Short Bursts:
Commander’s Intent Redux – A Counter-Rebuttal

by Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Rolls, CD

Introduction

In Volume 18.2 of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ), Lieutenant-Colonel (then Maj) Jon Cox wrote a rebuttal to my original article about formulating statements of commander’s intent from CAJ Volume 17.1.^{Footnote 1}  This article will address some of LCol Cox’s criticisms but aims to go beyond mere rebuttal. I argue that an explicit statement of commander’s intent in an operation order is unnecessary and should be removed from the Concept of Operations paragraph, following historical practice. Expressing what an organization needs to do and why should be straightforward and simple. This article will review my previous argument, LCol Cox’s criticisms, and the historical understanding of Commander’s Intent to support this thesis.

Background

In my previous article, I argued that expressions of commander’s intent in Canadian Army operation orders are often unnecessarily verbose, filled with excessive adjectives, and can redundantly describe the scheme of manoeuvre. Many are merely restatements of the mission or collections of adjectives that lack significance. This indicates a misunderstanding of the true purpose of commander’s intent, which should guide subordinates in using their initiative when conditions change. I concluded that the enduring element in tactical actions should be the mission's purpose, allowing subordinates the freedom to respond appropriately to local conditions. Thus, I proposed that commander’s intent should focus on the mission’s purpose and intended end state, linked to the missions of higher commanders, summarized as Intent = Purpose + End State. While I stand by this argument as an improvement, I believe we can achieve greater simplicity.

My assertions about commander’s intent in the Canadian Army are supported by research from counterparts in the US and UK. Gary Klein, a psychologist known for his work on naturalistic decision-making, identifies seven key pieces of information that help subordinates understand senior commander’s intent: the purpose of the task, its objective (which is described as “an image of the desired outcome”), steps for completion, rationale for the specific course of action, important decisions to be made, undesirable outcomes, and any constraints.^{Footnote 2}  The first two relate directly to the mission's purpose and end state, while others can be found elsewhere in operation orders.

Klein also analyzed 35 commander’s intent statements from units training at the US Army’s National Training Center (NTC) and found significant variation in content and length, with the shortest at 21 words and the longest at 484. Notably, the mission's purpose appeared in only 19% of the samples, indicating a lack of necessary information to enable initiative. ^{Footnote 3} LCol Lawrence Shattuck, a professor of behavioural science and leadership at West Point, researched how battalion and company commanders in the US Army were drafting statements of intent and how well these statements were understood by subordinates. His research asked battalion commanders and their staff to draft an operation order in response to an NTC scenario which was then issued to company commanders who would subsequently back brief the battalion commander. An update to the situation required the company commander to react. The responses of the company commanders were recorded alongside what the battalion commander deemed a reasonable response. Only 34% (11 of 32) responses matched the intent of the battalion commander.^{Footnote 4}  Lastly, Dr. Jim Storr, a retired British infantry LCol, argues that the notion of "commander’s intent does not work" and often includes redundant information that would be better placed elsewhere in operation orders.^{Footnote 5}

LCol Cox largely agreed with my view on the problem of statements of Commander’s Intent across the Army but believed my “characterization of the problem and proposed solutions will limit flexibility and mission command, potentially adding to confusion.”^{Footnote 6}  He argued the issue stemmed from poor written communication skills and that specific guidance on drafting commander’s intent would restrict a commander’s freedom to express themselves. However, my recommendation was not meant to bind a commander’s self-expression; as stated in Staff Duties for Land Operations, a commander may express their entire Execution paragraph as they see fit.^{Footnote 7}  My argument, then and now, aims not to change this but to provide best practices for current and future commanders to consider, to be included in doctrine and taught in schools. The issue with commanders articulating their intent is likely less about communication skills and more about how officers have been taught to formulate that intent, as the current practice of the concept is fundamentally flawed.

Historical Practice

My previous arguments against the formulation of commander’s intent still hold. The current approach to communicating it is relatively new and lacks historical precedent in Canadian or Allied command doctrine prior to the 1990s. How did leaders communicate intent during 20th-century wars, and what drove the shift to explicit formulation of commander’s intent? Notable commanders and their subordinates in major battles before then never wrote such paragraphs; they didn’t need to and didn’t engage in debates or writing about it.

