Evaluation of Joint and Common Force Readiness

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Executive Summary

This report presents the results of the Evaluation of the Department of National Defence (DND) Joint and Common Force Readiness (JCFR) Program. The evaluation examined the relevance and performance of this program over the period of 2010 to 2015, and it was conducted in accordance with the 2009 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Evaluation.¹ This program has not been previously evaluated in its entirety; however, components of the program have been included in previous evaluations.

The JCFR Program encompasses the activities required to produce and renew joint and common force elements on a continual basis for use in defence combat and support operations. Results are delivered by assembling joint and common force elements from the fundamental elements of defence capability and integrating them through various training and certification programs. This ensures that they have the requisite amount of readiness in order to fulfill predefined roles within the operations for which they are destined.

JCFR is built upon a foundation of existing land, sea and air readiness. The funds expended specifically on JCFR in fiscal year (FY) 2014/15 totaled $80 million or 0.44 percent of the defence expenditures with interoperability and integration training expending $48 million.

JCFR is one of the fundamental components of the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) ability to rapidly deploy. The CAF identifies eight High Tempo Units / High Readiness Units (HTU/HRU), seven of which are joint units. Five of the seven joint units are under the command of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and conduct readiness activities. First Canadian Division (1st Cdn Div), with its deployable Joint Headquarters (HQ), National Command Element (NCE), Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) capabilities, is a vital enabler of the Government of Canada’s (GC) ability to respond to emergencies.

The responsibility for joint and common production and readiness is fragmented. Joint and common readiness is the only force generation capability without a clearly identified force generator. The dispersed responsibilities inhibit holistic management of joint and common readiness. This report contains recommendations to the organizations responsible for specific areas of joint and common readiness. However, a single joint and common “force generator” would provide clear governance and oversight to this vital capability.

The DND allocation of resources does not reflect the actual joint and common resources expended. The evaluation identified joint and common activities that were allocated to other Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) elements such as training. This inaccuracy resulted in an inability to identify the resources expended for joint training and inhibited the assessment of economy and efficiency. A brief summary of the key findings and recommendations of the evaluation is provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations. This table summarizes the key findings and recommendations of the evaluation.

Note: Please refer to Annex A—Management Action Plan for the management responses to the ADM(RS) recommendations.

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Context for the Evaluation

This report presents the results of the evaluation of the DND JCFR Program. The evaluation examined the relevance and performance of this program over the period of 2010 to 2015 and was conducted in accordance with the 2009 TBS Policy on Evaluation.² This program has not been previously evaluated. However, sub-section 1.3.3 in this report notes components of the program that were included in previous evaluations.

In the conduct of the evaluation, the evaluation team requested that representatives from L1 organizations and specific divisions, including CJOC provide 1st Cdn Div, SJS, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian) (ADM(HR-Civ)) and the Canadian Army (CA), with advice and support to ADM(RS). Consultations were held at key intervals throughout the evaluation, specifically when defining the project scope, developing the logic model, identifying key performance indicators and reviewing preliminary findings. The findings and recommendations in this evaluation may be used to inform management decisions related to program delivery and resource allocation, and they will serve as a baseline for future evaluations.

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1.2 Program Profile

1.2.1 Program Description

The JCFR Program encompasses the activities required to produce and renew joint and common force elements on a continual basis for use in defence, combat and support operations. Results are delivered by assembling joint and common force elements from the fundamental elements of defence capability (i.e., personnel, materiel and information systems, information and, in some cases, real property) and integrating them through various training and certification programs so that they have the requisite amount of readiness in order to fulfill predefined roles within the operations for which they are destined. There are portfolios for force elements that operate jointly across these domains and force elements that provide common support functions.³

Common capabilities are required to support the CAF. Common capabilities are services, materiel or facilities provided on a common basis for two or more elements, or other organizations as directed.⁴ The Military Police, as an example, provide police services to all elements and bases. This support, while not joint, provides a capability required by the CAF.

The definition of what is a specific “joint” activity for the evaluation team and the CAF is a challenge. There are several definitions used in the DND/CAF dealing with different levels of “jointness.” The definition of joint is “activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two components participate.”⁵ At the highest strategic level, the passage of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (Bill C-238), on February 1, 1968, unified the Canadian Forces into a single “joint” force comprising the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the CA and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) elements. For example, an RCN vessel can sail with an RCAF helicopter detachment and a CA cook. Under the stated definition, this core RCN activity is technically “joint.”

The definition for joint training has evolved. The Defence Terminology Bank defines joint training as “training of a force comprised of elements from two or more of the environments, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control over such a force.”⁶ CJOC has recently proposed a new and more relevant definition for joint training. For the purpose of the evaluation, the JCFR Program utilized the following CJOC definition of “joint” with a specific focus on exercises and governance:

Joint training is an activity that prepares individuals, joint staffs or joint forces to respond to strategic, operational or tactical requirements to execute their assigned or anticipated missions. Joint training encompasses individual training and collective training of joint staffs, units and the service components of the Canadian Armed Forces.⁷

1.2.2 Program Objectives

The JCFR Program ensures DND is ready to operate in a joint capacity, as directed by the Government, to respond to domestic, continental and international requirements within specified response times. The program will generate and sustain forces for activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two environments (e.g., RCN, CA and RCAF) participate. This is accomplished through the provision of training of a joint and common nature, the equipping of forces and the provision of their means to deploy in a joint capacity.⁸

The specific outcomes of the program in support of this objective are depicted in the JCFR Logic Model (see Annex C).

1.2.3 Stakeholders

JCFR is the responsibility of multiple stakeholders, some of whom have it as a secondary responsibility. For example, the RCN has the responsibility of ensuring RCN and Maritime Component Command readiness.

