The Role of Wargaming in Urban Operations Training

by Stuart Lyle

Introduction

Training effectively for high-intensity urban combat is a challenge that militaries have faced for decades, and it has not become easier with time. Relying solely on live physical training is insufficient to adequately prepare troops and commanders for the unique challenges anticipated in future urban battlefields.

Urban combat, taking place in the most intricate terrain, involves combined arms engagements with threats from all directions. It presents 360-degree threats, an abundance of concealment for defenders and attackers, and walls providing cover from view but not necessarily from fire. Short engagement ranges can reduce a weapon’s effectiveness, endangering the user or preventing the weapon’s use entirely. Different structural construction types result in drastically different effects being delivered to the target or no effect at all. Narrow streets can constrain vehicle access, restricting a commander’s tactical options.^{Footnote 1}

Urban environments undergo rapid alterations due to heavy fighting, evident in historical battles where buildings collapse, roads become blocked by rubble, new openings appear in buildings for entry, exit and/or firing, and obstacles suddenly appear as infrastructure is degraded. There are different urban terrain zones (UTZ), each with unique, albeit generalized, physical and human characteristics.^{Footnote 2} Each favours a different force design and approach to conducting combat. For example, light forces excel in dense “old towns” or areas with high-rise buildings, while heavy armoured forces are better suited for industrial areas with more manoeuvre space and long sight lines for cannons/anti-armour weapons.

Furthermore, the presence of civilians distinguishes urban areas from rural ones. Thousands of civilians flee the fighting and put strain on higher formation sustainment plans, while at the tactical level many remain in the combat zone. Their presence poses constraints on military actions that are often not a factor in rural fighting.^{Footnote 3}  Moreover, these humans communicate, creating electromagnetic clutter that is distinct from any other environment and likely unique for each urban one.

Collectively, these features make traditional military training based on physical training exercises difficult, if not impossible. It is demanding, but possible, to deploy units ranging from a company to a brigade to a rural training area (whether temperate, desert or arctic) for a variety of exercises, including combined arms live fire, and such deployments are often a prerequisite for achieving deployment readiness. However, as this article will explore, replicating such training for urban combat is simply not achievable. Therefore, we must embrace and exploit an alternative method with proven potential to bridge this training gap: wargaming. The article will explore the potential of wargaming to fill the gaps in urban training and where it best fits within the overall training needs.

Limitations of Live Training

The physical and cognitive stresses inherent in live training are invaluable. Wargames fall short in replicating the physical exertion, the complexities of coordinating force elements and the physical manipulation of battlefield systems as effectively as live training does. However, despite the benefits live training offers, it cannot cover everything that is required to truly prepare for high-intensity urban combat at all echelons. There are notable limitations in live training which become increasingly amplified when attempts are made to simulate urban operations. These limitations fall into three broad categories: the environment, representing military effects, and multi-domain activities.

1. The Environment

The representation of other environments is heavily dominated by the physical topography, in addition to some unique characteristics such as weather for arctic and desert regions. It is quite manageable to find training grounds that mimic these topographical features. However, urban terrain is much more complex than just its topography. The urban environment consists of four layers:

1. Physical terrain – This includes the topography of the area, the urban sprawl, the physical features of different urban terrain zones and even the physical characteristics of individual buildings. 
2. Human terrain – Urban and rural terrain are differentiated by civilian populations, and these populations significantly influence the conduct of operations. The complexity is further heightened by various socio-economic groups, ethnic and language diversity, and distinct patterns of life in different city areas. For instance, residential areas tend to be relatively empty during the daytime but busy at night, whereas the opposite is true for office spaces.
3. Information layer – The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is cluttered by civilian and military communications, mobile phones, the internet and connected devices. These elements can be exploited to different levels and varying degrees across the spectrum of conflict.
4. Infrastructure – This includes the systems for communications, transport, power, water and waste. These are prominent features of urban areas, integral to the functioning of both the urban area and its population, and they can have a significant impact on the conduct of urban operations. In fact, these elements might be the primary motivation behind initiating the operation.

It is nearly impossible to replicate the scale and complexity of the civilian population within a training environment. Generating sufficient role players to simulate anything beyond minor interactions is challenging, and they often lack the cultural and language diversity needed to present realistic challenges.

For more tactically focused training – in particular for simulating combat and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) – the multi-dimensional environment is of the utmost importance. The surface, super-surface, sub-surface, and interior of buildings, as well as the information layer, are all crucial to the conduct of operations at that level. These factors will also vary depending on the simulated UTZ, meaning that there is a notable difference between a shanty town and a high-rise business district.

