To Earth Orbit and Beyond: Discussion Points for a Strengthened Canadian Defence Strategy in Outer Space (RCAF Journal - FALL 2015 - Volume 4, Issue 4)

By Major Joshua Kutryk, CD, MSc

As nations become more dependent on space-based assets and as the commercial sector continues to invest in outer space, the defence of space will become of increasing interest.^[1]

— The Future Security Environment 2008–2030

Western militaries have reached an unprecedented level of dependency on space just as they are discovering the precarious vulnerabilities that space introduces to their national security. Indeed, satellite support is increasingly intertwined with military operations, specifically, and with national security, generally. So much so, in fact, that there may presently exist a discrepancy between the security and defence challenges Canada faces in space and the readiness of national strategy, civilian and defence alike, to deal with them. Even without considering the complexities of space weaponization, there remains a steadfast requirement for Canadian policy—in terms of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) but also the wider national-security organization in general—to recognize the present and growing militarization of space.^[2]

Although internal Canadian defence studies have regularly concluded that “the world is at a point where falling behind in space security may prove to be fatal to a state’s sovereignty,”^[3] any significant policy efforts to evolve the country’s defence organizations accordingly remain difficult to discern. Clear and comprehensive strategic guidance is required for the Department of National Defence (DND) to be successful in the space environment, but such policy has been slow to promulgate. There is presently no published defence space strategy or policy (the last one being officially published in 1998), and space as a topic continues to be under-represented in the wider national-security discussion. Accordingly, national space plans have not accounted sufficiently for either the requirements or contributions of the defence sector. That significant defence space initiatives have recently been undertaken successfully is likely due more to the pragmatism of DND leadership than to the coherent direction granted by any departmental or national space policy.

Specific to CAF, and particularly to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) within it, policy makers should accept that emergent trends are emphasizing already-existing requirements of a Canadian military space programme while generating a host of new ones. This article is a limited survey of the Canadian-defence space issue, aiming only to present certain aspects of the space environment in order to demonstrate their increasing relevance to both CAF as well as to the wider issue of national security. In doing so, it presents a case for a robust defence space strategy—guided by a clear, concise, and interdepartmental policy—not only on the basis of current military space dependencies but also on the expectation that the Canadian defence organization will soon face an expanded security role in space. Both perspectives indicate a requirement for a comprehensive and deliberate approach to DND’s space programme, one that can reliably yet efficiently ensure military capability in space while also confronting the national-security challenges that are emerging there.

More than 20 years ago, the Gulf War demonstrated to defence leadership CAF’s “near outright dependency on American space support.”^[4] Throughout the conflict, reliance on space assets was consistent: satellites detected missile launches, discovered enemy formations, provided navigational cuing, analysed the weather, and provided instantaneous communications between field commanders and strategic staffs.^[5] Years later, this dependency of military operations on space continues to accelerate. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that military planning processes still underestimate the full extent of satellite dependency. After a United States (US) Army–sponsored war game analysed a 2020 scenario in which an in-orbit, indiscriminate explosion electromagnetically degraded satellite capability, a report bluntly related the results: allied “military forces just ground to a halt.”^[6] Even more noteworthy, the modus operandi of Western militaries now relies on space-based assets that are in large part commercially owned. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the US military witnessed a 560 per cent increase in the use of commercial satellites for military purposes.^[7] And during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2003, 60 per cent of military communications reportedly passed through civilian satellites.^[8] Some studies have estimated that commercial satellites provide 80 per cent of Western military space-based functionality.^[9] Contemporary British aerospace doctrine summarizes the issue well, emphasizing the general vulnerability created for a nation when “over ninety percent of current … military procurement projects rely to a greater or lesser extent on space.”^[10] The Canadian military, certainly, is no less dependent on space, nor is it any less affected by the recent trends in space militarization and commercialization.

