Canadian Air Power in Peace-Support Operations: Towards a New Definition of Air Power in Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine (RCAF Journal - FALL 2015 - Volume 4, Issue 4)

With this in mind, the RCAF requires a more nuanced definition of air power that addresses the spectrum of peace-support operations. This article will demonstrate that there is a Canadian historical precedent for using air power in peace-support operations. It will then examine current Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and RCAF doctrine and demonstrate that the current RCAF definition of air power is too narrow to fully include peace-support operations. Finally, it will argue that, over time, peace-support operations have become more complicated and that this trend will continue in the future. The RCAF’s recent involvement in Afghanistan can be used as a model for the future, where all aspects of air power will once again be called upon to play key roles.

Arguably, the history of the post–Second World War RCAF is one of new capabilities, aircraft, and the overall arms build-up of the Cold War. While the RCAF played an integral role in the defence of North America and the nuclear deterrent in Europe, Canadian air power was also having important effects in peace-support missions around the globe. Although there are many examples, only four missions where Canadian air power was salient will be examined: the UN missions in the Congo, India and Pakistan, the Balkans, and Haiti.

Air power in peace-support operations began, arguably, with the UN mission in the Congo (more commonly known by its French name and acronym, Opération des Nations Unis au Congo or ONUC), and this is especially true for the RCAF. Prior to 1960, the Congo was a Belgian colony. When independence was granted on 30 June 1960, the country fell into disorder and Belgium deployed its military to restore law and order; however, this was without the agreement of the new Congolese government.^[2] It was at this point that the UN became involved. Although the employment of transport aircraft in peacekeeping missions was not new to the UN, the mission in the Congo was the first time that air power was showcased on a large scale. Transport elements from both the United States Air Force (USAF) and the RCAF were utilized to get the initial response of 14,000 troops and supporting equipment into the Congo in July 1960.^[3] Transport aircraft were only a part of the mission, as it also incorporated many different forms of air power, including helicopters, support elements for internal airlift, and personnel to run the country’s air navigation system and air traffic control.

The UN mission was unprepared for the logistical complexities that the Congo demanded. Many of the aircraft allocated for the mission were from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war reserve in Europe, obsolete and, worse still, were often manned by underqualified crew of other contributing nations.^[4] Canada’s initial contribution to the mission was in the form of 13 North Star transport aircraft to provide internal and external airlift. The airlift was a key contributor to the early success of ONUC due to the Congo’s lack of transportation infrastructure.^[5] The RCAF’s ability in this area was unmatched, and “the USAF of the day lauded our operations as the best military air transport in the world.”^[6] Unfortunately, due to economic concerns in Canada and the increasing violence of the mission, the Diefenbaker Government decided to withdraw this key component of Canadian air power from ONUC in the fall of 1962.^[7] Although the North Stars were withdrawn, RCAF personnel continued to serve in ONUC in many other critical tasks, such as air traffic control as well as the command and control functions of the remaining international air transport force.

Canadian air power in peace-support operations expanded throughout the 1960s. After Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947, the region of Kashmir was left free to accede to either state; however, it quickly became an issue. The UN stepped in with an observation mission, and by 1964, Canada had become involved with military observers. Observation stations were spread out along the Line of Control^[8] in the disputed region and were extremely difficult to access. The RCAF was called upon to alleviate this problem.^[9] This contribution began with only one Caribou aircraft and support personnel; however, after the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, the force (117 Air Transport Unit) was upgraded to two Caribou aircraft and CC123 Otters. The Caribou were tasked with internal airlift, while the Otters flew reconnaissance missions.^[10] The RCAF’s contribution played a critical role in the mission; however, it was not without sacrifice. The RCAF lost one Caribou during a Pakistani air strike on an Indian airfield in 1964.^[11]

When both India and Pakistan withdrew their consent for the UN presence, the mission ended, as did the RCAF’s role.^[12] Although small, the Canadian contribution was critical. The mission could not have functioned the way it did without the airlift, reconnaissance, and communication capabilities that the RCAF’s aircraft and personnel provided.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian peacekeeping contributions lessened.^[13] The fall of the Soviet Union brought a new era of peacekeeping missions, many of which Canada participated in. Arguably, Canada’s foremost operations in this period were the missions in the Balkans. The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought with it an unfortunate number of conflicts. From 1992 to 2001, there were 18 different UN missions that Canada was involved in, many of which had an air component.^[14] Most people will remember the NATO bombing campaign that occurred in 1999, which resembled more of a war than a peace-support operation. It was in this period that the definition of peacekeeping evolved into a spectrum of peace-support operations. The Canadian Air Force participated in many different aspects of the missions in the Balkans, from transport to bombing.