Historically, the Commander’s Intent paragraph was not included in operation orders before the early 2000s. Any explicit statement of Commander’s Intent was found in what we now call the Mission Statement. The 1939 and 1949 editions of Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 Part III – Appreciations, Orders, Intercommunication and Movement (equivalent to today’s Staff Duties for Land Operations) contain no reference to a Commander’s Intent paragraph. Instead, they list the major headings for an operation order as Information, Intention (emphasis mine), Method, Administrative Arrangements, and Intercommunication.^{Footnote 8}  The Intention paragraph is a clear precursor to our current Mission and it seems likely that once the Intention paragraph was renamed to the Mission then the concept of a Commander’s Intention became conflated with other parts of the order. Field Marshal William Slim offers some insight,

"I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in my name, but I never, throughout the war, actually wrote one myself.  I always had someone who could do that better than I could.  One part of the order I did, however, draft myself - the intention.  It is usually the shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important, because it states - or it should - just what the commander intends to achieve.  It is the one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated.  It should, therefore, be worded by the Commander himself."^{Footnote 9}

Field Marshal Slim, in stating he drafted the Intention, was referring to what we now call the Mission Statement, not a Commander’s Intent paragraph, which was neither required nor used at that time.

As late as 1991, the Commander's Intent paragraph was absent from Canadian doctrine. In B-GL-303-002/FP-002 Staff Duties in the Field, chapter 9 outlines the operation order format familiar to today’s officers: Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Signals. Under Execution, it lists only one subparagraph, “Gen [General] Outline,” with further subparagraphs noted as “as required.”^{Footnote 10}

By 2007, changes had occurred with the publication of Command in Land Operations, which deemed an explicit statement of commander’s intent necessary. It stated, “The Concept of Operations consists of two components: a statement of commander’s intent [emphasis in original] developed personally by the commander and a description of how the available combat power will be employed [emphasis in original] to accomplish this intent.”^{Footnote 11}   This is argued as being necessary under a Mission Command approach where unity of effort and common understanding are essential to success.  Specifically, the Commander’s Intent

describes how the commander visualizes the battle unfolding, from the current state until the achievement of the end-state. It is a clear and concise statement of what the commander hopes to achieve to include a statement on acceptable risk, and identification of the desired end-state, and the criteria for success. The intent statement includes the key tasks/effects that must be performed by the force or the conditions that must be met in order to meet the stated purpose. The commander’s intent provides the unifying focus for all subordinate elements and must be understood two levels below the issuing commander. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate when a plan no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force.^{Footnote 12}

The elements described above, such as the commander’s objectives, end state, tasks, and purpose, already exist in an operation order. Some components, like statements of acceptable risk and criteria for success, may have questionable value in tactical orders where speed is crucial for maintaining tempo. These should be excluded, included as annexes, or discussed between commanders and staff. While mutual understanding to facilitate subordinate initiative two levels down is essential for the CA, history shows that an explicit commander’s intent paragraph is not necessary for this.

Recommendations

To recap, for nearly a century, the CA did not require explicit statements of Commander’s Intent beyond the mission statement, and there was no subparagraph for it in the Concept of Operations. However, the CA has since instructed officers and NCOs that Commander’s Intent is essential for disciplined initiative and should be explicitly stated in a paragraph. In practice, these statements have added little value, lengthened orders, and encouraged verbosity over simplicity.

To improve, CA doctrine and schools should stop teaching that an explicit statement of commander’s intent is necessary for effective orders, as history shows it is not. This will shorten orders and help drafters focus on the order's critical components. As LCol Cox mentioned, this should be part of a broader effort within the CA, led by the Staff College, to enhance written and verbal communication discipline.^{Footnote 13}

Second, the explicit intent statement must be replaced with a more holistic understanding of the direction given, rooted in the purpose of one’s superior and higher commander’s missions, the end state to be achieved, and the methods for accomplishing it. Well-formulated mission statements, with a clear unifying purpose, will provide the essential component of a Commander’s Intent. Additionally, in Groupings and Tasks, subordinates should receive not just a task but also its associated purpose, clarifying the relationship between their task and those of their superior and higher commanders, as well as its connection to adjacent organizations.^{Footnote 14}

Friction in the execution of operations means things rarely go as planned; however, the purpose behind an operation is likely to remain valid even when the situation changes significantly, providing a solid foundation for decision-making. Understanding the mission's purpose two levels above them equips leaders with the context needed to navigate uncertainty. This understanding should empower commanders to make crucial decisions when the original task or even the purpose itself becomes invalid. Therefore, it must be exceptionally clear, concise, and easily understood. This clarity is why purpose is central to a renewed approach to Commander’s Intent, and its placement in the Mission Statement ensures it is prominently and succinctly articulated in the operation order.

The method of achieving the mission is part of the Commander’s Intent but is less important than the purpose, as it represents just one way to achieve that purpose and may be altered by friction. Nonetheless, subordinates need to understand their roles and those of others in the current plan. This understanding enables them to take initiative within the existing framework when the situation shifts but does not require a complete overhaul of the plan, allowing for minor adjustments to seize opportunities and sustain the initiative and tempo.

