The Reconnaissance Gap: Canadian Army Reconnaissance and Security Units in History

by Major Bryce Simpson, CD 

INTRODUCTION^{Footnote 1}

As the practitioner and student of war, Sun Tzu indicates, reconnaissance has always been an essential part of warfare. Few would contest this fact, but it is also clear that there is a decided lack of consensus within the Canadian Army about the conduct of formation reconnaissance. The debate over the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC)’s medium reconnaissance^{Footnote 2}  capability (the capability provided by formation reconnaissance squadrons) is ongoing, and some have argued for a de-emphasizing of this capability in favour of what has come to be termed the “cavalry concept.”^{Footnote 3}  It is this issue—the place of formation reconnaissance units in the Canadian Army—that will be addressed in this article.

Military doctrine constitutes the “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives,” and it “represents the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience.”^{Footnote 4}  In his seminal treatise On War, Carl von Clausewitz argues that the roots of military “theory” (doctrine) in historical experience lead writers aiming to “displace a method in current usage, confirm a dubious, or introduce a new one”^{Footnote 5}  towards the exploration of historical examples. However, Clausewitz advises caution in such endeavours, noting that historical examples “may be used to support the most contradictory views; and three or four examples from distant times and places dragged in and pulled up from the widest range of circumstances, tend to distract and confuse one’s judgement without proving anything.”^{Footnote 6}  The proponents of the RCAC’s recently adopted cavalry concept undertook a historical justification of their theory, and so it is incumbent upon professional soldiers to scrutinize their evidence to determine whether their conclusions are justified. Utilizing a historical survey of RCAC reconnaissance structures, this article will demonstrate that the Canadian Army’s pre–cavalry concept reconnaissance doctrine was grounded in a solid foundation of experience and that these reconnaissance units have been identified repeatedly as essential warfighting elements for a modern ground force.

The cavalry concept owes much to the publication of an article by then-Captain Matthew McInnes in 2017.^{Footnote 8}  Though the cavalry concept has been much discussed in the RCAC throughout the last several years, and rapidly shifting arguments in its favour have regularly appeared in innumerable Army briefings, McInnes’s 2017 article in the pages of this journal remains the solitary published articulation of the concept’s “first principles.” McInnes attempts a historically grounded argument for what he terms “the cavalry gap,” a conceptual space between the RCAC’s reconnaissance and tank subunits whose doctrinal separation results in undesirable “streams” within the Corps.^{Footnote 9}  Further, McInnes critiques the maintenance of formation reconnaissance elements within an army, arguing that “there is no greater need for a reconnaissance-specific manoeuvre organization than there is for an attack-specific manoeuvre organization, as multipurpose combat forces are by their very nature equipped and trained for the full range of tactical activities.”^{Footnote 10} 

The RCAC officially accepted the historical assertions and associated recommendations made in McInnes’s article, promulgating the cavalry concept in an August 2021 letter to all RCAC commanding officers.^{Footnote 11}  The precepts of the concept include “the rescinding of all extant armoured, ‘tank,’ and ‘recce’ doctrine” and the assertion that “there is only one type of combat squadron within the RCAC, the armoured cavalry squadron,” which calls for the reorganizing reconnaissance subunits into “a single organizational structure predicated on the principle of four (four Armoured Fighting Vehicles per troop, 20 AFV[s] per squadron divided amongst four troops and squadron headquarters).”^{Footnote 12}  The former reconnaissance squadrons (now “Light Armoured Squadrons”) were assigned the same spectrum of tactical tasks as tank subunits, with a significant focus on offensive and defensive tasks for both squadrons.^{Footnote 13}  This order effectively deleted specialized reconnaissance squadrons from the Army’s doctrine for the first time since they had been initially formed in 1940.^{Footnote 14}  If, as Clausewitz suggests, war’s “very nature is usually revealed to us only by experience,” the historical analysis of our past reconnaissance structures and doctrine to which we will now turn will demonstrate that in attempting to close a conceptual “cavalry gap” between light and heavy elements, the RCAC may have opened a genuine physical cavity in the Army’s battlefield framework: the reconnaissance gap.^{Footnote 15} 

RECONNAISSANCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The RCAC experience with formation reconnaissance had its genesis in the 1920s–1930s doctrinal debates within the British Army.^{Footnote 16}  Ironically, given the recent use of the term in the RCAC, a theory known as the “cavalry concept” emerged, which promoted the notion of AFVs “merely replacing horsemen in their traditional mobile role” separate from other arms, as opposed to more radical reformers who promoted something recognizable as modern combined arms tactics.^{Footnote 17}  As one decorated veteran officer bitterly recalled, “very unfortunately for the Royal Armoured Corps, the cavalry influence predominated” before the war and contributed to what he characterized as the generalized slaughter of light-AFV units thrown without integral combined arms support into offensive tasks for which they were almost as unsuited as their equine predecessors.^{Footnote 18}  These issues remained unresolved during the conflict, contributing to what historian John English calls “tactical schizophrenia” in doctrine, and led to the formation of three distinct Commonwealth reconnaissance unit establishments with different equipment and doctrinal underpinnings.^{Footnote 19}  These were the armoured reconnaissance regiments, armoured car regiments, and infantry division reconnaissance regiments. Recent RCAC commentators tend to highlight only the armoured reconnaissance regiments in their analyses, citing them as a positive example; McInnes uses them to promote his contention that armoured tactics, even in reconnaissance roles, are universal and that armour and reconnaissance simply exist on a spectrum of tasks.^{Footnote 20} 

The emphasis placed on only this single unit type has led to the propagation of a myth that tank-equipped units conducted all formation reconnaissance functions. For instance, Captain Vladimir Kessia, recently commenting on Canadian reconnaissance, was able to hastily generalize that “during the war, “reconnaissance within the RCAC was conducted by four vehicle troops in tanks.”^{Footnote 21}  Despite the confidence of this declaration, neither he nor other recent commentators have provided an analysis of the effectiveness of armoured reconnaissance regiments, nor has the structure, role and performance of the armoured car regiments or the infantry division reconnaissance regiments been examined.

By 1944, armoured reconnaissance regiments were structured and equipped as normal armoured regiments of the RCAC. Regiments comprised three squadrons of tanks and were integral to armoured divisions.^{Footnote 22}   They were not designed to provide the medium reconnaissance role fulfilled by other units and were, according to doctrinal publications, “equipped to carry out the role of close reconnaissance on the armoured divisional front, and of detailed reconnaissance after contact has been gained.”^{Footnote 23}  In simpler terms, armoured reconnaissance units were optimized to fight for information as the spearhead of an armoured thrust, while the division’s medium reconnaissance functions were expected to be provided by infantry divisions already in contact or by higher headquarters.

In practice, armoured reconnaissance regiments rarely performed their doctrinal function and were instead used as a fourth armoured regiment within armoured divisions.^{Footnote 24}  The Canadian Official History seemingly notes only one occasion when armoured reconnaissance regiments performed their assigned role: the pursuit following the Battle of Falaise.^{Footnote 25}  The non-employment of these units in their intended roles stemmed in part from the unsuitability of their equipment and the lack of dismounted capability. British experience highlighted this fact: their units suffered heavy losses while attempting to perform reconnaissance in the absence of infantry or light vehicles.^{Footnote 26}  Major-General Bert Hoffmeister’s staff in the 5th Canadian Armoured Division concluded that the armoured reconnaissance regiment required “lighter and more manoeuvrable [vehicles]” in order to be effective in its designated role.^{Footnote 27}  The armoured reconnaissance regiments cannot be deemed a success in their intended tasks, though they performed admirably as standard armoured regiments. Indeed, by increasing the combat “weight” of a reconnaissance element through the predominance of tanks in the structure, the unit’s designers were all but guaranteeing that commanders would employ them as regular manoeuvre units, leaving armoured divisions with a reconnaissance gap.^{Footnote 28} 