Many of CAF’s most sophisticated weaponry systems rely on uninterrupted access to the global positioning system (GPS) satellite array, without which, employment capability becomes significantly degraded. Such systems are increasingly designed to counter GPS-denied environments, with encrypted signals and alternate guidance modes frequently incorporated; however, and as with other examples, satellite dependency transcends the oft-cited ways in which such space assets enable military operations. The precision time and position data provided by the satellites also dictate the algorithms of many military communications and data-link networks that rely on frequency-agility techniques for security.^[11] Even more fundamentally, military operations—especially domestic ones—assume a certain baseline functionality of civilian infrastructure, much of it also entirely dependent on GPS satellites. Basic yet critical workings of society depend on the same GPS timing signals for applications, ranging from air traffic control to cell phone time synchronization.^[12]

But GPS is only one of many examples demonstrating the extent to which Canadian military operations currently depend on space. Increasingly, remote-sensing data is critical to military operations, and it, too, is frequently obtained from commercially owned or operated satellites. This very issue is known to have created problems for the US military in Afghanistan where, in order to safeguard sensitive operational imagery, the Pentagon was forced to buy exclusive rights to the products of remote-sensing company Space Imaging.^[13]

In Canada, a domestic—albeit similarly intriguing—example is to be found with the mostly successful evolution of the RADARSAT (Radar Satellite) programme. Although the programme has developed with DND as a main partner (and with the intent of satisfying the military requirement for remote-sensing imagery as a main objective), it actually accentuates the argument for a more robust and indigenous space programme within CAF. Contemporary military planning does not sufficiently account for civilian remote-sensing systems becoming unavailable, and cases of DND data requirements being undermined by data limits or other priorities already exist.^[14] In 2014, the Ottawa Citizen reported that DND would be at risk of utilizing its entire data allotment under the RADARSAT agreement by 2017, a date that was earlier than originally predicted due to the satellite having become so “essential, particularly for the military’s surveillance of the country’s coastline.”^[15] The report indicated that DND was experiencing exponential growth with the use of RADARSAT data for military applications, and it noted that RADARSAT was contractually bound to deliver on data agreements with other countries as well, including Norway, the US and China as part of its ongoing commitments.^[16] Such dependency of military operations on commercial remote-sensing satellites and, even more importantly, the rates at which these dependencies are expanding represent significant challenges for DND space-policy formulation. That the RADARSAT programme has obligations to supply data not only to other departments within Canada but also to other national governments and commercial companies is, in the best case, a contingency that DND space policy must account for and, in the worst case, a significant security vulnerability.

Canadian military space dependency is poised for exponential expansion if only because of the already expanding list of future applications. As the military will expectedly embrace many of these new, forthcoming satellite applications, CAF’s requirements for space data may be set to accelerate at rates that will exceed the capacity of national space assets to keep pace. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is one example of a relatively new technology promising to be a force multiplier in novel ways. Incorporation of AISs aboard satellites carries with it the potential for real-time data on the position and trajectory of nearly every ship greater than 300 tonnes in the world. CAF has been clear regarding its intent to rely on AIS data in maritime surveillance roles,^[17] proposing the system for inclusion on the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM); however, therein lies a significant shortcoming. When space-policy decisions cannot be made within the framework of guidance or government commitment that a defence-oriented National Space Plan and/or DND Space Strategy would provide, they become adrift in the sea of national security. A pragmatic and passive “just-enough” approach to defence space issues is adopted, while space dependencies and vulnerabilities accelerate, in most cases without being properly anticipated or addressed. In this case, and despite DND’s AIS plans for RCM, the government’s 2012 budget did not reference the satellite constellation at all, leaving industry stakeholders to speculate whether the project would proceed. MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates reacted by restructuring its workforce, releasing more than 100 of the engineers necessary for the project.^[18] In the end, the programme did advance, but the lack of government commitment to a long-term vision or strategy for CAF in space created consequential inefficiencies for industry and defence planners alike.

The development of space technologies with defence applications contributes to a user expectation within DND for real-time, priority access to space data across all scenarios. Already, military leaders in Canada likely take the availability of space-derived data for granted.^[19] For instance, the Canada Command lessons-learned document from the 2011 crash of First Air Flight 6560 revealed that real-time space surveillance of the crash site had not been available, and it went on to recommend that the federal government “look at expanding satellite coverage by procuring new initiatives that give 100% satellite imagery coverage of the north.”^[20] The accelerating dependency on, and expectation for, space support within DND manifests the requirement for a greater national policy prioritization of the defence space sector. In space, any dichotomy between resource availability and user expectation only heightens CAF’s vulnerability there.