The first role the Canadian Air Force played in the Balkans was during the Sarajevo airlift, when CC130 Hercules aircraft flew into the city three times a day with almost 16,000 kilograms (kg) of food and other aid per trip.^[15] Later, when the UN’s Stabilization Force was established, more aircraft fleets became involved, including CF188 Hornets and the new CH146 Griffon helicopters. The Hornets were mostly employed in the air-to-ground bombing role; however, they also flew combat air patrols. Their flexibility, as well as that of their Canadian pilots, was well noted by the air campaign’s commanders.^[16] The Griffons had a variety of roles, including command and liaison missions, passenger and cargo transport, reconnaissance and photo missions, as well as presence overflights.^[17] Concurrent to these operations was Operation MARITIME GUARD, where Canadian CP140 Auroras and CH124 Sea Kings assisted in the trade embargo. Many of the Air Force’s assets were involved in this operation, and even the Kosovo air campaign fits within the spectrum of peace-support operations, albeit on the far right towards all-out war.^[18]

These peace-support operations were not restricted to regions on the other side of the globe; some existed in North America’s backyard. In particular, Canada has had a large involvement time and again in Haiti. Haiti has had a troubled history following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, with civil unrest and a dictatorship under Raoul Cedras. To modernize the armed forces and create a new police force, among other tasks, the UN stepped in. From an air-power perspective, there were four main operations that saw the deployment of Canadian aviation assets. The first of these was in 1995, with the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In March of that year, Canada deployed a contingent under the name of Operation PIVOT.^[19] This contingent involved Air Force personnel tasked with the logistics and construction support for the mission. The next year, the mission was expanded and renamed Operation STANDARD. Along with new Army units to replace Air Force personnel, 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron and its CH135 Twin Hueys were deployed. These aircraft greatly assisted the Canadian contingent by providing transport, reconnaissance, and an evacuation capability.^[20] In 1997, the situation on the ground had changed such that UNMIH ceased to exist, and the new UN transition mission in Haiti was stood up. This transition also saw 408 Squadron replaced by 430 Squadron and its new CH146 Griffon helicopters, which continued performing the same role.^[21] This mission ended in November of 1997. Between 1997 and 2000, there was a UN civilian police mission; however, the Air Force did not participate. It did begin to participate again, however, in 2004, assisting with the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stablilisation en Haiti. This summertime mission saw the deployment of six Griffon helicopters from 430 Squadron, which provided transport and reconnaissance capabilities to the Canadian Army contingent. In August, the Canadian contribution was withdrawn.

Through this brief snapshot of Canadian missions, it is apparent that air power is a valuable tool for any peace-support operational commander. These missions have varied in time, place, and especially aircraft; however, many of the roles are the same. Transport is and has always been vital; internal and external airlift are the lifeblood of most of the Canadian contingents. Many missions had Canadian aircraft provide reconnaissance and photographic intelligence. Further still, in the Balkans, Canadian air power was called upon by way of using its CF188s in combat. As evidenced by the four previously discussed missions, the roles of Canadian air power evolved over time. In all, Canadian air power across the spectrum of peace-support operations is important, with many lessons having been learned.

The spectrum of peace-support operations (Figure 1) is a sliding scale, as missions and their situations on the ground change. On the left are the more peaceful disputes, where the international community is involved to facilitate peaceful resolutions. The potential for violence increases with the movement to the right of the spectrum. The more traditional peacekeeping missions—the interposition of military forces—are in the centre. Further still on the right is peace enforcement, where missions like the Balkans fit. The furthest right is all-out war. At any given time, all conflicts and peace-support missions fit somewhere on the spectrum. This spectrum also illustrates that air power can be employed throughout its range, as evidenced by the historical examples. It is important to note that the definition of air power must not be confined to individual capabilities, as showcased in missions like airlift or tactical aviation but, rather, includes these capabilities and much more. It is these other operations outside of traditional combat and domestic operations in which we have historical experience and where the RCAF employs all of its different air-power assets in varying combinations. This is not represented in current RCAF doctrine.

