reconnaissance and security forces. For instance, the mission of armour elements in the U.S. Army is “to close with the enemy by maneuver to destroy or capture the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and engage in close combat and counterattack,” while their cavalry elements exist to “set conditions for successful operations of the unit for which they are conducting reconnaissance and security tasks.”²⁸ The United Kingdom also draws a sharp line in roles and characteristics between armour and armoured cavalry, with the former characterized by their platforms (the tank), which provide “the brigade’s principal protected, precision shock action capability” while armoured cavalry are “FIND, UNDERSTAND and EXPLOIT assets that are able to fight for information, in extremis, if required.”²⁹

As our allies do, associating the role and characteristics of armour with a specific platform (the tank) and outlining separate roles and characteristics of reconnaissance or cavalry forces was also Canada’s approach to doctrine until recently. Canada’s 1990 doctrinal statements on armour did not divide this concept into tank and reconnaissance elements. Instead, doctrine described armour’s characteristics as directly associated with a specific platform: “the battlefield requirements of firepower, mobility, and protection are present, in the tank … Tanks can produce shock action through the violent application of firepower and mobility.”³⁰ Despite occasional arguments to the contrary, the “tank” is not going to become obsolete until it is “surpassed by new weapon systems that do a better job of combining direct firepower, protection and mobility in a single package.”³¹ Consequently, armour’s role and characteristics should remain closely associated with the combination of firepower, protection, and mobility currently embodied by the main battle tank. However, despite the platform-driven and distinct role for armour (tanks), there remains a distinct—but complementary—role for those mounted forces that do not operate tanks.³²

Allied Cavalry

As seen above, “cavalry” among our closest military allies refers to specific organizations with separate roles and characteristics from those associated with armour. The two branches of mounted manoeuvre remain conceptually distinct. The U.S. Army (with perhaps the most extended history of mechanized cavalry employment) describes how the cavalry squadrons³³ assigned to brigade combat teams (BCT) are the brigade commander’s “main organization” for the conduct of reconnaissance and security tasks as follows:

Commanders use reconnaissance operations to understand the situation, visualize the battle, and make decisions. Security tasks provide reaction time and maneuver space so commanders can make decisions and protect the force from unanticipated danger … The Cavalry squadrons of the BCT can conduct security tasks and fight for information.³⁴

Major Amos C. Fox, a prolific commentator on recent developments in American cavalry, explains the dual reconnaissance and security function of cavalry units as being analogous to the “shield” of traditional manoeuvre forces, which constitute the “sword.”³⁵ The cavalry “shield” is by no means a passive or defensive tool and indeed is a weapon in its own right, existing to shape “the environment and the situation of its supported force” by softening targets with direct and indirect fire, informing commander’s decisions, misleading the enemy on the direction of the supported forces’ intended direction of advance, facilitating positioning and manoeuvre of other units, deceiving the enemy about what lies to its front, and providing warning and stand-off during defensive operations.³⁶ The central roles of cavalry in American thinking (reconnaissance and security) are heavily associated with providing information to the supported commander.³⁷

The British Army takes a similar view of cavalry, describing both light and armoured variations of these units jointly as “ground mounted reconnaissance” whose “primary role” is “acquiring information.”³⁸ Both types of units are also capable of conducting security tasks. The expectation of providing information does not cease, with armoured cavalry, in particular, being capable of “aggressive reconnaissance” because of its platforms’ capability.³⁹ Importantly, cavalry is not considered merely another manoeuvre unit but instead constitutes a specialized “FIND” asset structured to conduct reconnaissance tasks with the associated ability to EXPLOIT as a result of integral combat support enablers.⁴⁰

The distinction between cavalry and manoeuvre elements in both the American and British armies is key to understanding their employment and provides the starkest contrast with the Canadian “cavalry concept” discussed above. McInnes’ conception of cavalry excludes specialized reconnaissance elements, and he asserts that “reconnaissance is simply a tactical task inherent to all combat units and, in fact, activities, which during times of major combat will naturally be conducted by multi-purpose combat forces whether there are dedicated specialist reconnaissance units present or not.”⁴¹ The danger of such thinking is evident to our allies, who have utilized their own specialized reconnaissance cavalry forces for a much more extended period. American doctrine is explicit in its warning to those who would use cavalry as only another combat unit: “Reconnaissance is significantly degraded when Cavalry units assigned to close combat missions become decisively engaged. When reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and capitalizing upon information collection is lost.”⁴² Major Fox further explains that commanders who use cavalry “as another combined arms or infantry battalion … mismanage their available forces, which in the case of mismanaged cavalry, equates to fighting with a blindfold strapped around one’s eyes.”⁴³ That is not to say that British and American doctrine does not contemplate the use of cavalry forces in the traditional offensive or defensive tasks. However, when cavalry is employed in such tasks, it is an “economy of force” element for its supported formation.⁴⁴ For American cavalry squadrons, “when the squadron conducts offensive and defensive missions, the BCT made a deliberate decision to employ the cavalry squadron outside its intended role,” which remains the provision of reconnaissance and security.⁴⁵

It is also worth noting that the post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of cavalry elements at the brigade level. Whereas both British and American forces previously employed their specialized reconnaissance and security units at division- or corps-level, often entirely eschewing the establishment of such units in their brigades, today they both operate full units in their brigades to fill the cavalry role.⁴⁶ Indeed, the U.S. Army has entirely deleted division- and corps-level cavalry from its organization.⁴⁷ That has important implications for the Canadian Army. Whereas before we could assume that, when deployed as part of a multinational force, there would be dedicated units or formations fulfilling cavalry roles provided by our allies’ divisions or corps, today this is not the case. Consequently, it may be time to examine whether a single reconnaissance/cavalry squadron in our brigades can fulfill all reconnaissance and security tasks that a commander could place upon it.

For our closest allies, cavalry consists of specialized mounted reconnaissance and security elements that are capable of fighting for information and, using the combat capabilities that allow them to fulfill their core information-gathering function, are capable of conducting economy of force tactical tasks up to and including traditional offensive and defensive operations. They are distinct from conventional manoeuvre forces in role (reconnaissance and security) despite sharing similar equipment as other mounted forces. This conception of cavalry bears little resemblance to the current direction in RCAC-thinking, where non-tank-equipped subunits are structured identically and designed to operate with the same mission-set as their heavier cousins. As we will see, we would be wise to pursue our Allies’ vision of cavalry, and we will therefore examine this vision of cavalry further.