The promise of technological developments, then, will require Canadian defence space programmes to expand in concert, something that will demand a formal policy approach. Microsatellites stand as one example of a technology niche into which DND could reasonably advance, benefiting not only DND but also the economic situation of the entire Canadian space sector, if government policy was only oriented towards encouraging it. A Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) proposal recently recommended that defence microsatellites, each weighing less than 100 kilograms, be used to provide “persistent wide-area coverage” services.^[21] Such satellites would augment the capability of CAF with an economical, responsive, and flexible solution that, importantly, would be indigenous to CAF. It would further operationalize space for defence organizations, in the process providing solutions that would be more independent, secure, and responsive to defence requirements. Other nations have already expressed intent to develop defence programmes based on microsatellite technology. A 1999 United States Air Force study has recommended that the US government pursue microsatellites as a matter of priority.^[22] In the United Kingdom, aerospace doctrine has described microsatellites as “a potential route for the development of indigenous space capabilities as an alternative to cost-sharing or negotiating access to the space assets of allies and partners.”^[23] The future use of microsatellites by militaries is, to a certain extent, inevitable. For now, they serve as a useful example of the type of space capability that will likely become necessary for even relatively small-force countries like Canada.

Although cost remains a significant obstacle to defence programmes regardless of their nature, it alone should not be assumed to negate the inevitability of certain technological developments and dependencies. Canadian defence scientists estimate that, if pursued, capable microsatellite capabilities could be developed for between $15 and $30 million per platform, a comparatively small sum given the capability.^[24] In Canada, such technologies have already been demonstrated, with partnerships between the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and DRDC leading to the development of both the Near Earth Orbit Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) and the Maritime Monitoring and Messaging Microsatellite (M3MSat). In both cases, the involved agencies concluded that partnering had allowed them to “leverage each other’s funding, resources and expertise.”^[25] Beyond practical applicability, such technologies are also insightful demonstrations of the organizational construct for national space-sector oversight and policy that may soon become necessary in light of future security-policy paradigms.

The dependency of Canadian military operations on space support should not be underestimated. It is persistent and pervasive throughout the entire defence organization; more importantly, it is primed for rapid expansion. In light of contemporary examples, the 1992 Space Awareness Study’s conclusion that space would shortly be identified as an operational centre of gravity^[26] is very likely no longer a strategic prediction. It is a strategic truism, and it should be regarded as such at all levels. The Chinese military’s assessment of space having been a “battle winning advantage”^[27] for the West during recent middle-Eastern engagements is equally valid. The Space Foundation’s 2012 report seemingly agreed, publishing similar conclusions while summarizing the extensive reliance on space that had enabled one of the most sensational, well-known military operations of the present decade: the discovery and killing of Osama Bin Laden.^[28]

The relevance of space to military operations can be extrapolated to the developing requirements for a more security-oriented national space programme in general, a programme in which DND will—by necessity—play a leading role insofar as the security of civilian space capability is concerned. Canadian government correspondence from 2000 acknowledged that certain threats to national security from space were increasing in prominence and that many of them would become DND responsibility.^[29] Canada, therefore, requires a defence space programme that addresses space as an independent operating environment in which DND will bear increasing responsibility for the national-security concerns that exist there.

Aspirations to keep space peaceful-purposed—despite their good intentions and logic—do little to actually ensure freedom in space. Indeed, any conceptualization of space as a free, uncontested domain is erroneous even if significant (and contemporary) treaty and policy efforts continue in their endeavours to preserve the “sanctuary” of space.^[30] The increasing societal importance of satellite capabilities is simply too great to be ignored; rather, it is directly responsible for increasing the importance of these capabilities as targets for Western adversaries.^[31]

Canadian policy makers should view space as an increasingly contested operating environment if only because the technology needed to contest it is proliferating rapidly. Many examples apply, including a well-known case whereby China, in 2007, intercepted and destroyed one of its own satellites with a ground-based weapon, in the process creating an estimated 300,000 pieces of space debris.^[32] In doing so, China not only revealed to the world a significant strategic capability; the ensuing and foreboding debris cloud demonstrated the potential for unilateral action in space, no matter the intention, to result in potentially catastrophic problems for much more than only military operations.