Despite the size of the RCAF during the Cold War, there were not many Air Force personnel or scholars who wrote air-power doctrine.^[22] Of the Canadians who did, their focus, unsurprisingly, was on the offensive and defensive roles of aircraft in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Today, the RCAF has created doctrine through its own institution, the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC), located in Trenton, Ontario. CFAWC is the focal point for Canadian aerospace power doctrine, lessons learned and the Royal Canadian Air Force Journal. So far, CFAWC has produced 10 doctrine documents; from a strategic-level capstone document to specific operational capabilities. Absent, however, is a document that clearly defines the roles of the RCAF across the spectrum of peace-support operations. The focus of current doctrine lies with the traditional offensive outlook of air forces, where fighter aircraft are supported by other air-power capabilities.

The B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine^[23] publication is a foundation document. It begins with a history of the Canadian Air Force through its many organizational changes; however, it wholly neglects the important role Canadian air power has played in peace-support operations. The document further defines the structure in which aerospace doctrine will be formed, following the model of the overall Canadian Forces military doctrine document.^[24] Falling under this capstone publication in the hierarchy are the operational-level documents. These subordinate-level publications “describe the organization of aerospace forces and guide their employment in the context of broad functional areas, distinct objectives, force capabilities, and operational environments.”^[25] It is at this level that a document for peace-support operations would be appropriate. Presently, the overall problem with the doctrine is not so much the lack of a peace-support document (although it would be beneficial) but the fact that the definition of air power is too focused on the offensive and defensive roles. This fighter focus leans towards a Maslowian thought process where “if the only tool you have is a hammer, treat everything as if it were a nail.”^[26] As we know, historically, this is not true for Canada’s Air Force and should not be found in its doctrine. Very little mention is made of the roles of the many aircraft fleets, other than of what they could do in war or domestic operations. This needs to be expanded to include the many roles that all of Canadian air power, not just aircraft, can play in varying combinations across the spectrum of peace-support operations.

There is a historical trend when viewing peace-support operations through the frame of the spectrum. These missions have become more complex over time; furthermore, CAF continues to participate in UN-sanctioned peace-support missions over the entire spectrum of operations (i.e., border patrol, monitoring ceasefires, buffer zones, etc.).^[27] This is mentioned in CAF capstone doctrine. This strategic-level document defines the role that the entire CAF can play in these operations. The RCAF’s capstone doctrine, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, however, is missing this key peace-support component.

Canada’s air forces have been used in simple and complex missions, with many lessons learned about how to organize and utilize aviation elements in varying situations. This trend will no doubt continue into the future. To further enforce this point, a brief case study of the RCAF in Afghanistan follows.

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States (US) in 2001, the West found itself in a war on ideals. The conflict in Afghanistan was complicated. Most recent academic writing, in terms of air power, is found in books and articles dealing with counter-insurgency and the role aircraft can play in these types of conflicts. What is missing, however, is the overall impact air power can play in a complicated peace-support operation such as Afghanistan. For Canadian air power, Afghanistan was the catalyst for an upgraded Air Force. The RCAF acquired new capabilities in strategic airlift, medium- to heavy-lift helicopters as well as improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This was Canada’s defining peace-support operation, where most of the possible roles that air power could play were utilized.

The mission in Afghanistan began in 2001 with the deployment of Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HALIFAX with its on-board Sea King helicopter. Shortly after, Canada committed a CC150 Polaris transport to the mission and two CP140 Auroras to provide an ISR capability to assist maritime coalition forces. In 2002, the Air Force committed three CC130s to provide external airlift from Camp Mirage into Afghanistan. By 2006, it became clear that some outposts in Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan, and Kandahar provinces needed to be supplied from the air. Thus began the first aerial resupply of beleaguered troops flown by the Air Force since the Korean War.^[28] In the eight years these aircraft were involved, they moved 78,000,000 pounds [35,380,000 kg] of cargo, more than 244,000 passengers, and logged more than 22,000 flight hours over 4,500 flights.^[29]

