CIMM – IRCC Organizational Review Report by Neil Yeates – October 24, 2023

Neil Yeates
February 2023

Table of Contents

• Introduction
  • Purpose of the review and Summary Findings
• Methodology
• Environmental Scan
  • IRCC growth over last 10 years
• The Four Elements: Organizational Structure, Culture, Management Systems, Governance
  • A. Organizational Structure
    • Strategic Policy and Programs and Operations
    • Corporate Services
    • Other Organizational Units
    • Transformation
    • Afghanistan and Ukraine
    • Response to Crises
    • Summary and Recommendations
    • Recommendation
  • B. Governance
    • Recommendation
    • Recommendation
  • C. Management Systems
    • Recommendation
  • D. Culture
    • Recommendation
• Concluding Unscientific Postscript and What Remains to be Done?
• Annex I – List of Inte rviewees
• Annex II – List of Interview Questions
• Annex III - Summary of Recommendations
  • Organizational Structure Recommendations
  • Governance Recommendations
  • Management Systems Recommendations
  • Culture Recommendations

Introduction

Purpose of the Review and Summary Findings

The purpose of this review is to provide strategic advice to the Deputy Minister on how the department can become a more efficient and effective organization given the many competing demands that it currently faces. These demands include an ambitious annual levels plan, special initiatives in Afghanistan and the Ukraine, continuing high demand for case processing across all business lines, especially for temporary visas, passports and citizenship. Of particular interest is whether the current organizational structure is still “fit for purpose”.

The findings of the review can be readily summarized with the statement that the current organizational model at IRCC is broken but is being held together by the hard work and dedication of staff. Now a series of steps need to be taken to realign the organizational structure (including a major shift to a business line-based structure), reform the governance system, implement stronger management systems (especially planning and reporting) and facilitate the development of a culture to better support the department’s goals and objectives (including consideration of an overall review of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and measures to better leverage the experience and expertise of diverse staff groups). The analysis in this report is based on these 4 pillars: organizational structure, governance, management systems and culture, with recommendations for action in each area. It is important to note that action is required in all of these areas and piecemeal efforts are unlikely to be successful as these factors interact with one another and one may defeat the other if not considered holistically (see in particular the discussion of culture in this regard). The reasons for the current state of affairs are myriad but two stand out: one, the operating environment, both nationally and internationally, has grown ever more complex, unstable and frenetic, and two, the department has grown exponentially since the current organizational structure was put in place over 20 years ago. It is a very different world today and the department must adapt. It is not the purpose or the intent of the review to assign blame, but rather to help the department move forward.

Methodology

The methodology used in the review is a series of interviews with key informants, notably all members of the Executive Committee, select DG’s from across the department, former IRCC Deputy Ministers (which including the reviewer go back to 2009), and other closely related departments and agencies, including the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) and the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) (a list of interviewees and the questions used can be found in Annexes I and II). The interviews have been supplemented by additional research and document review on key issues. To an extent the department is a “moving target” for the review in that events continue to unfold globally and nationally, and work is underway on many fronts, including “lessons learned” from Afghanistan, a governance review, an assessment of the Situation Centre, and perhaps most impactful in the medium term a broad based review of immigration policy. This report begins with an environmental scan and then moves on to an analysis and series of recommendations based on the 4 pillars identified above. The report ends with some implementation considerations, including an assessment of the risks of proceeding and not proceeding with the changes recommended.

Environmental Scan

What are the current forces facing the department? There are many competing forces facing IRCC. A brief discussion of the main ones are discussed below.

• Hybrid work environment and COVID-19 - The nature of office work appears to be changing permanently due to the experience of COVID- 19, whose variants continue to emerge and the severity of which, while appearing manageable at the moment (early 2023), remain unpredictable. The “work from home” model, which many predicted would not work, did in fact work remarkably well, aided by substantial improvements in video technology. Interestingly, few if any today advocate for a full return to the office - that world seems to be disappearing, at least in the public sector. Instead recent direction within the Government of Canada requires a return to the office for 2-3 days per week, with an allowance for exceptions as warranted. Exactly where each department lands on this prescribed continuum is perhaps less important than the new reality of hybrid work. The challenge will be mitigating any negative effects of these new work arrangements, particularly for newer and younger staff who may have limited “in office” work experience. In addition, the impact on organizational culture remains to be seen but one would imagine it will be changed, for better or for worse.
• Demand for IRCC services - For many years the demand for the programs offered by IRCC has been high, typically exceeding the processing capacity of the department as measured in desired processing times or service standards. The latter concept has always been problematic since the budget allocation regime does not generally take any service standards into account, except for the annual levels plan, and even there perhaps not always fully. There are various ways to manage program demand, including placing caps on applications, pausing program intake for periods of time, using third parties to assist in processing (e.g. visa application centres), shifting to fully on line applications, waiving requirements, declaring amnesties and so on. Even with these initiatives demand may still overwhelm capacity in some program areas, particularly where there is a sudden spike as occurred with the passport program when international travel resumed more quickly than anticipated by governments and industry alike. Once demand begins to outstrip processing capacity the inventory can grow frighteningly quickly, which historically in some instances has resulted in special measures, or in the case of asylum, amnesty programs.
• Growth of the department - Since the passage of IRPA in 2001 and the creation of CBSA in 2003, which then became responsible for immigration enforcement, the program responsibilities of IRCC have been relatively stable, with the notable addition of the passport program in 2013. The rationale for the transfer of the passport program from Global Affairs at the time was to build on CIC’ s case processing expertise. What has changed significantly is the size of the department as programs have grown, driven most recently by a levels plan with a target of 500,000 admissions per year by 2025, but also with substantial special initiatives in Afghanistan and the Ukraine. What was a medium sized department in 2013 with 5,217 staff has by 2023 increased to 12,721 - a expansion of 144%. The Ex complement has also increased significantly from 135 in 2013 to 227 today, albeit at 68% much less than the general staff increase, which may explain the substantial workload pressures being felt across the management level, although to the extent staff increases are in processing one would not expect the same level of Ex growth. The Ex 2 and 3 complement has increased from 52 to 94 (81%), while the Ex 4 and 5 complement has grown from 5 to 11 (120%). During this period of significant growth the organizational structure, designed for a much smaller department, has largely remained the same.