Stakeholders include, but are not limited to, the following:

Main Force Employers

a. CJOC

b. Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)

c. North American Aerospace Defence Command

Under CJOC

a. 1^st Cdn Div HQ

b. Maritime Component Command

c. Joint Force Air Component Command

d. All Source Intelligence Centre

e. Joint Task Force Atlantic

f. Joint Task Force East

g. Joint Task Force Central

h. Joint Task Force West

i. Joint Task Force Pacific

j. Joint Task Force North

k. Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group

l. Operational Support Hubs (when activated)

m. Deployed Joint Task Forces

n. Joint Task Forces being prepared for specific missions

Other Organizations

a. RCN

b. CA

c. RCAF

d. Chief Military Personnel (CMP), Health Services Group

e. Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM)

f. Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) (ADM(PA))

g. SJS

h. VCDS

i. ADM(IM)

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1.3 Evaluation Scope

1.3.1 Coverage and Responsibilities

The JCFR Program is linked to the DND/CAF PAA under the strategic outcome “Defence Remains Continually Prepared to Deliver National Defence and Defence Services in Alignment with Canadian Interests and Values.”⁹ Specifically, this evaluation includes portions of the following program and sub-programs:

• 3.0 Defence Ready Force Element Production
• 3.1: Force Elements Readiness Sustainment
  • 3.1.5: Joint and Common Roles – Readiness Sustainment
• 3.2: Force Elements Integration Training
  • 3.2.5: Joint – Integration Training
  • 3.2.6: International and Domestic – Interoperability Training
• 3.3: Force Elements Production
  • 3.3.5: Joint and Common – Force Element Production

• 3.4: Operational Readiness Production, Coordination, and Command and Control

  • 3.4.5: Joint and Common – Force Elements Production, Coordination, and Command and Control

1.3.2 Resources

Multiple L1 organizations and CAF elements attributed resources to the JCFR PAA. The primary L1 organizations involved are: CJOC, SJS, VCDS, ADM(PA), CA, RCAF, RCN and CFINTCOM.

1.3.2.1 Financial

Over the five fiscal years covered by the evaluation, JCFR expenditures averaged $185 million dollars during the evaluation period. Table 2 contains the JCFR expenditures within the PAA in thousands of dollars.

Table 2. JCFR Expenditures per PAA Element. This table contains the JCFR expenditures by PAA sub-sub-program and the percentage of change over years 2011 to 2015.

Multiple L1 organizations expended resources in support of JCFR. Table 3 contains the JCFR expenditures, excluding personnel, by L1 organization in thousands of dollars. L1-specific JCFR expenditures averaged $66 million during the evaluation period. The RCAF delta¹⁰ of $21 million in 2014 was in response to the inclusion of RCAF participation in joint exercise activities under PAA 3.2.5. Moving 1st Cdn Div from the CA to CJOC accounts for the CA decrease and the CJOC increase in 2014. The ADM(HR-Civ) expenditure in 2015 was a one-time event spread across all PAA elements to account for the change in civilian payment cycle.

Table 3. JCFR Expenditures by L1 Organization. This table denotes the JCFR expenditures, excluding personnel, by L1 organization over years 2011 to 2015.

1.3.2.2 Personnel

Joint and common readiness is built upon a foundation of existing land, sea and air readiness. JCFR PAA elements include a combination of dedicated L1 full-time equivalents (FTE) and an apportionment of RCN, RCAF and CA personnel time expended in support of joint and common activities. This combination is then applied to the CMP and Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) / Chief Financial Officer (ADM(Fin)/CFO) expenditures. Table 4 denotes the FTEs allocated to the joint and common PAA elements in FY 2015. The FTEs as a percentage of the DND total is 1.8 percent for military and 0.9 percent for civilian personnel.

Table 4. FTEs by PAA. This table denotes the FTEs allocated to the Joint and Common Readiness PAAs for 2015.

1.3.3 Exclusions

The evaluation excluded JCFR activities that have been previously evaluated or audited by ADM(RS) or by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Additionally, activities that will be the subject of a future evaluation(s) are not covered in this evaluation. The evaluation scope excluded the following components of JCFR:

• CFINTCOM
• CANSOFCOM
• Space and cyber activities¹¹

• Military Police¹²

1.3.4 Issues and Questions

In accordance with the TBS Directive on the Evaluation Function (2009),¹³ the evaluation addresses the five core issues related to relevance and performance. An evaluation matrix listing each of the evaluation questions, with associated indicators and data sources, is provided at Annex D. The methodology used to gather evidence in support of the evaluation questions can be found at Annex B.

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2.0 Findings and Recommendations

The following sections examine the extent to which the JCFR Program addresses a demonstrable need, is appropriate to the role of the Federal Government; is aligned with DND/CAF priorities, performs against expected outcomes and demonstrates efficiency and economy. To make this determination, the evaluation analysed program documents, empirical data and qualitative evidence.

2.1 Relevance—Continued Need

This section examines whether JCFR continues to address an ongoing demand for the outcomes and objectives of the program. The findings in this section are based on documents reviewed and informant interviews with representatives from CJOC, SJS, VCDS, RCAF, RCN and CA. The indicator “evidence of current and future need for the programme” was used in the assessment of alignment with federal roles and responsibilities.

Key Finding 1: The JCFR Program is a critical support element to force readiness, allowing the DND/CAF to respond to the needs of the GC.

In DND, the JCFR Program has an important and direct link to the overall readiness of the CAF as it aims to sustain the readiness state of joint and common force elements that have been assigned to roles requiring them to prepare for operations.¹⁴ Those joint and common forces elements that are assigned roles requiring a specific readiness state must take the appropriate action to maintain the necessary level of readiness. Results are provided through the conduct of periodic training, exercises and maintenance activities, which ensure that the capabilities attained by these force elements do not degrade and that they remain responsive to fulfilling assigned roles when called upon.

Between FY 2011/12 and FY 2015/16, joint and common forces were deployed both domestically and internationally in response to a wide range of crises and threats as directed by the GC. The readiness is supported by undertaking dozens of exercises each year. There is also a growing expectation that readiness levels must be maximized in order to meet operational demands in a security environment that continues to be unpredictable and volatile.

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2.2 Relevance—Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

This section examines the extent to which the program aligns with departmental and federal roles and responsibilities. The following indicators were used to assess the alignment with federal roles and responsibilities:

• alignment of JCFR with government acts and legislation; and
• alignment of JCFR with government policies and strategies.

Key Finding 2: The JCFR Program aligns with the roles and responsibilities set by the Federal Government.

The JCFR Program is aligned with the roles and responsibilities of DND. The program ensures Defence is ready to operate in a joint capacity, as directed by the Government, to respond to domestic, continental and international requirements within the required response time. According to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive, “Force Posture and Readiness defines the force requirements and capabilities, in force generation terms, consistent with [the current defence strategy], aligning with Government of Canada policy with potential military outcomes.” The Directive further states that it is “the mechanism through which I direct the CAF … to prepare for contingencies, support ongoing commitments, and apply resources to ensure the effective delivery of military capability.”¹⁵

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2.3 Relevance—Alignment with Government Priorities

This section examines whether the objectives of the JCFR Program are consistent with current GC and DND/CAF priorities. The following indicators were used to assess the alignment with federal priorities:

• alignment with GC defence priorities; and
• alignment with DND/CAF priorities.

