Navigating the Challenge of the Weaponization of Civilians: Leveraging Intermediate Force Capabilities

by Dr. Peter Dobias

Introduction

Effective military operations require tactical mobility and the freedom of movement.^{Footnote 1}  Both urban and rural environments, especially those with canalization points (e.g. roads through impassable terrain) pose a number of unique challenges to mobility.^{Footnote 2}  One of the significant challenges is the ubiquitous presence of civilians.^{Footnote 3}  During the planning stage, the civilian population is often viewed as a mere background in which the adversary can operate (e.g. as a cover for armed groups in insurgencies or terror attacks).^{Footnote 4}  However, the last 30 years have demonstrated that some actors have resorted to employing civilians as a “weapon,” particularly in a counter-mobility role or in obstructing military movements. As evident in early stages of the war in Ukraine, even a small crowd when strategically positioned at critical locations can potentially stop or delay movements of military units.^{Footnote 5}   

Past conflicts offer numerous examples where the adversary leveraged civilians to impede military forces’ freedom of motion. For instance, in Mogadishu in 1993, civilian crowds slowed down the ground forces, potentially leading to heavy friendly force casualties and extending the mission duration. The convoys were slowed by roadblocks set up by militias and Somali civilians.^{Footnote 6}  Similarly, in 2021 in Burkina Faso, a civilian crowd opposed to French involvement in the region successfully halted a French military convoy for hours, resulting in a standoff that escalated tensions.^{Footnote 7}  Such incidents are not limited to counter-insurgencies. In the aftermath of the 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian separatist forces reportedly used crowds to block Ukrainian military convoys or to prevent quick reaction forces leaving Ukrainian bases to support units.^{Footnote 8}  Further, in February 2022, there were reports of a Ukrainian crowd blocking a Russian armoured convoy in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, delaying Russian advances.^{Footnote 9}

While some countries, despite being signatories of Geneva and Hague conventions,^{Footnote 10}  demonstrate complete disregard of non-combatant status,^{Footnote 11}  NATO countries strictly adhere to the law of armed conflict (LOAC)^{Footnote 12}  and try to prevent any unnecessary civilian casualties. The 2016 NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) reinforces the NATO commitment to protecting civilians from harm and notes, “A PoC perspective should be included in the planning and conduct of operations and missions, training, education and exercises, lessons learned, as well as defence and security-related capacity building activities.”^{Footnote 13}  Interestingly, even the Russian military, despite showing regretful disregard for the protection of civilians and the law of armed conflict,^{Footnote 14}  was at least temporarily stopped by determined Ukrainian civilians, as shown by the last example in the previous paragraph. Moreover, in today’s pervasive information environment where any questionable action can make it to social media in no time, it is important that the allied forces’ actions be above reproach. Even the slightest hint of improper action or behaviour can be damaging to the credibility and legality of an allied mission. As Dan E. Stigall puts it, “On the modern battlefield, information and images will catalyze and shape the course of a conflict. They will also enhance or undermine military efforts in significant ways.”^{Footnote 15}

Given that background, NATO forces often find themselves in a challenging position when dealing with non-compliant or openly hostile crowds. Their response is often limited to doing nothing. According to Ben Lagasca et al., “in such cases, U.S. warfighters often had no good choice other than to kill or possibly be killed. Dismounted soldiers operating in Mosul, Iraq, and other cities faced similar situations. When armed threats appeared, it was sometimes hard to sort out combatant from civilian or child.”^{Footnote 16}   These challenges, especially amidst the fog of war, makes the adversaries’ tactic of weaponizing civilians more successful. It is imperative to explore innovative crowd-management methods in conflict/war zones while ensuring the protection of civilians and upholding both legal and ethical standards and intention. 

In light of this context, this paper contends that the accessibility of intermediate force capabilities (IFC), specifically directed energy (DE) non-lethal capabilities (NLC), has the potential to bolster NATO forces’ ability to counter the use of civilians as a counter-mobility capability. To expand on the concept, the IFC encompasses a range of “non-lethal weapons as well as other non-lethal tools” designed to “bridge the gap between a mission of mere presence and the use of lethal effects, allowing active measures when presence alone is insufficient to deter malign activities or when the use of lethal or destructive force is neither desired nor appropriate.”^{Footnote 17}   Within the broader umbrella of the IFC lie conventional and DE non-lethal weapons (NLW) capabilities. 