IRCC growth over last 10 years

Employees are counted in their substantive position

• Immigration Policy Review - The policy and regulatory landscape is never static and to the extent that programs and policies are not being continually evaluated and updated they will inevitably become outdated and ineffective (i.e. they will no longer meet the objectives for which they were created, if indeed those objectives were clear in the first place which often they are not). In addition, the original policy objectives may no longer be relevant as circumstances change. Without a strong performance measurement regime in place some of these effects may not be “discovered” for some time. Answering the question “what is the purpose of immigration?” is not straightforward and has historically resisted a clear answer as it is many things at the same time. The dominant narrative that Canada is a geographically big country, can accommodate many more people, has a low natural birth rate and low domestic labour force growth has not generally been challenged. The actual impact of immigration, however, is not generally well documented and many other countries with similar challenges as Canada do not turn to immigration to address these issues. All to say a policy review is a timely initiative and may have a significant impact on the future direction of IRCC.
• Transformation - A major thrust for IRCC is transformation, a reimagining of program design and delivery to fit a modern client service system that is “digital by design”. This project, referred to as Digital Platform Modernization, has received substantial funding and has been identified as one of three major initiatives under the purview of the Treasury Board Secretariat Deputy Minister Core Services Committee. These kinds of transformations are always challenging, particularly when the press of regular business is intense, as is the case at IRCC. However, there is little question that IRCC’s processes need to shift to becoming fully digital and re-engineered along the way.
• Uncertainty – It has been said that if you don’t like uncertainty then a senior public service role is not for you. IRCC is operating in highly uncertain times. Globally armed conflicts are on the rise, democracy is in retreat in some parts of the world and migration is growing, exacerbated by the above factors along with climate change and the enduring search by many for the opportunity of a better life. It appears that the strength of these forces will increase in the years ahead and may have a substantial impact on IRCC.

The Four Elements: Organizational Structure, Culture, Management Systems, Governance

A. Organizational Structure

As noted previously, the current organizational structure of IRCC has been in place for more than 20 years. It is not a typical structure for a program delivery department, where program policy and delivery would usually be integrated in single business line units. On the surface it is a bit odd that a country like Canada, which has long been a leader in asylum and humanitarian measures, does not have an ADM Asylum, for example. An integrated delivery model is found in the Settlement and Integration Sector, which was established several years ago, and includes an array of policy and program delivery responsibilities, the core of which is a substantial grants and contributions regime. However, some program policy elements remain in other sectors (eg. Refugee Resettlement Policy in SPP). The persistence of the current structure can be explained by the fact that it has worked reasonably well over time, that some amount of matrix management is unavoidable at IRCC, with multiple business lines that extend into case processing domestically and internationally, and a recognition that major re-organizations can be disruptive and distracting affairs.

Strategic Policy and Programs and Operations

IRCC is dominated by two large sectors: Strategic and Program Policy (SPP), and Operations. The lines between program policy and program delivery are understandably blurry. These two sectors need to work closely together or the consequences for the department will be severe. Today, the work is being carried out due to a strong collaborative culture, not through strong governance or management systems. About 15 years ago Assistant ADM positions were established in SPP and Operations in recognition of the broad scope of these sectors, the increasing workload and the need for a second-in-command. Today, due to workload pressures these sectors have essentially been split in two and the A/ADM’ s, now simply called ADM’s, do not report to the Senior ADM of the Sector but rather directly to the DMO. They are no longer the 2-i-C in the Sector to the extent that acting assignments are typically taken by DG’s from that half of the Sector. This is not to say these ADM’s do not work closely together, indeed they must, but that the organizational model has from an accountability perspective been radically altered and theoretically at least it is up to the DMO to ensure all of this comes together, which is challenging to say the least.