Corps-level armoured car regiments were designed to perform “medium reconnaissance up to a distance of 50 miles ahead of the main columns” of their supported formation.^{Footnote 29}  The regiments reflected the interwar cavalry concept’s emphasis on the mounted performance of tasks, with few attached combat support enablers and only a small “support troop” in each of the four squadrons to provide some dismounted scouts.^{Footnote 30}  The mainstay of the squadrons consisted of five scout troops, each operating as an “officer’s patrol” with four light-wheeled vehicles.^{Footnote 31}  As they were not designed to fight for information, doctrine dictated that “if enemy opposition is met on one road, the patrol concerned will use its weapons to make a successful getaway, report contact, and seek an alternative route” and advised that armoured car regiments were not to be employed in delaying or offensive actions.^{Footnote 32}  This separation of reconnaissance and security functions is important to note: armoured car regiments were structured and doctrinally capable of accomplishing only the former.

Armoured car regiments in Canadian service delivered a chequered performance in operations. They were originally formed on the scale of one armoured car regiment per armoured division but, following the campaign in North Africa, that was reduced to one per corps.^{Footnote 33}  The poor mobility of wheeled AFVs often left them road-bound, and their lack of dismounted strength left them unable to effectively screen their supported formations or perform more aggressive reconnaissance.^{Footnote 34}  Commanders often employed them in what one official report called “strange roles” that doctrine had not anticipated.^{Footnote 35}  During one of Canada’s most significant engagements (Operation TOTALIZE), the 12th Manitoba Dragoons found themselves controlling traffic and escorting trucks, a typical utilization of those units.^{Footnote 36}  Indeed, an official historical report noted that the Royal Canadian Dragoons had a “bitter experience” in such roles during their service in Italy. They had to wait until April 1945 (with the war nearly at an end) before weakened enemy resistance allowed for their employment in a “classic cavalry task” for which they believed themselves best suited.^{Footnote 37} 

The limited capacity of armoured car regiments to conduct kinetic security tasks became apparent in the multinational context of the war: when it came time to establish a screen at the seams of the British 21st Army Group and the American 12th Army Group, the task fell to an American cavalry organization, as Commonwealth forces lacked a formation-level unit capable of such a vital operation.^{Footnote 38}  Post-war writings reflected the somewhat disappointing performance of armoured car regiments, commenting on the relegation of those regiments to rear area security and their placement in the rear of the order of march during offensive operations.^{Footnote 39}  In a belated recognition of their limited combat utility, the post-war doctrinal publication The Armoured Car Regiment added more “strange roles” to the list of official tasks, including the “dull but very essential” management of traffic control and the protection of headquarters and supply columns.^{Footnote 40} 

The final wartime reconnaissance unit was paradoxically the most versatile and historically overlooked unit type of the three: infantry division reconnaissance regiments. As with many military innovations, reconnaissance regiments were born out of wartime necessity. In that modernization, Canada actually preceded the British by acting on a post-Dunkirk analysis of the British Army’s poor performance against the Wehrmacht in the French campaign. The findings of that report highlighted a gap in divisions’ reconnaissance capabilities, and, in response, the Canadian Army established the first brigade reconnaissance squadrons during the summer of 1940.^{Footnote 41}  Later, those squadrons were amalgamated into divisional reconnaissance regiments under the RCAC.^{Footnote 42} 

Reconnaissance regiments each contained three reconnaissance squadrons, a mortar troop and an anti-tank battery.^{Footnote 43}  The reconnaissance squadrons included three “Scout Troops,” which consisted of a reconnaissance section of two patrols (each containing a pair of light AFVs), two carrier sections (equipped with Universal Carriers which could generate formed dismounted elements) and a headquarters. A substantial assault troop of forty mounted, infantry-trained troopers rounded out the squadron.^{Footnote 44}  Unlike armoured car regiments, the doctrine did not limit these units to stealthy reconnaissance and non-combat roles, and training pamphlets warned that reconnaissance regiments “will seldom gain good information without having to fight.”^{Footnote 45}  Regiments could also be assigned “protection” tasks, including acting as an advance guard, covering a withdrawal, establishing screens, and performing economy-of-force tasks such as “seizing and holding a vital piece of ground,” “pursuing a beaten and disorganized enemy” or acting “as a mobile reserve of firepower.”^{Footnote 46}  As units with a high degree of mobility and a disproportionate amount of firepower for their size, the RCAC’s reconnaissance regiments filled vital reconnaissance and security gaps for the Canadian Army as it learned to fight a modern war.^{Footnote 47} 

