Russian and Chinese Influence in Afghanistan

Both Russia and China want to contain jihadist extremism to within Afghanistan’s borders. Russia fears cross-border contagion into Central Asia. China is attempting to suppress discontent in Xinjiang, which borders for a short distance on Afghanistan. For both, a prolonged stalemate enabled by US assistance to the government of Afghanistan is preferable to the risks of a Taliban government, despite the Taliban assurance that it is focused only on Afghanistan. As the US prepares to leave, Moscow and Beijing have established contacts with the Taliban.

While their interests and involvement in Afghanistan are not identical, Moscow and Beijing share one overriding concern: preventing the rise of Islamist forces that each sees as having an ‘internationalist’ agenda. Moscow fears that the rise of the Taliban could lead to its ascent in former Soviet Central Asia and in the Muslim-majority regions of Russia itself. Beijing, on the other hand, is concerned that it could strengthen Muslim opposition to Chinese Communist Party rule in its Xinjiang province.

Despite their many differences with the US, both Russia and China acquiesced to (and Moscow even supported) the US-led military presence in Afghanistan as a means of furthering their goal. With the recent drawdown of US and allied forces from Afghanistan, however, the Kremlin and Beijing have been preparing for the complete departure of these forces by working with the beleaguered Kabul government and cooperating with the Taliban and Pakistan, its principal external backer. While both major powers previously saw the Taliban as a threat, they now see it as an ally against more radical movements such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K)^{Footnote 17}  and the East Turkestan Liberation Front, of which they are far more fearful.

Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan has nevertheless been more active than China’s both in the past and at present. The Soviet Union maintained good relations with and provided significant aid to the Afghan monarchy until its downfall in 1973, and the republic that replaced it until its own overthrow by Marxist forces in 1978. The USSR  intervened militarily in support of the Marxist regime at the end of 1979 and conducted a fruitless counter-insurgency campaign against the regime’s opponents, who were being supported by several countries including the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran (both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic). Soviet forces withdrew in 1988-1989, but the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev continued to support the Marxist regime in Kabul. This support ended with the downfall of the USSR and the rise of Yeltsin in Russia at the end of 1991.The Marxist regime fell a few months later and was replaced by an Islamic Republic dominated by northerners who had fought against the Soviet occupation. When this regime was in turn ousted by the Taliban, a movement dominated by Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, Moscow quickly made common cause with its former adversaries from the north to prevent the Taliban from overrunning the entire country. Indeed, prior to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Russia and Iran were the two external powers providing military support for the Taliban’s internal opponents. And Russia had good reason to do so: in addition to playing host to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban allowed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to operate from northern Afghanistan and launch raids into former Soviet Central Asia in 1999 and 2000.

After the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin, not only supported the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, he even approved the establishment of a US military presence in the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to facilitate this. Russian-US relations, though, would soon deteriorate over a number of issues, and in 2005, President Putin began calling for the departure of US forces from Central Asia. Yet despite their many differences, President Putin continued to support the US-led efforts in Afghanistan, especially through the establishment of the Northern Distribution Network that offered the US an alternative supply route from the one through its troublesome partner, Pakistan, which was simultaneously aiding the Taliban. But with the rise of the IS-K and its spread to Afghanistan, the drawdown of US and allied forces, and the increasing vulnerability of the Kabul government, Moscow came to see the Taliban as preferable to the IS-K. While Moscow views the IS-K as having an internationalist agenda designed to spread jihad into Central Asia, it now sees the Taliban’s aims as being limited to Afghanistan. Moscow has held frequent talks with Taliban officials and has joined them in calling for the departure of US and allied forces from the country. At the same time, Moscow is providing security assistance to the Kabul government and promotes itself as a mediator in reaching a settlement between Kabul and the Taliban.

China had preferential ties with Pakistan prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Seeing the USSR as its principal opponent, China supported Pakistani and Western backing for the Afghan mujahedeen fighting against Soviet occupation. Just as Moscow saw the Taliban as supporting Islamists in Central Asia, Beijing feared their support for Islamists in Xinjiang, where there was a growing Muslim opposition movement against Chinese rule. While China did not join in the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, it seemed to view the coalition presence as an obstacle to Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for Islamist movements seeking change in Xinjiang. China has provided some security assistance to the Kabul government and reportedly has established a small military base on Afghan territory near the Chinese border. With the drawdown of US and allied forces, Beijing has also been talking with the Taliban as well as continuing to cooperate with Pakistan, which has remained China’s chief partner in the region.