Corporate Services

Some of the corporate functions are relatively standard with Communications and Internal Audit as standalone units, others less so. The division of labour between Finance, Security and Administration and Corporate Services (which is mostly HR, and oddly Parliamentary Affairs, privacy and ATIP) is a somewhat mixed bag and could be done differently, and was in the past with all of the Corporate Services (including HR) under a single ADM with a more focused CFO role separated out and both positions reporting to the DM. Some functions such as governance support, Cabinet and Regulatory Affairs and Parliamentary Affairs are not directly overseen by the DMO. CIC, the former incarnation of IRCC, had a Corporate Secretary with responsibility for these functions and the position reported to the DMO, and today a number of departments use this model. There is also a trend across departments to combine Internal Audit with Evaluation in order to take advantage of the synergies between these two different but related lines of work. Audit results can helpfully inform evaluations and vice versa.

Other Organizational Units

Finally, there are a number of what can be described as “bolt on’s” across the department, including the Future of Work, the Anti-Racism Task Force, Conflict Resolution and Afghanistan, where units have been established to deal with new priorities and placed where capacity exists to manage them, somewhat irrespective of the logic of the current organizational structure. While seen as a necessity at the time due to workload pressures and in some cases a desire for clearer accountability, this approach is generally not sustainable over the longer term and tends to create other problems, including coordination with existing sectors which would normally be responsible for these endeavors and ensuring proper governance and oversight.

Transformation

The Digital Strategy, Services and Innovation Sector is a mix of transformation work, which is mostly business process re-engineering, and traditional information technology, the latter an enabler of the former. The Sector has two ADM’s: one for Digital Strategy and one as the CIO, and both report directly to the DMO, representing another hybrid structure similar to SPP and Operations. The transformation project, expected to take 5-7 years and referred to as Digital Platform Modernization, has 3 phases with Phase 1 now complete and Phase 11 well underway (scheduled to be completed in March 2023). Both of these phases are being led by the CIO. Phase III, which is the more complex design and development of a new digital operating model, is being led by the Digital Strategy ADM. In general it is not ideal to associate business process re-design with IT, even though the objective in this case is to create a digital platform, because there is a significant risk that re-design will become detached from operations and program policy. Unfortunately, the highway is littered with the wrecks of failed “transformation” projects, particularly those associated with IT. The Phoenix pay system has achieved legendary status in this regard as the extremely, and many would argue overly, complex federal pay regime essentially broke the leading edge payroll software of the day. A major way to mitigate this risk is through strong governance and this appears to be in place at IRCC with the DM-led Transformation Committee. A cautionary note is that many interviewees, both internal and external, generally indicated a lack of clarity and understanding of Digital Platform Modernization. One would not expect this to be the case given the governance regime in place. That said, important progress is being made as witnessed by the impressive development of online services in Phase II, including the new online citizenship test, the Citizenship Tracker, e-applications for permanent and temporary residence, study applications and critically capability to set up an account and receive status updates on file processing.

Afghanistan and Ukraine

It is instructive to consider the different approaches taken for the Afghanistan and Ukraine initiatives. Afghanistan is a major resettlement initiative in a highly complex environment that requires considerable coordination with other departments and agencies, while the Ukraine is at this point a temporary movement, the evolution of which remains to be seen. To note the Syrian crisis also started out as a temporary movement and only later involved permanent settlement of refugees from the still running civil war. For Afghanistan a new sector was established in November 2021 and an ADM recruited to lead it with a mandate to “Lead and reinforce IRCC’s work to advance the Government of Canada’s commitment to resettle at least 40,000 Afghan nationals by fostering horizontal collaboration, to provide strategic advice and integrated planning and reporting to implement the Afghan resettlement initiative, and to foster stakeholder support, confidence and participation”. This is a very public commitment and has received a considerable amount of media attention, often focused on challenging individual cases. The ADM reports directly to the DMO and not through Operations. At the start the precise role and accountabilities of the Sector were unclear, which is not surprising since these functions would normally be undertaken by the Operations, SPP and Settlement Sectors. The task of sorting this out was taken up by the new ADM and resulted in an admirably clear Responsibility, Accountability, Consultation, Information (RACI) matrix. It is somewhat disconcerting to observe that 59 discrete items are identified, testifying to the complexity of these arrangements. The case of Ukraine is much more straightforward as it is largely the responsibility of the Operations Sector and thus works within existing reporting and accountability channels with linkages to SPP and Settlement, and other areas of the department as required. The differences in approach to these initiatives are shown in the table below (prepared by Operations Sector), with the addition of Syria, where a similar approach to Ukraine was taken with the A/ADM Ops as the departmental lead. It is important to note that Syria became a resettlement initiative while Ukraine remains a voluntary visa application-based initiative with settlement supports.

Was it necessary to set up a separate sector for the Afghanistan initiative? Clearly that was the assessment at the time and given the pressures on the department, described as “unrelenting”, both to deliver on the government’s commitment and the existing workload, it is understandable. Now, however, the question is when should this sector be disbanded and responsibilities sent back to the respective sectors?