The wartime experience of Canada’s reconnaissance regiments was as varied as their equipment. In the reconnaissance role, these units proved capable of the sweeping “cavalry-esque” movement required during a pursuit, such as following the breakout in Normandy where II Canadian Corps’ two reconnaissance regiments led the advance, dealing with all minor resistance in the path of the advancing divisions.^{Footnote 48}  They were also exceptional in conducting reconnaissance-in-force tasks, such as the remarkable performance of the 17th Duke of York’s Royal Canadian Hussars in the assault across the Laison River during Operation TRACTABLE. There, two squadrons bypassed German defenders to seize an intact bridge and fording site and then held the bridgehead against counterattacks until the supported infantry and armour could accomplish their crossing.^{Footnote 49}  Though the unusually restricted and densely defended Norman and Italian theatres occasionally limited the full-time requirement for medium reconnaissance, reconnaissance regiments proved they could still complete those tasks when required.^{Footnote 50} 

Reconnaissance regiments were arguably the best-performing RCAC unit type in the completion of reconnaissance tasks, but they were also extremely successful in their equally important security role. Though unglamorous, the essential task of dominating the ground between and on the flanks of advancing divisions, corps and armies was one at which reconnaissance regiments excelled. Their mobility, large self-contained subunits and dismounted firepower allowed them to screen significant frontages or concentrate on establishing a more robust guard force. The official history of the Italian campaign outlines how the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards managed the “formidable task” of establishing and maintaining for weeks a nearly 50-kilometre screen between the Corps along the Eighth Army’s two axes of advance.^{Footnote 51}  Reconnaissance regiments continued to demonstrate their versatility when conditions in Italy degenerated into a congested stalemate, and the need for more infantry became desperate: the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards found themselves operating as a rifle battalion in the summer of 1944.^{Footnote 52}  The corps commander considered The Royal Canadian Dragoons for the task but, as an Armoured Car unit, they lacked the dismounted experience of the Dragoon Guards. The latter performed admirably as infantry for months before returning to the reconnaissance role.^{Footnote 53}

Canada’s three wartime reconnaissance units had considerably different structures and varied performances, which inadvertently created something of a practical experiment in ground reconnaissance theory. The “heavy” reconnaissance provided by armoured reconnaissance regiments proved unsuitable in the reconnaissance role due to their oversized vehicles and lack of dismountable personnel, while the armoured car regiments’ small, four-light-vehicle troops were, by design, non-combat elements for stealthy reconnaissance-only operations against minor or non-existent opposition. Conversely, reconnaissance regiments performed well as both reconnaissance and security units and had the versatility to transition to other roles. Clausewitz posits that “if, in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective, it will be used again … and so, backed by experience, it passes into general use,” and reconnaissance regiments reflected the wartime trend towards common doctrinal solutions to the new problems of mechanized warfare.^{Footnote 54}  That trend manifests in the broad similarity between those units and their foreign counterparts: American and German reconnaissance units operated comparable mixes of light vehicles, combat support elements and plentiful dismounts organized into large, multi-platform platoons, which allowed them to perform a similar range of reconnaissance, security and economy-of-force tasks for their supported formations.^{Footnote 55}

