Our Reading List’s Missing Shelf

By Maj Cam Meikle - September 4th, 2024

Reading Time: 28 min

All too often, the critical importance of military theory either is not well understood or is completely ignored by many officers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory.¹ – Dr Milan Vego, Joint Forces Quarterly

In August 2023, the Canadian Army released its latest iteration of the Commander Canadian Army’s Reading List. With great fanfare, this updated list featured several long-overdue improvements, including the addition of audio and ebooks, and making the list more accessible by categorizing titles by rank. That said, these modernization efforts overlooked a category of books that have been a mainstay of previous Canadian Army suggested reading lists – books on military theory.² The absence of these titles is concerning. Without an appreciation of the academic basis of military thinking, Canadian military professionals cannot truly understand their doctrine and may be unable to identify suitable strategies for countering adversaries. Further aggravating this omission, as current Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development is near-void of discussion on this critical military topic, without military theory’s inclusion on the Canadian Army Reading List, a military professional could complete their entire career without receiving this pivotal knowledge.

Much of the understanding of the nature of conflict has been derived from the seminal work of individuals such as Sun Tzu, Karl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Giulio Douhet.³ – Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is a product of theory; therefore, professionals must possess a baseline comprehension of this tool to understand these essential documents. Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01, the foundation of all Canadian Armed Forces doctrine, is a perfect example of how, often without reference, Canadian doctrine is built on military theory.⁴ For example, Chapter 2 highlights that military power is a mix of three components: conceptual, moral, and physical. Not mentioned is that this concept is found in J.F.C. Fuller’s 1926 Foundations of the Science of War, where he drew upon the Napoleonic wars and World War One to develop his ideas.^v In addition, Chapter 2 attributes the principles of war, debatably – if not incorrectly, to Carl von Clausewitz as the first to have put this list forward.^vi These are merely two of the many examples from this publication that highlight the interconnected nature between doctrine and the military theory upon which these essential documents are based.

While non-history-minded soldiers and officers may be disinterested in debating which theorist created the principles of war, military professionals should appreciate that if you don’t understand the theory underpinning doctrine, you will be challenged to identify when current publications are no longer valid. As an example, CFJP 01 uses principles of war derived from Napoleonic battles that occurred over 200 years ago. At that time, entire armies (and only armies) met on the same battlefield, with each flank just a short horse ride away. While the underlying nature of war may be unchanged, perhaps now that warfare includes air, space, cyber, open-source intelligence activities, the increased blurring between military and non-military activities, and the potential of autonomous vehicles and machine learning, this list requires, at a minimum, a thorough review to ensure all concepts remain relevant. With all subsequent Canadian Armed Forces doctrine based on this foundation, without confirmation that the underlying theory of warfare remains applicable, perhaps all current military doctrine is in question. However, without understanding the theory underpinning these publications, challenging these doctrinal concepts, with some quoting them with near biblical status, devolves into a debate better suited for the schoolyard.

Theory does not pretend to solve problems: it sheds light on problems and thus can provide guidance for those who have the responsibility for solving them.⁷ – Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy

In an homage to one of the original military theorists, Sun Tzu stated, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”⁸ However, without the profession’s reading list encouraging the pursuit of knowledge contained within our adversaries (or potential adversaries) theories, the Canadian Army is falling short of fulfilling Sun Tzu’s 2000-year-old maxim. For example, Operation IMPACT is Canada’s military contribution to address instability caused by the terrorist group Da’esh.⁹ With up to 850 Canadians participating in this operation yearly since 2014, how many were familiar with Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery – the theory on which Da’esh based its strategy?¹⁰ A skim through Naji’s document, published in 2006, outlines Da’esh’s vastly different worldview than the one seen through Canadian eyes. Rejecting a liberalistic world controlled by Western institutions such as the United Nations, Da’esh’s strategy centered on drawing the West into a prolonged conflict to economically dismantle these nations while attacking their populations’ cohesion through an aggressive media campaign. Without this understanding, Sun Tzu would say Canada increased its likelihood of succumbing in battle by fifty percent.¹¹

Canada’s potential adversaries understand the importance of studying military theory and have used this analysis to devise strategies to counter Western concepts. In 1999, two Colonels from China’s People’s Liberation Army published a treatise – Unrestricted Warfare – which some debatably call “China’s master plan to destroy America.”¹² This text, which does provides some insight into Chinese thinking, analyzes many Western theorists to methodically break down weaknesses in how NATO forces operate.¹³ These ideas form a strategy to defeat Western armies, not on the traditional battlefield that NATO forces dominate, but by blurring the lines between war and peace to systematically destroy its opponents’ social, economic, and political will to fight. Just as these two Chinese officers highlight the ability to identify weaknesses and develop modern methods of winning in conflict through the study of military theory, Canadians can and must do the same. Unfortunately, this modernization of Canadian tactics and strategy will not take place without a nudge towards the importance of reading military theory – which the Canadian Army Reading List could provide.