Response to Crises

An important question has been raised as to how IRCC should prepare itself for the periodic crises that confront the department. Should IRCC have a permanent “response team” in place? The short answer is no. There are several reasons for this conclusion. One, it is not feasible to have a group of experienced staff underutilized in periods when there is no “crisis”. Two, having a separate unit is always going to be a complex endeavor to manage as it interferes with the regular responsibilities and accountabilities of the existing sectors, and additionally these events evolve over time and can change significantly (e.g. Syria). Third, to the extent that a crisis requires senior leadership (e.g. an ADM lead as was determined for Afghanistan) and additional capacity (Afghanistan and Ukraine), these resources can be placed within existing structures. Fourth, the current diffusion of accountabilities at IRCC can be considerably lessened with a different organizational structure. There are, however, are several measures that can be undertaken to ensure IRCC is better prepared for the inevitably occurring crises (are “crises” still “crises” when you are expecting them?). These include developing protocols for crisis and emergency management, determining the desired role of the Situation Centre and learning from other departments that are often required to respond to crises (e.g. Department of National Defense). There are likely only a handful of scenarios that would need to be mapped out.

Summary and Recommendations

In summary, the current organizational model has been adjusted in a number of ad hoc ways over the past several years to deal with workload pressures and crises and is no longer “fit for purpose”. Therefore, it is time to consider major changes.

Recommendation:

With respect to organizational structure it is recommended that IRCC move to a business line organization.

With respect to crisis management it is recommended that IRCC develop protocols for crisis and emergency management that identify ADM leads in various scenarios.

B. Governance

Effective and efficient governance is essential for the management of a large organization. At IRCC there is a strong consensus that current governance arrangements are neither effective, efficient or even readily understandable. As noted in a recent (November 2022) draft governance review “The current structure is no longer serving its purpose as there are too many layers of the same conversation, convoluted processes, and an over reliance on consensus”. This finding was amplified in the interviews and it was observed that most of the actual decision-making occurs in DMO/ADM bilats. Thus, many respondents felt that too much of committee time is being taken up by information items, receiving presentations leaving little time for actual discussion and decision-making limited or unclear (“what was decided?”). These are common complaints about meetings in most organizations and some have taken radical action (Shopify recently announced it was “banning meetings”). However, at IRCC it is clear that these concerns need to be addressed. It is particularly urgent given the workload pressures on the department. ESDC has developed a performance management regime for its governance committees, which include a series of outcomes and indicators, which is worth IRCC examining. The indicators include such measures as the percentage of items presented linked to the departmental plan and the percentage of meeting time spent on discussion and/or decision-making (both have a target of 70%).

The table below provides an overview of the current governance committees at IRCC.

DM Corporate Governance oversees the horizontal, strategic decisions and direction of the organization.

ADM Operational Governance oversees the tactical, day-to-day, operational decisions of the organization.

Departmental Audit Committee (DAC) provides objective advice and recommendations regarding the sufficiency, quality and results of assurance on the adequacy and functioning of IRCC’s risk management, control and gouvernance frameworks and processes, including accountability and auditing systems.

Performance Measurement and Evaluation Committee (PMEC) uses performance measurement and evaluation information to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Departmental programs. It ensures timely course-correction to enhance program results.

National Security Committee (NSC) aims to strengthen domain and operational awareness of national security issues relating to the Department as well as identify priorities and develop advice relating to national security matters.

Legal Issues Management Committee (LIMC) supports the Deputy Minister and Associate Deputy Minister in the effective management of significant legal issues and risks arising from operations, policies, procedures, and litigation, and to strengthen the management of legal costs incurred by the Department.

DM/DMA Advisory provides insight on more specific standing issues and results.

In reviewing the Terms of Reference of these committees a number of observations can be made:

• The committees are large - despite the suggestion in all of the terms of reference that “The effective size of a committee has been set at 8-12 members” all of these major committees exceed this guidance by a considerable margin, averaging 17-21 members. This is a very large size and makes strategic discussion a challenge and meetings potentially quite time consuming. The diffuse organizational structure and lack of clear accountability at IRCC results in large committee membership in order that all of those with “a piece of the pie” are represented.
• Transformation has its own governance - one of the biggest risks with transformation initiatives is that they become separated from day to day operations and secondly, they become overly associated with IT. The Transformation Committee is described as an advisory body but it is chaired by the DMO, so one would think it should be a decision-making forum. A sub-committee of the Transformation Committee is the Digital Transformation Programme Board, co-chaired by 2 ADM’ s, and is described as a “delegated decision-making authority”. The substance of this delegation is not in the Terms of Reference but is outlined in a separate Programme Management Framework that extends to individual letters of agreement on roles and accountabilities. Specific governance for crown projects is a TBS requirement and thus unavoidable, but linkages with the rest of the governance system are crucial.
• Two of the critical department-wide fora are chaired by ADM’s and the DMO is not directly involved - these fora are the Corporate and Finance Committee (CFC) and the Issues Management Committee (IMC), both of which provide regular reports to the Executive Committee (Ex Comm). Both fora are described as operating with “delegated decision-making”, although the nature of this delegation is not documented in the Terms of Reference for these committees. It is observed that “inconclusive decisions” will be referred to Ex Comm. It is critical that the DMO provide regular oversight of operations given the nature of IRCC and this needs to be reflected in the governance regime. To note in passing “issues management” is not really governance, but rather the focus needs to be on accountability and the overall management of the department.
• Both the Issues Management Committee and Corporate and Finance Committee are supported by an array of DG-led committees - the IMC and CFC both include 7-8 DG representatives and therefore there is a question as to potential overlap and repetition between these different levels of governance.
• IRCC has a number of key inter-dependencies with other departments and agencies - of particular relevance are the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). Responsibility for immigration enforcement is largely assigned to CBSA under IRPA and CBSA is at least indirectly, if not directly in some areas, accountable to the Minister of IRCC, while the IRB reports through the Minister of IRCC on immigration appeals and refugee claims determination. ESDC has a service provider role for a range of programs including passports, Temporary Foreign Workers and Express Entry, with a lead role on Foreign Credential Recognition and labour market services. GAC manages the Government of Canada’s international platform of which IRCC is by far the largest user. GAC also has a strong policy interest in immigration and asylum issues given its leadership role in international relations and particularly where IRCC’s actions may have a significant impact on bilateral relations. These program and policy relationships are complex and require considerable and regular attention if they are to be successfully managed. The horizontal nature of this work is challenging given the federal accountability systems are largely vertical and are the natural default position. With IRB a DM-led Asylum System Management Board is in place, but with CBSA, GAC and ESDC there is no formal governance at the DM level. Making inter-agency governance work requires continued and consistent leadership by DM’s and agency heads through an established structure that can then oversee and direct ADM and DG inter-agency fora. In addition, while IRCC is generally the policy lead with respect to its relationship with these departments and agencies, it is important to involve these organizations in policy discussions. As IRCC has learned from its own experience policy needs to be informed by operations as otherwise unintended consequences can quickly be realized, including the risk that the policy cannot in fact be implemented, or at least not in the way anticipated. It should be emphasized that consulting on policy matters does not mean obtaining the formal approval of these organizations, but rather that IRCC needs to ensure it fully understands the operational implications, and in the case of GAC the impact on bilateral relations, of policies it is seeking to advance and the views of these organizations need to be reflected in the analysis within IRCC.

Recommendation:

Based on the above observations and the substantial feedback on governance received through the staff interviews it is recommended that the IRCC governance regime be streamlined as follows:

• That the Executive Committee assume responsibility for finance and corporate services and thereby absorb the functions of the Corporate Finance Committee.
• That a new Operations Committee be established, chaired by the DMO, that will absorb the functions of the Issues Management Committee.
• That the membership of these committees be reconsidered as part of the re-organization process and that membership be no larger than 12.
• Eliminate the ADM-led CFC and IMS.
• Review the DG-led committees with a view to streamlining and ensuring alignment with the new governance regime.
• That the Terms of Reference be updated to reflect any changes and any delegated authority be explicitly outlined.
• That formal governance mechanisms at the DM level with ESDC, GAC and CBSA be established and meet on a quarterly basis.

Sharing a single piece of legislation, in this case IRPA, between 2 Ministers (IRCC and CBSA/Public Safety) is a complex undertaking and as recommended above requires structured governance to be effectively managed. It appears that the current split of responsibilities and accountabilities is not optimal and this has been the case since the inception of CBSA and remarked upon by previous Deputy Ministers. This creates unnecessary friction in the IRCC/CBSA relationship and runs the risk of reducing the effectiveness of both organizations.

Recommendation:

That a review be undertaken of the split of responsibilities between IRCC and CBSA under IRPA be undertaken with an objective of rationalizing and streamlining roles and accountabilities.

C. Management Systems

Large organizations depend on effective management systems and without them things can quickly become chaotic and descend into “issues management”, a series of periodic crises that seemingly were unknown and unpredictable. However, experience shows that the stronger a planning and reporting system that an organization has in place, the fewer crises there are, or at least the department is much better prepared to deal with them having presaged many of them and undertaken mitigation strategies early on. What are the components of such a regime? The table below outlines what is described as an “Accountability System” with three major elements: planning, performance measurement and reporting.

Within each of these categories there are a number of different elements and there are various ways to approach them. What matters most is that they are in place. The focus on accountability is the centre of this regime and the intent is that all of the department’s accountabilities are included. It is not a priority-based regime, nor one focused on a Minister’s mandate letter, both of which are inherently limited and prone to missing key elements of actual accountability for the Minister and department. The lack of clear accountabilities across the department is one of the major issues emerging from the interviews and this system is designed to fix this fundamental problem. The important idea is to have a plan, measure progress and report on it on a regular basis and make adjustments as required. When this system was in place at then CIC from 2009 to 2013 it was referred to as “Quarterly Reporting”, as the full range of department plans were reviewed by the Executive Committee every 3 months based on milestones for that quarter. A 5 year strategic plan was developed for the 2010 to 2015 period, supported by HR, IT and financial plans. It was not long: 6 strategic goals with key strategic actions under each (43 initiatives in total) with key results (21) identified. The objective within this regime is to realistically plan work, foresee risks and develop mitigation strategies as required. In the model graph between promises on the one axis and delivery on the other one wants to avoid the “over promise and under-deliver” quadrant. Experience has shown that managers do not generally lack ambition to get work done and if anything are overly optimistic. These regular quarterly discussions amongst one’s peers and the Deputy Ministers provides the necessary discipline to ensure planning and delivery are well aligned. No one wants to be in the position of explaining every 3 months why something was not completed or conversely be seen as under-contributing to the department’s work.