The ignoring of reconnaissance regiments by cavalry concept proponents is difficult to comprehend, given that those multipurpose, combat-capable units arguably spanned the “cavalry gap,” the alleged existence of which was the primary justification for the reforms of the cavalry concept. By omitting them from his analysis, McInnes creates a false dilemma wherein his artificial gap between armoured car “scout” structures and tanks can be closed only by imposing his proposed reforms, while simultaneously ignoring the proven wartime solution: reconnaissance regiments

COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THE “TYPE 56” MYTH

A further historical myth has influenced doctrinal discussions of the present-day cavalry concept: it concerns the origins of what until recently was called the Army’s brigade reconnaissance squadrons. McInnes contends that the “first use” of two-car patrols in troops of eight or more vehicles occurred during the peacekeeping deployment of the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron to the Sinai.^{Footnote 56}  In light of the examination of the reconnaissance regiments above, it is clear that his contention is inaccurate. McInnes goes on to assert that the “56-Recce Type” squadron only came to be as a combination of three regimental reconnaissance troops created on an ad hoc basis for pragmatic reasons related to the low-spectrum nature of the operation rather than combat effectiveness, as part of his thesis that reconnaissance squadrons have “no place in Canada’s warfighting doctrine.”^{Footnote 57} 

McInnes seemingly bases his assertion on a misreading of a commemorative history of the RCAC. In The RCAC: An Illustrated History, historians John Marteinson and Michael R. McNorgan note the fact that only regimental reconnaissance troops existed on the regular order of battle in 1956, from which McInnes mistakenly infers that these elements became the basis of the deploying squadron structure.^{Footnote 58}  In reality, the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron deployed its scout cars not in three eight-vehicle troops but in four troops based on the self-contained tank troop standard, with no evidence that they were intended to operate as two-vehicle patrols.^{Footnote 59}  The Strathcona officers selected to command two of the four troops were referred to as “patrol officers” in the regimental newsletter, indicating that the Sinai squadron’s designers intended it to operate along the lines of the wartime armoured car regiments’ four-car “officer patrols.”^{Footnote 60}  If the squadron did split its troops into two-car patrols, that would have been supported by post-war armoured doctrine, which noted that “a pair of mutually supporting tanks or scout cars is the smallest patrol.”^{Footnote 61}  Still, the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron structure arguably had far more in common with a wartime armoured car squadron than with the now-defunct reconnaissance squadrons. 

Rather than being born as an ad hoc compromise for peace support operations, our recently deceased brigade reconnaissance squadrons originated as a response to the undeclared conflict known as the Cold War. Only one regular brigade remained in the Army in the immediate post-war period. Post-war planners designed the Army to require mobilization before a future war, and there were no reconnaissance units in the regular force.^{Footnote 62}  However, with the 1951 positioning of a brigade group to Europe as part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments, the Army quickly found itself with a large formation overseas, operating as part of a multinational army group.^{Footnote 63}  The Army quickly recognized problems with that force structure, including identifying a reconnaissance gap. The 1956 Exercise GOLD RUSH, designed to support the development process for the Army’s future structure, concluded that the lack of a reconnaissance element in Canadian formations “poses a very serious weakness in preparing our forces for war. We are not only depriving ourselves of the necessary reconnaissance training but, in addition, failing to provide a balanced force for the training of all arms.”^{Footnote 64}  Consequently, when the Army expanded 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (4 CIBG) in Europe in 1957, it included, for the first time, a brigade reconnaissance squadron.^{Footnote 65}  Though it was deployed almost simultaneously with the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron sent to the Sinai, this squadron would have a very different structure, with its lineage hailing from the wartime reconnaissance regiments rather than the armoured car units. The squadron seems to have had its Ferret scout cars (later Lynxes) organized into large troops of seven vehicles, restructured by 1960 to include a revived assault troop.^{Footnote 66}  Deployed on the anticipated front line of an anticipated conventional war, this squadron was self-evidently not intended for peace support operations. The NATO squadron would form the basis of brigade reconnaissance squadrons across the Army and through minor evolutions over the next 53 years before their abrupt dissolution as part of the cavalry concept reforms.^{Footnote 67} 