The foundation for [professional military] expertise resides in a deep and comprehensive understanding of the theory and practice of armed conflict.¹⁴ – Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada

The absence of military theorists from the Canadian Army Reading List is further aggravated by a lack of this critical topic in current professional military education programs. As an example, despite the Joint Command and Staff Program’s syllabus stating that “military theory is poorly understood in general (even within militaries themselves!), but quite implicit within the structure of modern doctrine”, this course, designed to prepare senior military officers for command and senior staff appointments, only offers instruction on military theory during two non-mandatory electives.¹⁵ With theory near-absent from the Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System’s training and education pillars, this knowledge defaults to self-development – a pillar heavily influenced by the Canadian Army’s Reading List.¹⁶

The Canadian Army Reading List itself would also benefit from the knowledge underpinning warfare to get beyond surface-level conclusions from the remainder of its books. In Thinking, Fast and Slow, an outstanding book detailing a theory on human thinking currently on the reading list, Daniel Kahneman describes how the human brain makes decisions using one of two processes.¹⁷ The first, ‘System One’ thinking – automatic or intuition-based decisions – represents the majority of decisions humans make daily. This thinking allows individuals to unconsciously decide where to place their feet as they walk to avoid falling or use their intuition to brace themselves as they slam their car’s brakes while attempting to avoid a collision. Conversely, ‘System Two’ decisions are deliberate and use rationality and logic, representing when a human takes a moment to weigh options to make an informed choice. While it should be apparent why humans need the much quicker ‘System One’ process to be productive members of society, this thinking suffers from being easily fooled as the mind does not spend sufficient time to consider in depth what it is looking at. ‘Google’ Harvard’s ‘Invisible Gorilla Experiment” if you don’t believe the human mind can be blind to the obvious.¹⁸

A review of Kahneman’s book gives the reader a better understanding of the workings of their mind and how its functionality makes humans susceptible to many cognitive biases. This knowledge is helpful to the military practitioner, empowering the reduction of these biases during their thinking. However, next-level military professionals can merge Kahneman’s ideas with a military theory to develop new or better methods of executing military operations. Let us use J.F.C. Fuller’s military theory in The Foundations of the Science of War as an example – specifically his ideas surrounding surprise (which he identified in 1926 as a principle of war).¹⁹ Fuller says the foundation of surprise is a military force’s ability to understand the true value of the physical means of war.²⁰ In other words, if you underestimate your enemy’s strength, this will surprise you when hostilities start and increase your opponent’s chances of success.

Israel’s initial inability to repel Hamas’ reprehensible attack on 7 October 2023, despite its sophisticated intelligence enterprise, could have been conceived through the blending of Kahneman and Fuller’s theories. For example, Hamas required its forces to conduct pan-domain training to ensure a properly executed attack while maintaining the element of surprise – Fuller’s principle – to increase the likelihood of success. Using Kahneman’s ideas, Hamas could preserve surprise provided their preparatory actions stayed below Israel’s ‘System Two’ thinking trigger point. This threshold for Israeli officials, believing an attack unfathomable, could be extremely high, setting the conditions for sustained ‘System One’ thinking despite Hamas terrorists practicing the raiding of mock kibbutzim and border guard stations in plain sight. As a result, despite Hamas now prepared to execute a coordinated pan-domain assault, Israeli officials, perhaps quickly and without much analysis, dismiss these warning signs as an imaginary scenario.²¹ Consequently, Israel’s military would underestimate Hamas’ strength, solidifying their unpreparedness for a coordinated enemy pan-domain assault, and facilitate for Hamas what Fuller’s theory says is the secret to victory in battle: surprise.²² While there is no evidence that Hamas consciously blended Kahneman and Fuller’s theories or that the reason for Israel’s unpreparedness was a result of ‘System One’ thinking, this type of strategy could be conceived by an understanding of military thinking combined with other works currently contained within the Canadian Army Reading List.

There has been no great modern commander who has not been in some degree a student of war.²³ – Colonel C. P. Stacey, Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students

By now, it should be clear that the Canadian Army Reading List will only benefit from the inclusion of military theory within its list of books. Through this addition, Canadian military professionals will better understand their doctrine and improve the substance of their professional debates. In addition, these titles will aid military planners’ abilities to understand how their adversaries think, improving counter-strategies and reducing bias caused by mirror-imaging.²⁴ Finally, without the academic foundation derived from understanding the military theory, getting beyond surface-level conclusions from the remainder of the Reading List’s books will be more difficult for the military professional.