At IRCC today department-wide planning is limited and some interviewees suggested it has in fact disappeared completely. There is no multi-year strategic plan, annual plans are not in place consistently across the department and consequently reporting is seen by many as haphazard. This is not to say that the forward agenda planning for the various governance committees is not well developed and well organized as it appears to be so through the work of the Corporate Governance Unit. And many sectors have their own planning documents and extensive dashboards and reports. It is rather the larger context is missing, which must be driven by a planning regime. Financial planning and reporting forms the backbone of the current approach, which is generally the default position of government departments and is often the case for government as a whole where “planning” revolves not so much around a plan per se but the annual budget. The budget always gets delivered and so it is with departments. In reviewing the departmental P6 financial report one can observe the missing planning elements. These include reviewing the levels budget allocations (including FTE’ s) against expected results and structural pressures, actual and planned resource utilization by Program, workforce and staffing plans, expectations for new investments in intake, prioritization and management, and the department’s costing and benefit strategies (see slide 8). This is within the context of a forecasted lapse of $368 million, much of which is tied to funding for Afghanistan and Ukraine, but Sectors themselves are forecast to lapse $75 million. At the same time the Passport Revolving Fund is projecting a deficit of $238 million. The question is posed in the report as to what extent the department can absorb future funding requests (see slide 7), and furthermore, to what extent should Digital Platform Modernization projects be adjusted to fit within existing IT capacity and emerging priorities (see slide 6). With respect to DPM it is also noted that phases II and III do not have ongoing sources of funds with the suggestion that anticipated cost savings may be an offset.

The IRCC budget is indeed complex and thus requires a great deal of management attention, which is why a more streamlined CFO function is recommended. The P6 report itself is excellent. It does underline, however, that financial planning has to be built on robust program planning, hence the many questions in the report. Program and financial planning are supported by human resource and IT planning, all of which need to be reviewed by the Operations Committee. The key to all of this is that a regime be in place and that it is designed to meet the needs of the department. The extensive quarterly reporting system previously in place will likely be seen as too much by some and thus the trick will be to design a system that the department can commit to and is willing to devote the time to developing and maintaining. This will require the leadership of the Deputy Ministers. The federal public service is highly attuned to the signals of senior leadership and any lack of commitment will be quickly sensed and staff will adjust their efforts accordingly.

Recommendation:

Therefore it is recommended that IRCC:

• Deputy Ministers lead a new planning and reporting regime
• Develop a 3 to 5 year strategic plan
• Undertake an annual planning cycle across all areas of the department, including HR, IT, Financial and Program plans
• Implement a quarterly reporting regime
• Ensure linkages with the departments performance management work

D. Culture

Organizational culture is notoriously difficult to grasp and define but there is little question that it is a real force and needs to be understood in the context of implementing change. Wikipedia defines organizational culture as “a set of shared assumptions that guide behaviour” and further that “...organizational culture affects the way people and groups interact with one another, with clients and with stakeholders”. This is not to say the culture is necessarily uniform in an organization as there may well be several sub-cultures also in play, some of which may conflict with one another. Importantly, it is also noted that organizational culture will affect how people react to certain changes (i.e. changes that are perceived to conflict with the culture will be resisted). Henry Mintzberg, a former academic at McGill University specializing in management, has observed that “Culture and especially ideology do not encourage strategic change so much as the perpetuation of existing strategy” (p. 268 in Strategy Safari, 1998). Interestingly, culture can be difficult even for those in an organization to define. Mintzberg suggests much of culture “...exists below the level of conscious awareness” and consists of “taken for granted assumptions” but this ambiguity may in fact be a strength and is often cited in the context of successful organizations.

In talking to senior managers at IRCC the culture was universally seen as “committed”, “collaborative”, “supportive” and so on. Furthermore, the strong culture underpinning IRCC, which has been of this nature for many years, is seen as helping to overcome the shortcomings of the current organizational structure and of the weakness of the governance and management systems. Seen in this way culture can trump these other factors and hence the oft quoted maxim that “culture eats strategy for lunch” attributed to renowned management theorist Peter Drucker. At the same time, IRCC’s culture is seen as having a defensive element, resistant to change, whose first reflex is to refuse new initiatives but if eventually taken on heroic efforts are made to achieve the desired outcomes.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides an important backdrop to the culture at IRCC. This complex legislation replaced The Immigration Act (1985) in 2001 and has since been amended many times, but the basic framework remains as originally conceptualized and that is as “exclusionary”, itemizing many reasons for refusing an application, including extensive inadmissibility provisions. The preface to the 2017 Annotated IRPA quotes a British common law ruling that notes “no alien has any right to enter this country except by leave of the Crown”. The modern parlance of client service has little place in IRPA where there are no clients, only applicants and claimants. There is a reference to “consistent standards and prompt processing” under the immigration objectives (see 3(1)f) in the context of achieving the government’s immigration goals. All to say that it may be an appropriate time to review the legislation recognizing what a large and complex task this would be, but also recognizing the impact of this legislative framework on the department culture, the relationships with partner departments and agencies and the achievement of IRCC’s goals. It would be instructive to re-draft the objectives outlined in IRPA to get a sense of what the “before” and “after” scenarios might look like.