The 1957 formation of both the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron in the Sinai and the brigade reconnaissance squadron in Europe reflects remarkable continuity between wartime armoured car and reconnaissance regiments, respectively. The Army occasionally employed the former throughout the Cold War on peace support operations (e.g. Cyprus in 1964).^{Footnote 68}  The latter carried on providing the formation reconnaissance function of the Army until being transformed under the cavalry concept into what appears to be 21st-century armoured car squadrons. The adherents of the cavalry concept would have us believe that the combat-experienced Canadian Army of 1957 knowingly allowed its warfighting reconnaissance function to be filled by a doctrinal construct it knew to be “non-combat-capable,” but that stretches credulity, though anecdotally within the RCAC and in print the myth is casually accepted as fact.^{Footnote 69}  One wonders whether Major I. MacD. Grant, DSO, a decorated professional and combat veteran of the Second World War who commanded the first 4 CIBG Reconnaissance Squadron, would be amused by such a claim.^{Footnote 70}  In actuality, it was his brigade reconnaissance squadrons which were born from the experience of wartime reconnaissance regiments to fill the acknowledged reconnaissance gap in a future conflict.

RECONNAISSANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Proponents of the cavalry concept have also critiqued the performance of reconnaissance squadrons in Afghanistan. McInnes argues that those deployed squadrons were “immediately found to be ineffective due to the innate lack of mutual support, resources and depth inherent in the two-vehicle patrol construct,” due to the inability of a two-vehicle patrol to conduct safe tactical movement, maintain observation posts indefinitely, or produce sufficient dismounts to secure patrol bases or conduct dismounted drills.^{Footnote 71}  McInnes gleans many of those critiques from the Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC)’s Dispatches: The RCAC in Afghanistan but fails to cite the ALLC’s proposed solutions to the identified issues. The ALLC did find that the two-vehicle patrol had deficiencies in the context of Afghanistan. However, the dispatch authors did not recommend the permanent restructuring of reconnaissance squadrons into four-vehicle troops to compensate for those issues. Instead, they suggested that the three-vehicle patrol model remain a “mission specific employment option” for commanders.^{Footnote 72}  In fact, the option to “on occasion” increase patrol size to three vehicles based on task has existed since at least the publication of 1977’s Reconnaissance Troop Leader’s Manual.^{Footnote 73}  The flexibility to do so is simply one of the things that made reconnaissance squadrons such versatile assets in operations. It is perhaps unfair to condemn Afghanistan-era reconnaissance commanders for employing their assets in the way they were explicitly designed to be used.

Part of the noted deficiency of the two-vehicle patrol lay with their employment on independent tasks out of mutual support from the rest of their troop. McInnes appears to believe that this utilization was the doctrinal norm for reconnaissance squadrons, referring to the “corrosive effects” of having 16 “fire-units” (patrols) rather than the more manageable four (troops).^{Footnote 74}  Contrary to this assertion, most reconnaissance and security tasks were designed to be conducted at the troop level. This can be illustrated through an examination of one of the most common reconnaissance tasks: route reconnaissance. Doctrine from 1944 directed “as a rule” that “a single road” was all a troop could cover, and that a squadron could cover no more than two.^{Footnote 75}  Multiple Cold War doctrinal statements were slightly less restrictive, establishing that a squadron could manage only a single route if it was expected to face opposition and three if it was not.^{Footnote 76}  The continuity in limiting the scope of the squadron’s tasks seems to have been further softened by the publication of 2008’s Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance, which only cautioned against “assigning more than one route” to a squadron, then incongruously provided an example of a squadron tasked with no less than two major and multiple minor routes requiring significant dispersion of the squadron assets.^{Footnote 77}  Similar over-dispersion of squadrons in Afghanistan across expansive areas of responsibility may have necessitated the tasking of individual patrols to tasks. Such operational necessities overriding doctrinal prescriptions are indicative of an overtasked asset in an unusually large task force area of operations and do not constitute a repudiation of the reconnaissance squadron structure itself.