Compare this to simulating rural operations, where one only needs to model the topography, which probably consists of small villages (not very complex buildings) and limited infrastructure, and where the majority of the EMS is dominated by military systems. From an environmental perspective alone, representing urban operations is an order of magnitude more complicated. Further, there are issues of scale and variation. It is not feasible to build an urban training site that is large enough for a sizeable force element to manoeuvre through. The French and German militaries have built impressive facilities at the Centre d’entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine and Schnöggersburg,^{Footnote 4}  respectively. The US has similar facilities at Fort Irwin and Twenty-Nine Palms. These facilities comprise hundreds of buildings, replicating multiple UTZs and variety in building complexity and height. However, there are still several limitations with these sites:

• Despite their size, they are quickly memorized by exercising troops, reducing complexity for troops over time. 
• They do not effectively support large-scale manoeuvres within the urban space, especially above the company/squadron level.
• They still lack the representation of combined arms effects.
• They lack a civilian population.
• They are generally “uncluttered” or lack significant “battle damage,” reducing realism.
• They generally present very limited (or no) EMS clutter.
• Although they might represent different UTZs, each representation is small, exacerbating the difficulty of training combined arms manoeuvre in them.

Simply put, it is impossible to create the necessary scale, complexity and realism of a real urban area within an artificial training estate. Additionally, cities are changing. The emergence of “smart cities,” increased verticality in both skyscrapers and subterranean complexes, the rise of slums, and complicated alternative forms of governance are reshaping how a military force may interact with a city and its population.^{Footnote 5}  Despite the impact these trends may have on military operations, it is highly challenging to prepare commanders for them using current physical training methods.

Lastly, the limited numbers of, and high demand for, these large urban training sites means that units rarely have the opportunity to conduct training there. Consequently, there is often a condensed training schedule which prevents troops from repeating tactical scenarios and applying lessons learned from initial attempts. This poses a challenge to establishing a solid foundation for training.

2. Military Effects

The most challenging aspects of live urban training involve accurately representing battle effects, and this includes even seemingly simple aspects like having them included as options in training scenarios.^{Footnote 6}  Combined arms live firing is considered essential for rural training, but it is not even feasible for urban training. 

Even in non–live fire exercises, many essential weapon systems are missing. It is rare to see urban training exercises in which troops use explosive weapon systems such as grenade launchers and anti-structure munitions, despite those being the very operations for which they are designed. Similarly, there is a notable absence of represented combined arms effects: mortars, tank cannons and airstrikes are adjudicated effects at best, and more commonly they are entirely absent. As a result, most urban training, even a combined arms company group exercise, will devolve into a dismounted fight inside buildings. This fails to adequately prepare troops for combined arms urban operations and forces them to learn hard lessons in real combat.^{Footnote 7} 

By omitting the representation of these capabilities or their effects, training reinforces incorrect assumptions or imparts poor tactics. Troops may lack the knowledge of when it is best to employ explosives instead of small arms, relying on “muscle memory” developed in exercises where explosives were never represented.

At higher formations, one of the primary functions is the coordination of joint fires effects in support of close combat elements, including kinetic effects as well as novel effects such as cyber and space capabilities. If these aspects are not integrated into urban training, a clear training gap emerges.

3. Multi-Domain Activities

At higher formations, urban operations entail a broader spectrum of responsibilities compared to rural operations. In urban battles, tasks such as coordinating with host nation services, supporting large displaced populations, managing sustainment for high-intensity urban combat and various other factors suddenly become critical. In this context, the urban flows of people, resources, waste, communications and other associated aspects play a significant role. International diasporas, global media and global links between cities begin to influence the conduct of operations.^{Footnote 8}  Of course, the scale of the urban area of operations is much larger also. Determining how to manoeuvre through a large urban space and coordinate multiple entities on different ground lines of communication presents a daunting challenge and not one that can be replicated in any existing urban training venue.

Furthermore, the timescales associated with these activities often extend beyond what is realistic in a live exercise. Most large urban battles typically unfold over weeks or months, encompassing shaping activities, intelligence collection, the battle itself and the transition to security, each of which generally requires a significant amount of time.

In summary, when compared to the demands of real world urban operations, the current physical training capabilities are lacking across the spectrum of training needs and all echelons.

What is wargaming?