Some have raised the possibility that as US influence in Afghanistan wanes, Russian and Chinese interests might start to compete with each other in this theatre. But based on how Russia and China have behaved in Central Asia, this seems unlikely. There, Moscow and Beijing seem content with a division of labour whereby Russia provides security in the region while China focuses on economic development, in a manner that benefits Chinese interests. In Afghanistan, China has greater economic interests than Russia, but both regional great powers have very modest commercial and investment ties with Afghanistan. In 2017, Afghanistan imported USD 1.15 billion worth of goods from China. Although this made China Afghanistan’s top import supplier, such an amount was economically derisory for Beijing, as was the mere USD 3.44 million worth of goods that Afghanistan exported to China. Russia had even less economic interaction with Afghanistan: in 2017, Afghanistan’s imports from Russia amounted to just USD 157 million, while its exports to Russia were worth a paltry USD 1.15 million.

China’s main interest is to ensure that Islamist forces in Afghanistan do not threaten Xinjiang. Beijing sees Russian policy there as serving this goal, and so it is supportive of Moscow’s dual approach of supporting Kabul and working with an internally-focused Taliban.

Moscow’s working with opposing sides simultaneously in Afghanistan is not unusual, but rather characteristic of its policy in many conflicts between and within states—between Israel and Iran, the Gulf Arabs and Iran, and opposing parties in Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and even Syria to some extent. Moscow may prefer the stalemate between Kabul and the Taliban to continue, but if the Taliban were to prevail, Moscow would want to have good relations and work with it against IS-K. As recent Russian commentary indicates, Moscow now seems convinced that the Taliban no longer poses a threat to Russia.

Both of these scenarios, though, pose risks for Moscow. A stalemate between Kabul and the Taliban, in which both remain focused on each other, might allow the IS-K and other such forces to grow more powerful. On the other hand, if the Taliban prevails over its internal opponents, it may return to supporting jihadist groups targeting other countries as it did from 1996 to 2001. It is possible, of course, that if the Taliban returns to power, it will indeed confine its activities to Afghanistan, as its representatives have been saying to all who want to hear. The Taliban’s doing so, however, may result in its more radical elements defecting to the IS-K or similar groups.

Concern about the IS-K is not the only reason why Moscow is willing to work with the Taliban. Russia has joined it in calling for the departure of US and allied forces from Afghanistan. Indeed, there are many in Moscow who seem to relish the idea of the US leaving in defeat like the USSR did in 1989. But just as Moscow was calling a few years ago for the US to withdraw its military forces from Central Asia while keeping them in Afghanistan, Moscow may now actually prefer US military assistance to Kabul to continue even if coalition forces depart. This would hedge against the risks entailed in a Taliban victory and maintain US funding to Kabul so that it can continue buying Russian weapons and other goods that it might be unable to afford otherwise and that Moscow does not want to subsidise.

While the security situation in Afghanistan has been growing more precarious, neither Russian nor Chinese interests have suffered much so far. Moscow and Beijing can be said to benefit from the fact that all the contending parties are too weak to prevail but strong enough to keep their opponents in check. The failure of the US and its allies to defeat Kabul’s enemies means that the US cannot use Afghanistan as a secure base from which to spread Western influence into Central Asia. The continued US presence, though, has meant that the Taliban forces, which Moscow and Beijing saw as a threat, did not prevail, and the US and its allies were the ones that took on the main burden of ensuring that did not happen.

Outlook

Combined with the rise of the IS-K, the drawdown of US and allied forces from Afghanistan (as well as President Trump’s promise to reduce their numbers even further) has significantly altered the situation. While the decline of the US and allied military presence portends a shifting of the burden of combating jihadist forces onto Russia and China, the IS-K’s rise has helped cast the Taliban in the role of an organisation seeking only domestic change and sharing its neighbours’ interest in defeating the IS-K. This may allow Moscow and Beijing to maintain a balancing act in which no side can prevail inside Afghanistan nor target their interests. But the situation remains precarious. Russia and China could face a more serious problem should the US and its allies withdraw indeed and either the Taliban come to power and revive its internationalist ambitions or no one is able to prevent the IS-K from becoming powerful enough to do so. If jihadist forces are to be prevented from harming their interests, Beijing and Moscow will have to shoulder much more of the costs. The most likely way in which they would share this burden is through China providing the economic support needed for Russia somehow to manage the security situation. Still, the terms of such an agreement could cause friction between them, especially if Moscow sees Beijing providing economic assistance on terms unfavourable to Russia for a task that Russia sees as benefiting them both.

This worst case, from Russia’s viewpoint has not yet emerged and the Kremlin and Beijing will work hard to ensure that it does not. While they may not admit it publicly, one way for them to make sure that the worst does not come to pass as well as to minimise their costs is for the US and its allies to maintain a sufficient presence in Afghanistan to ensure that neither the Taliban nor the IS-K prevail.