Space systems are inherently vulnerable because, by virtue of their design, they are generally predictable, easily detected, and in many cases incapable of defensive manoeuvring.^[33] Besides the capability of kinetic weapons, satellite technology is also vulnerable to less sophisticated threats such as jamming and spoofing, something the 2003 alleged jamming of the Telstar 12 communications satellite by Iranian agents manifested clearly.^[34] Other countries are actively responding to such trends. United States Air Force space policy not only recognizes space as a distinct operating environment, it also asserts the requirement to “protect and defend” the nation’s space capabilities.^[35] As other nations already have, Canada should expect that the proliferation of technology will, in the future, require space policy that more actively extends CAF responsibility into earth’s orbit. Just as the RCAF integrates into a whole-of-government approach to airspace sovereignty, DND needs to be integrated into a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to space security.

In fact, space may be demanding an expansion to the very definition of aerospace power itself. Whereas RCAF doctrine defines aerospace power traditionally, describing it as an “element of military power applied within or from the air and space environments to achieve effects,”^[36] the intricacies of space likely establish requirements for a broader, more inclusive definition. Societal dependency on satellite services is expanding to unprecedented levels, and the public has placed a high value on the services that satellites assure for them. For example, it is likely that mobile-satellite hybrid networks will emerge as a cost-efficient solution to providing media content everywhere because they are being driven by the powerful economics of current trends in social media.^[37] From cell phones to banking transactions, from remote industrial-plant monitoring to emergency-response capability, satellite infrastructure has become central to the basic functioning of Canada’s general populace, never mind its military. For its part, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives has concluded that space is now vital to Canadian commerce.^[38] More recently, the CAF lessons-learned document published following the 2009 Schriever-V war game found that “our financial system, electrical grid, telecommunications, commercial fishery, agriculture, natural resource management, and aircraft movements” all relied on space.^[39] Such arguments have basis in real events too. In 1996, a timing error transmitted to a GPS satellite for six seconds caused more than 100 cell phone networks to be degraded.^[40] More recently, problems observed in Canadian telecommunications, Internet, banking and air-traffic-control services over a 24-hour period in 2011 were jointly attributed to a failure aboard the Anik F2 satellite.^[41] The maintenance of aerospace power, then, is calling for more synergistic and formal relationships between Canada’s aerospace industry, its commercial space sector, its space research agencies, and DND’s space strategy itself.

Canada, therefore, requires a defence space policy that not only addresses the protection of DND space infrastructure but also anticipates the requirement to protect other national interests threatened from or within space. There is already evidence to confirm the earlier prediction that “pressures will likely build from the commercial sector for the military to provide defence for commercial assets.”^[42] The Canada First Defence Strategy describes ensuring the security of Canadian citizens as the “first and foremost” role of the Canadian military.^[43] So, whereas opponents of widened DND activity in space may argue that space problems are beyond the scope of military responsibility, such reasoning ignores the very premise on which defence organizations exist.

Space assets are not, however, only threatened by deliberate action; they are also increasingly threatened by the environment itself. The mere extent of debris orbiting earth represents a threat to Canadian satellites (civil and military) of increasing significance. CAF will have to prioritize monitoring of orbital activity not only for defence purposes but also for the purposes of protecting wider Canadian interests in space from catastrophic collisions. Arguments that space-surveillance programmes actually disguise space weaponization programmes draw on the example of ballistic missile defence and the use of space-surveillance network (SSN) assets for warning and targeting. The many applications of any SSN aside, the requirements for Canada to be centrally involved in orbital surveillance cannot be reasonably discounted. In 2009, the Cosmos 2251 satellite collided with an operational Iridium satellite in what was a “wakeup call” for the space community because it seemed to demand a new approach to the management of space traffic.^[44] Now, both the European Space Agency and NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] regularly perform evasive manoeuvres with satellites in order to avoid collisions. In 2007, the orbital altitude of the International Space Station had to be changed in order to avoid a collision with a Russian rocket stage that had been in orbit since 1971.^[45] As such, that Canada requires a defence space programme capable of sustaining and, in fact, augmenting current allied space-surveillance efforts is but one reason why CAF should expect to take on an expanded role in earth’s orbit.