Cavalry in Reconnaissance Operations

As we have seen above, cavalry’s raison d'être is the provision of information. We shall therefore examine how cavalry has historically fulfilled its primary role. First and most importantly, cavalry formations have predominantly been structured so that their ability to conduct this primary role is optimized. McInnes asserts that the “principle of four” AFVs predominates in mounted combat and further claims that troops/platoons any larger than that are “unable to survive the demands of a counterinsurgency campaign, let alone general war, due to an inherent lack of fighting power, [and] have no place in Canada’s warfighting doctrine.”⁴⁸ However, in Figure 3, we can see nine historical and current reconnaissance or cavalry units compared based on the number of platoon-sized elements in their subunits, the number of vehicles in those platoons, as well as weapon systems and dismount capability. What quickly becomes apparent when comparing these units is that platoons of more than four vehicles have historically been the norm and remain so despite the seven decades that separate the earliest organization listed (1944) to the present day. Most of the British, American, and Australian cavalry organizations listed have been tested in combat ranging from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency, in various terrain and tactical conditions. Yet, they seem to have gone through this experience without resorting to a universal “principle of four,” which did not prevent them from accomplishing their missions. There is a remarkable continuity in the sizes of troops/platoons over time. Why should that be the case? 

As it turns out, armies have been doing things this way for the simple reason that three to four sub-platoon elements are the optimal structure for the conduct of cavalry and reconnaissance organizations’ most common tasks: route, area, point, and zone reconnaissance and the conduct of screens. Canada rediscovered that fact in the 1990s when it reduced the troops’ size in reconnaissance squadrons to five cars and redistributed Coyotes to create DFSV/cavalry squadrons on the four-car tank model. Then-Captain T. J. Cadieu critiqued that decision, noting that “by removing three patrols from the Reconnaissance Squadron arsenal, many of the technological advances offered by the Coyote have been neutralized, flexibility has been lost, and the overall effectiveness of the squadron has been diminished.”⁶⁵ Specifically, he outlined how the five-car troop was “ineffective” during offensive operations, as it could not adequately conduct a route recce without a third patrol (which involves tracking the route and clearing terrain adjacent to it out to antiarmour weapon range).⁶⁶ Screening operations were also hampered by an inability to provide depth within the troop and the requirement to employ all troop vehicles as sensors, which rapidly diminished patrols’ abilities to conduct surveillance tasks for more than 24 hours.⁶⁷

Other critics of reduced troop size quickly emerged. In 1999, the Royal Canadian Dragoons experimented with five-, seven-, nine- and thirteen-car (!) reconnaissance troops before concluding that the seven-car troop was optimal for many of the same reasons outlined by Cadieu.⁶⁸ The commanding officer (CO) of the Dragoons, P. J. Atkinson, entirely dismissed the idea that the four-car troop of his cavalry squadron was capable of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and assigned those to his dedicated reconnaissance squadron.⁶⁹ Future Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) CO, Major P. P. J. Demers, concluded vociferously that “five-car troops have proven to be inadequate, even in peace support operations, in properly conducting route, area, or zone reconnaissance or escort tasks. Clearly screen or guard tasks are even more significantly hampered by the reduced troop size.”⁷⁰

The RCAC can perhaps be forgiven for once again dabbling with reduced troop size in its reconnaissance organizations, given that a cursory examination of some of our Allies’ doctrine might suggest that it is a viable construct. Our American allies experimented with the cavalry squadrons of their Stryker BCTs, introducing four-vehicle platoons in 2003. Extensive testing (both at the National Training Center and in combat operations in Iraq) revealed that it took an entire troop (company) to conduct reconnaissance of a single route as a result of the limited platoon size.⁷¹ The Americans rectified that structural deficiency in 2016, increasing platoon size to six vehicles while retaining only two platoons in the troop.⁷² Marine light armoured reconnaissance (LAR) battalions, which utilize four-vehicle platoons, have explicitly accepted this deficiency in their doctrine, by stating that single route reconnaissance is a task for a full company (though LAR battalions have up to five subunits to compensate).⁷³ British armoured cavalry regiments resolve this deficiency by supplementing their four-vehicle Scimitar troops with sections from support or guided-weapons troops, thus making the size of the employed Scimitar troop in the six-to-eight vehicle range.⁷⁴ From that, we can conclude that the four-vehicle platoon/troop is by no means universal and that forces whose primary mission is the provision of information tend to be structured in such a way to optimize the completion of those tasks.

“To Fight or Not to Fight”: The Question of Stealth

The debate over whether mechanized reconnaissance/ cavalry forces should (or can) conduct their mission by stealth or by fighting for information has dogged such organizations since their inception and has cropped up again in the Canadian cavalry concept.⁷⁵ McInnes contends that elements mounted in armoured vehicles are virtually incapable of conducting reconnaissance by stealth and should therefore be structured to fight for information (in four, four-vehicle troops). He dismisses the possibility of mounting a significant dismounted element in armoured reconnaissance units “as one would naturally detract from the other.”⁷⁶ McInnes, then, is firmly in the camp that argues that armoured reconnaissance elements should fight for information.

However, proponents of the Canadian cavalry concept, and others who have made this argument over the years, create a false dichotomy between stealth and the ability to fight for information. In his comprehensive study of manoeuvre reconnaissance in American history, Robert S. Cameron concludes that “doctrine must embrace the value of both fighting and stealthy reconnaissance … The ability to fight for information or collect a steady stream of intelligence from an undetected observation post are both valid methods of securing details on threat activities. They are not mutually exclusive but complementary.”⁷⁷ Indeed, as we saw above, both the U.S. and British Armies characterize cavalry organizations by their ability to conduct their tasks through either method.⁷⁸ Arguably, the most salient feature of cavalry in both armies has been the flexibility to do so. Whether a cavalry force conducts its reconnaissance function by stealth or through fighting is less a matter of choice and more a question of tactical conditions. Figure 5 proposes a relationship between the manoeuvre space available to a reconnaissance or cavalry force and the amount of combat power required to accomplish its information-gathering tasks. In relatively static conditions with two opposing forces already closely engaged (such as on the Western Front during the First World War or the Italian Front in the Second), cavalry forces will struggle to fulfill their optimal informationgathering function. They will instead conduct economy of force tasks or even re-role to other functions.

In the middle of the spectrum, cavalry is often forced to fight for information and concentrate its assets to achieve its core function. Many recent counterinsurgencies (such as American and Australian cavalry in Vietnam or our own recent experience in Afghanistan) could arguably fall into this category. With every culvert and piece of disturbed earth a potential “enemy,” the psychological distance between a counterinsurgent force and its guerrilla opponents is minimal indeed.⁷⁹

Cavalry, however, thrives in conditions where manoeuvre space is plentiful. It can take maximum advantage of its mobility differential between both the supported friendly force and the enemy. In particular, when a breakthrough has been achieved or conditions enable a great deal of physical space between belligerents (such as following the Normandy campaign or the recent French cavalry operations in Mali), cavalry is the optimal force to conduct pursuit and exploitation operations, ranging far ahead of their supported force (in the above campaigns, sometimes by days and hundreds of kilometres).