Asserting this broader argument, the paper is structured as follows: the subsequent section provides a brief exploration of the use of civilians for counter-mobility. Thereafter, the paper details the wargame series conducted in support of the NATO IFC concept development. It is followed by a discussion of the tactical and operational impact of a crowd as a counter-mobility capability, and the effects of the IFC employment based on the wargame observations. Finally, there is a brief overview of the use of agent-based models to assess key IFC characteristics relevant to counter-crowd utilization.

Combatting the Weaponization of Civilians

The success of military operations relies on freedom of manoeuvre, which is closely linked to the effective management of the civilian population in a war or conflict zone. This becomes particularly critical when adversaries utilize civilians to obstruct or impede military operations, potentially placing them in harm’s way. While it may be possible to use military police in the crowd control role in some instances, their actions are usually subject to significant scrutiny. This creates a vulnerability, as adversaries can often achieve their goals while staying below the threshold of lethal force, effectively neutralizing NATO’s superior firepower. If NATO forces resort to using force that is deemed non-proportional, they risk being portrayed as the aggressors in the situation. It is crucial to find ways to strike a balance between maintaining security and mitigating harm to civilians.

There is a range of capabilities that would enable NATO forces to deal more effectively with the presence of crowds; some are operationally ready while others require more research and development.^{Footnote 18}  The operational ones include conventional crowd control capabilities such as batons and shields (usually employed by the military police), blunt trauma (rubber bullets) and warning rounds, as well as some DE NLC, such as a long-range acoustic device (LRAD) designed to propagate sound over distances of hundreds to thousands of metres (either spoken word or high-pitch warning sound), or an active denial system (ADS).^{Footnote 19}   The ADS is a millimetre wave system that creates an unbearable heat sensation without any actual physical harm.^{Footnote 20}  The ADS was selected as an example of mature DE NLW technology on advice of the experts from the US Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office. It was evaluated extensively through a number of military utility experiments and, contrary to some media reporting, it was determined to be safe for operation.^{Footnote 21}  This alternative is possibly significantly less contentious than, for instance, malodorants like the Skunk used by the Israeli forces.^{Footnote 22}  The Skunk’s odour can last several days, rendering buildings uninhabitable and thus impacting people and infrastructure.^{Footnote 23}  Furthermore, use of malodorants and tear gas to facilitate military operations would most likely run afoul of the LOAC,^{Footnote 24}  which prohibits the use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare.^{Footnote 25}  These concerns most likely do not apply to the ADS, as the weapon is capable of discriminate targeting, and the intensity is purposefully below the level that would cause burns.^{Footnote 26}

Within the context of conventional and DE NLW capabilities that fall under the broader term, IFC, there are more advanced experimental capabilities with promising research and development aimed at a smaller form-factor and lesser energy demand. In 2020–2021, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) led the development of an IFC concept. The wargames conducted in support of the IFC concept development provided insights into the employment and performance requirements of IFC more broadly.^{Footnote 27}  Although there are unresolved legal questions regarding the deployment of IFC to counter both civilians and combatants within the constraints of the LOAC, the study team was advised that the intended use of the NLC aligned with the LOAC principles.^{Footnote 28}

Wargame Series in Support of IFC Concept Development

During 2020–2022, NATO Systems and Analysis Studies 151 (SAS-151) designed and executed a series of six wargames supporting development of the NATO SACT IFC concept.^{Footnote 29}  Traditional wargaming approaches normally represent a tactical, operational, or strategic level. The divergence of time and spatial scales typically hinders the simultaneous representation of multiple levels because the game would either become overwhelmingly resource-intensive and lengthy or largely provide a higher-level overview, limiting insights into the tactical capabilities. The SAS-151 study group implemented a novel wargaming approach based on renormalization approaches,^{Footnote 30}  which can be described as essentially employing the lowest possible resolution unless higher resolution is necessary. This approach combines different games operating at different levels with a view to resolve the limitations inherent in individual game types.^{Footnote 31}  

