Report on Medak Pocket Operations

PRELUDE

1. On 9 September 1993 Croatian forces launched a surprise attack on Serb held positions in the area of STRUNICI (DIVO SELO) GR WK 2927, LICKI CITLUK GR WK 3324 and DONJI SELO GR WK 3423. They commenced with heavy artillery and mortar fire followed by an infantry and tank assault. Of note, all along the front in Sector South, artillery, mortar and heavy machine gun fire was exchanged. CANBAT 1 was in the process of establishing observation posts in the general area. In fact, the reconnaissance was completed on 8 September 1993 and one post was to be established in the area of DEBELA GLAU GR WK 3026 on 10 September. CANBAT l had established a platoon forward in MEDAK at GR WK 406 224 as a preliminary move. Nine Platoon C Company received artillery and mortar impacts continuously for a 12-hour period, some within 50 metres of their location. Heavy shelling occurred in the MEDAK Pocket area and throughout Sector South for days following the attack. During this period three CANBAT 1 soldiers received minor shrapnel wounds. Tensions were and remain extremely high.

2. The exact reason or reasons for the attack are unclear at this time. Two possible options are: first, this was an attempt to create a breakthrough to seize the important valley north of the Maslenica Bridge with a view to eventually securing it or, second, the constant harassing artillery fire on GOSPIC from this Serb region was unacceptable and this was the obvious solution to stop it.

3. The opportunity for UNPROFOR to prevent further bloodshed occurred shortly after the Serbs began shelling the city of KARLOVAC and fired a FROG missile at ZAGREB. After these attacks the Croatians indicated a willingness to withdraw to the pre 9 September 1993 ceasefire line if the Serbs would stop their shelling.

BATTLE PROCEDURE

4. CANBAT 1 received a warning order at reference A on 132133B September 1993. This commenced the battle procedure for the implementation of the MEDAK Pocket Agreement which involved the separation of opposing forces, the withdrawal of Croatian forces to the pre 9 September 1993 front line and the establishment of a UNPROFOR controlled de-militarized buffer zone between opposing forces. Attached under operational control to CANBAT 1 were two FREBAT Companies, one from FREBAT 1 in Sector North and one from FREBAT 3 in Bosnia Hercegovina from the BIHAC area.

5. CO CANBAT 1 issued verbal orders followed by confirmatory notes, (reference B) on 141630B September 1993. The CANBAT 1 plan was a four-phase operation as follows:

6. Phase 1. C Company CANBAT 1 and FREBAT Company 1 would replace the Serbs in their frontline positions. In depth on the Croatian side UNMOs would confirm pre 9 September 1993 Croatian lines.

7. Phase 2. CANBAT 1 would open a crossing point on the main hardstand road from the Serbian frontline to the Croatian frontline. Anti-Armour Platoon to provide overwatch. Engineers to be prepared for mine clearing tasks.

8. Phase 3. D Company CANBAT 1 and FREBAT 3 Company would cross to the Croatian side with D Company to occupy Croatian frontlines and FREBAT 3 Company to occupy the pre 9 September 1993 Croatian frontlines. Anti-Armour Platoon to provide overwatch. CO tactical command post and Recce Platoon to move into the Pocket.

9. Phase 4. CANBAT 1 to ensure Croatians withdraw back to pre 9 September 1993 positions. Patrolling tasks to commence within the new buffer zone. A Sweep Team would deploy to clear villages of bodies, survivors and assist in the provision of humanitarian relief with UN Civil Affairs and UNHCR, etc.

OPERATIONS – 15 SEP 93

10. The operation commenced on 15 September 1993 with the occupation of Serb frontline positions. This proceeded quickly and was achieved by early afternoon. C Company had platoon positions at GR WK 380 253, GR 353 220 and 355 242. FREBAT 1 Company had platoon positions at GR 377 307, 400 277 and 416 295. On numerous occasions shortly after occupation Croatian forces directly engaged these UNPROFOR soldiers with small arms, heavy machine gun and in some instances 20 mm cannon fire. The CANBAT 1 forces returned fire when it was obvious it was directed at them. Fire was responded to in kind, i.e., small arms for small arms and so on. Numerous firefights occurred, some lasting for up to 90 minutes between Croatians and CANBAT 1 troops over the following 15-hour period. No casualties were suffered by CANBAT 1 soldiers. It is not confirmed if Croatian soldiers were injured, however the Croatian media reported 27 soldiers killed or wounded during this operation. The cause of the Croatian fire in some cases could have been attributed to Serbian forces sniping at Croatian positions and using UN forces as a shield. Negotiations at Serbian 9 Brigade HQ stopped this activity. However, Croatian forces did continue to engage CANBAT 1 positions in a sporadic nature. It is suspected that the Croatian Military Command had not informed their soldiers that a ceasefire agreement was being implemented.