Key Finding 3: The JCFR Program is aligned with CG and DND/CAF defence priorities.

Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R) characterizes the force in relation to a set of missions, as outlined in the GC policy and establishes a quantifiable relationship between readiness, operational requirements and GC direction. JCFR is also a key priority for DND that ensures that resources are aligned and available to support determined readiness levels, and the DND/CAF is therefore able to position military capabilities to meet planned and anticipated requirements of the Government of Canada.¹⁶

The DND Report on Plans and Priorities 2014-15 states that the organizational priority is to maintain required CAF posture and defence readiness by implementing the tasks identified in the annual CDS Directive for CAF FP&R 2013 in order to ensure resources are aligned and available to support determined readiness levels. This is achieved via the following PAA sub-sub-programs:

• 3.1.5: Joint and Common Operations Roles – Readiness Sustainment
• 3.2.5: Joint – Integration Training
• 3.2.6: International and Domestic – Integration Training
• 3.3.5: Joint and Common – Force Element Production

• 3.4.5: Joint and Common – Force Elements Production, Coordination and Command and Control

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2.4 Performance—Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

This section evaluates the achievement of the JCFR expected outcomes with a focus on PAA 3.0 – Defence Ready Force Element Production Program, which produces and renews force elements on a continual basis for use in defence combat and support operations and for the delivery of defence services and contributions to government. This is done in order to increase the likelihood of success and decrease risk of failure in the defence of Canada and promotion of Canadian interests. Results are delivered by assembling force elements from the fundamental elements of Defence capability (i.e., military personnel, materiel and information systems, information and, in some cases, real property) and integrating them through various training and certification programs so that they have the requisite amount of readiness in order to fulfill predefined roles within the operations for which they are destined. The term readiness refers to the volume, endurance, responsiveness and capability attributes of force elements that are not employed. These attributes are used to determine the degree of risk that would be associated with assigning them to fulfill perspective roles within ongoing or contingency operations. There are portfolios for force elements that operate jointly across these domains and force elements that provide common support functions. Across these portfolios, force elements are produced to meet readiness targets. These readiness targets ensure that production can be sustained over short- and medium-term horizons, and that the number of force elements available for employment in ongoing and contingency operations is in accordance with acceptable levels of operational risk.¹⁷

Accordingly, an assessment of JCFR was conducted based on the following immediate outcomes:

• ability to sustain the readiness state of joint and common force elements that have been assigned to roles requiring them to be ready for operations (PAA 3.1.5: Joint and Common Roles – Readiness Sustainment);
• ability to increase the level of integration between joint force elements across different environment portfolios so that collective objectives of a larger joint formation can be achieved (PAA 3.2.5: Joint – Integration Training);
• ability to increase the level of interoperability between force elements from multiple nations or domestic organizations so that the collective objectives of these cooperative ventures can be achieved (PAA 3.2.6: International and Domestic – Interoperability Training);
• ability to produce portfolios of individual force elements that operate across the environmental domains and have attained the ability to operate as a cohesive unit capable of delivering unique capabilities that can be built upon and integrated into a larger task-tailored force (PAA 3.3.5: Joint and Common – Force Element Production); and

• ability to ensure that joint and common force elements are ready to be employed in Defence operations or deliver defence services. (PAA 3.4.5: Joint and Common – Force Elements Production Coordination and Command and Control).¹⁸

2.4.1 Joint and Common – Readiness Sustainment and Element Production

Joint and common components are required to be able to support all elements of CAF operations. The key components of this ability are element production and readiness sustainment. This section of the report will evaluate the effectiveness of resources expended in PAA 3.1.5 and PAA 3.3.5.

Immediate Outcome – Joint and Common Roles – Readiness Sustainment PAA 3.1.5

The JCFR Program aims to sustain the readiness state of joint and common force elements that have been assigned to roles requiring them to be ready for operations. Results are provided through the conduct of periodic training, exercises and maintenance activities, which ensure that the capabilities attained by these force elements do not degrade and that they remain responsive to fulfilling assigned roles when called upon.¹⁹ Table 5 denotes PAA 3.1.5 expenditures. The $1.2 million expended by Land Force Québec Area Montréal in 2013 and the $143 million expended in 2014 were incorrectly attributed to PAA 3.1.5. The CA requested that the funds be allocated to the correct PAA elements. The Military Police is not in the scope of this evaluation as it was covered in the 2013 Evaluation of Military Police Services.²⁰

Table 5. PAA 3.1.5 Expenditures. This table denotes the PAA 3.1.5 resources expended from FY 2010/11 to FY 2014/15 in dollars.

Joint and Common – Force Element Production PAA 3.3.5

The Joint and Common – Force Element Production Program seeks to produce portfolios of individual force elements that operate across the environmental domains and have attained the ability to operate as a cohesive unit capable of delivering unique capabilities that can be built upon and integrated into a larger task-tailored force. Results are delivered through structured readiness production processes where force elements are assembled from the fundamental elements of Defence capability (i.e., military personnel, materiel and information systems, information and, in some cases, real property). Within this program, force elements acquire abilities to deliver a range of military effects according to understood concepts and standards. The products provided by this program sustain Defence by directly enabling the Joint and Common Roles – Readiness Sustainment, the Joint – Integration Training and the International and Domestic Interoperability Training programs. In some cases, the readiness targets set to be assigned to employment within Defence operations are consistent with the degree of readiness obtained by force elements through this program. In other cases, force elements must transition to the Joint – Integration Training Program before attaining the requisite level of readiness.²⁴ Table 6 denotes PAA 3.3.5 expenditures.

Table 6. PAA 3.3.5 Expenditures. This table denotes the PAA 3.3.5 resources expended from FY 2010/11 to FY 2014/15 in dollars.

The indicators used to assess readiness sustainment and element production are as follows:

• extent to which joint and common elements support the DND/CAF;
• extent to which joint and common element production and readiness are effectively governed;
• extent to which 1^st Cdn Div remains continuously ready to apply Defence capabilities during operations against threats or to deliver defence services;
• extent to which C-IED supports Defence capabilities during operations against threats or to deliver defence services;
• extent to which periodic readiness training events are conducted to ensure sustainment of the required readiness level; and
• extent to which force generation activities conducted produce ready joint and common elements.