While there were specific details in the implementation of the mentioned wargames, in a broad sense, they were designed as follows: the tactical vignettes were implemented within the framework of a semi-rigid Kriegsspiel. The games had a duration ranging from one to a few hours, with time steps represented in the range of 10–30 minutes. Individual units or small groups of three to four people were used to represent the units. The available capabilities were represented by capability cards, which included the probability of success with or without the adversary’s countermeasures, along with possible collateral damage. These cards were developed in collaboration with the technical experts. The players had the liberty to determine movements and actions for each turn. The effect of the chosen actions was adjudicated using dice. The broader strategic implications of these actions were then replayed through a matrix-style game. The players stated their actions, objectives, and rationale for anticipated success. The entire round was then adjudicated by the white cell. Owing to the necessary abstractions, the secondary effects and damages (such as injuries due to downed uncrewed systems or due to stampeding crowds) were generally not represented.^{Footnote 32}

In three of the SAS-151 wargames, crowds were employed to disrupt the movement of NATO forces. The first wargame focused on force protection of a naval task group in a port, where hostiles used a crowd to block access to the ship. In the second wargame, which included the most significant crowd component, the hostiles used a large crowd to prevent quick reaction forces from leaving the base (or convoys from accessing the base). Finally, the last of these wargames centred on contested non-combatant evacuation with hostiles using small crowds to slow down or stop the evacuation convoy. Subsequent paragraphs discuss the observations in greater detail.^{Footnote 33}

In the first wargame (titled "NATO Task Group in Port”), a NATO naval task group executed a rest and resupply operation in a friendly country.^{Footnote 34}  The hostiles opposing their country’s partnership with NATO organized a crowd of approximately 70 people at the access point to the ship with twofold objectives: a.) prevent supplies from reaching the docked ship, and b.), use the crowd as a cover to kidnap sailors who were away from the ship. In the option without IFC, the friendly forces lacked the ability to handle the crowd. The only available resource was the use of local security forces with minimum crowd control capabilities (pepper spray, batons). These local forces were in a difficult situation, as any action against the crowd could potentially spark additional riots in the port city and increase opposition to the NATO forces’ presence. This resulted in conceding the initiative to the adversary. The security forces were unable to disperse the crowd, which prevented the task group from finishing their resupply. Furthermore, the crowd succeeded in kidnapping the sailors, enabling the opposition forces to blackmail the local government.^{Footnote 35}

In this scenario, the ADS proved to be the most effective IFC for crowd control. While the current version is not mobile, it demonstrated sufficient range to create a corridor through the crowd and ensure safe passage of sailors and completion of the resupply. This contributed to the overall operational success of the NATO forces. The scenario of the wargame highlighted the vulnerability of NATO forces to hostile crowds, revealing that even a relatively small crowd (less than a 100 people) could significantly disrupt or block NATO forces’ freedom of movement. In the absence of advanced IFC, reliance on the local forces proved insufficient and had the potential to aggravate the already tenuous strategic situation. The ADS was a game changer as it provided the NATO forces with the counter-capability to this particular use of crowds as a weapon.^{Footnote 36}

In the second wargame titled “NATO Task Force in Land Wargame Scenario,” a NATO Task Force was engaged in training local forces in a third country. The population of the country was divided into two groups. While the first group that was controlling the government sought NATO presence as a means of stabilizing the security situation in the region, the second group was aligned with the neighbouring country that opposed NATO presence in the region. This division resulted in localized insurgency, with the neighbouring country threatening an attack if NATO or NATO-aligned security forces committed violence against civilians of their ethnic group. The tactical vignette started when a returning joint local–NATO patrol was ambushed while crossing a marketplace filled with civilians. Concurrently, the hostile element organized a crowd of approximately 400 people (men, women, elderly people and children), preventing the exit of a quick reaction force (QRF) from the base. The agitated but unarmed crowd, with the threat of throwing rocks, completely blocked the access route to the base, making it impassable for both the convoy and the QRF sent by the base commander to assist the ambushed patrol. The discussion below focuses on the part of the vignette involving the crowd by the base.^{Footnote 37}   

In this wargame, three options were evaluated. In the baseline, the local military police was the only crowd control capability available to the NATO and aligned forces. The local military police were equipped with legacy non-lethal systems including batons and shields, tear gas, and blunt trauma systems (rubber bullets). The second option introduced the currently available ADS, which is portable but stationary when employed. The third option offered a “next generation” ADS (shorter range, but air-mobile).^{Footnote 38}