But the space-debris issue also has more subtle implications for DND because it helps illustrate why the protection of civilian satellites will become a military responsibility. Just as the RCAF, with the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), maintains responsibility for Canadian airspace sovereignty, space situational awareness will also continue to be DND jurisdiction. In the past, Canada has had access to US space-surveillance data in return for contributing to NORAD.^[46] This is one way that DND collaborates with the US in order to access its space-surveillance-catalogue data. Presently, the mainstay of Canada’s contribution to this arrangement is Sapphire, an electro-optical satellite designed to track objects in outer orbits or deep space.^[47] However, that Canada is presently able to rely on the US for space-surveillance data due to niche contributions like Sapphire is not a suitable argument against the need for further expenditures and policy developments in the field. Canada’s ability to benefit from American data is precariously based on its ongoing contribution to the process, something that will have to keep pace with US developments. Sapphire, in fact, demonstrates the need for long-term commitment to a Canadian space plan; it was, after all, originally scheduled for only a five-year operational mission.^[48] They are equally telling points that, as of 2012, the US space-surveillance system’s operating budget was financed entirely by the Air Force Space Command budget and that the United States Air Force did not charge recipients for use of the data.^[49] Recent developments in American policy may indicate changing trends, though, causing sector analysts to anticipate that the US will require Canada to invest more in military space programmes if it is to remain an active and valued partner in such partnerships.^[50] The case of space surveillance, therefore, contributes to the requirement for a more robust, independent presence of DND in space, one that is capable of expanding its commitment to meet the requirements of lateral agreements while also preserving a certain level of independent capability for Canada in the field.

On the issue of international cooperation, traditional bilateral and multilateral commitments represent for Canada foreign-policy objectives that will continue to depend on having a capable defence space programme. Even without considering the growing relevance of space surveillance to security, the benefits of Canada’s membership in organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and NORAD will continue to rely on the capability and contributions inherent in a strong Canadian defence space sector. A Canadian Council of Chief Executives document summarized:

Given the obvious vulnerabilities of the Canadian economy to attacks on Canadian satellites, and the pressing need for up-to-date satellite surveillance of the entire North American land mass for security reasons, it is inconceivable that Canada aspire [sic] to play a full role in North American defence without setting down a comprehensive Canadian policy on the “securitization” of space.^[51]

With the relatively new issue of space security then, policy along the lines of Canada’s oft-cited niche strategy may not necessarily suffice in the future; wider participation will become necessary. In the case of ballistic missile defence, Canada’s 2005 decision not to cooperate with the US in the endeavour resulted in changing dynamics that may still prove detrimental.^[52] In 1985, after all, with a similar decision not to participate in Strategic Defence Initiative research, a derivative effect was the decline in Canadian access to US-military space programmes.^[53] Space defence capability, therefore, represents a requirement not only of any national-security policy but also a requirement of importance to Canada’s future bilateral and multilateral agreements with other nations.

As a concluding point, inefficiencies in the organization of Canada’s space programme and, specific to this article, the placement of DND within it have resulted from a failure to evolve with changes in the relative contributions of different stakeholders. In many cases, organizational paradigms still reflect realities of the CSA’s initial period of operation, a time frame during which the CSA accounted for 90 per cent of total government expenditures in space, with DND playing only a minor role. Since then, DND involvement in space has grown considerably: it is now responsible for close to 30 per cent of the total Canadian space budget.^[54] So, whereas DND has historically occupied only a small portion of Canada’s overall investment in space, its share is rapidly increasing. Additionally, in fulfilling their individual mandates, other government departments are increasingly reliant on the CSA. Examples include the departments of the Environment, National Resources, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Aboriginal Affairs.^[55] These stakeholders are interdependent with each other and with DND when it comes to national space capability. From a military perspective, the growth in the utilization of space lends credence to the need for a strategic-level reorganization of Canada’s space sector, one that will permit DND priorities to be more fully incorporated.

The Canadian military is dependent on space-based assets, exposing significant vulnerabilities that some experts warn could result in a “Space Pearl Harbor” for Western militaries.^[56] That said, it is not sufficient to view space as merely a military enabler. To do so is to underestimate the future contributions of DND in space to Canada’s national security. Canada’s defence space policy must anticipate future requirements. It should view space as an operating environment in which the military will be required to take on additional roles to do with the defence of Canadian interests.

CAF requires increased government commitment to a strategic direction for its role in outer space; without it, the defence of Canada continues to be at risk. Debates on the likeliness of space weaponization are irrelevant to the immediate challenges a DND space programme faces. Of relevance are the dependencies of national security on space and the proliferation of technology that is capable of threatening these dependencies. That most countries of the world are—at least in published policy—against the weaponization of space should not detract from the nevertheless increasingly prolific trends in space militarization. Current military dependency on space-based enablers, combined with the accelerating importance of space to national security, likely indicates that DND needs to pursue a more robust space programme. The challenges to such development, however, are noteworthy, given recent trends in the prioritization of military and civilian space programmes alike, both of which have suffered under marginal levels of government interest and investment. Yet such challenges in no way lessen the evolving importance of space policy to fundamental defence requirements. Therefore, it is likely that Canada will require a new, reinvigorated approach to its objectives in space, military and otherwise. Any such approach will be wide in scope, involving a defence-oriented but interdepartmental national space strategy, combined with a more ambitious, specific, and relevant DND space policy.