In late 2008, even with three types of aircraft already committed to the mission, the RCAF saw the need for additional air power and stood up Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) Air Wing. This air wing controlled all RCAF flights in and out of the theatre of operations and oversaw the deployment of RCAF aircraft in the roles of air combat support, ISR, strategic airlift, and tactical airlift. Not only did the existing Canadian air-power assets play a huge role in the mission, but the RCAF also expanded its capabilities to further prove the worth of air power. The operation in Afghanistan was the catalyst for the acquisition of the Sperwer UAV, used D-Model Chinook helicopters from the US, and four CC177 Globemaster aircraft to better provide a strategic-airlift capability. It also led to the leasing of Heron UAVs and MI-8 medium-lift helicopters. In the words of Lieutenant-General Yvan Blondin (Commander RCAF):

The establishment of the JTF-[Afg] Air Wing ushered in a new era in Canadian military air operations and underlined the importance of having an agile and expeditionary Air Force. It also underlined the importance of having the right equipment to do the job. …

The RCAF fed a vital, comprehensive battle picture to Army commanders on the ground, and contributed to the protection of soldiers’ lives from improvised explosive devices, landmines and ambushes by reducing their reliance on ground-based transportation for moving personnel and cargo.^[30]

The air wing, itself, was a major undertaking, having three of its own subordinate units: the Canadian Helicopter Force Afghanistan operating Chinook, Griffon, and MI-8 helicopters; Canadian Heron UAV detachment; and the Tactical Airlift Unit operating the CC130s for internal airlift. The air wing did its intended job, which was to save lives.^[31] By being able to move troops and supplies by air, the threat to Canadian, Afghan, coalition troops, and police was greatly diminished. This gave the Canadian and allied forces the advantage in the region, allowing other resources to be spent in the development of Kandahar province.^[32]

The mission in Afghanistan was a major undertaking, and it is an understatement to say that there needs to be more attention paid to the RCAF’s role in this conflict. With the mission complete, it is now the job of both academia and the Air Force to look back at the lessons that were learned and improve the way the RCAF operates in missions across the spectrum of peace-support operations. Through the brief snapshot of previous peace-support missions, it is clear that air power has played an important role. Furthermore, this role has expanded as the missions became more complex. The future will hold many more peace-support operations, some as complex as the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. A more nuanced definition of air power is needed in the RCAF, one that includes the many roles air power can play in peace-support operations. The current definition from which the doctrine is written is too narrow and too focused on the offensive role and supporting capabilities. This is not to discount the important role of offensive air power. A new definition of air power that allows room for peace-support operations will help the RCAF in the future, as it will be called upon time and time again to deploy to various regions and complicated situations. The RCAF will see itself employed in operations from one end of the spectrum of peace-support operations to the other, from humanitarian missions on one side of the world to combat-support missions on the other. It is imperative, therefore, that the RCAF ensures that it not only is prepared for future operations with its new capabilities but also has codified the lessons that were learned in the past.

Second Lieutenant Andrew McNaughton is from Winnipeg, Manitoba. He recently graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a degree in Military and Strategic Studies. He is now undergoing training as a pilot in the RCAF.

CAF―Canadian Armed Forces
CFAWC―Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre
DND―Department of National Defence
ISR―intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JTF-Afg―Joint Task Force Afghanistan
kg―kilogram
NATO―North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUC―Opération des Nations Unis au Congo
RCAF―Royal Canadian Air Force
UAV―unmanned aerial vehicle
UN―United Nations
UNMIH―United Nations Mission in Haiti
US―United StatesUSAF―United States Air Force

[1]. Figure adapted from a class taught by Colonel H. G. Coombs (Retired) from a slide from the Canadian Peace Support Training Centre PowerPoint about the Changing Nature of Peace Operations Since 1990, September 2014, at the Royal Military College of Canada. (return)

[2]. “Republic of the Congo – ONUC Background,” United Nations, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucB.htm. (return)

[3]. William K. Carr, “Planning, Organizing, and Commanding the Air Operation in the Congo, 1960,” in Air Power in UN Operations, ed. A. Walter Dorn (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), 42. (return)