A significant portion of cavalry’s flexibility to operate across this continuum of manoeuvre space and combat power comes from the option entirely dismissed by McInnes: the provision of substantial numbers of dismounted soldiers in a cavalry unit. As Figures 3 and 9 show, the vast majority of reconnaissance and cavalry organizations utilized historically and today have had significant dismounted components at either the platoon/troop or subunit level. The ability to dismount has long been considered essential for all armoured crews, as George S. Patton noted in the early days of the Second World War: “When any of you gets to a place where your experience tells you there is apt to be an anti-tank gun or mine or some other devilish contrivance of the enemy, don’t ride up in your scout car or tank like a fat lady going shopping, stop your vehicle, take a walk or crawl and get a look.”⁸⁰ In particular, cavalry units must possess dedicated dismountable components that do not compromise the operation of the unit's armoured fighting vehicles (i.e. an assault troop or the scout squads of U.S. Army, U.S. Marine and Australian cavalry/light armour units). Indeed, the presence of integral dismount elements is part of what distinguishes cavalry units from traditional armoured ones, and Cameron concludes that “[r]econnaissance organizations require a robust dismount capability. The ability to dismount ensures a degree of stealth capability even for heavily armed and armored reconnaissance organizations.”⁸¹

The requirement for a dismounted capability is the closest parallel between modern mechanized cavalry and the horse cavalry of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which armies primarily utilized for its mounted mobility, but they often conducted reconnaissance or fought dismounted to maximize firepower and survivability.⁸² From that, we must conclude that where armour’s core competency is mounted combat, the core competency of cavalry must be mounted mobility with the choice of whether to operate (or fight) mounted or dismounted being dictated by the tactical situation. A robust dismount capability is useful in either extreme and, as we shall see, along with other combat enablers, is essential for the conduct of cavalry’s second prominent role: security operations.

Cavalry in Security Operations

Security operations (which include screening, guards, and covering forces) are the other significant role of cavalry units. They are also closely tied to the provision of information, early warning and protection to supported formations.⁸³ Current Canadian reconnaissance squadrons are capable of only the least kinetic of these tasks: the conduct of screens where there is no requirement to protect the main force by “fighting to gain time” or “intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the covered force.”⁸⁴ Genuine cavalry organizations must be capable of conducting the more kinetic end of security operations if they are truly to be of use to their supported formation. Our allies have recognized that cavalry must be capable of fighting in its security role and have organized their cavalry elements accordingly. However, they have not created units capable of fighting highly contested guard or covering force actions by merely increasing the number of AFVs or organizing their cavalry organizations like those of armour, as Canadian cavalry concept proponents would have us do. Instead, they have emphasized the inclusion of integral combat support elements within their units along with the dismounted capability discussed above.

Figure 9 shows the same cavalry and reconnaissance units examined in Figure 3 compared based on their available integral combat support enablers and where they were echeloned. Several trends quickly emerge: first, as we have already seen, a dismounted capability is nearly universal and may arguably be the single capability that defines cavalry units (as opposed to light armour or armoured car units, which generally lack dismounts). A close second is the existence of anti-tank capability and/or direct fire support assets. Finally, integral indirect fire assets in the form of mortars exist in most of the examined units. It is important to note that they are integral assets, not ad hoc attachments for temporary tasks. It is the ability to conduct all of its assigned functions without significant enhancement through attachments that makes a cavalry element effective (and distinguishes a cavalry organization from the current Canadian reconnaissance squadrons). As Cameron argues, “units dependent on regular augmentation to perform their missions are improperly designed.”⁸⁵

The addition of significant combat support elements, all mounted in highly mobile platforms with the associated agility of all mounted units, allows cavalry to combine a high degree of firepower delivered rapidly to any location on the battlefield with a relatively low-density of personnel. For instance, American mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons in 1944 could generate 200% more firepower than an infantry battalion while possessing only 75% of the manpower.¹⁰⁴ Cavalry then is a multi-arm element that utilizes its integral combat enablers to achieve its tasks at the more kinetic end of the security operations spectrum and is best characterized by high firepower, high mobility, and low personnel density. 

Those inherent characteristics of cavalry units make them the optimal choice for economy of force offensive or defensive tasks within a formation. However, it is essential to recognize that they do not achieve success in these missions by fighting symmetrically to their opponents, pitting cavalry (which are less protected and more sensitive to personnel casualties) against their enemies’ strength. For instance, American Stryker cavalry squadrons emphasize the necessity for flexible groupings of anti-tank and mobile gun system assets with cavalry scouts to allow them to succeed against conventional enemy forces in “hunter-killer” teams.¹⁰⁵ LAV-equipped Marine units in the Persian Gulf War fought a classic cavalry engagement against attacking Iraqi armour in January 1991 as part of their duties as the formation guard force. However, they did so by applying asymmetric tactics, making heavy use of air and artillery support, integral anti-tank assets, and dismounted capabilities.¹⁰⁶ The ability of cavalry to conduct economy-of-force tasks results from them being structured with sufficient combat power to accomplish their fundamental security mission.

Consensus on Cavalry

The above analysis of historical and current cavalry organizations among our allies reveals remarkable consensus in cavalry elements’ basic structure and mission. Cavalry is a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. It contains integral combat support elements and is characterized by high mobility, high firepower, and low personnel density.

It is an inherently flexible organization capable of gaining information by stealth or by combat and reorganizing to engage in specific tasks. Its core competency is mounted mobility, with the decision to operate mounted, dismounted, or in a hybrid form dictated by the situation and the cavalry organization’s task.

That definition of cavalry is radically different from that proposed in the currently in-vogue Canadian cavalry concept, which proposes using light armoured vehicles in structures similar in form and tactics to tank squadrons, reviving the tank-trainer concept that Canada has utilized before. However, Canada should not be so quick to dismiss the cavalry structures of our allies. Indeed, they may provide an ideal model for the RCAC to structure itself upon in the ongoing discussions surrounding Force 2025. Conveniently, the RCAC also has a rich history of mechanized cavalry tradition to draw upon in discussions of this nature.

Canadian Proto-Cavalry: From the Second World War to Present

Proponents of tank-trainer/cavalry concepts are fond of pointing to Canada’s tank-equipped armoured reconnaissance regiments of Canada’s Second World War RCAC as exemplars for units that conducted a range of tasks using explicitly tank-tactics.¹⁰⁷ However, they are less likely to comment on Canada’s infantry division reconnaissance regiments of the Second World War, which have not received significant scholarly attention in Canadian military history.¹⁰⁸ As such, their operational role and experience are not well understood in the Canadian Army of today. Unlike the armoured car regiments assigned directly to corps (which were purely armoured vehicle formations with limited combat support enablers), and the tank-equipped armoured reconnaissance regiments, which were designed “to carry out the role of close reconnaissance [emphasis added] on the armoured divisional front, and of detailed reconnaissance after contact has been gained,”¹⁰⁹ division reconnaissance regiments (also part of the RCAC) were well-balanced, all-arms units operating in the medium reconnaissance role for infantry divisions.