There is considerable debate among the world’s leading wargaming academics regarding how to define a wargame and whether such definitions are beneficial.^{Footnote 9}  However, for the purpose of this article it is essential to provide a definition and clarify the advocated position. In this article, a wargame is defined as a simulation of military conflict and activities that is adversarial, built around a structured model and guided by rules, and in which the players’ decisions have an impact on the progress and outcomes of the actions.

The practice has a long and rich history in aiding military preparation, from the heavily abstracted representation of combat in chess, utilized for centuries from Persia to Europe,^{Footnote 10}  to its application by the Germans in the 1930s to develop Blitzkrieg^{Footnote 11}  and by the US Navy to develop carrier tactics.^{Footnote 12}  More recently, Western allies have run highly detailed wargames to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces make decisions regarding their counteroffensives, including the 2022 Kherson offensive.^{Footnote 13}  This particular instance highlighted the dangers of a broader offensive that the Ukrainians had been planning, with the wargames suggesting a much more limited  and more focused operation around the city of Kherson. This was ultimately successful, with Ukraine recapturing the regional capital and more than 1,000 square kilometres of territory in two weeks.

Wargames come in many forms, but the simplest breakdown of the types is into two categories: manual and computer-based (formally called constructive simulation). 

• Manual wargames are classic tabletop games with maps on a table and counters to represent entities in the conflict. These are especially good for collaborative training, as all participants are gathered around the map, discussing their actions and assessing how their actions affect other players. As a result, manual wargames tend to be slower to run. They can also be less intuitive for non-wargamers, with more complex games requiring specialists to run and facilitate them.
• Computer-based wargames are more immersive, potentially run in real time, and more visually engaging. They are also quicker to run, which increases their repeatability value. They are especially good for individual training and for training specific aspects such as command and control (C2) and high-tempo combat scenarios. These also tend to be more intuitive, making complex simulations more accessible to non-gamers than a comparable manual game would. However, they require more hardware to run “at scale” to train the same number of people as a manual wargame, and that hardware is more expensive.

Most military professionals are aware of wargaming or have actively participated in it. From course of action wargames as part of the planning process to larger joint exercises like Warfighter, the military is accustomed to a variety of wargaming techniques. Despite this, wargaming has still not been embraced with enthusiasm for more routine training and continues to be seen as “a game of dice not much different from Risk and is more associated with ‘childish things.’^{Footnote 14} 

This article will focus on the features of wargames that are pertinent to training, excluding the more intricate analytical wargames that serve more specialized or specific purposes.

Where does wargaming fit?

For wargaming to complement live training, it is crucial to identify the most suitable areas where it can be best applied. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct levels of training for urban warfare:

1. low-level skills training (up to platoon/troop level);
2. initial combined arms training (up to company/squadron level); and
3. higher formation collective training (battalion, brigade and division level).

Although there is undoubtedly some overlap in training reliance between these levels, each level has distinct requirements that result in separate training needs for wargaming.

1. Low-level, individual and small-unit skills are still the preserve of live training. Virtual reality, constructive simulation such as computer games and manual/tabletop wargames are not intended to replace physical training for these skills. They require the “muscle memory” developed through multiple iterations to ensure that soldiers can react quickly and, if necessary, instinctively. They require the visceral experience of making snap decisions while fatigued and under the pressure of battlefield stresses. To use the old adage, soldiers simply need to move, shoot and communicate, and this is best done for real.^{Footnote 15}  However, the cognitive foundation (the conceptual component of fighting power) can be cultivated through wargames. Certain computer wargames are relevant at this level, but the training can even be as simple as a Tactical Exercise Without Troops conducted in real urban terrain, with a suitably empowered adversary actor and an adjudicator to keep the discussions constructive.^{Footnote 16}  Manual wargame systems like Advanced Squad Leader have been employed to enhance the tactical training and planning processes for platoon commanders.^{Footnote 17} 
2. Initial combined arms training is where coordination and process become more important than physical manipulation of systems. As aptly noted by Robert Taylor, Duncan Stewart and John Spencer, “A soldier’s ability to co-ordinate an artillery barrage will improve their overall lethality disproportionately more than a 5mm or better grouping at 100m.”^{Footnote 18}   Even more so will the experience of knowing when artillery or other assets are the answer, rather than dismounted close combat.^{Footnote 19}  Wargames can represent significantly more battlefield effects than physical training (even if abstracted), which means that troops can contemplate when it might be appropriate to use them and the impact they might have. In addition, they can offer a terrain scale appropriate to company-to-battalion-level manoeuvre, thereby reinforcing lessons on C2 between close combat elements, joint fires and sustainment elements, as well as posing a risk of being outflanked in the dense urban terrain. For this level, manual wargames are excellent for collaborative training of section, platoon and company commanders, while computer-based wargames are best for more focused individual training of platoon and company commanders.
3. Higher formation collective training for urban warfare can be almost entirely conducted using wargames. This is often the area where little or no urban training occurs. In real urban combat, higher formations are likely to be static in buildings for much of their time, coordinating units they cannot physically see due to the terrain. In that context, wargaming is actually not as abstract a training reality. 