In the first option, the NATO task force commander deployed a military police crowd control company out of the base to attempt to disperse the crowd and facilitate safe passage of the QRF convoy. However, the legacy capabilities proved inadequate and led to further escalation of the situation. The crowd even threatened the base access point and attempted to cut off the military police company from the base support. The hostile groups, both domestically and in the neighbouring country, used the employment of the rubber bullets to generate negative publicity for the government forces. Given the inability to send the QRF, the ambushed patrol needed to fight their way out with no assistance. Even after escaping the ambush, the patrol found it challenging to return to the base. Overall, the escalation of force contributed to the neighbouring country’s decision to invade, using oppression of their ethnic minority as an excuse.^{Footnote 39}

In the other two options, the availability of the ADS altered the dynamics of the confrontation.^{Footnote 40}  However, the current version of the ADS lacking mobility proved to be insufficient to secure the QRF passage. While effective in protecting access points, the crowd could simply move out of the ADS range, establishing a new blocking point down the road. That necessitated dependence on the military police to open the corridor, although it still provided the NATO and local forces with the initiative. The ability to rapidly defuse and resolve the crisis by the base, with minimum use of force, helped de-escalate the overall situation. In this option, the neighbouring country lacked sufficient grounds for invasion. In the next generation option, the mobility of the ADS prevented the crowd from shifting its location, thus enabling the NATO and aligned forces to rapidly send out the QRF and ensuring freedom of movement.^{Footnote 41}

This game demonstrated that the crowds are an effective counter-mobility tool. The inability to displace the crowd in the baseline option carried significant strategic implications. In the two options with the IFC, the ADS was effective even in its current form as it helped to keep the crowd away from the gate and created room for more effective intervention by the forces. The next-generation ADS was considered light enough to be mounted on mobile platforms. Although it assumed shorter range, its mobility enabled rapid crowd dispersion. In fact, it prevented the crowd from re-establishing the block point far enough from the base to be out of reach of the ADS, emphasizing that mobility outweighed range in importance. 

The final wargame, titled “Game 4 – Contested Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Scenario,” unfolded within the context of strategic competition/confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers vying for influence in a neutral country called Hypatia. Once aligned with the regional hegemon Illyria, Hypatia is now attempting to align itself with Western democracies. The NEO is triggered by an impending invasion of Hypatia by Illyrian forces seeking to prevent pro-western Hypatian orientation. The NEO is to be executed by a NATO amphibious task force that deployed a battalion-sized force responsible for evacuating NATO military trainers and civilians from a Hypatian base. The hostile paramilitary forces controlled by Illyria were trying to prevent the evacuation in order to use the NATO citizens as a negotiation tool.^{Footnote 42}

The convoy of evacuees was composed of buses and accompanied by light military vehicles (Growler^{Footnote 43}  was used as a representative). To stop the convoy, or at least delay it long enough for the Illyrian forces to cut it off from the extraction point, the paramilitary forces attempted to assemble small crowds (from the local population opposed to the Hypatian government) at several points along the road. As a result of the swift insertion of NATO forces, the paramilitary had minimal time to set up crowds and associated roadblocks. With the invading forces rapidly approaching the planned evacuation point, any delays would have likely led to failure of the evacuation attempt.^{Footnote 44}

In this wargame, only two distinct options were played, each featuring IFC present on both the NATO and Illyrian sides. In the first option, the IFC relevant to crowd control were limited to legacy NLW (blunt trauma and warning rounds). The second option equipped the NATO forces with next-generation ADS mounted on both the Growlers and on helicopters available onboard the amphibious landing ship. In the first option with no ADS available, the initial crowd successfully blocked the convoy for an extended period of time, allowing other hostile groups sufficient time to organize additional blocking points. Since the buses could not travel off road, the convoy was effectively tied to the road and could not bypass the crowds. Initially the NATO forces tried to invent a deception to get through the blockage but remained unsuccessful. Subsequently, they tried blunt trauma rounds, but these proved ineffective against the hostile and determined crowd, highlighting the limitations of legacy blunt trauma NLW.