In 1944, during the fighting in Northwest Europe and Italy, a division reconnaissance regiment was made up of three squadrons. Each squadron deployed three “scout troops,” which consisted of twelve integral armoured vehicles, including armoured cars and universal carriers with anti-tank weapons and mortars.¹¹⁰ At squadron level, an assault troop of infantry-trained soldiers provided a dedicated dismounted element.¹¹¹ At regimental level, there was an anti-tank battery of towed anti-tank guns and a troop of medium mortars, both of which were designed to be quickly allotted down to squadron- or troop-level command.¹¹²

Existing training pamphlets emphasize the flexible nature of these regiments, with “troops and even sections” capable of operating on independent tasks at a great distance from regimental support and with a suite of combat support enablers.¹¹³ That allowed the regiment to cover vast distances in reconnaissance tasks, with each combined-arms scout troop grouping being assigned a single major route to recce in support of an advance.¹¹⁴ However, the significant mounted and dismounted firepower contained in a unit smaller in manpower than an infantry battalion, but far more mobile, allowed it to mass to conduct a broad range of “protection” tasks for infantry divisions at the squadron or regimental levels, including acting as covering forces, acting as an advanced guard, covering a withdrawal, seizing and holding vital ground “for a limited time,” pursuing a “beaten and disorganized enemy,” and providing a mobile reserve of firepower.¹¹⁵

In optimizing for reconnaissance and security tasks, integral combat support elements, high mobility and firepower, and the ability to fight for information mounted or dismounted, division reconnaissance regiments were clearly cavalry in all but a formal title. Indeed, the men of these units considered themselves to be cavalrymen.¹¹⁶ Despite being attached to infantry formations, these units of the RCAC were all formed from prewar militia cavalry units, and they maintained those traditions throughout their extensive combat experience in Italy and Northwest Europe.¹¹⁷ Canadian commanders seemingly valued the characteristics of these units. Even as they converted the tank-equipped armoured reconnaissance regiments to simply being armoured regiments and converted armoured car regiments to other roles, they maintained the infantry divisions’ reconnaissance regiments in the postwar period.¹¹⁸ By 1947, the “divisional regiment, RCAC” of all postwar Canadian divisions was made up of a mix of armoured cars, light tanks, and armoured personnel carriers (APC) and was unmistakeably a descendent of the wartime reconnaissance regiment.¹¹⁹ In short, the only two combatproven RCAC unit types to survive the Second World War (in an organizational form) were armoured regiments and the long-forgotten reconnaissance regiments.

Given the lack of a division on the regular order of battle in the postwar Canadian Army, these division reconnaissance regiments in their proto-cavalry Second World War form did not reappear in the RCAC, which instead toyed with the structure and equipment of its brigade group reconnaissance squadrons for much of the Cold War.¹²⁰ Perhaps ahead of their time, attempts were made at a revival of the sort of multi-arm, flexible, reconnaissance and security units that were of such broad utility in the Second World War. Historian Sean Maloney outlines how in 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. St. Aubin (CO, 8th Canadian Hussars [Princess Louise’s]) studied Canada’s Second World War reconnaissance units’ experiences extensively and concluded that purely light AFV-equipped units “could not acquire the information necessary for the commander to reach appropriate decisions in a mid-to-high intensity war.”¹²¹ St. Aubin was also strongly influenced by the American cavalry doctrine of the day. In response to those two influences, he reorganized his unit along multi-arm cavalry lines with integral dismounts, mortars, and DFSV in each reconnaissance squadron.¹²² His regiment became the model for the 1972 “light armoured regiment” to which all Canada-based armoured regiments were to convert.¹²³

Of course, this reorganization never took place, as other units of the RCAC immediately grouped the tanks they were issued as DFSV-surrogates into small tank squadrons. When the DFSV (the Cougar) was finally procured, it was immediately employed in the tank-trainer role.¹²⁴ Canada’s first attempt to revive its successful Second World War cavalry traditions had failed. A second near-revival took place in the 1980s as part of the Corps 86 Force Development project. The (highly) notional Canadian Corps in this structure was supported by an “armoured cavalry brigade group” conducting “security and reconnaissance tasks” for its supported formation.¹²⁵ Division reconnaissance regiments were to be multi-arm organizations of dismounts, reconnaissance vehicles and a small complement of tanks, conducting similar reconnaissance and security tasks at the division-level.¹²⁶ The post-Cold War period’s peace dividend aborted the creation of even the smaller of these units. When “cavalry” subunits finally came into being in Canada, it was the rebranded DFSV tank-trainer squadrons of the 1990s.

Like Lieutenant-Colonel St. Aubin in the 1960s, some RCAC officers proposed a way out of the doctrinally dubious tank-trainer concept. In 1999, then-Major S. J. Bowes confronted the reality that the reorganization of armoured regiments to contain reconnaissance, armour (tank) and cavalry subunits had made it “inconceivable that any one of the armour regiments could be cohesively deployed as a multipurpose, combat-capable unit without a major reorganization.”¹²⁷ He proposed creating a Canadian “light cavalry regiment” along the lines of the light armoured regiment of the past and drawing heavily on then-current American cavalry doctrine. This unit would be structured for the provision of reconnaissance and security and equipped with plentiful dismounted capability and the requisite combat support enablers, including mortars and anti-tank vehicles.¹²⁸ Unfortunately, Bowes’ proposal to create highly flexible cavalry units in the Canadian Army seems to have been a non-starter. The units of the RCAC have continued along to the present day, seemingly fretting over a perceived imbalance between the light and heavy subunits that constitute it.

Recommendations

Though the RCAC’s historical precedent would suggest that it is likely to retread the well-worn path of generating and calling what essentially amounts to tank-trainer squadrons “cavalry,” perhaps the time has come to pursue an actual cavalry capability along lines that our allies would understand and that they have proved in decades of combat across the spectrum of operations. Indeed, to maintain the relevance of itself as an institution, the adoption of a true cavalry capability may be necessary for the survival of the RCAC as the mounted arm of manoeuvre. To that effect, below are several recommendations for a way forward:

1. Doctrine: Define cavalry’s role in Canadian doctrine. Such a definition could be a variation of the following: The role of cavalry is to conduct reconnaissance and security for its supported formation through a combination of mobility, firepower, and flexibility. Cavalry’s characteristics in Canadian doctrine should and must include its core competency as mounted mobility, the ability to accomplish its missions by either stealth or force, the flexibility to operate mounted or dismounted, the provision of integral combat support capabilities, and its suitability for economy-of-force tasks. 
2. Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Structure: The Army should acknowledge the growing proliferation of full cavalry units (vice subunits) at brigade level amongst our allies and accept the reality that we can consequently no longer count on augmentation from higher-level allied cavalry units in operations. It may be worth examining whether a Canadian mechanized brigade group (CMBG) requires a cavalry regiment for the conduct of reconnaissance and security tasks. Such a unit would provide the Army with a self-contained and unique capability that could operate as part of its parent formation or help to fill the formation-level reconnaissance gaps that exist in Allied structures. Significant work remains to be done to design such a regiment, taking into account the requirement to provide integral combat support capabilities (including antitank and potentially indirect fire elements) as well as sufficient dismounts. Admittedly, some capabilities may require the expansion of existing procurement programs, the initiation of new ones, or the reallocation of existing equipment, and initially a cavalry regiment may have to be designed for-but-not-with certain types of equipment. However, we could do far worse than returning to S. J. Bowes’ proposal, that of the St. Aubin’s light armoured regiment or even Second World War-era division reconnaissance regiments to seek guidance in designing a modern Canadian cavalry regiment. Given that significant quantities of new equipment and personnel are unlikely to appear overnight, it may be necessary to sacrifice total numbers of subunits to build correctly enabled cavalry units. Still, the increase in employability should more than offset this difficult institutional change.
3. Army Structure: The Army is currently examining itself through the Force 2025 initiative and is at least tacitly considering the notion of “asymmetric brigades” once again, where light, medium, and heavy formations could be created across the Army.¹²⁹ The RCAC should be the loudest voice in the room in favour of such a move. The creation of light, medium, and heavy forces would allow the Corps to concentrate its medium and heavy mechanized forces to the greatest possible effect and ensure that existing mechanized forces are properly enabled with both cavalry and armour assets. For instance, a heavy brigade could consist of an armoured regiment and a cavalry regiment, with a medium brigade supported by a cavalry regiment (with a potential for a dual-mission of providing light armour support to a light brigade).¹³⁰ Currently, the RCAC spreads itself thin across three CMBGs; the Corps should seize the opportunity to ease that stress on the institution.
4. Mindset: Accept that cavalry exists to complement the traditional ground manoeuvre elements, armour and infantry. Discard the notion of “platform neutrality” introduced in recent Canadian armoured doctrine and associate armour strictly with the combination of mobility, firepower, and protection currently resident in the tank. Further, at least one tank-equipped armoured regiment should remain in the RCAC. Cavalry, however, is not subordinate to either infantry or armour in the doctrinal hierarchy but is a distinct capability all its own. Throughout history and on a variety of mounts, cavalry has always been an entity distinct from the other arms (including, after its introduction, armour) and has often seen itself as an elite force. Cavalry organizations in many nations have sought to attract and recruit the best (and most dashing) soldiers of many historical and contemporary armies. Modern cavalry fills a vital role and acts as the commander’s eyes and ears on the battlefield. It is often the first formation into the ground fight and conducts perhaps the widest variation of tactical tasks of any arm. Canadian cavalry should adopt this mindset wholesale, and, indeed, all armour officers and non-commissioned members should ideally serve in both organizations throughout their careers, regardless of regimental affiliation. 

Conclusion

The adoption of a conception and structure of cavalry as outlined above would constitute a return to the forgotten history of our Second World War division reconnaissance regiments. It would also be a suitable acknowledgement of the postwar RCAC officers who attempted to reintroduce this unique capability in Canada. More importantly, it would constitute a recognition that cavalry as a capability is distinct in function and structure from armour. This is not to say that both branches of mounted manoeuvre should not coexist under the existing RCAC structure. For a resource-constrained mounted force trying to define itself for the next decade and beyond, operating in a multinational environment where increasingly we will be unable to count on the provision of division- or corps-level cavalry organizations of comparable capability by our allies, perhaps now is the opportunity for Canadian cavalry to ride again.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the many fellow officers and NCOs who kindly provided him with advice, feedback and valuable criticism during the drafting and revision of this article. In particular, if its contents include anything of worth to the military profession, it is the result of an ongoing dialogue with the following officers and NCOs: Major Gord Elliott (OC B Sqn, LdSH[RC]), Major Nathan Hevenor (OC A Sqn, LdSH[RC]), Major Mike Timms (OC HQ Sqn, LdSH[RC]), Captain Thom Gray (Royal Lancers [Queen Elizabeth’s Own]), Captain Matthew Hoffart (BC Recce Sqn, LdSH[RC]), Captain Shaun Rogozinski (2IC HQ Sqn, LdSH[RC]), Lieutenant Leon van Heerden (Third Troop Leader, Recce Sqn, LdSH[RC]), and Sergeant Reg Ferguson (Patrol Commander, Recce Sqn, LdSH(RC)).

About The Author

Captain Bryce Simpson, CD, is an armoured officer serving as the operations officer of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians). During his first regimental tour, he served as a troop leader in both reconnaissance and tank squadrons. He then served as a joint terminal attack controller with 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, before returning to his regiment as a tank squadron battle captain in 2019. During his career, he has deployed on two international operations, first to Sinai, Egypt (Op CALUMET) and later to Latvia (Op REASSURANCE). Captain Simpson holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Nipissing University and a Master of Arts in military history from Norwich University. 

Endnotes

1. Matthew McInnes, “First Principles and the Generation of Armoured Fighting Power,” The Canadian Army Journal 17.3 (2017): 84.

2. Canada, Department of Defence, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, B-GL-050-000/FT-003, Dispatches: The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps in Afghanistan 18.1 (April, 2016): 19.

3. Phillip J. Halton, “The Re-Transformation of the Armoured Corps,” The Canadian Army Journal 17.3 (2017): 65.

4. Commander, Canadian Army, “Force 2025 – Commander’s Planning Guidance,” DLFD S1-2, dated 10 September 2020.

5. Indeed, internal Corps conflict may be built straight into the foundation of the RCAC’s origins as a compromise grouping of technically minded advocates of mechanization and the diehard horse cavalrymen of Canada’s interwar Army, many of whom resisted the inevitable death of their traditional arm to the bitter end. For a discussion of the interwar tensions between traditionalists and advocates of mechanization in Canada, see J. L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 1993), 122–124.

6. See Sean M. Maloney, “A Proportion of Their Cavalry Might Be Converted: Light Armoured Force Development in Canada’s Army, 1952–1976,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 83–103.

7. Of course, the Canadian Army was not titled as such during the 1990s, where the country’s ground forces changed title from “Mobile Command” to “Land Forces Command.” However, this article will utilize the commonly used title “Canadian Army” to refer to all of Canada’s historical land forces despite the official nomenclature of the day.