At this level, wargames can inject pertinent features such as sizeable civilian populations to be managed, the impact of information operations, political direction or interference, and the involvement of other aligned actors such as non-government organizations or host nation forces. It also provides a platform to represent joint and inter-agency actors or capabilities in a manner that is considerably more challenging in physical training settings. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) in the United Kingdom recently ran a wargame for NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps to assist them with developing corps-level urban doctrine. The team used representatives from various non-government organizations to assume various non-combatant roles, bringing their real-world experiences of helping civilians in war zones to the exercise. This was the first time anyone in the corps headquarters had exercised urban operations at the corps level, and for some planners it was their first-ever experience wargaming urban operations. 

Regardless of the level, an important aspect of training is repeatability. The ability to conduct diverse scenarios with different adversaries using varied tactics is key to developing flexible and adaptable decision makers. If we learn from our experiences, it is undoubtedly a best practice to create as many varied experiences as possible. Physical training has a diminishing potential for repetition the higher we progress through the echelons. While computer wargames are generally quicker to run than manual wargames, each category generally has more repeatability than physical training exercises. Players can change roles, thereby experiencing being a company commander one day, a battalion commander the next and the red force commander the day after, giving them a much broader experience base for the future. According to Perla and McGrady, “The need to explore, repeat, and reflect on decisions made in the context of games is critical to what we must do to learn better how to cope with a world rapidly moving beyond our range of real experiences.”^{Footnote 20} 

Another crucial aspect is immersion. At its simplest, this involves having players take on roles that can shape how they approach and tackle problems. However, it goes beyond that, encompassing immersion in the processes to provide players with a realistic sense of the stress and challenges associated with conducting urban operations. For example, Dstl runs the commercial computer wargame Combat Mission in a way that forces the player to see only the force elements that they could actually see in real life (see image above). This forces commanders to make decisions based on heavily restricted but realistic representations of their situational awareness. Notably, many Dstl military players have commented on how disorienting they found it. 

Another facet of immersion involves considering the consequences of actions. Wargames enable the representation of outcomes such as civilian casualties, infrastructure damage, information operations failures, high Blue Force casualties and other difficult challenges. Maps can be altered to represent the degradation of the environment commensurate with the level of destruction applied by the players. Even a simple wargame with card-driven “events” like these can force commanders to take responsibility for their actions – both positive and negative – and grasp their implications and how they might influence subsequent actions.^{Footnote 21}

It’s not that simple, though

To be clear, even simulating the complexity of urban operations in a wargame is still very difficult. The US Army conducted a review of all their legacy simulations for urban operations utility. When assessed across the PMESII-PT^{Footnote 22}  spectrum, the only category that warranted a green rating was, unsurprisingly, “Military.”^{Footnote 23}  

Dstl conducted a review of UK Defence’s wargaming capabilities and, having identified comparable limitations in its core wargaming capabilities, is actively making efforts to address them. Acknowledging that valuable ideas are not exclusive to any single organization, Dstl is addressing these challenges by leveraging both computer-based and manual commercial wargames and adapting them to meet their specific requirements. Many commercial games strive to cover the conflict in an engaging way that allows representation of many of the factors outlined above or the use of mechanics that emphasize specific functions such as C2 and information operations. 

Wargames serve as simulations of conflict, but not all wargames are created equal. There is a maxim among modelling and simulation practitioners: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” No single wargame can cover everything, and there will always be compromises, just as in live training.^{Footnote 24}  The key lies in discerning the level of realism required for the intended outcome and tailoring the wargame accordingly.

It is equally essential to recognize that wargames deliberately emphasize certain aspects and may not attempt to encompass every possible entity and influence. Aspects deemed less relevant to the purpose of the wargame are often represented in more abstract ways to enable players to focus on the primary aim.^{Footnote 25}  A classic example is the resolution of combat using dice, symbolizing the risk commanders must weigh and the inevitable frictions that can disrupt even the best-laid plans. While it may not achieve 100% accuracy for all combat engagements, it is often considered sufficient to allow the progression of the wargame and focus the players’ attention on the main objectives.

