Armoured Corps Modernization: An Overview of the Cavalry Concept

Since I recently returned from a two-year posting with 1st Cavalry Division, US Army, getting back up to speed with the Canadian Army (CA) in my new capacity as Director, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) has been a unique challenge, especially as I have had the privilege of witnessing pivotal events that have affected our organization and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) over the past several months. Indeed, reconstituting the CAF after a period of high tempo, optimizing the domestic and expeditionary outputs of our forces, supporting Canadians through COVID-19 and concurrently protecting our people, all while wrestling with culture and recruiting challenges, amount to no small feat. Nonetheless, the CA continues to think deeply and challenge our ways of doing business in order to prepare for the next conflict. Force 2025 (F2025) and the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy are the catalysts, but the changes in the RCAC have been underway for more than half a decade. To highlight Armoured Corps modernization, an overview of the cavalry concept will set the stage for some of the outstanding contributions to this edition of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ), outlining and advancing the discourse on where the RCAC is headed and where refinements will be needed.

In 2015, the Corps began moving towards implementation of the Armoured common concept, transitioning from separate “recce” and “tank” streams to a single armoured construct for both Regular Force and Reserve elements. This change bridges Military Employment Structure (MES) and individual training uniquely, as the size of our Corps was not large enough to support two separate streams of officer and soldier military occupational specialties. The Armoured common approach culminated with the completion of the MES review in 2021, and the natural extension was a common approach to doctrine and force structures that would become the cavalry concept.

Following approval of the broad cavalry concept from Commander Canadian Army at Army Council in February 2021, the RCAC is moving forward with refining and operationalizing the tenets of this approach. At its simplest, the structural identity of the cavalry concept is characterized by the principle of four: four armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) per troop, four troops plus a headquarters for each squadron. This configuration may understandably be seen as a move “back to the future,” given that tanks and other AFVs in “sabre” squadrons have been organized this way in our recent past. However the generation of officers and soldiers who have experienced the post-2004 recce-centric training and employment model may view the Armoured common and cavalry concept changes more emotionally, as existential. The cavalry concept can be best described as a conceptual pathway from the provision of a narrow dual-stream direct fire versus furtive reconnaissance approach, towards an integrated, cohesive mounted manoeuvre force capable of delivering firepower and battlefield effects across the spectrum of conflict. Since “the devil is in the details,” the RCAC is currently refining exactly how the Corps will move forward with Canadian Armoured Cavalry (Armd Cav), pending decisions on Army structure through F2025. This is a period well suited to discourse, debate and unofficial experimentation as the Corps gains consensus on what Armd Cav is and is not, how to optimally employ it, and how to mitigate known gaps in equipment, personnel and doctrine.

The role of Armd Cav is to shape and define the battlefield by informing and protecting the commander’s manoeuvre space and defeating the enemy through mounted manoeuvre. Underlying this role is shock action derived from the use of mobile, protected, direct fire vehicle platforms, integrated with enablers. Armd Cav encompasses the breadth of the RCAC F-echelon capabilities. Most numerous are the Light Armd Cav squadrons, typically mounted on the light armoured vehicle family of vehicles (FOV) and, sub-optimally (from a direct fire support perspective), on tactical armoured patrol vehicles. Heavy Armd Cav squadrons will be mounted primarily on the Leopard 2 FOV. It is important to note that we are not discussing tank squadrons versus Armd Cav squadrons; tanks are our key anti-tank asset at present, and they have a vital role to play in reconnaissance and security tasks—including screen, cover and guard forces—as part of the “cavalry gap” that previously existed between stealth recce forces and tanks. This is not to say that there is no longer a role for Heavy Armd Cav in providing intimate support to the infantry during an assault; however, this cannot be the only role for which tanks are retained. There are risks, certainly, that recce and tank skills could be diluted or lost as we attempt to cover a broader spectrum of tasks with Armd Cav forces. The cavalry concept, however, is an acknowledgement of the size of our Corps and the requirement to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces—which inherently means accepting some risks in order to remain relevant and sustainable. As a vital element to consider and include in the evolution of our Corps, the cavalry concept encompasses both Regular and Reserve Force elements of the RCAC, as the basis of training will focus on the same core tasks, varying in breadth rather than depth. This commonality will enable seamless integration in a domestic or expeditionary context, with equipment-specific training bridging the cross-over where required, to enhance our overall flexibility. Augmentation of Regular Force squadrons with Reserve elements can therefore occur at troop level or as low as single-vehicle or individual levels. Challenges with staffing levels in both Regular and Reserve units of the RCAC are acknowledged, as is attrition; the cavalry concept will seek to leverage commonality of training and tactical employment in order to increase Regular/Reserve Force integration, benefiting from synergy to increase effectiveness and retention, which are both key components in the CA reconstitution plan.

While these “big-hand, small-map” concepts are neither new nor complex, the articles in this edition of the CAJ demonstrate the gaps and seams that belie the simple explanations offered above. Captain Bryce Simpson, in “A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future,” provides an outstanding historical perspective, with quantitative and qualitative comparisons of Canadian Armd Cav concepts and those of our closest allies. Captain Simpson posits that our focus should shift from a platform-agnostic attempt to “do” cavalry in the “tank trainer” fashion towards an enabled, purpose-built cavalry force that can conduct reconnaissance and security while fighting to gain information if required. Colonel Chris Hunt, in his article “Defining Cavalry within the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps,” highlights firepower as the key RCAC value proposition and examines means to optimize firepower and use it to update our doctrine and classification of cavalry in a Canadian context. No mounted anti-tank guided missile is currently part of the CA arsenal, and Colonel Hunt’s article shines a light on the challenges involved in providing Armd Cav with firepower beyond that found elsewhere in the empowered combined arms team. Both of these articles are enlightening and thoughtprovoking; they reflect the healthy debate that is key to defining issues and addressing the evolving identity of our Corps. Part of the challenge lies in focusing and framing the debate: with issues from Armoured Corps personnel generation, roles and equipment—further convoluted by a mix of terminology not clearly defined in a Canadian context—it is easy to talk past one another. As the CA solidifies its direction towards F2025, it is up to us as leaders and professionals to read, write and continue to examine the direction of our Armoured Corps and our Army through the force development continuum. With personnel generation addressed through the Armoured common approach, and equipment allocations/capabilities known for the short term, framing the debate around roles—to include tasks, tactics and Armd Cav as a combat / combat support element—is most likely to bear fruit. The RCAC’s current “identity crisis” (as some have labelled it) is a natural result of the challenging of our assumptions and the way we have adapted over the past two decades. While there is a requirement to be synchronized and in line with the CA, as decisions are made towards F2025 from a “whole-of-Army” perspective, the RCAC can nonetheless seize this opportunity to be at the forefront of modernization. To remain relevant, we must embrace change and move forward; our flexibility and agility, earned on the battlefields of the past, will allow us to adapt to the next conflict.

Worthy!