8. Some notable examples include: P. J. Atkinson, “The Armoured Combat Vehicle and the Future of the Armoured Corps,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 104–106; Charles Branchaud, “Let’s Face Reality,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 116–117; Richard Moreau, “Concept for the Employment of the Cavalry Squadron,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 118–125; Jeff Barr, “Let’s Have Another Look: Employment Options for the Equipment Redistribution Plan Reconnaissance Squadron,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 126–138; Dave Banks, “A Single Combat Branch,” The Canadian Army Journal 7.2 (Summer 2004): 26–33; Shane Brennan, “Time for Consideration: One Combat Arms Classification.” The Canadian Army Journal 8.2 (Summer 2005): 52–65; C. M. Fletcher, “Armour at the Crossroads,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 3.1 (Spring 2000): 26–30; Lee J. Hammond, “Tank: The Canadian Army’s Four-Letter Word,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 4.4 (Winter 2001): 74–82; D. J. Senft, “The Mobile Gun System is Coming!... Now What?,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 6.3 (Fall/Winter 2003): 26–32.

9. Halton, 67.

10. T. J. Cadieu, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” The Canadian Army Journal 10.4 (Winter 2008): 5.

11. The TAPV and the LRSS are not the first vehicles to cause doctrinal churn in the RCAC. The Coyote, now in its third decade of service with a generation of armoured soldiers who appreciate many of its characteristics, was not universally acclaimed upon arrival in the 1990s and led to a similar re-examination of doctrine and the development of new tactics, techniques and procedures. For a discussion of the doctrinal teething problems with the Coyote, see Senft, 26.

12. Halton, 78.

13. Ibid., 75.

14. Fletcher, 26–30.

15. The “cavalry” moniker can possibly be credited to the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), who have been referring to their DFSV squadron by this title since at least 1997. See Atkinson, 105.

16. Major Richard Moreau went as far as to assert that the permanent organization of Coyotes into the four-car troop cavalry squadrons would mark “the end of the armoured corps,” as the institution would have ceased to provide anything unique in terms of firepower, protection, or mobility to the combined arms fight. See Moreau, 119.

17. In arguing for a single-combat branch containing infantry, armour, artillery, and engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Banks contended that “regrouping all LAV Coyote in armoured regiments is, in [his] opinion, job protection.” See Banks, 24.

18. See: Sean Maraj, “Discussion Paper – Revisiting the Concept of Armoured Cavalry,” Armour Bulletin 47.1 (2014): 48–51; J. W. Ring, “Armoured Bulletin Cavalry Article – What is Canadian Cavalry,” Armour Bulletin (2015): 57–60; and W. D. Lambie, “Armour or Calvary [sic]: Which Way to Turn,” Armour Bulletin (2016): 48–50.

19. Ring, 57.

20. McInnes, 95.

21. Ibid., 95.

22. McInnes goes as far as to argue that the four-vehicle troop (regardless of platform) is the RCAC’s “institutional vital ground.” McInnes, 90.

23. McInnes cites the example of the Cougar tank-trainer concept favourably as part of his argument for a Canadian cavalry concept with existing AFV fleets. McInnes, 95.

24. Canada, Department of Defence, Canadian Army Doctrine Note (CADN) 17-1, The Armoured Regiment in Battle, (18 July 2017): 1–2.

25. Ibid., 3

26. Ibid., 4.

27. Proponents of the cavalry concept would argue that “armoured cavalry” should replace reconnaissance squadrons in the current definition and take over some (or all) of the tank squadron’s tasks, blurring the distinction in tasks between tank elements (focused on a platform), and non-tank armour (which are platform-neutral).

28. United States of America. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, (Washington, D.C.: 27 Jan 2016): 1–4; and United States of America. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1 July 2015): 1–3.

29. The British Army also has a further delineation of mounted manoeuvre forces known as “Light Cavalry.” United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Capability Directorate Combat, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 1B, Brigade Tactics, Army Code 71982, (2012), 1–15; and United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Capability Directorate Combat, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 2, Battlegroup Tactics, Army Code 71648, (2014), 1–15.

30. The 1990 doctrinal statement associating armour directly and specifically with tanks is still current since the publication in question has not been superseded. This actually leaves Canada in the position of having two doctrinally correct definitions of armour: one associated directly with tanks and one subdivided into tank and armoured reconnaissance elements. See Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-305-001/FT-001, Armour, Volume I: The Armoured Regiment in Battle, (31 December 1990), Chapter 1, Section 2.

31. Halton, 65.

32. It is worth noting that Canada’s ratio between light and heavy armour subunits is actually quite comparable to our allies. Canada has three tank subunits and seven (including two understrength) reconnaissance subunits, meaning roughly 30% of our Corps’ units are heavy. The Regular British Army by comparison has three light cavalry regiments, three armoured cavalry regiments, and three armoured regiments, meaning roughly a third of the Royal Armoured Corps is mounted in tanks. In 2015, the U.S. Army had 96 active-duty cavalry subunits (42 of them mounted in Humvees) and only 66 tank companies, meaning that just 41% of the subunits in the U.S. Armor Branch were heavy while the balance was made up of light armour. It appears that having roughly a third of an armoured branch in tanks seems to be the norm across multiple armies. See Nathan A. Jennings, “Arming for Impact: Empowering Cavalry to Enhance Joint Combined-Arms Operations,” Armor 125.1 (January–March, 2015): 116–120.

33. Cavalry in the U.S. Army use a different nomenclature from that of Commonwealth armies, which can lead to confusion. A cavalry “regiment” in the American context is a brigadesized formation, “squadrons” are battalion-sized, “troops” are company-sized, and platoons make up the sub-subunits of troops. In Canada, “regiments” are battalion-sized, “squadrons” are company-sized, and “troops” make up the smallest sub-subunits.

34. United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, (Washington, D.C.: 12 May 2016), 1-1.

35. Amos C. Fox, “On the Employment of Cavalry,” Armor 133.1 (Winter 2020): 34.

36. Ibid.

37. See Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight: Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 371–372.

38. United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 2, Battlegroup Tactics, 1-15. Note that the British Army’s adoption of the “armoured cavalry” unit structure in 2014 can be somewhat confusing given that there have always been “cavalry” units in the British Army—some historically organized for reconnaissance and some as armoured regiments. Today, some cavalry units are armoured cavalry (such as the Royal Lancers) and some are armoured (such as The Queen’s Royal Hussars). Both maintain the connection to their cavalry traditions, while only the former is officially organized as an “armoured cavalry regiment.” There is consequently a distinction between historical cavalry units and those organized for the role of modern cavalry today.

39. British armoured cavalry are equipped with combat vehicle reconnaissance (tracked) (CVR[T]) Scimitars with 30-mm cannons along with supporting anti-tank and dismounted capabilities. These are soon to be replaced with the Ajax family of vehicles, which provide increased combat capabilities. United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 2, Battlegroup Tactics, 1-A-1.

40. United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 1B, Brigade Tactics, 1-15. 41. McInnes, 105.

42. United States of America, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, 1-1.

43. Fox, 34.

44. In British parlance, this is referred to as “economy of effort.” United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 1B, Brigade Tactics, 1-15.