Key Finding 4: Joint and common readiness is vital to DND’s ability to rapidly deploy for most missions.

The CAF has to be ready to respond rapidly when requested by the GC. The CAF maintains capabilities that are constantly available for deployment within as little as eight hours.²⁷ The CAF also meets this requirement through the generation of HTU/HRUs. HTU/HRUs are designated units or positions that are regularly tasked for short-term deployments of 1 to 60 days primarily to special duty areas or special duty operations.²⁸ HTU/HRU personnel and equipment are required to be ready to be deployed within stated timelines. These units form a rapid CAF core response with capabilities that can be augmented over time with support from other CAF units if required.

Joint and common readiness is one of the fundamental components of the CAF’s ability to rapidly deploy. The CAF identified eight specific HTUs/HRUs, seven of which are joint units.²⁹ The seven joint units are under the command of CJOC, with five in the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Support Group and two comprising 1^st Cdn Div.³⁰ 1^st Cdn Div, with its deployable Joint HQ, NCE, DART and NEO capabilities, is a vital enabler to the GC’s ability to respond to emergencies. As 1^st Cdn Div also utilizes the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Support Group, the evaluation focused on 1^st Cdn Div.

Key Finding 5: The joint and common element production and readiness governance and responsibilities are fragmented and lack L1 oversight and coordination.

The responsibility for joint and common production and readiness is fragmented. Element production and readiness is normally the responsibility of an L1 position. The responsible positions for readiness production and sustainment activity are as follows:

• Maritime Readiness Sustainment : Commander RCN;
• Land Readiness: Commander CA;
• Aerospace Readiness: Commander RCAF;
• Special Operations Readiness Sustainment: Commander CANSOFCOM; and
• Joint Readiness: Chief Military Personnel (VCDS), Deputy Commander CJOC and CAF Provost Marshal (VCDS).³¹

Document reviews revealed the CAF lacks the governance and coordination provided by a single joint and common L1 force generator. JCFR is the only force generation capability without a clearly identified force generator. In the past, VCDS was the L1 responsible for joint and common readiness sustainment and capability management. Through recent transformations and resource constraints, responsibilities have been transferred between multiple force generators. For example, during the evaluation period, CJOC became a force generator in addition to having force employer responsibilities.³² The dispersed responsibilities inhibit holistic management of joint and common readiness. This report contains recommendations to the organizations responsible for specific areas of joint and common readiness. However, a single joint and common force generator would provide clear governance and oversight to this vital capability.

Key Finding 6: 1^st Cdn Div meets the readiness requirement for the four core tasks.

1^st Cdn Div has a long, but fragmented, history of providing the CAF with a rapidly deployable HQ responsible for the command and control of joint and combined forces in response to a variety of crises. 1^st Cdn Div was established at the beginning of the First World War as Canada’s first fighting element of the conflict on August 10, 1914. 1^st Cdn Div was established three more times: during the Second World War, following the Korean War in 1954, and again near the end of the Cold War in Kingston, Ontario in November 1989.³³

In 2000, 1^st Cdn Div HQ was disbanded for the fourth time. In its place, Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group was created under the Deputy CDS and comprised the Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters, the Canadian Forces Joint Signal Regiment and Canadian Forces Joint Support Unit. Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group was subsequently disbanded in 2006, and Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters and Canadian Forces Joint Support Unit were transferred to Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and Canadian Operational Support Command respectively.³⁴ The CDS directed the reinvigoration of the Canadian Forces’ joint deployable Command 2 capability in 2009, thus re-establishing 1^st Cdn Div.³⁵ Control of 1^st Cdn Div was formally transferred from the CA to CJOC on January 8, 2016.³⁶ The current iteration of 1^st Cdn Div HQ is based in Kingston, Ontario.

1^st Cdn Div HQ is responsible for supporting the following core tasks:

• humanitarian operations and disaster relief at home and abroad;
• non-combatant evacuation operations for the safe evacuation of Canadians abroad, such as in Lebanon in 2006;
• first rotation of deployable joint HQ for full-spectrum operations, such as the past mission in Afghanistan; and
• provision of an NCE responsible for the command and the logistic, operational and strategic support of Canadian military assets and personnel.³⁷

As stated in the Key Finding 4, 1^st Cdn Div forms a key component of DND’s rapid response capability. The following are examples of 1^st Cdn Div operations conducted during the evaluation period:

• Operation PROVISION – Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon (Syrian Refugee Evacuation), November 2015
• Operation RENAISSANCE 15-01 – Nepal (DART), May 2015
• Operation IMPACT – Kuwait (NCE), January 2015
• Operation RENAISSANCE 13-01 – Philippines (DART), November 2013
• Operation MOBILE – Libya (NEO), March 2012

These examples demonstrate the readiness and ability of 1st Cdn Div to deploy at a moment’s notice on any of their four primary tasks: DART, NEO, Deployable Joint HQ and NCE. This is demonstrated by successful completion of their four primary tasks. To increase high-readiness capability, 1^st Cdn Div is investigating the possibility of creating of a second deployable DART.

2.4.2 Immediate Outcome – Joint, International and Domestic Interoperability Training PAA 3.2.5 and PAA 3.2.6

CAF joint and common training is divided into the two main categories of joint integration and international/domestic interoperability training. Joint integration training, PAA 3.2.5, aims to increase the level of integration between joint force elements across different environment portfolios so that collective objectives of a larger joint formation can be achieved. International and domestic interoperability training, PAA 3.2.6, aims to increase the level of interoperability between force elements from multiple nations or domestic organizations so that the collective objectives of these cooperative ventures can be achieved.³⁸

The indicators used to assess this immediate outcome are as follows:

• extent to which joint training is effectively governed;
• extent to which PAA 3.2.5 and PAA 3.2.6 joint and common training is effectively managed;
• extent to which joint force elements have completed integration training events; and
• extent to which lessons learned are leveraged to improve interoperability.

The Joint – Integration Training Program aims to increase the level of integration between joint force elements across different environment portfolios so that collective objectives of a larger joint formation can be achieved. Results are achieved through the execution of training events like JOINTEX, which increase joint readiness to deal with the complexities of modern warfare. After partaking in this program, force elements attain abilities to deliver a broader range of military effects. This program sustains Defence by enabling the Joint and Common – Readiness Sustainment Program and by enabling the employment of joint force elements within ongoing Defence operations or to deliver defence services.

