Enabling Operations Historical Vignette: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Versus 25th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment
November 10, 2022
Reading Time: 7 min
(Bolded locations and numbers in brackets correspond to numbers on the accompanying map)
BACKGROUND
On D-Day Major-General Rod Keller’s 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (CID) landed on Juno Beach. The 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades (CIB) were the main effort while Brigadier Douglas G. Cunningham’s 9 CIB, landed later as the reserve brigade. Unfortunately, division objectives were not met during the day and Major-General Keller decided to have 8 CIB consolidate its position while 7 and 9 CIBs continued the advance. On D+1, 7 CIB continued west of the Mue River and 9 CIB to the east of the river. 7 CIB was given the task to secure Putot, while Brigadier Cunningham was to strike south and capture airport at Carpiquet (1). The Division’s overall operational objective was to take Caen and the vital ground surrounding it.
Caption
CIB - Canadian Infantry Brigade, BIB - British Infantry Brigade
THE PLAN
9 CIB consisted of three battalions of infantry which included the Highland Light Infantry of Canada (HLIC), the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDGH), and the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNSH), along with the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) (27 CAR) “under command” and 14th Field [artillery] Regiment “in support”. Although 9 CIB had a been given a specific objective which was approximately 9 km away and they were aware that that they were facing elements of the 21st Panzer Division, the specific enemy situation and ground facing them was not clearly understood. Cunningham continued to advance to maintain the initiative, but did so with 7 CIB to the west out of sight, while 9th Brigade of 3rd British Division (9 BIB) to the east would not advance in conformity with 9 CIB. Cunningham deployed his forces “one up”, holding HLIC and SDGH back. His vanguard consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Petch’s NNSH Battle Group (BG) with 27 CAR and an M-10 tank destroyer troop under command. LCol Petch deployed his BG in a wide arrow formation with the Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ Armoured Recce Troop leading, followed by C Company centre mounted in carriers, B Company left riding on B Squadron, A Company right riding on A Squadron and D Company riding on C Squadron while Support Company and the BG HQ brought up the rear.
EXECUTION
At dusk on 6 June the NNSH BG formed a fortress position between Anisy (2) and Villons‑les‑Buissons (3). During the night an enemy patrol of half-tracks and motorcycles infiltrated the position. Two half-tracks were destroyed. Although the advance guard moved off at first light 7 June, its push south has been described as “stepping off into the dark” down the D220. The Recce Troop mounted in Stuart light tanks advanced directly down the road and promptly disappeared. Based on subsequent German reports, they did reach Franqueville (4) but were quickly destroyed by German Panzers. Meanwhile the NNSH BG main body advanced along the same axis. Despite the relatively open country, LCol Petch chose to lead with infantry with armour in support. The NNSH BG quickly ran into elements of Kampfgrupppe Rauch (Combat Group ‘Smoke’) from 21st Panzer Division, holding the Buron (5), Authie (6), and Franqueville area. The BG came under serious fire at les Buissons (7) but secured Buron by 1200 hrs (four hours from les Buissons to Buron). Petch quickly realized, however, that his left flank towards St. Contest (8) was under intense enemy fire from what turned out to be 21st Panzer Division elements.
To the south, SS-Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer’s 25th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment (equivalent to brigade size), the lead element of 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler Youth), was rapidly advancing on the left flank of the NNSH BG. Meyer’s mission was to “reach the beaches” and he intended to break through to the Allied rear areas and wreak havoc, most likely expecting a total collapse of the inexperienced Canadians, similar to what he had witnessed on the Russian front. Thus, both Cunningham and Meyer’s forces were on a collision course. In contrast to the Canadian commander, Meyer was forward and able to observe the movement of the NNSH BG from the tower of the l’Abbaye d’Ardenne (9). Just as the BG vanguard approached Authie (6), he decided to launch a hasty attack. The attack began around 1330 hrs and succeeded in recapturing Buron. Furious fighting continued throughout the rest of the day which included significant tank losses on both sides and was highlighted by the recapture of Buron by the NNSH BG. Due to the inability of 14th Field Regiment to provide fires (they were out of range), and a complete communications failure to naval guns, the NNSH BG fought outnumbered without artillery support until 1800 hrs. Further, the British 9th Brigade only began advancing on Cunningham’s right at 1400 hrs but stalled north of Cambes (10). Despite the NNSH BG holding their ground and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, by dusk, Petch’s BG was significantly depleted and no longer had the combat power to continue the advance forcing Petch to seek permission to pull back. As such, Cunningham determined that the brigade objective of Carpiquet was unobtainable (it was on a forward slope overlooked by the enemy). He ordered the NNSH BG to move from Buron back to les Buisson and Villons-les-Buissons, where HLIC and SDGH were digging in and establishing a brigade “fortress”. It would take weeks before the Allies were able to take Caen.
FURTHER READING
In accordance with (IAW) the AOC EO 232.02B General Instruction.
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