45. United States of America, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, 5-1.

46. See Cameron, 395.

47. There is a concerted effort by some in the U.S. Armor Branch to return these cavalry units to higher-level formations. See Nathan Jennings, “Reconsidering Division Cavalry Squadrons, Part IV,” Armor 132.2 (Spring–Summer 2019): 5–12; Joseph J. Dumas, “Modern Application of Mechanized-Cavalry Groups for Cavalry Echelons Above Brigade,” Armor 131.3 (Fall 2018): 34–39; Nathan Jennings, “Fighting Forward: Modernizing U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Security for a Great Power Conflict,” Military Review 99.6 (Nov–Dec, 2019): 100–108.

48. McInnes, 101.

49. This is the number of personnel that can be dismounted from vehicles without a consequent loss in combat capability for AFVs. For instance, a Coyote-equipped Canadian Recce Troop may dismount crew commanders and the surveillance operator in order to create a two-soldier dismounted team (for a total of 16 soldiers for the troop), but that would degrade the fighting capability of the AFV, so Coyote-equipped troops are indicated as having eight dedicated dismounts only.

50. United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Head of Warfare Development, The Ground Reconnaissance Tactics Handbook, Army Code 72118, (2019): 2–5.

51. Matthew Darlington Morton, “Men on ‘Iron Ponies,’ the Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.S. Cavalry,” unpublished dissertation, (Florida State University, 2004): 349–352.

52. Peter S. Kindsvatter, “The Army of Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron – A Doctrinal Step Backward?,” monograph, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985): 44–46.

53. United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, Force Structure Reference Data: Stryker Brigade Combat Team, (Fort Benning: October 2016), 34.

54. United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, Force Structure Reference Data: Armor Brigade Combat Team, (Fort Benning: October 2016), 41. 

55. United States of America, U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 3-14, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, (2009): 2-2–2-3.

56. Roger Noble, “Australian Light-Armoured Vehicles (ASLAV) as Mounted Cavalry: Vanguard for a Hardened Army,” Australian Army Journal 2.1 (Winter 2004): 39.

57. Australia, Australian Army, Doctrine Note DN 2-2014, Combat Brigade Aide Memoire, (30 June 2014): 1–17.

58. United Kingdom, Military Training Pamphlet No. 60, Part 4, The Tactical Employment of Armoured Car and Reconnaissance Regiments: The Reconnaissance Regiment, (1944), 2.

59. Maloney, 97.

60. Canada, Department of Defence, CFP 305 (2), Armour, Volume II: Light Armoured Regiment, (18 February 1972), 1-11.

61. Centurion tanks were employed in the DFSV role on an interim basis. Later the Cougar would be procured (and utilized in tank-trainer squadrons rather than in its intended role). See Maloney, 96–97.

62. Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-305-002/FT-001 (CFP 305 (2), Armour, Volume II: The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle, (9 February 1979).

63. Canada, Department of Defence, CAF Catalogue #07482A, Division Reconnaissance Regiment in Operations (training film), Direction and Production Coordination by Pierre Gadbois Productions Ltd, 1988, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=oZcsp4lSDLk (accessed 6 Jan 2020).

64. Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-394-002/FP-001, Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance, (2015): 2A-1-1.

65. T. J. Cadieu, “Alternatives to the Five Car Coyote Troop,” Armor Bulletin 33.2 (September 2000): 12.

66. Cadieu recommended a return to seven-car troops, even if it meant utilizing a light platform instead of two more Coyotes. Cadieu, “Alternatives to the Five Car Coyote Troop,” 13.

67. The requirement for crew rest in extended screen tasks is important, and observation posts are generally considered to consist of two vehicles at a minimum in order to provide for adequate crew rotation. Cadieu, “Alternatives to the Five Car Coyote Troop,” 14.

68. The Dragoons also determined that AFV troops utilizing only mutual support by fire tactics (as proposed by Canadian cavalry-concept advocates) resulted in all tactical tasks taking up to 40% longer. One wonders if this figure would be similar or even vastly greater for a four-car troop of TAPVs, given the much shorter effective range of its main armament compared to the Coyote. See Barr, 126–138.

69. Note that Canada’s brief 1990s experiment with DFSV/cavalry squadrons did not replace reconnaissance squadrons as the current restructure of the RCAC does. Atkinson, 105.

70. P. P. J. Demers, “The Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron – Recommended Organization Based on Multi-National Operations in Bosnia,” Armour Bulletin 35.1 (2003): 25.

71. See Cameron, 443.

72. The choice to create two six-car platoons over three four-car platoons is an interesting one, indicating that the designers of the current Stryker cavalry squadrons prioritized the increased effectiveness of their platoons above simple gross numbers of sub-subunits. United States of America, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, 1–19.

73. United States of America, U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 3-14, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 3–5.

74. Interview with Captain Thomas Gray, Royal Lancers (Queen Elizabeth’s Own), conducted 5 Feb 2021.

75. Robert S. Cameron says of the stealth vs fighting for information debate: “The related issues continue to defy permanent resolution, and, in fact, have been recurring points of debate at least since the 1930s.” Cameron, xvi.

76. McInnes, 95.

77. Cameron, 576.

78. British Armoured Cavalry “can operate mounted to provide a responsive find capability for high tempo manoeuvre or, dismounted ….” United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, Volume I, Part 1B, Brigade Tactics, 1-15; American cavalry squadrons all have varying levels of dismounted capability, United States of America, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, 1–8.

79. Therefore, the concentration of Canadian armoured reconnaissance troops into three to four vehicle patrols during the war in Afghanistan should not come as a surprise or be seen as a repudiation of existing Canadian doctrine. Indeed, regrouping for the conduct of specific security or economy of force tasks is precisely the sort of flexibility required of cavalry organizations. For a discussion of reconnaissance troop reorganization to support specific operational conditions, see Canada, B-GL-050-000/FT-003, Dispatches: The Royal Canadian Infantry Corps in Afghanistan, 7.

80. Quoted in Cameron, 41.

81. Ibid., 578.

82. See Michael Howard, War in European History, updated edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 104. 

83. Indeed, in Canadian doctrine, reconnaissance and security operations are tied together under the title of “enabling operations.” Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations, (1 January 2008) 7-109.

84. Ibid., 7-110.

85. Cameron, 577.

86. Note that this comparison includes only assets integral to the unit order of battle. Other units could be attached to the base organizations.

87. Includes dedicated AT assets only (i.e. excludes standard short-range-style weapons like Second World War-era anti-tank rifles or the current M72 light anti-tank weapon).

88. Includes all large-calibre direct fire guns including light tanks, medium tanks, main battle tanks, assault guns, tank destroyers, and the Stryker-based mobile gun system. Not all of these systems provided the ability to kill tanks of the day, though some did (and thus offset lack of anti-tank (AT) firepower elsewhere in the organization).