The International and Domestic – Interoperability Training Program aims to increase the level of interoperability between force elements from multiple nations or domestic organizations so that the collective objectives of these cooperative ventures can be achieved. Results are achieved through the execution of international or domestic training events. Recent examples include Exercises RIMPAC, JOINT WARRIOR and TRIDENT FURY. After partaking in this program, force elements attain the ability to deliver a broader range of military effects during defence operations. This program sustains Defence by enabling the Force Element Readiness Sustainment Program and by enabling the employment of force elements within ongoing Defence operations or to deliver defence services.

Key Finding 7: Governance of joint and common training has improved during the evaluation period.

Effective governance requires clear alignment of responsibilities and authorities. SJS was assigned as Collective Training Authority in 2009.³⁹ DAOD 8015-0 – Collective Training assigns SJS the responsibilities to coordinate collective and integrated training plans and to amend the CAF Collective Training and Exercise Guidance.⁴⁰ In 2013, CJOC was tasked as the CAF Combined and JTA. As the JTA, CJOC was tasked to develop, execute and maintain the Joint Management Readiness Plan, and assumed authority, responsibility and accountability for CAF joint readiness validation.⁴¹ No additional resources were provided to CJOC when it was assigned this responsibility. CJOC is currently in the process of staffing the positions required to support the JTA activities.

The principal issue with the original governance was one of capacity. With only a lieutenant-colonel, a major and a financial administrator, SJS could not perform suitable governance on a force-wide level. With the JTA in place, this team can now provide critical oversight of a program and ensure strategic synchronization but will not be drawn into detailed tactical and operational-level discussions on what is to be accomplished. Those previous requirements did not allow for a truly strategic overview. Additionally, there were no evaluation criteria in place and no guidance that forces linkages between environments. All that could be governed was each environment conducting activities within environmental lines. Additionally, it was difficult to link CJOC collective training needs to operational deployment cycles, resulting in the current assignment of forces to exercise, which may not be optimized to deploy on real-world operations.

Interviews with stakeholders revealed that, following the transfer of responsibility to CJOC, the implementation of the transformation is ongoing. CJOC J7 continues to manage the strategic direction of activities, working with SJS to obtain the correct resources and CDS guidance in order to build on the plan to meet the short-term (one-to-five-year) requirements. Governance will continue to be influenced through resource allocation by SJS and implemented through CJOC. The largest change that is envisioned is the move within the functional authority from a collegial system to one that is a more directive as it matures to ensure more effective coordination and alignment to operations readiness and to other L1s’ FP&R responsibilities.

Key Finding 8: The assignment of CJOC as JTA has improved the coordination of joint and common training.

Various efforts are taking place to improve joint and common training coordination. Guidance and policy documents are being introduced and revised, CJOC J7 is researching an alternative exercise management tool to replace the Collective Training and Exercise Schedule (CTES), and lessons learned are being utilized to improve interoperability.

The Commander of CJOC/JTA directed that the JMRP evolve into two separate documents. The first one, the JMRP, Volume I – Guidance for the Conduct of Joint Readiness Training in the Canadian Armed Forces, will be the guidance for the conduct of joint readiness training in the CAF. The intent of this guidance is to provide enduring direction on what needs to be achieved to increase the CAF’s level of joint readiness. It will be reviewed and re-published as required. The second document, the JMPR, Volume II – Canadian Armed Forces Joint Training and Validation Plan, will be published annually in the spring and will include joint training events and associated validation activities that will increase joint readiness.⁴²

CTES is a one-stop shop designed to provide broad and detailed knowledge of CAF collective training exercises or events, including: exercises, aims and objectives, exercise specifications and instructions, participant lists by organization, funding and budget information, planning documents and document templates, exercise planning and conference scheduling, feedback and lessons learned, etc.

Initial investigation by the evaluation team showed that CTES has the capability to manage joint training. However, further research revealed that it is a data repository and not a management tool. Information obtained from interviews with key stakeholders revealed that it is an outdated system that does not integrate newer technologies. It does have a large amount of capability, but it is unwieldy and therefore cannot be easily presented to management. Force generators make little use of CTES capabilities other than providing updates at the budgeting portion of the year to request training funds in a central place. Even that function has been disregarded as it is too restrictive to use. CJOC has replaced this function with a detailed joint training spreadsheet. Inevitably, CTES will continue to become less relevant and even obsolete. CJOC J7 is researching an actual exercise management tool, based on the NATO system, which could be useable for management from conceptualization to close out.

Leveraging the results of joint training is vital to improve interoperability. The implementation of a robust lessons learned and validation capability is required to meet this need. CJOC, as the JTA and owner of lessons learned, maintains them within the KMat database on both classified and unclassified networks, allowing entry and retrieval of lessons learned documentation. Information is produced from major exercises in the form of a First Impressions Report, followed with a consolidated After-action Review and a final presentation to the Armed Forces Council. For example, the First Impressions Report observations from the JOINTEX 15 command post exercise were routed to CJOC and ADM(IM) for action, resulting in improved capabilities in time to support the actual JOINTEX 15 live exercise.

Interviews revealed that lessons learned are being used by exercise planners to improve interoperability. At the outset, they have strategic objectives and contingency plans that identify training objectives. The trend is to use those training objectives coupled with lessons learned and after-action reviews from the past to influence how the upcoming exercises are to be designed. This cycle allows planners to determine if they met those goals, and so the loop continues when new exercises are designed based on information gathered, thereby reducing areas of weakness and improving on their strengths.

Key Finding 9: Joint and common training resources were not properly attributed to PAA elements.

Joint training ensures that the CAF is trained, equipped and prepared to employ a broad portfolio of military capabilities that offer versatility across the full spectrum of military operations.⁴³ As such, data extracted from CTES demonstrates that joint force elements have successfully completed hundreds of integration training events during the evaluation period. These joint and common training activities are attributable to PAA 3.2.5 and PAA 3.2.6.