11. The Croatian Military agreed to a meeting during the evening of 15 Sep 93. Gen Ademi (Operational Zone Commander) attended for the Croatian Forces. Col Maisonneuve (Chief Operations Officer UNPROFOR), LCol Calvin (CO CANBAT 1) and LCol Nielsen (SMO Sector South) attended for UNPROFOR. At this meeting it was agreed that CANBAT 1 would be permitted to establish a crossing site on the main MEDAK-GOSPIC road during the night 15/16 Sep 93. It was also agreed that the two companies for Phase 3 of the plan would be allowed to cross, beginning at 1200 hrs 16 Sep 93. The first company, crossing at 1200 hrs, would occupy the front line of the Croatian defences and the second coy, crossing at 1330 hrs, would occupy the 9 Sep 93 Croatian line. The meeting adjourned at approx. 2200 hrs 15 Sep 93.

12. The crossing point was established at 2400 hrs 15 Sep 93 when D Company HQ crossed from the Serbian to the Croatian side by way of the hardstand road which leads NORTHWEST from MEDAK toward LICKI RIBNIK (area GR 3725). Engineers cleared the road of mines and elements of the D Company tactical HQ remained on the Croatian side to hold the crossing open until the companies could cross on 16 Sep 1993.

OPERATIONS – 16 SEP 93

13. At first light 16 Sep 93 the forward position reported smoke rising from the villages of D. SELO and LICKI CITLUK. Sporadic small arms firing was also heard as well as large explosions coming from the area of the villages. It was suspected that the Croatians were destroying the property of the former occupants of the towns.

14. During the course of the morning several meetings took place in GOSPIC between the UNPROFOR negotiating team of Col Maisonneuve and LCol Nielsen and the Croatian authorities. The original CANBAT 1 operational plan was changed substantially during negotiations. Rather than immediately occupying both the forward Croatian line and the 9 Sep 93 Croatian line, CANBAT l was directed to conduct the operation in phases by occupying successive road lines from east to west until they finally reached the 9 Sep 93 line. In addition, the timeline for withdrawal was extended by 24 hrs so that the Croatians did not have to be clear of the 9 Sep 93 ceasefire line until 1800 hrs 17 Sep 93 instead of last light 16 Sep 93 as originally agreed. This information was communicated to CO CANBAT 1 through radio transmissions on the UNMO net.

15. At 1200 hrs the first company from CANBAT 1 (D Coy) commenced moving across the crossing point to the Croatian side. There they found the barriers and mines still in place. The company was held up until 1330 hrs by Brigadier Mezic, the Operational Zone Senior Liaison Officer, using various excuses for delay. All the while, more small arms shooting and explosions could be heard coming from the town held by the Croatian army. Heated discussions took place between CO CANBAT 1 and Brigadier Mezic at the crossing point. Finally, CO CANBAT 1 used the media in attendance to apply indirect pressure by filming the delaying tactics. This ploy succeeded in putting sufficient pressure on the Croatians to achieve the crossing. At 1330 hrs D Company was permitted across and it began to occupy the Croatian front line. The second company (FREBAT 3) was further held up until 1430 hrs until it was permitted to move to the town of ORNICE GR 3327 on the second road line. Here they were ordered to hold until 1800 hrs by the UNPROFOR negotiation team before moving into the town of LICKI CITLUK. This time had been agreed upon by the UNPROFOR negotiating team in GOSPIC. Explosions and small arms fire continued in the Croatian held towns.

16. At 1630 hrs the CO CANBAT 1 met with Col Maisonneuve in GOSPIC to explain the situation with respect to ethnic cleansing he suspected was going on. Again, the timelines were explained and the importance of keeping the agreement emphasized by the UNPROFOR representative.

17. At 1800 hrs the FREBAT 3 company, CO's tactical command post and Reece Platoon moved into LICKI CITLUK and found it razed to the ground. Simultaneously CANBAT 1 received orders from Comd Sector South to proceed west to attempt to rescue an enclave of Serbian civilians in the area of STRUNICI GR 2927. The restrictions on the operation were that it must be done before last light and it must be done safely. A platoon of the FREBAT 3 Company was dispatched forward, however no sign of the Serbians was found. Of note, every building was burning or had been razed between the towns of LICKI CITLUK and STRUNICI. The platoon returned to the town of LICKI CITLUK for the night so as not to disrupt ongoing negotiations.

18. The two companies now in position were given direction to consolidate in their locations and to do a quick sweep of their areas for survivors. This was accomplished; three Serbians were found alive and provided protection in a UN vehicle and several bodies were discovered. The three survivors were evacuated back to MEDAK shortly after midnight.

OPERATIONS – 17 SEP 93

19. At first light the companies were ordered to conduct further sweeps of their areas. At 0900 hrs the FREBAT 3 company began moving westward towards the next phase line which was the line STRUNICI GR 2927 -POLJARI GR 3027. This line was achieved by 1200 hrs 17 Sep 93.

20. The 1200 hrs line was reached on time. The Croatian Army had moved about 50 soldiers into the area and they staged a small demonstration of shooting at the highlands, supposedly at CHETNIKS, before withdrawing from the area. A platoon from the FREBAT 3 company was dispatched to conduct a dismounted patrol into the highlands to see if they could locate the enclave of Serbians which had been previously reported. They did not find any sign of them.

