Vignette – The Tactical Advantage of Reverse Slopes

During Operation SPRING on 25 July 1944 the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Rockingham demonstrated the inherent strength of reverse slope positions. The RHLI (part of 4 CIB) was tasked with taking Verrieres village in Phase 1 to support the follow-on attack of the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) on Rocquancourt in Phase 2. West of the RHLI the Calgary Highlanders of 5 CIB were tasked with taking May-sur-Orne in Phase 1 to support the follow-on attack of the Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (Black Watch) in Phase 2.

The ground was very different in the RHLI and Calgary Highlander areas. The later had to advance downhill and the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel MacLaughan, described German fire as “so carefully planned that every posn we were likely to move to, or to wait in, had fire raining down on it. Systematically such areas were engaged whether or not he could see them.” The result was that “all the fire seemed observed fire coming from extremely well hidden pos[itio]ns. Hence movement of any sort was discouraged.” The RHLI likewise had to initially move downhill from its start line at Troteval Farm, but when they succeeded in taking the village they were still a few hundred metres north of the crest of Verrieres Ridge, or on the reverse slope. Rockingham quickly pushed elements beyond the village to occupy positions in tree lines which were still below the crest. This subtle difference in the ground on which the Calgary Highlanders and the RHLI consolidated played a key role in the ability of the later beat back numerous counterattacks throughout the day from 1 SS Panzer Division ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’, several of which were under cover of smoke screens. The Leibstandarte did in fact penetrate Rockingham’s covering elements to within 400 yards of the village but could not advance any further.

While reserve slope positions added an element of surprise for the defender, the opposite position, attempting to dig-in on forward slopes, sacrificed much tactical advantage. For example, on 20 July a Calgary Highlander company attempted to dig in on the forward slope of Point 67 and suffered heavy casualties as a result. Of the five separate battalion attacks carried out in Phases 1 and 2 of SPRING, only the RHLI succeeded in holding their position, in part due to the intrinsic tactical strength of a well-organized reverse slope position.