In the course of the game, not only did the attempts using rubber bullets fail, but they also provided hostile groups with material for anti-NATO propaganda. Eventually, the convoy managed to force its way through the initial crowd but found itself trapped between two crowds, with the second crowd having more time to organize and set up roadblocks. Unable to continue or return to the base, the convoy remained passive. The second blockage underscored the significant cost of inaction, echoing findings by Shortland et al., where the lack of a response option––in this case, doing nothing––had outcomes similar to using excessive force.^{Footnote 45}  The failure to evacuate or secure the civilians at the base led to complete operational and strategic failure of the NEO, providing the strategic advantage to the invading power and forcing the NATO forces to be passive and negotiating release of its citizens.^{Footnote 46}

In the option with IFC, the NATO forces were equipped with the notional next-generation mobile ADS modeled as short-range and vehicle-mounted as a part of the common remotely operated weapon station (CROWS) system.^{Footnote 47}   Despite its notional range of only 50–100 metres, the IFC was sufficient to move the crowd to the side of the road and away from the buses. This ensured a rapid passage of the convoy through the first crowd before it could block the road using debris and trees, thus further preventing the additional crowds from reaching the road in time. Consequently, the convoy could proceed swiftly toward the evacuation point while the hostile groups remained behind. This gave NATO forces the initiative and forced the invading Illyrian forces to use long-range artillery strikes against a road tunnel in order to slow down the evacuation. While the evacuation did not meet the original time limit, the evacuees made it to the extraction point. The use of lethal force by Illyria provided the NATO forces with the information advantage, enabling them to hold the strategic initiative. The difference in the strategic outcomes demonstrated that the use of crowds as a counter-mobility capability may have significant strategic effects and sway the strategic initiative. Within the scenario, the counter capability in the form of DE NLW (in this case the ADS) provided an effective option of dealing with the crowds.^{Footnote 48}

The final game conclusively proved the observations from the previous games that crowds are highly effective as a counter-mobility tool. At the minimum, they can slow down the military forces and, in more extreme cases, block them entirely. The inability to displace the blocking crowd without causing harm could have significant strategic implications. The high cost of inaction becomes evident, therefore highlighting the need for NATO forces to incorporate effective countermeasures in their planning stage and acquire capabilities that help displace crowds without causing harm. While some belligerents might be willing to cause large civilian casualties, the experience from Ukraine has shown that, even in those cases, sufficiently large crowds could disrupt armed forces’ freedom of movement.^{Footnote 49}  Furthermore, the final game confirmed the value of ADS in countering crowds, and showcased that the ADS’ mobility was more important than its range. In comparison to legacy blunt trauma systems, DE capabilities, particularly the ADS, outperformed by preventing information advantages for adversaries.^{Footnote 50}  This finding aligned with an earlier study by the RAND Corporation.^{Footnote 51}

Modeling Crowds in Counter-Mobility Role Using Agent-Based Models

The wargaming described above provided valuable qualitative insights into the use of NLW, both legacy systems and DE NLW systems such as ADS, for countering crowds. However, to better quantify the contribution of IFC to mission success, it is worth implementing IFC in computer simulations that could be eventually incorporated into higher level games.^{Footnote 52} The initial attempts on representing IFC in simulations were done using an agent-based model called Map aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA), developed by the New Zealand Defence Technology Agency.^{Footnote 53}  MANA’s high level of abstraction renders it suitable for modeling future capabilities when precise performance specifications are uncertain. Furthermore, the abstraction introduces an element of outcome dependency on parameter selection, making it most suitable for comparing parametric options that are subjects to the same assumptions and limitations on system performance. The earlier work considered scenarios involving the use of IFC in a counter-material role to counter swarms of potentially suicidal uncrewed systems in the maritime domain.^{Footnote 54}  The study concluded that the effectiveness of DE NLW in countering swarms relies on their area coverage and the ability to engage multiple targets and render them immobile. This capability proves crucial for success when facing swarms that could otherwise overwhelm a limited number of lethal systems.^{Footnote 55}