The requirements of any new DND approach to space are further complicated by the breadth of national stakeholders for whom space is becoming an increasingly vulnerable dependency. Defining a military space policy for Canada is challenging because the consequences of space to national security mean that the management of a national space programme will transcend a country’s traditional departmental dividing lines.^[57] Government interests in space are increasingly interconnected by way of means, costs, and benefits through considerations of economic impact, technological development, and national security. In the end, analysis suggests that national defence interests in space will be best served by a truly interdepartmental approach, the full implications of which may still exceed even the best of our present strategic senses.

Major Joshua Kutryk is an RCAF test pilot. This article is an excerpt from a longer paper written during his studies at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, while under the supervision of Dr. Richard Goette. Major Kutryk is presently the Officer in Charge of Fighter Evaluations at the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment in Cold Lake, Alberta.

AIS―Automatic Identification System
CAF―Canadian Armed Forces
CSA―Canadian Space Agency
DND―Department of National Defence
DRDC―Defence Research and Development Canada
GPS―global positioning system
NORAD―North American Aerospace Defence Command
RADARSAT―Radar Satellite
RCAF―Royal Canadian Air Force
RCM―RADARSAT Constellation Mission
SSN―space-surveillance network
US―United States

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[38]. D. Bercuson et al., “National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World” (A Report Prepared for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Calgary, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 18. (return)

[39]. Francois Malo, “Schriever V: Lessons Learned – A Canadian Perspective,” High Frontier –The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals 5, no. 4 (2009): 30. (return)

[40]. Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 41. (return)

[41]. Space Working Group, Final Report Submitted to the Aerospace Review (Ottawa: Department of Industry, 2012), 22. (return)

[42]. Canada, DND, Space Appreciation 2000 (Ottawa: Directorate of Space Development, 2000), 13. (return)

[43]. Canada, DND, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2006), 7. (return)

[44]. K. Becker et al., Space Situational Awareness, SSE Educational Series 2012 (Austria: Space Generation Advisory Council, 2012), 10. (return)

[45]. D. Mehrholz et al., “Detecting, Tracking and Imaging Space Debris,” European Space Agency Bulletin 109 (February 2002): 129. (return)

[46]. D. Bercuson et al., “National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World” (A Report Prepared for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Calgary, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 17. (return)

[47]. K. Becker et al., Space Situational Awareness, SSE Educational Series 2012 (Austria: Space Generation Advisory Council, 2012), 7. (return)

[48]. D. Kendall, “Advances in Canada’s Contributions to Space Situational Awareness” (Scientific and Technical Subcommittee presentation to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, New York, NY, February 13, 2014), 29. (return)

[49]. K. Becker et al., Space Situational Awareness, SSE Educational Series 2012 (Austria: Space Generation Advisory Council, 2012), 19. (return)

[50]. James Fergusson and S. James, Report on Canada, National Security and Outer Space (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 22. (return)

[51]. D. Bercuson et al., “National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World” (A Report Prepared for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Calgary, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 18–19. (return)

[52]. The issue was raised by Senator Daniel Lang during a 2014 session of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence when he suggested that, as a result of Canada’s stance on ballistic missile defence, Canada may no longer be entitled to the same intelligence sharing privileges that it has benefited from in the past. See Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence concerning ballistic missile defence and Canada’s space programme, Monday, April 28, 2014, accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/412%5CSECD/06EV-51354-E.HTM. (return)

[53]. James Fergusson and S. James, Report on Canada, National Security and Outer Space (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 28–29. (return)

[54]. Space Working Group, Final Report Submitted to the Aerospace Review (Ottawa: Department of Industry, 2012), 44. (return)

[55]. Canada, Department of Industry, The Aerospace Review Volume 2, Reaching Higher: Canada’s Interests and Future in Space (Ottawa: Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2012), 16. (return)

[56]. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 8. (return)

[57]. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 25. (return)