Keeping in line with the Reading List’s new, and in this author’s opinion, improved, organization of works by rank, the inclusion of military theory must be done methodically. Understanding Clausewitz is impossible without the historical context of the Napoleonic wars and the German Enlightenment period of the early 1800s. It will be essential to start with accessible books, such as Olivia Garard’s An Annotated Guide to Tactics: Carl von Clausewitz’s Theory of the Combat, or similar articles, podcasts, or YouTube videos, establishing a foundation before tackling the more impenetrable On War.²⁵

To end, I will quote the current Chief of Defence staff. “Woe is the leader who deploys into an operation armed only with a superficial appreciation of it.”²⁶ The Canadian Army Reading List can cure its ‘woe’ by dusting off its shelf on military theory.

Abstract

The article is an academic argument discussing the absence of books on military theory from the Canadian Army Reading List. The author argues that without such knowledge, military professionals may struggle to comprehend doctrine, identify suitable strategies to counter adversaries, and critically debate new ideas.

End Notes

1. Milan N Vego, “On Military Theory,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 62 (July 2011): 59.
2. Department of National Defence, The Canadian Army Reading List (Kingston, ON: St. Joseph Print Group, 2009), iii, 3-6; Canadian Army (CA), Commander CA’s Reading List (Kingston, ON: Army Publishing Office, 2015), 27-41.
3. Joint Doctrine Branch (JDB), Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01: Canadian Military Doctrine (Ottawa, ON: CF Experimentation Centre, 2009), 2-10.
4. JDC, CFJP 01, vi.
5. J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchison & Co., 1926), 63, 209.
6. JDC, CFJP 01, 2-4.
7. Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 26.
8. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Sweet Water Press, 2006), 27.
9. Government of Canada, “March 2020 – Operation IMPACT (Iraq)”, Canadian Armed Forces Operations and Activities – Transition binder 2020, 30 September 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/caf-operations-activities/2020/03/caf-ops-activities/op-impact-iraq.html.
10. Abu Bakr Naji, “Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass,” trans. William McCants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006), https://www.narrativespace.net/uploads/
    1/1/7/9/117904861/management_of_savagery.pdf; Dr. Brian Steed, “Ft. Leavenworth – ISIS, Abu Bakr Naji, and the Management of Savagery,” The Dole Institute, 4 February 2021, YouTube video, 1:08:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unqVuOk8UDE.
11. The second sentence of this often quoted Sun Tzu quote is “ If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer defeat.”
12. Liang Qiao, Wang Xiangsui, and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Medina Univ PR Intl, 2021).
13. Unrestricted Warfare speaks of Clausewitz, Fuller, Douhet, Tukhachevsky and Mao to name a few.
14. Canada Department of National Defence, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009), 17.
15. Canadian Forces College Foundation, “Joint Command and Staff Programme,” accessed 20 December 2023, https://cfcollegefoundation.ca/news-events/jcsp/; Canadian Forces College, “Syllabus: Joint Command and Staff Programme-Residential,” 12-13, accessed 20 December 2023, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/118/406/cfc300-46-eng.pdf.
16. Government of Canada, “Canadian Armed Forces professional development framework,” accessed 20 December 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/professional-development/framework.html.
17. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013).
18. Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, “Gorilla Experiment,” The Invisible Gorilla, accessed 20 December 2023, http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/gorilla_experiment.html.
19. Fuller, Science of War, 221, 272.
20. Fuller, 274.
21. Peter Beaumont, “Israeli intelligence leak details extent of warnings over Hamas attack,” The Guardian, 28 November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/28/israeli-military-had-warning-of-hamas-training-for-attack-reports-say?ref=upstract.com.
22. Fuller, Science of War, 272.
23. Colonel C. P. Stacey, Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students (Ottawa, ON: Queen’s Printer, 2003), iii, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/defence/caf/militaryhistory/
    dhh/general/book-1964-history-students-en.pdf.
24. Mirror imaging bias is a cognitive bias where individuals assume that others think, feel, and act the same way they do.
25. Olivia Garard A., “An Annotated Guide to Tactics: Carl von Clausewitz’s Theory of the Combat” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
26. General Wayne Eyre, “Why We Study: Our Duty of Self-Development as Military Professionals,” Commander Canadian Army’s Reading List Supplement No. 1, June 2016, https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/ld.php?
    content_id=35412374.