[4]. William K. Carr, “Planning, Organizing, and Commanding the Air Operation in the Congo, 1960,” in Air Power in UN Operations, ed. A. Walter Dorn (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), 45. (return)

[5]. Kevin A. Spooner, “A Fine Line: Use of Force, the Cold War, and Canada’s Air Support for the UN Organization in the Congo,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 82. (return)

[6]. Kevin A. Spooner, “A Fine Line: Use of Force, the Cold War, and Canada’s Air Support for the UN Organization in the Congo,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 52. (return)

[7]. Kevin A. Spooner, “A Fine Line: Use of Force, the Cold War, and Canada’s Air Support for the UN Organization in the Congo,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 82. (return)

[8]. The Line of Control was a separation line agreed upon by India and Pakistan in July of 1972. “United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan: Background,” United Nations, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.html. (return)

[9]. Matthew Trudgen, “Above the Rooftop of the World: Canadian Air Operations in Kashmir and Along the India-Pakistan Border,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 101. (return)

[10]. Matthew Trudgen, “Above the Rooftop of the World: Canadian Air Operations in Kashmir and Along the India-Pakistan Border,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 105. (return)

[11]. Matthew Trudgen, “Above the Rooftop of the World: Canadian Air Operations in Kashmir and Along the India-Pakistan Border,” in Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations, 109. (return)

[12]. Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945–1970 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 227. (return)

[13]. Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945–1970 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 241. (return)

[14]. “Operations Database,” Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence (DND), accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/index-eng.asp. (return)

[15]. Matthew Trudgen, “Operation Air Bridge: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift,” The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 2, no. 2 (2013): 35. (return)

[16]. Dwight Davies et al., “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000): 57. (return)

[17]. Ltn. Oystein Paulsen, “472 Tactical Helicopter Squadron,” SFOR Informer 73 (November 25, 1999), accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.nato.int/sfor/sfor-at-work/velika/t991115b.htm. (return)

[18]. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation MARITIME GUARD,” Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=189&CdnOpId=229. This operation was part of the larger NATO Operation SHARP GUARD. (return)

[19]. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation CAULDRON,” Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=287&CdnOpId=345. (return)

[20]. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation CAULDRON,” Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=287&CdnOpId=345. (return)

[21]. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation CONSTABLE,” Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=309&CdnOpId=379. (return)

[22]. Richard Goette, “A Snapshot of Early Cold War RCAF Writing on Canadian Air Power and Doctrine,” The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 1, no. 1 (2012): 51. (return)

[23]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Trenton, Ontario: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2010), accessed March 24, 2015, http://rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/doctrine/b-ga-400-000-fp-000.page. (return)

[24]. Canada, DND, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2009). (return)

[25]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Trenton, Ontario: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2010), 4, accessed March 24, 2015, http://rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/doctrine/b-ga-400-000-fp-000.page. (return)

[26]. Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Joanna Cotler Books, 1966), 15. Maslow, a psychologist during the 20th century, is most remembered for his creation of the Hierarchy of Needs. (return)

[27]. Canada, DND, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2009), 6-9. (return)

[28]. Lieutenant-General Yvan Blondin, “Going Full Throttle into a New Era: The RCAF Experience in Afghanistan,” Royal Canadian Air Force News and Publications, DND, May 9, 2014, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/news-template-standard.page?doc=going-full-throttle-into-a-new-era-the-rcaf-experience-in-afghanistan/huz805ja. (return)

[29]. Lieutenant-General Yvan Blondin, “Going Full Throttle into a New Era: The RCAF Experience in Afghanistan,” Royal Canadian Air Force News and Publications, DND, May 9, 2014, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/news-template-standard.page?doc=going-full-throttle-into-a-new-era-the-rcaf-experience-in-afghanistan/huz805ja. (return)

[30]. Lieutenant-General Yvan Blondin, “Going Full Throttle into a New Era: The RCAF Experience in Afghanistan,” Royal Canadian Air Force News and Publications, DND, May 9, 2014, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/news-template-standard.page?doc=going-full-throttle-into-a-new-era-the-rcaf-experience-in-afghanistan/huz805ja. (return)

[31]. “Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing,” Canadian Armed Forces, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-athena-jtfaaw.page. (return)

[32]. “Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing,” Canadian Armed Forces, DND, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-athena-jtfaaw.page. (return)