21. At this time the FREBAT 1 company was moved up to the area of STRUNICI GR 2927 and given orders to conduct a forward passage of lines through the FREBAT 3 coy to the 9 Sep 93 Croatian line. This line ran approximately from V KRAG GR 2625 to PODKLISA GR 2828 to VEDRIC POLJE GR 2829. This line was achieved by 1800 hrs 17 Sep 93 at which time all Croatian forces had withdrawn from the area.

SWEEP TEAM OPERATIONS

22. In anticipation of witnessing ethnic cleansing by the Croatian Army, CANBAT 1 had formed a team to sweep the area and give an unbiased assessment of damage. The team consisted of:

23. Medical Officer (Canadian)

24. UNCIVPOL Reps; and

25. CANBAT 1 soldiers to search, record damage and assist in 2 movement of bodies.

26. The CANBAT 1 Sweep Team proceeded quickly to clear the villages of DONJI SELO and LICKI CITLUK on 16 September 1993. Over the next 72 hours they swept the remaining villages and houses in the area including BRLJICI, NJEGOVANI, RAICEVIC, ROGICI, KRAJINOVICI, BUDICI, JOVIA, PUTKONJACI and STRUNICI. Their findings are included in the ethnic cleansing paragraphs and in the annexes.

CONSOLIDATION

27. During the period from 17-18 September 1993 the actual boundaries of the new UNPROFOR Buffer Zone were uncertain and

LESSONS LEARNED

30. Troop Selection. It is critical that the correct type of units and companies be selected to carry operations such as this one. They must be very well trained so they can remain calm under fire and respond to incoming fire with determination. They must be well equipped with APCs, medium and heavy machine guns, anti armour weapons and engineering equipment. And finally, if possible, they should be "seasoned troops" who have been in theatre for a period of time so they are well aware of the threats from mines, snipers and artillery.

31. Use of UNMOs. In this operation the Senior UNMO Sector South and a strong UNMO contingent were placed under OPCON of the CO CANBAT 1 to effect liaison and carry out recce tasks on the Croatian side of the CFL. This proved to be a very good solution to the problem of communicating with Croatian authorities outside the UNPA and Pink Zone boundaries. This technique should be strongly considered for use again in future operations of this nature.

32. Chain of Command. To some extent the normal chain of command was bypassed during the MEDAK Pocket operation. Although technically the command chain still operated from Force Commander to Sector Commander to CO CANBAT 1, in fact direction was received direct from the UNPROFOR representatives in GOSPIC. This effectively cut Sector South HQ out of the chain and resulted in them not receiving information in a timely fashion. This ad hoc local arrangement worked in this instance, probably because of the previous working relationships between CO CANBAT 1 and the UNPROFOR representative, Colonel Maisonneuve. In fact, in some ways this streamlined chain of command may have assisted the operation. However, in future operations, a clear chain of command must be established to ensure the legality of orders and to minimize confusion at the working level of the operation.

34. UNCIVPOL Involvement. The UNCIVPOL were used extensively in the CANBAT 1 Sweep Team operations and proved a critical link in ascertaining time and cause of death for the bodies found. They were extremely cooperative and the overall success in compiling this report particularly the annexes on ethnic cleansing, is attributable to their timely submission of reports and excellent field skills. They must be incorporated into any future operation of this nature from the outset.

35. Commanders Guidance. Particularly helpful to CO CANBAT 1 during this operation was the three-hour visit by the Force Commander on 14 Sep 93 when the operation commenced. The ability to receive directly the overall intention of the mission and to clearly understand the levels of risk acceptable was of immeasurable benefit during the following 72 hours. If this cannot be achieved in future operations, as a minimum the Force Commander must put in writing his commanders intentions and guidance.

36. Ability to Concentrate Force Quickly. UNPROFOR's ability to quickly mobilize a large, mechanized force had a profound effect on the military forces on both sides during the MEDAK operation. Certainly, the Serbian forces were tremendously impressed with the large number of APCs that moved into MEDAK immediately prior to the operation. This gave them greater confidence that UNPROFOR would actually complete the operation. Similarly, once the crossing was established and the mechanized companies flowed into the Croatian lines, the large, mechanized presence created a sense of urgency in the Croatian military to withdraw. UNPROFOR must not underestimate the effect of a large show of force when preparing to implement future agreements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

37. The following recommendations are made

a.
b.
c. It is clear that the area surrounding the MEDAK Pocket will remain very tense for the short-term future. It is recommended that UNPROFOR maintain a minimum of two mechanized companies with engineer and anti-armour support in the MEDAK area until Dec 93.

CONCLUSIONS

38. This was a very successful operation from a number of perspectives. Of particular note was the success in focusing both political and military pressure at the decisive time and place to achieve the aim of a ceasefire agreement. It is rare to see the two branches operate in such synchronization and perhaps it would be useful to use the MEDAK Pocket Operation as a case study for UNPROFOR personnel on how a small-scale operation should be approached in the future.