Given McInnes’s assertion that, when mixing mounted and dismounted forces in squadrons, “one would naturally detract from the other,” and his consequent focus on the mounted performance of tasks, he unsurprisingly does not discuss ALLC’s identification of deficiencies in the RCAC’s dismounted competencies.^{Footnote 78}  ALLC identified the “crucial importance” of those skill sets and concluded that the absence of assault troops (with their specialized dismounted capabilities) from Afghanistan-era squadrons was a weakness.^{Footnote 79}  ALLC concludes that the requirement for “an Assault Troop capability is valid” despite their current absence from the squadron order of battle.^{Footnote 80}  The early-2000s loss of assault troops was a damaging doctrinal blow to reconnaissance squadrons. Their absence, unremarked upon by McInnes in his critique of Afghanistan-era squadrons, may have mitigated many of the problems he cited. Arguably, it was the presence of this and other combat support enablers which had made the RCAC’s reconnaissance units so successful in the past.^{Footnote 81}  While McInnes’s quoting of the ALLC’s list of squadron shortcomings is appropriate, failing to include one of its chief remedies for those shortcomings appears somewhat one-sided.

Overall, the performance of reconnaissance squadrons in Afghanistan cannot be said to have been “ineffective,” as alleged in the cavalry concept. The ALLC disputes that condemnation, determining that “the utility of the recce subunits across a spectrum of missions further validated the fundamental recce characteristic of flexibility… This capability was an ideal economy of force asset and provided commanders with a vital capability that could rapidly react to a myriad of tactical tasks.”^{Footnote 82}  Further, rather than implementing a revolutionary removal of formation reconnaissance from the Army, the ALLC proposed evolutionary change, concluding that it was imperative for the RCAC to “reconstitute our core competencies in both recce and tank.”^{Footnote 83}

HISTORY AND FUTURE TRENDS

The above historical survey of Canadian reconnaissance structures shows quite clearly that the characterization of reconnaissance squadrons as exclusively “peace support” structures is not supported by the historical record. Indeed, the precise opposite of that claim is true: the uniquely structured reconnaissance squadrons were formed to meet the modern Army’s requirement to fill a reconnaissance and security gap. At the same time, the non-combat “armoured car” model survived in the post-war Army only as a peacekeeping construct. Revealingly, the 1943 Armoured Car Squadron (Figure 4), the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron (Figure 9) and the cavalry concept’s recent “light armoured squadron” (Figure 2) share conspicuous structural parallels. It is also apparent that, until very recently, the Canadian Army’s accepted doctrine was to maintain a structural differentiation between armour and formation reconnaissance rather than the conglomerated “platform-neutral” model of the cavalry concept.^{Footnote 84}  Therefore the profligate abandonment of reconnaissance doctrine and structures constitutes an unjustified revolution, and ultimately the cavalry concept amounts to a break with experiential precedents.

If there is no compelling historical basis for this recent revolution in the Army’s structure and doctrine, we must consider the possibility that the cavalry concept hit upon a future trend brought about by a change in the character of ground combat. Any one of innumerable military developments (such as uncrewed aircraft systems) may potentially justify the deletion of formation reconnaissance elements from the Canadian order of battle, just as machine guns and the tank heralded the doom of traditional horse cavalry.^{Footnote 85}  It is equally possible, though, that potential future conditions will militate for the amplified relevance of formation reconnaissance units. Indeed, it seems that for most of the world’s armies, the latter case for increased reconnaissance relevance is the overwhelming consensus.