In terms of drafting and analyzing orders, this approach represents minimal change from our current practices—actually, it’s less than what we do now. It will shorten orders, reduce verbosity, and streamline the process. We should eliminate the requirement for a separate Commander’s Intent paragraph, as this often leads to unnecessary wordiness. Instead, we should focus on crafting a clear, unifying purpose in the mission statement and ensure our schemes of manoeuvre are concise and simple. Subordinates should receive only essential tasks that are clear and are linked to an associated purpose to form an overall unity of effort.

An operational order based on this approach would resemble the following for the 2 RCR BG:

SITUATION.
En.  Annex B
Fri.  Msn. 2 CMBG will SEIZE Obj COBRA to enable the forward passage of lines by 1 Multinational Division (MND).
SoM. 2 CMBG will conduct two sequential BG attacks to maximize cbt sp for each and establish the conditions for the main effort. 2 RCR as a supporting effort will attack to SEIZE crossings 1 and 2 allowing the 1 RCR BG to attack through them into Obj COBRA. Once conditions are set, 2 CMBG will support the Forward Passage of Lines of 1 MND. Security forces will screen the crossings and protect the Bde’s flanks and the Bde will hold a light battalion in reserve. ME. 1 RCR BG.
ES. Obj COBRA seized, bridgehead secured and 2 CMBG able to support the Forward Passage of Lines by 1 MND.

MISSION. 2 RCR BG will SEIZE crossing points 1 and 2 IOT enable the Forward Passage of Lines of 1 RCR as the Bde main effort.

EXECUTION.
Concept of Ops.
SoM. 2 RCR will SEIZE Crossing Points 1 and 2 simultaneously with two infantry heavy combat teams. Bde artillery and BG mortars will support both attacks. BG reconnaissance forces will work in conjunction with 2 CMBG reconnaissance forces to SCREEN the crossings and support combat teams in their attacks. A balanced combat tm will exploit the success of whichever attack is most promising to support in setting the conditions for 1 RCR’s attack. The BG will maintain a single platoon in reserve. The BG will eventually support the Forward Passage of Lines of 1 MND.
ME. The main effort will be with the commitment of the exploitation force following the seizure of whichever crossing is most promising.
ES. Crossings 1 and 2 seized and 2 RCR ready for 1 RCR BG to conduct a Forward Passage of Lines.
Groupings and Tasks.
G Coy. Grouping. Att. 1 x Tank Trp
Task. SEIZE crossing point 1 to set the conditions for the BG ME to exploit success and allow 1 RCR’s forward passage of lines.
H Coy. Grouping. Att. 1 x Tank Trp
Task. SEIZE crossing point 2 to set the conditions for the BG ME to exploit success and allow 1 RCR’s forward passage of lines.
I Coy. Grouping. Att. 2 x Tank Trps
Task. BPT conduct EXPLOITATION of the success of either attack to facilitate the attack by the Bde’s ME.
9 Platoon. Reserve. BPT support attacks on either crossing or work in conjunction with I Coy to exploit success.
AA Pl. GUARD the BG’s SOUTH flank in order to provide early warning of an enemy attack.
Recce Pl. SCREEN crossing points 1 and 2 and handover contacts to combat teams in order to support each attack.
Mortar Pl. SUPPORT BY FIRE IAW BG Fires Plan IOT support both the supporting and main efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the CA should adopt a more holistic perspective on Commander’s Intent, prioritizing purpose and method while eliminating the explicit Commander’s Intent paragraph. This would shorten orders, reduce redundancy, and decrease the chances of misalignment, all while maintaining the purpose of enabling subordinate initiative. The Commander’s Intent paragraph is a recent addition that historical commanders did not use to communicate effectively, so its inclusion now is unnecessary. If it's not needed, it should be removed for simplicity, eliminating redundancy and the risk of misunderstanding. Ultimately, by eliminating the Commander’s Intent paragraph, we can create simpler, more direct orders. Let’s keep it simple and return to basics.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Rolls enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 2006 as an infantry officer and later joined The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). He spent all of his regimental time with 2 RCR, as a platoon commander, company second in command, assistant operations officer, adjutant, and rifle company and admin company officer commanding. He deployed as a rifle platoon commander with both the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, on TF 1-10, and in Latvia for Operation REASSURANCE as a rifle company officer commanding. He graduated from the US Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School and the Joint Command and Staff Programme. He has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and a master’s degree in Defence Studies and Military Studies. He is currently employed in the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) – Chief Combat Systems Integration cell.

---

This article first appeared online in the Short Bursts section of the Canadian Army Journal (February 2025).