Resources accounted for in PAA 3.2.6 do not reflect the resources actually expended. The PAA sub-sub-activities are aligned as maritime, land, aerospace, special operations and joint and common. Each of PAA sub-sub-activities 1 to 4 are assigned to various L1s. For example, maritime training is the responsibility of Commander RCN, whereas joint and common responsibility is assigned to: Chief of the Naval Staff, Chief of the Army Staff, Chief of the Air Force Staff, Commander CANSOFCOM, CMP, Deputy Commander CJOC and the CAF Provost Marshal.⁴⁴

There is a famous saying that states that “if everyone is responsible then no one is responsible.” For example, the interoperability training exercises documented in DPR 2014/15 are not accounted for in the PAA expenditures. Exercise TRADEWINDS⁴⁵ included participants from the RCN and the CA without accounting the resources under PAA 3.2.6 as denoted in Table 7. Fund Centre C170, controlled by SJS, was created in 2013 to record expenditures relating to large joint, interagency and combined exercises and training.⁴⁶ SJS, as the comptroller of C170 training funds, should ensure these funds are accurately attributed to the respective PAA elements.

Table 7. L1 Joint Training Expenditures to PAA Expenditures in FY 2014/15. This table denotes the PAA expenditures, the training and exercise funding by L1 organization and the delta for FY 2014/2015, excluding military and civilian HR costs.

2.4.3 Immediate Outcome – Joint and Common – Force Elements Production Coordination and Command and Control PAA 3.4.5

Joint and Common – Force Elements Production Coordination and Command and Control PAA 3.4.5 ensures that joint and common force elements are ready to be employed in Defence operations or deliver defence services. Results are achieved by developing and maintaining joint and common command and control structures that deliver governance, directives, policies and procedures, coordination, resource planning and management, that exercise overarching control and that provide advice and direction for and in the joint and common military operations context.

Not all PAA 3.4.5 expenditures are within the scope of this evaluation. Table 8 denotes the PAA 3.4.5 expenditures by every L1 during the evaluation period. The expenditures, excluding personnel resources, averaged $11.6 million during the evaluation period. The VCDS expended on average 66 percent of the PAA 3.4.5 resources. The RCN expenditures, totalling $11,000 for the evaluation period, were not evaluated. ADM(HR-Civ) expenditures were explained in section 1.3.3 – Resources of this report. CFINTCOM activities were previously evaluated. The CA expenditures averaging $1.1 million during the evaluation period were primarily expended on 1st Cdn Div and the C-IED Task Force. CJOC expenditures were primarily for the J7 training staff, which is covered under Key Finding 12. Lastly, SJS was excluded due to the meagre $39,000 spent.

Table 8. PAA 3.4.5 Expenditures by L1 during the Evaluation Period. This table lists the PAA 3.4.5 expenditures by L1 for years 2011 to 2015.

The indicator used to assess this immediate outcome is as follows:

• extent to which VCDS provides joint and common support to military personnel.

Key Finding 10: The increase in charging rates of Department of Justice lawyers combined with flat funding resulted in a decreased level of DND/CF LA personnel resources. DND/CF LA has been managing increasing requests for services with fewer staff.

Military members require support to conduct their duties. The support function is normally provided by the base to which the member is assigned. However, there are positions that are not within an acceptable range to a CAF base. Where numbers permit, a CFSU provides support to personnel in a given geographic area.

Two principle examples of this are in the National Capital Region (Ottawa/Gatineau) and in Europe. VCDS provides support for personnel through CFSU (Ottawa) and CFSU (Europe) respectively. CFSU (Ottawa) provides support to the 7,072 military positions in the National Capital Region.⁴⁷ CFSU (Europe) provides support to CAF personnel and their families in Europe. There are more than 300 CAF members plus their families living and working in various locations throughout Europe. CAF soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen serve in more than 10 different European locations.⁴⁸

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2.5 Performance—Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

The indicators used to assess this immediate outcome are as follows:

• extent to which the DND/CAF joint and common resources and outputs support PAAs outcomes;
• evidence of efficient use of financial resources;
• evidence of performance measurement processes/activities; and
• evidence that alternative processes / delivery arrangements are considered.

Key Finding 11: The inconsistent accounting of joint and common resources inhibits analysis of economy and efficiency.

The DND allocation of resources does not reflect the actual joint and common resources expended. PAA 3.1.5 expenditures, excluding HR allocations, averaged $1.6 million or 0.0086 percent of the total defence budget per year during the evaluation period. The evaluation identified joint and common activities that were allocated to other PAA elements such as training.

DND is inconsistent in the assignment of resources to PAA 3.2.5 and 3.2.6. The two PAA sub-sub-activities of joint integration and international/domestic interoperability training incorporate the resources expended for joint training exercises. Table 7 denotes the PAA expenditures, excluding military and civilian HR costs, the training and exercise funding by L1 organization and the delta for FY 2014/2015. The L1 organizations assign resources to PAA elements according to their own internal attribution rules. The inconsistent application of rules for joint training resulted in the RCAF assigning $21 million, while the RCN and CA assigned $0 to joint and common training. If no other RCN and CA joint training is conducted, the respective expenditures of $581,000 and $111,000 C170 funds should be assigned to the joint training PAAs.

The inability to identify the resources expended for joint training inhibits the assessment of economy and efficiency. The delta between the training fund centre and PAA elements is $17.9 million. However, when excluding the RCAF assignment, the delta changes to -$2.1 million. This results in a potential accuracy window of + or - $20 million. This accuracy window also does not include the resources for joint training not funded by the C170 fund code. The creation of a CAF-wide definition of joint and common training activities and attribution ruleset would improve the accuracy of the resources expended. Due to the joint training governance challenges noted earlier in this report, although SJS currently controls the allocation of C170 funds, the Office of Primary Interest (OPI) should be the JTA to ensure the rules encompass all joint training activities and not just the C170 funds. Furthermore, the implementation of a performance measurement framework can mitigate the above stated issues and aid in improved monitoring and accountability.

Key Finding 12: Assignment of CJOC as JTA is in alignment with allies.