Another set of cultural factors revolve around case decision-making under IRPA, which is delegated to individual officers who are trained in the provisions of the legislation. Little attention has historically been paid to “unconscious bias” although anti-racism and diversity have become important themes in the department with the creation of the Anti-Racism Task Force, for example, and in the federal government more broadly. The idea of unconscious bias has been defined by science journalist Jessica Nordell as follows: “Unconscious bias is about growing up in a particular culture. We learn the categories of people in that culture - whether it’s race or ethnicity; or ones based on class, ability, disability, gender or sexual orientation. We learn beliefs, stereotypes and ideas about those groups. When confronting someone belonging to one of those categories, all that information stored in our memory influences the way we interact with that person...This kind of bias is pervasive, and can be under appreciated in terms of consequences, which can be severe” (from an interview in the Director Journal (November/December 2022) but also see her recent book, The End of Bias). Immigration and refugee case decisions are hugely impactful, and the history of Canadian immigration and refugee policy attests to what was a highly discriminatory regime (country or ethnic preferences, for example, were in place until 1962 - see Valarie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015). The Anti-Racism Task Force has a leadership role on racism and bias with a number of important initiatives underway, including, for example, the creation of a Racial Impact Assessment Tool and the launch of pilots to test it, working with the Settlement Sector to assess the proposal intake process, and use of a comparative case study on Nigeria and India to develop an Institutional Bias and Racism Identification Methodology for use in operations and risk management. These issues have also received attention from the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which published a report in May 2022 titled Differential Treatment in Recruitment and Acceptance Rates of Foreign Students in Quebec and in the Rest of Canada, making 35 recommendations. The department’s response indicated it agreed “either partially or in full” with all of the recommendations and outlined actions being undertaken in a number of areas. Overcoming racism and bias is at least in part about culture change. The development of executive leadership competencies by IRCC in this area is a helpful tool to both guide managers and to promote accountability (the identification of ineffective behaviours – something seldom seen – is worth noting in particular). This work also includes departmental responsibilities with respect to Truth and Reconciliation.

A recent front page Globe & Mail story points to the potential cultural conflict between what might be called the “IRPA school” and the “client service school”. The Globe obtained an internal report discussing potentially waiving some eligibility requirements as a means to deal with the large backlog of visitor visa applications (see January 17, 2023 issue). To those who are close followers of IRPA waiving such requirements is somewhat of a heresy, while for those who are more concerned with service it may be a necessary compromise. On the one hand this is a clash of values and on the other differing views of acceptable risk. Either way it is likely a reflection of tensions rooted in organizational culture. This tension may be exacerbated by the significant reduction in immigration expertise in the ADM/DG cadre. Historically, a majority of DG’s and ADM’s were immigration officers steeped in IRPA, served in missions overseas and who had risen through the ranks, whereas today few senior managers have this expertise. This creates a credibility gap with both front line staff and managers from the “IRPA school”.

Recommendation:

Based on the above assessment it is recommended that IRCC:

• Undertake a review of IRPA to determine whether amendments should be made to better support desired outcomes, including improved service delivery.
• Review the training provided to staff involved in the administration of IRPA to ensure if reflects the desired philosophy and approach of the department.
• Examine means to integrate the voices of IRCC’s diversity communities into the departmental governance regime.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript and What Remains to be Done?

IRCC is at a crossroads and as Yogi Berra famously quipped “when you come to a fork in the road, take it”. But which fork to take? There are risks involved either way. The “Big Bang” organizational change will clearly be disruptive, but as noted at the outset the current model is broken and cannot be fixed with a few minor adjustments. A substantial majority of those interviewed would support wholesale change. So, the advice is to proceed now. Implementation can be done in phases and the “tidying up” option identifies these which represent a suite of changes than can be done immediately. Moving ahead on organizational restructuring will require a staff engagement and change management strategy. Announcing the intended end state and the process to be used in getting there will be crucial. At the end of the day the recommendations in this report, which have been informed by a relatively extensive series of interviews, are the considered judgment of the reviewer and it is of course up to the department to decide on how to proceed based on their own assessment of the situation. There is much work to be done, but the path forward outlined in this report will put the department on a much stronger footing to move ahead and deal with the multiplicity of challenges it is facing. IRCC is a strong organization with deeply committed staff and with an extremely important mandate for the future of Canada. It has many strengths to build on and with a robust change agenda can move forward with confidence.