It is worth noting that no major country’s military has removed formation reconnaissance capabilities, and 25 out of 30 NATO countries maintain dedicated formation reconnaissance elements.^{Footnote 86}  Major nations have initiated an evolution of their reconnaissance forces to match future realities, just as ALLC recommended that the RCAC do post-Afghanistan. The United States is currently revitalizing its cavalry units given responsibility for reconnaissance and security tasks and is experimenting with the re-formation of divisional- and corps-level cavalry elements.^{Footnote 87}  The British Army is ambitiously attempting to shorten the “sensor–shooter” link by grouping much of its mechanized division’s reconnaissance and fires units into a “reconnaissance-strike brigade” concept: with five cavalry regiments in the reconnaissance role, this division is slated to have an unprecedented 1:1 ratio of reconnaissance regiments to mechanized infantry battalions.^{Footnote 88}  One of our most likely potential adversaries, the Russian Army, enlarged its brigade reconnaissance element to battalion size in 2013 following complaints that its “New Look” reforms left commanders only an inadequate company for reconnaissance.^{Footnote 89}  This international “reconnaissance renaissance” indicates a future increased relevance for reconnaissance and security elements that may even exceed their historical importance.

CONCLUSION

It is charming that the German word for Enlightenment, Aufklärung, is the same term used for cavalry reconnaissance. 

– Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Roman Jarymowycz.^{Footnote 90}

Just as reconnaissance forces allowed manoeuvre commanders to peer into the still omnipresent fog of war to understand the battlefield and the enemy, there is comparable enlightenment for military professionals in the study of history. Proponents of the cavalry concept were quick to cite history to assert the validity of their structural changes to the Canadian Army’s “eyes and ears.” However, as a comprehensive analysis of these claims has demonstrated,  we should heed Clausewitz’s admonition against the “superficial, irresponsible handling of history,” which “leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.”^{Footnote 91}  The purpose of this article was to revisit some of the cavalry concept’s “wrong ideas” and to highlight the Army’s historically robust reconnaissance structures and doctrine. Given that our pre-2021 doctrine demonstrably “represents the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience,” combined with the current international trends in formation reconnaissance, there seems to be enough evidence to suggest that the cavalry concept’s sudden denigration of reconnaissance elements was hasty, and ultimately misguided.

The Army must seriously re-examine the place of formation reconnaissance elements in doctrine. Discussions within the Army seem to be trending in this direction, and the term “cavalry” itself seems to be falling into disuse within RCAC transformation efforts. A recent RCAC working group agreed that a doctrinal difference should remain between heavy (tank), medium and light armour, with the first focused on close combat and the latter two emphasizing the finding and shaping of the enemy in the covering force area. This is a tentative first step towards a re-recognition of the classic division between armoured and reconnaissance/security elements.^{Footnote 92}  However, even with these tepid movements towards a doctrinal revival of reconnaissance, the cavalry concept’s transformation had two years to germinate within the Corps. Several light-vehicle squadrons were forced to utilize the revived armoured car–style structures and found—unsurprisingly, given the above historical analysis—that “when conducting traditional reconnaissance and tactical security tasks, the four-vehicle construct was extremely limited.”^{Footnote 93}  As the officer commanding a “light armoured” squadron, the author discovered that the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School had rapidly adapted its curriculum to the offence and defence focus of the concept, leading to the arrival of subalterns and non-commissioned officers in the field force who had not been trained to conduct reconnaissance and security tasks and indeed, in some cases, were apparently unaware of their existence. Corps transformation efforts must seek to address these doctrinal, structural and training scars resulting from the cavalry concept. Specifically structured and trained formation reconnaissance elements are a historically established doctrinal requirement. Following an honest reappraisal of its doctrinal past and future, the RCAC will very probably have to acknowledge that the absence of formation reconnaissance elements constitutes an unacceptable gap in a modern army’s force structure.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Bryce Simpson, CD, is an Armoured Officer serving as the Officer Commanding D Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians). During his regimental career, he was employed as a troop leader in both reconnaissance and tank squadrons, as a tank squadron Battle Captain, Second-in-Command, and Regimental Operations Officer. He also served as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller with 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. During his career, he has deployed on international operations to Sinai, Egypt (Op CALUMET), Latvia (Op REASSURANCE) and Kuwait (Op IMPACT), where this article was drafted. Major Simpson holds a Bachelor of Arts in History from Nipissing University and a Master of Arts in Military History from Norwich University.

This article first appeared in the April, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (20-2).