CJOC is responsible for joint training of the CAF. As the JTA, CJOC J7 (Exercises and Training) is responsible for managing the new JTA responsibilities of Commander CJOC, coordinating the selection and delivery of pre-deployment mission essential individual training, development and delivery of joint operational-level training to the CAF, managing financial allocations for joint operational-level training within CJOC to achieve force generation (using Joint Exercise Training Account (JETA), operation and maintenance and other funding), and managing the command-level reporting for FP&R (indirectly linked to collective/joint training). In Australia, Joint Operations Command is responsible for planning, controlling, conducting and evaluating the Australian Defence Force’s participation in non-operational domestic and international joint, interagency, bilateral and multilateral exercises and engagement activities scheduled in the endorsed Programme of Major Service Activities. This includes certification of force elements capable of conducting joint operations across the spectrum of defined joint collective training levels.⁴⁹ In the United Kingdom, Joint Forces Command is responsible for ensuring that joint activity is improved through concepts, education and training and applying lessons.⁵⁰

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Annex A—Management Action Plan

Key Finding 5

Management Action

In accordance with the Departmental Results Framework (DRF) and the VCDS Initiating Directive, “Transfer of Leadership Responsibilities for VCDS Related Capability Development Responsibilities to ADM(IM), the CA and CFINTCOM,” authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities for joint and common readiness will be determined at three Inter-Component Capability Transfer meetings that will also determine the transfer of personnel and financial resources.

Final operational capability of the new DRF is expected on April 1, 2018.

OPI: VCDS

OCI: CJOC/SJS

Target Date: April 2018

Key Finding 8

Management Action

Over the next two fiscal years, CJOC will improve the governance of joint and enabling capability elements training by employing a more guided approach underscored by a structured needs assessment of the joint managed readiness program. This plan is based on the assumption that JETA priorities and funding will continue to be centrally governed in the Department and provided with the requisite management resources.

Lines of effort will include the following:

• Finalize a catalogue of tasks and mission-essential elements encompassing CJOC joint and CAF enabling capabilities required to execute joint force employment. Tasks and mission elements will be used to measure effectiveness of exercises selected within the CJOC JMRP to meet rolling CDS and Commander CJOC FP&R directives.
• Design and implement a model that supports the logical development of a multi-year joint exercise program cycle that, based on extant strategic direction, defines optimal exercise cycles, considering funding levels and operational readiness risk.
• Develop and implement an exercise validation, evaluation (and certification) program that will measure the success of specific exercises in meeting force readiness needs and allow the evaluation of new concepts and/or nascent enabling capabilities to feed exercise program evolution.
• Re-invigorate the lessons learned policy and protocols across the CJOC Command and within deployed operations, through the release of an implementing directive, to support the identification, measurement, analysis and subsequent incorporation of real-world operation observations into exercise selection and design.
• Continue to identify via recognized HR staffing processes the permanent personnel establishment required to allow a fully governed readiness program and the execution of the CAF JTA functions assigned to Commander CJOC on behalf of the CDS.

OPI: CJOC

Target Date: March 2019

Key Finding 10

Management Action

With the implementation of the DRF, and given recent debate regarding future accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities for C170 JETA, an organization other than the SJS may be better suited for this MAP execution in due course, although presently the SJS is the logical OPI.

The tracking and reporting structure currently based on PAA 2014 is being replaced by the DRF. Specifically, PAA 3.2.5 (Joint Integration Training) and 3.2.6 (International and Domestic Interoperability Training) will be superseded by DRF Core Responsibility 4, “Prepare and Employ Forces,” from which updated performance indicators will be derived to enhance planning and tracking joint force training resources. The SJS Directorate Strategic Readiness is a key stakeholder in Core Responsibility 4 development given its nexus to FP&R management. The first stage of this MAP is concomitant with development of new DRF performance indicators, BETA versions of which should be activated by April 1, 2018.

The JETA represents a modest portion of pan-CAF collective training resources that force generators expend annually. Core Responsibility 4-related performance indicators along with evolved and explicit descriptions are intended to permit L1s to more accurately and efficiently attribute resources to joint training. Practical application requires a centrally directed matrix of fund centres to cost capture joint training and enable more systemic and consistent reporting and tracking with support from VCDS to enable them. The intent is to introduce this capacity with the initial DRF and full operationalization no later than April 1, 2019.

OPI: SJS

Target Date: DRF BETA version implementation, April 1, 2018

Key Finding 12

Management Action

As part of the DRF, a joint and common readiness program will be established and the activities that occur within it identified. Once established, the intent is to operationalize the DRF and track actual expenditures along these activity lines.

The initial DRF will take effect on April 1, 2018. The operationalization of the activities within the framework, and the ability to systematically track actual versus planned activities, is being targeted for April 1, 2019.

OPI: VCDS

OPI: CJOC/SJS

Target Date: April 2019

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Annex B—Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

1.0 Methodology

1.1 Overview of Data Collection Methods

The Evaluation of the JCFR Program included the use of multiple lines of evidence and complementary research methods to strengthen the rigour and reliability of the assessment. The methodology used a consistent approach when collecting and analyzing data to help ensure the reliability of the evaluation findings and recommendations. Quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used and included reviews of literature and program documents, access to financial data, requests for information (RFI) and key informant interviews and site visits. Following data collection and analysis, preliminary evaluation findings were presented to the key stakeholders. Discussions from these presentations helped to further refine and clarify the findings and recommendations that are presented in this report.

1.2 Details on Data Collection Methods

1.2.1 Literature and Program Document Review

A review of program documents was conducted in the initial phase of the evaluation to establish an understanding of the background and context of the DND/CAF JCFR Program. These documents included the following:

• federal/departmental accountability documents;
• strategic and operational program documents (i.e., orders, directives, briefing notes);
• content of various Web sites;
• guidance documents, process and procedure manuals;
• previous internal and external assessment reports;
• relevant academic literature and publications; and
• program products/outputs.

The document review was integral in the assessment of relevance of the program, as well as to support performance findings from other lines of evidence.

1.2.2 Access to Financial Data

Access to financial data was a useful method in scoping the program. The following sources were used in the analysis:

• PAA expenditures
• DPRs / Reports on Plans and Priorities
• Joint training fund centre
• Level of effort estimations
• SharePoint

Having access to the financial repositories allowed for an in-depth analysis with regards to financial attributions.

1.2.3 RFIs and Key Informant Interviews

Consultations were conducted at different phases in the evaluation via RFIs and interviews with key stakeholders. JCFR is the responsibility of multiple L1s. Due to the dispersed responsibilities, the RFIs provided a cost and time-effective method to determine the extent and nature of an organization’s contribution to the JCFR Program. RFIs were sent to VCDS, SJS, CJOC, CA, RCN, RCAF, ADM(HR-Civ), CFINTCOM and ADM(PA). The RFIs also helped narrow the list of interviews required. As such, interviews were conducted with CJOC J7 – Training, 1^st Cdn Div Chief of Staff Operations, 1^st Cdn Div Chief of Staff Support, 1^st Cdn Div J7 and SJS. These interviews were used to discuss the relevance and performance of the JCFR Program and to gather evidence of any issues affecting the program. Interviews also provided context and elaboration of trends observed in the program data. Information gathered by the evaluation team from the interviews was cross-reference against documentation to assess performance.