89. This only includes elements of at least section-size (eight+ personnel) with a dedicated command element (i.e. the 1–2 scouts per reconnaissance vehicle are not counted if there is not a purpose-designed command structure within the platoon/troop to command them upon dismount). Roles for these dismounts vary in the various organizations from operating as standard infantry, light engineering tasks, dismounted reconnaissance, etc.

90. United Kingdom, The Ground Reconnaissance Tactics Handbook, 2-5; note that British armoured cavalry regiments employed in experimenting with the “strike brigade” concept (such as the Royal Lancers [Queen Elizabeth’s Own]) utilize a slightly different organization. They contain four reconnaissance squadrons (vice three), each with two Scimitar “FIND” troops and two “fire support” troops that combined the support and guided weapons troops of the base organization cited above. Interview with Captain Thomas Gray, Royal Lancers (Queen Elizabeth’s Own), conducted 5 Feb 2021.

91. Morton, 349–352.

92. This squadron consisted of perhaps the most radical grouping of assets at the platoon-level in any cavalry organization, with a cavalry platoon consisting of armoured reconnaissance vehicles, tanks, infantry, and a mortar detachment (all under a second lieutenant). The squadron also included an air cavalry troop with scout and attack aviation as well as an airmobile rifle platoon. See Kindsvatter, 44–46.

93. United States of America, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96), Cavalry Squadron, 1-9–1-21.

94. Ibid.

95. United States of America, U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 3-14, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2-2–2-3.

96. Noble, 39.

97. Note that the cavalry squadron is a part of a three-squadron “armoured cavalry regiment” that contains a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and an APC squadron. However, this organization is a force-generation HQ and does not deploy as a cohesive unit as well as having no combat support assets at regimental-level. See Australia, Australian Army, LWD 3-3-4, Employment of Armour, (2016): 23.

98. United Kingdom, The Tactical Employment of Armoured Car and Reconnaissance Regiments: The Reconnaissance Regiment, 2.

99. Maloney, 97.

100. Canada, CFP 305 (2), Armour, Volume II: Light Armoured Regiment, 1-11.

101. Canada, B-GL-305-002/FT-001 (CFP 305 (2), Armour, Volume II: The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle.

102. Canada, Division Reconnaissance Regiment in Operations (training film).

103. UAS have been incorporated into many current Recce Sqns in Canada, though they remain outside the integral structure outlined in the cited pam. Canada, B-GL-394-002/FP-001, Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance, 2A-1-1.

104. Morton, 365, 475.

105. Mark H. Hoovestol, “The Stryker Brigade Cavalry Squadron in Decisive Action,” Armor 127.1 (January–March, 2016): 7–9; and Jared Wayne, “Strength Punishes, Speed Kills: The Stryker Weapons Troop at the National Training Centre,” Armor 128.2 (Spring 2017): 18–25.

106. It is also a myth that 25-mm-equipped LAV-25s conducted the main anti-tank fight during this engagement, where tanks were mostly destroyed by a combination of airpower, artillery, and the TOW-equipped LAV-AT. See David E. Johnson, Adam Grissom, and Olga Oliker, In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of Medium-Armored Forces in Past Military Operations, (Rand, Arrayo Centre, 2008), 60–61.

107. See Halton, 76; and McInnes, 99.

108. Victoria McGowan, “The Development of the 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment in Normandy and the Scheldt,” master’s thesis, (University of Calgary, 2019), 1, http://hdl. handle.net/1880/110177.

109. The current Canadian cavalry concept is actually much more similar to the Corps armoured car regiments of the Second World War, which contained four to five armoured cars per troop and contained minimal combat support enablers. United Kingdom, Military Training Pamphlet No. 60, Part 1, The Tactical Employment of Armoured Car and Reconnaissance Regiments: General Principles Regarding the Tactical Employment of Reconnaissance Units, (1943): 10.

110. One of the earliest of many examples of cavalry platoons or troops consisting of more than the allegedly “universal” doctrinal principle of four-vehicle troops.

111. United Kingdom, The Tactical Employment of Armoured Car and Reconnaissance Regiments: The Reconnaissance Regiment, 2.

112. Ibid., 14.

113. Ibid., 5.

114. Ibid., 10.

115. Ibid., 5.

116. When the 4th Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) was temporarily forced to dismount and fight as infantry during the Italian campaign, their war diarist noted the loss of morale associated with losing their mechanized steeds: “These were our homes for a long time, and no cavalryman ever felt sadder at losing a faithful and tried mount.” G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume II: The Canadians in Italy, 1943–1945, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 480.

117. In the British Army, reconnaissance regiments were initially called “battalions” and formed from infantry units who organically adopted cavalry culture in dress and organization, to the point that the War Office had to simply accept the practice and officially retitle them as reconnaissance regiments in 1942 with their cavalry traditions intact. Richard Doherty, The British Reconnaissance Corps in World War II, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 4.

118. In the case of the armoured reconnaissance regiments, this conversion was a recognition of the fact that, during the fighting in Northwest Europe, these tank-heavy units had almost universally been used identically to armoured regiments and had rarely been available for their intended close reconnaissance role. Indeed, medium reconnaissance assets from Corps were regularly attached to armoured divisions in Northwest Europe to provide a dedicated reconnaissance asset. See H. F. Joslen, Orders of Battle: Second World War, 1939–1945, (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2003), 10; and Canada, Canadian Military Headquarters, Historical Section, Canadian Participation in the Operations in North West Europe, 1944. Part IV: First Canadian Army in the Pursuit (23 Aug–30 Sep), (22 September 1947), 90.

119. Maloney, 86.

120. See ibid., 83–103.

121. Ibid.,96.

122. St. Aubin’s unit structure is remarkably similar to the 1964 American Division Cavalry Squadron, then in use in Vietnam. Ibid., 96.

123. Ibid., 96–97.

124. Ibid., 97–101.

125. Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-301-001-FP-001, Land and Tactical Air Operations, Volume I: Land Formations in Battle, Book 1, (26 November 1987), 2-2-3.

126. Note that division reconnaissance regiments were not to be all-tank organizations as suggested by McInnes (see McInnes, 98). Rather, they were to consist of three “heavy reconnaissance squadrons” that controlled three seven-car scout troops and two four-tank tank troops. Essentially, the tanks were to operate as the DFSVs had in the aborted light armoured regiment of 1972. Canada, Division Reconnaissance Regiment in Operations (training film).

127. S. J. Bowes, “The Case for a Light Cavalry Regiment (LCR) for Canada’s Army,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2.4 (Winter 1999): 110.

128. Ibid.,111.

129. Commander, Canadian Army, “Force 2025 – Commander’s Planning Guidance,” DLFD S1-2, dated 10 September 2020.

130. An RCAC structure along these lines was recently proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel Cole F. Peterson, who has supported the creation of an “asymmetric Army” with a heavy brigade based in Western Canada. See Cole F. Peterson, “The Asymmetric Army: Transforming the Army for Force 2025,” Canadian Army Journal 19.1 (2021): 48–65.