The manual wargame We Are Coming Nineveh! covers the operational level during the Battle of Mosul, Iraq (16 October 2016–20 July 2017). The combat is heavily abstracted but the game uses blocks to restrict Blue’s picture of Red (representing incomplete intelligence) and cards to represent a wide spectrum of possible events to influence the outcome. The incorporation of cards introduces a variable element, providing players with a different set of challenges in each playthrough. The game also has a function where the players must choose how to build their force before the battle, compelling players to consider force compositions. The trade-offs made at the outset have second- and third-order effects, influencing the later stages of the game. This allows players to replay the game with different force compositions, introducing an element of experimentation.

Computer wargames like Combat Mission allow combined arms companies to conduct high-intensity combat in heavily built-up areas using the full spectrum of joint effects, including airstrikes, electronic warfare, artillery and ISTAR. However, the trade-off is that the system is primarily designed for displaying company-sized elements, and the infantry combat is relatively simplistic. As it is a commercial game, though, it is reasonably easy to learn and can be used for individual training or with two opposing sides. The inclusion of a map maker function enables the generation of new urban areas, ensuring a variety of layouts and scales to keep the training challenging. Additionally and as noted previously, there are methods to run the game in ways that enhance the C2 challenges.

To train larger groups and at higher echelons, Dstl employs custom-designed wargames that can be tailored to achieve the intended training outcomes. In these scenarios, individuals with specific knowledge and expertise are often employed to play various factions, such as the enemy, the host nation, the local population and other international actors. This approach enables military players to focus on their specific, real-world roles.

While these approaches offer potential solutions to the limitations of physical urban training, they are not without challenges. For instance, finding suitably experienced players for faction roles can be challenging. Furthermore, the aggregated features inherent in wargames make them less suitable for training certain aspects of urban operations. For some players, card-driven events and dice resolutions might be perceived as too random, leaving them feeling as if they are playing a game of chance rather than conducting serious military training. Effective facilitation can mitigate these challenges. Ultimately, however, the alternative might be the exclusion of these aspects from urban training or, worse, a lack of urban training altogether.

Conclusion

Exclusive reliance on live training will fall short in adequately preparing militaries for future urban combat. The limitations of training locations become apparent as they are unable to replicate the scale, complexity (including EMS), variety and fragility of the physical urban landscape. Existing training facilities are also incapable of accurately representing the scale of the human dimension of conflict within this environment and how it evolves dynamically as a direct result of actions taken by commanders. Lastly, these sites are incapable of allowing representation of combined arms and joint effects (including non-kinetic), and live fire in particular, in sharp contrast with regular training requirements in rural environments. As a result of these deficiencies, militaries fail to sufficiently prepare commanders at all levels for the best employment of the full spectrum of available effects.

Despite the existing limitations, wargaming stands out as a viable means of genuinely preparing commanders to conduct urban operations, especially at higher formations. With adequate support, the acknowledged limitations of wargaming can be mitigated. While they may never achieve a perfect reflection of reality, wargames have the potential to provide a much more comprehensive representation of tactical and operational challenges in urban warfare compared to other means of training. Investing in the development of wargames offers a faster and more efficient and effective way to address the gap in urban training, rather than directing resources solely towards live training estates.

In order to prepare the allied and partner forces for the future urban battlefield, it is crucial to stop relying solely on live training. The inherent limitations of live training can lead to the entrenchment of poor tactics, as constrained exercises become the foundational experience for leaders at all levels from section to platoon, company and beyond. Relying on these constrained live exercises as the cognitive foundation for war readiness risks ingraining sub-optimal lessons in the force. Similarly, it would be imprudent to hope that soldiers can adapt when real urban combat presents itself. As the saying goes, hope is not a strategy, and this reliance on adaptation under fire may result in unnecessary casualties and collateral damage. Wargames offer a proven alternative. As highlighted by General von Muffling, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1824, upon observing a wargame, “This is not a game! This is training for war!”^{Footnote 26}

About the Author

Stuart Lyle is a Principal Analyst for the UK Ministry of Defence’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), focusing on Future Land Warfare. He is the lead for urban operations research at Dstl and led Dstl’s Future Cities: Trends and Implications report (2020), which examined future trends in urbanization and their implications for the military. Stuart has also been heavily involved in exploring technology to assist with urban operations, urban wargaming, how urban terrain impacts on explosive ordnance disposal activities and more. His most recent work focused on urban-optimized force design, creating a conceptual light role platoon that serves as the basis for the British Army’s Next Generation Combat Team.

This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).