1.2.4 Site Visits

Two site visits to 1^st Cdn Div HQ located at Canadian Forces Base Kingston were conducted during the JCFR evaluation. The first visit was for scoping interviews, and the second visit was to attend the orientation to DART and NEO and to conduct further interviews. The on-site visits were very informative regarding the rigorous processes in place for short-notice joint deployments.

2.0 Limitations

Table B-1 shows the evaluation limitations and the corresponding mitigation strategies.

Table B-1. Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Strategies. This table lists the limitations of the evaluation and the corresponding mitigation strategies.

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Annex C—Logic Model

Figure C-1. Logic Model for the JCFR Program. This flowchart shows the relationship between the program’s main activities, outputs and expected outcomes.

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Annex D—Evaluation Matrix

Table D-1. Evaluation Matrix—Relevance. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the JCFR Program’s relevance.

Table D-2. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Effectiveness). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining JCFR Program’s performance in terms of achievement of outcomes (effectiveness).

Table D-3. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Efficiency and Economy). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the JCFR Program’s performance in terms of efficiency and economy.

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Footnote 1 This was rescinded as of on July 1, 2016 and has been replaced with the TBS Policy on Results.

Footnote 2 This was rescinded as of on July 1, 2016 and has been replaced with the TBS Policy on Results.

Footnote 3 DND Performance Measurement Framework 2016-17.

Footnote 4 Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf. Last consulted on April 4, 2017.

Footnote 5 Canadian Defence Terminology Bank: http://terminology.mil.ca/index-eng.asp#. Last consulted on June 10, 2016.

Footnote 6 Defence Terminology Bank: http://terminology.mil.ca/index-eng.asp#. Last consulted on June 10, 2016.

Footnote 7 This definition will be submitted to the Defence Terminology Bank as a replacement for the one entered in 2004.

Footnote 8 DND. Departmental Performance Report (DPR) 2013-14, Program 2.4: Joint and Common Readiness.

Footnote 9 DND. PAA, 2014.

Footnote 10 Delta refers to the difference between PAA allocations and funds expended.

Footnote 11 Space and cyber activities are conducted under PAA 5.1.1 and are included in the Evaluation of Defence Capability Development Program.

Footnote 12 Evaluation of Military Police Services, December 2013. http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/219p0987-eng.aspx. Last consulted on April 18, 2017.

Footnote 13 TBS. Directive on the Evaluation Function, April 1, 2009. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15681&section=text. Last consulted on July 4, 2014.

Footnote 14 DND. DPR 2014-15, sub-sub-program 3.1.5: Joint and Common Operations Roles – Readiness Sustainment.

Footnote 15 Joint Managed Readiness Programme (JMRP) 2016.

Footnote 16 DND Report on Plans and Priorities 2014-15.

Footnote 17 DND. Performance Measurement Framework, version 1.19.

Footnote 18 Maritime Equipment Program Management PAA performance measurement framework FY 2014/15 fourth quarter report, April 2015.

Footnote 19 DND Departmental Performance Report 2014-2015.

Footnote 20 Evaluation of Military Police Services 2013. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-audit-eval/219p0987.page. Last consulted on April 18, 2017.

Footnote 21 Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services) is the former designation of ADM(Fin)/CFO.

Footnote 22 Counter-improvised explosive device.

Footnote 23 Second Canadian Division.

Footnote 24 DND. Departmental Performance Report 2014-2015.

Footnote 25 Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management).

Footnote 26 The ADM(HR-Civ) expenditure in 2015 was a one-time event spread across all PAAs to account for the change in the civilian payment cycle.

Footnote 27 RCN Ready Duty Ships are maintained on an eight-hour notice to move.

Footnote 28 CANFORGEN 118/05. Current HTU/HRU list provided by CMP on August 18, 2016.

Footnote 29 The RCN, CA and RCAF also maintain high-readiness elements. As the actual units change on a periodic basis, it is noted as a readiness capability and not as specific units in CANFORGEN 118/05.

Footnote 30 The eighth HTU/HRU is under the command of CANSOFCOM and is not in the scope of this evaluation.

Footnote 31 DND. Draft Performance Measurement Framework FY 2016/17.

Footnote 32 Control of 1^st Cdn Div was formally transferred from the CA to CJOC on January 8, 2016.

Footnote 33 DND website: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-how/1cdndiv-1divcan.page. Last consulted on April 18, 2017.

Footnote 34 Stage 1 Master Implementation Plan Joint Headquarters Renewal.

Footnote 35 1901-1 (Chief of Force Development), VCDS Initiating Directive Joint Headquarters (Reinvigoration) Phase 1, August 7, 2009.

Footnote 36 CAF Organizational Order 6590.

Footnote 37 DND website: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-how/1cdndiv-1divcan.page. Last consulted on 18 August 2017.

Footnote 38 DND draft Performance Measurement Framework FY 2016/17.

Footnote 39 CDS. CF Collective Training Standing Guidance, January 22, 2009.

Footnote 40 DAOD 8015 – Collective Training, dated August 7, 2009.

Footnote 41 CDS. Directive on CAF FP&R 2013, June 28, 2013, Annex C..

Footnote 42 JMRP, Volume I.

Footnote 43 JMRP, Volume 1.

Footnote 44 DND draft Performance Measurement Framework FY 2016/17.

Footnote 45 Exercise TRADEWINDS is an annual exercise led by the United States Southern Command to increase Caribbean nations’ capacity to counter transnational crime and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. From June 1 to 25, CAF land and maritime assets participated with Caribbean partners in the Caribbean Basin. DPR 2014-15.

Footnote 46 Financial code fund description FY 2016/17 document http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/en/systems-tools/financial-coding.page. Last consulted on April 18, 2017.

Footnote 47 Search of National Capital Region positions in the CMP database conducted on May 9, 2016.

Footnote 48 CFSU (Europe) website.

Footnote 49 Australian Annual Defence Report 2014-15.

Footnote 50 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command website https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/joint-forces-command/about. Last consulted on May 26, 2016.