Annex I - List of Interviewees

Afghanistan Sector
Jennifer MacIntyre, Assistant Deputy Minister

Corporate Services Sector
Holly Flowers Code, CHRO & Assistant Deputy Minister
Caitlin Imrie, Director General, Integrated Corporate Business & Chief Privacy Officer
Sarah Michaud, Director, Corporate Governance Division

Deputy Minister’s Office
Scott Harris, Associate Deputy Minister
Arun Thangaraj, Associate Deputy Minister

Digital Strategy, Service and Innovation Sector
Jason Choueiri, Chief Digital Officer & Senior Assistant Deputy Minister
Darcy Pierlot, Chief Information Officer & Assistant Deputy Minister

Finance, Security and Administration Sector
Hughes St-Pierre, Assistant Deputy Minister
Julie Chassé, Director General and Deputy Financial Officer

Operations Sector
Daniel Mills, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister
Tara Lang, Director General,, Centralized Network
Marie-Josee Dorion, Director General, Operational Planning and Performance
Pemi Gill, Director General, International Network
Michèle Kingsley, Assistant Deputy Minister

Settlement and Integration Sector
Catherine Scott, Assistant Deputy Minister

Strategic and Program Policy Sector
Marian Campbell Jarvis, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister
Michelle Mascoll, a/ Director General, Resettlement Policy
Philip Somogyvari, Director General, Permanent Economic Immigration Branch
Soyoung Park, Assistant Deputy Minister
Tina Matos, Director General, Admissibility
Nicole Girard, Director General, Citizenship

Strategic Immigration Review Sector
Louise Baird, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister

Other
Caroline Forbes, Executive Director and Senior General Counsel
Farah Boisclair, Director, Anti-Racism Task Force
Murray Jones, Director General, Communications
Nicole Primeau, Chief Audit Executive
Simon Cardinal, Director General, Future of Work Centre of Excellence

External
Catrina Tapley, Former Deputy Minister, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
(2019-2022)
Marta Morgan, Former Deputy Minister, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
(2016-2019)
Anita Bugusz, Former Deputy Minister, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
(2013-2016)
Laurie MacDonald, Associate Deputy Minister, Employment and Social Development Canada
and former Associate Deputy Minister, IRCC (2018)
Richard Wex, Chairperson, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
and former Associate Deputy Minister, IRCC (2015-2018)
Jean-Francois Tremblay, Deputy Minister, Employment and Social Development Canada

Erin O’Gorman, President, Canada Border Services Agency
David Morrison, Deputy Minister, Global Affairs Canada

Annex II - IRCC Interview Questions

• Please describe the role of your sector/branch?
• What are the key inter-relationships between your sector/branch and other parts of IRCC and other departments/governments/stakeholders?
• How do you report and be accountable for your work?
• What do you think are the biggest management challenges facing IRCC?
• How would you describe the culture at IRCC?
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the governance regime within IRCC?
• What do you see as the current strengths and weaknesses of IRCC’s organizational structure?
• What are the biggest barriers to the effectiveness of your sector/branch, the department?
• If you could make three changes to management systems, governance or organizational structure, what would they be?

Annex III - Summary of Recommendations

Organizational Structure Recommendations:

With respect to organizational structure it is recommended that IRCC move to a business line

organization.

With respect to crisis management it is recommended that IRRC develop protocols for crisis and

emergency management that identify ADM leads in various scenarios.

Governance Recommendations:

Based on the above observations and the substantial feedback on governance received through the staff interviews it is recommended that the IRCC governance regime be streamlined as follows:

• That the Executive Committee assume responsibility for finance and corporate services and thereby absorb the functions of the Corporate Finance Committee.
• That a new Operations Committee be established, chaired by the DMO, that will absorb the functions of the Issues Management Committee.
• That the membership of these committees be reconsidered as part of the re-organization process and that membership be no larger than 12.
• Eliminate the ADM-led CFC and IMS.
• Review the DG-led committees with a view to streamlining and ensuring alignment with the new governance regime.
• That the Terms of Reference be updated to reflect any changes and any delegated authority be explicitly outlined.
• That formal governance mechanisms at the DM level with GAC, ESDC and CBSA be established and meet on a quarterly basis.
• That a review be undertaken of the split of responsibilities between IRCC and CBSA under IRPA be undertaken with an objective of rationalizing and streamlining roles and accountabilities.

Management Systems Recommendations:

Therefore it is recommended that IRCC:

• Deputy Ministers lead a new planning and reporting regime
• Develop a 3 to 5 year strategic plan
• Undertake an annual planning cycle across all areas of the department, including HR, IT, Financial and Program plans
• Implement a quarterly reporting regime
• Ensure linkages with the departments performance management work

Culture Recommendations:

Based on the above assessment it is recommended that IRCC:

• Undertake a review of IRPA to determine whether amendments should be made to better support desired outcomes, including improved service delivery.
• Review the training provided to staff involved in the administration of IRPA to ensure if reflects the desired philosophy and approach of the department.
• Examine means to integrate the voices of IRCC’s diversity communities into the departmental governance regime.