Following this earlier work, Afara et al. designed and implemented two scenarios simulating crowds in a counter-mobility role in MANA.^{Footnote 56}  These scenarios were designed to demonstrate the employment of IFC to preserve freedom of movement in the presence of unarmed crowds. The first scenario was simplistic and served as a proof of concept for modelling a crowd as a counter-mobility capability and the use of IFC to counter the crowd. A military convoy moved along a straight line and was stopped by a crowd. MANA does not consider the size of individual entities. In other words, the vehicles could always pass between civilians. Therefore, the crowd counter-mobility role was modelled by stopping vehicles within a certain distance from civilians. Modeling the action of IFC was straightforward using different MANA weapon classes.^{Footnote 57}     

The second scenario involved a QRF moving across a populated market to support troops ambushed by insurgents on the other side of the town. The scenario assumed that the military convoy would have mounted ADS, and varied the ADS parameters (range, power), as well as the crowd and convoy size to obtain approximately 120 combinations of parameters. Each of the options was replicated 100 times for a total of 12,000 different data points. Two measures were used to assess the effectiveness of the friendly forces: objective achievement and time taken, along with an alternative measure, the number of casualties from the ambushed unit.^{Footnote 58}  

Different machine-learning approaches were then leveraged to obtain insights into the relative importance of the varied parameters and the implications for mission success. In the first scenario, the crowd size was of the greatest importance, followed by the power (defined as the duration of the effect of the ADS on an individual). In the second case, the crowd size was not as important, largely because the convoy only interacted with a small portion of the actual crowd. Range and power were the most important parameters. When considering the time factor (how quickly the convoy could get to its objective), power became the most important factor. Overall, the study “conclusively showed that the IFC improved the ability of BLUE force to achieve their Objective (and maintain freedom of movement).”^{Footnote 59}  The impact of crowd density on the relative importance of range and power was observed, indicating that, as crowd density increased, range became more crucial, while for sparser crowds, power (duration of the effect) gained greater significance.^{Footnote 60}   

Summary and Conclusions

Insights from various conflicts indicate that civilian crowds can be strategically employed as a counter-mobility capability. Usually, NATO and allied militaries operate under restrictive rules of engagement aimed at the prevention of civilian casualties. This, in turn, limits their ability to counter these crowds. Even during high-intensity conflict, the adherence to the LOAC limits the range of activities that the NATO forces may employ in case of civilians. 

In a series of six wargames, NATO SAS-151 simulated challenges in countering crowds with their current capability set. Lethal and traditional non-lethal weapons were insufficient against determined crowds, with military police actions risking escalation and the NATO forces losing the “battle of narratives” in the information environment. However, the use of DE NLW, specifically the ADS, provided initiative to NATO forces.^{Footnote 61}  As they are not observable, their use had limited negative information impact compared to the legacy NLW. The conclusions about the effectiveness of the ADS remained consistent with an earlier study conducted by the RAND Corporation.^{Footnote 62}  The SAS-151 wargames showed that the mobility of the ADS is more important than its range, and the modelling & simulation work demonstrated that the benefits of a greater range increased with greater crowd density.^{Footnote 63}   

In summary, crowds prove to be an effective counter-mobility tool across various scenarios of competition and conflict, emphasizing the strategic importance of addressing this challenge. Therefore, Canadian and NATO planners would be prudent to consider the use of crowds and appropriate counters in operational planning. While current military police capabilities may be useful in certain situations, their limitations in speed and potential information costs underscore the need for alternative measures. As observed from the wargames noted above, DE NLW, particularly with a focus on mobility over range, can emerge as promising counter-capabilities, offering effective crowd control without negative information implications. The qualitative results from the wargames, and the quantitative results from modeling IFC in MANA suggested that the mobility of these capabilities is more important than the range. In view of this finding, it would be rewarding for future research and development to prioritize reducing size and power demand, even at the expense of range, to enhance these capabilities. 

About the Author

Dr. Peter Dobias is a senior operational research advisor at North American Aerospace Defense Command. Previously he was a section head for the Land and Operational Commands section of Defence Research & Development Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (DRDC CORA), in Ottawa, Canada, where he was responsible for operational research and strategic analysis support provided by five teams embedded with the Canadian Armed Forces’ operational commands and the Canadian Army. His research background includes analysis of complex adaptive and self-organized systems, deterrence and escalation, threat analysis, wargaming and constructive simulations, and strategic and operational mission assessment.

This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).