Chapter 1: Shape fundamentals (B-GA-403-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Aerospace Shape Doctrine)

• Introduction
  • Force application
  • Information operations
• Why Royal Canadian Air Force Shape?
• Aerospace power
  • The strategic effect of aerospace power
• Shape capabilities and roles
• Shape and the Sense function
• Summary

Shape optimizes agile manoeuvre and integrated information operations in the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic aerospace power to achieve desired effects.^[1]

Aerospace forces exist to exercise aerospace power on behalf of the nation. This is accomplished through the control and exploitation of the air and space domains to achieve assigned objectives in order to satisfy the commander’s desired end state. A century of air warfare has demonstrated that all effective air forces, whether large or small, are capable of performing a number of specific functions. These functions are influenced by the physical possibilities and limitations imposed by the domains and by each other. One cannot work efficiently or effectively without the other; however, it is the unique capabilities of each function that, when integrated, ensure the proper application of aerospace power. Aligned with Canadian Forces (CF) joint doctrine,^[2] Canadian aerospace doctrine consists of the following six functions^[3]:

In order to conduct aerospace operations, the core functions of Command, Act, and Sense operate within a continuous cycle of activities. The outputs of Sense activities are assessed during Command activities to determine the current state. After evaluating the current and desired states, Command activities direct and plan actions. Act activities then create effects that will achieve the desired state. Sense activities assess the results of these effects, and the cycle is repeated. This cycle of activities influences, or can be influenced by, the enabling functions of Sustain, Shield, and Generate.

The Sustain, Shield, and Generate activities must be performed continuously in order to effectively maintain, protect, and develop RCAF assets and capabilities. Without the activities of these functions, the Command, Act, and Sense activities could be compromised or even eliminated. Consequently, a weakness in, or failure of, one function will negatively impact not only the other five functions but also the force’s ability to achieve a desired state.

Within the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the Act function translates the commander’s directives and operational desires into effects. Act integrates agile manoeuvre, firepower, and info ops^[4] to achieve desired effects. The Act function is further subdivided into Shape and Move. Move exploits the global reach and speed of aerospace power to rapidly deploy and position personnel and materiel and is fully discussed in B-GA-404-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Aerospace Move Doctrine. Shape optimizes agile manoeuvre and integrated info ops in the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic aerospace power, influencing the battlespace to achieve military effects in accordance with the commander’s intent and campaign plan. Shape affects the physical, moral, and informational domains^[5] through force application and info ops.

Force application operations are primarily focused on the physical domain. This is the tangible battlespace within which all military forces manoeuvre. Aerospace shaping within the physical domain may be broadly defined as the application of military force by aerospace assets against airborne, surface and sub-surface targets. Force application does not necessarily result in the destruction of a target; rather, it is the selective application of the required, proportional force to achieve the desired effect. It can be kinetic or non-kinetic, direct or indirect, and lethal or non-lethal. Force application occurs across the spectrum of conflict^[6] (from peace to war) and ranges in effect from simple presence to the use of deadly force. Aerospace force application missions may take place exclusively in an aerospace context (as is the case with intercepting foreign aircraft in Canadian domestic airspace); be independently applied within the land or maritime domain (an attack on a strategic location or vessel); or fully integrated with land, maritime, or special operations forces (a close air support mission).

Some force application examples designed to create physical effects include:

1. armed fighters intercepting long-range aircraft in Canada’s remote and/or Arctic regions;
2. convoy escort missions by armed tactical helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft providing overwatch for land-force vehicles;
3. maritime aerospace power attacking a submarine threatening friendly naval vessels;
4. armed fighters or surface-based anti-air weaponry engaging hostile aircraft (fighters, bombers, or surveillance aircraft);
5. aerial bombardment of infrastructure targets such as bridges, power stations, or an adversary’s logistic nodes; and
6. an aerial fire support mission conducted by fighters, armed unmanned aircraft (UA), and helicopters in support of friendly surface forces in close proximity to an adversary.

Force application operations can also have effects on the moral and informational domains. These domains exist in the minds of friendly, adversary, and neutral/uncommitted audiences and in the informational systems that support their activities and understanding of their environment. The successful application of force can create primary and secondary order effects, undermining an adversary’s capability, understanding, and behaviour as well as supporting the achievement of friendly force objectives.

Some force application examples designed to create effects in the moral and informational domains include:

1. long-range attacks against an adversary’s strategic centres of gravity (CGs);^[7]
2. a low-altitude show of force by military aircraft over adversarial forces;
3. air policing and patrolling of allied or neutral airspace; and
4. kinetic strikes against an adversary’s computer network infrastructure.

Information operations^[8] (info ops)^[9] are designed to shape the physical, moral, and informational domains by focusing on specific sub-domains within each, namely the electromagnetic, psychological, conative (will), cognitive (understanding), information, and cyber sub-domains. Their aim is to change the behaviour of a target audience by influencing its will, perceptions, and ability to process information and communicate. Info ops exert pressure on any cognitive, emotional, moral, and cultural levers that advance friendly objectives. To be successful in this realm, planners must have a complete understanding of the target audience; they must not assume that non-kinetic actions which swayed one populace are equally valid for another. Additionally, info ops is a synchronized iterative process that commonly requires time to build upon successive levers of influence. Therefore, the greatest success is enjoyed when info ops actions, which are carefully designed to support operational objectives, are commenced at the very beginning of an operational campaign. Done correctly, they can produce strategic-level effect and lessen the requirement for kinetic action. Done incorrectly, they can produce negative effects that, in the modern context, have the potential to overshadow all other military activities and successes.

It must be understood that, in the joint context, info ops is principally a synchronizing discipline; it is not truly a separate capability. To the operational commander, joint info ops derives its unique military value by synergistically coordinating the actions of a number of components. The most common of these components are: electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOPS), operational security (OPSEC), computer network operations (CNO), military deception, public affairs (PA) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). In this manual, the components of joint info ops that are utilized in aerospace Shape-related operations are grouped together as the aerospace info ops capability.

While most info ops are non-kinetic, if the underlying rationale for a specific kinetic action is the psychological impact it will have on neutral or adversarial groups, physical attack can also be part of an overarching info ops plan. There can also be notable physical effects associated with other info ops techniques, such as an electronic attack (EA) or computer network attack (CNA). A CNA was used to great effect by the designers of the Stuxnet computer virus, which crippled a significant portion of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure in 2010 by reprogramming the equipment’s control parameters, effectively causing the machines to self-destruct.

Space in which to maneuver in the air, unlike fighting on land or sea, is practically unlimited, and . . . any number of airplanes operating defensively would seldom stop a determined enemy from getting through. Therefore the airplane was, and is, essentially an instrument of attack, not defence. … The only proper defence is offence.^[10]

– Air Vice-Marshal J. E. (Johnnie) Johnson

The mission of the RCAF, as an integrated element of the Canadian Forces (CF), is to provide the Government of Canada (GC) with a relevant, responsive, and effective aerospace instrument of national power. Canada’s commitment to domestic and international security and defence demands a robust, agile, flexible, and interoperable force equipped to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic aerospace power, optimizing both agile manoeuvre and integrated info ops. While aerospace forces can aim to achieve these effects purely in the air domain, they can also achieve them on the surface in support of maritime, land, and special operations forces. With control of the air, friendly surface forces enjoy significantly increased freedom of action in the pursuance of their objectives. The RCAF identified a Shape sub-function because air assets can shape the battlespace throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict in ways that surface forces cannot.

Generally speaking, an attacking land force requires superior forces to overtake entrenched defensive positions. The armies of the Clausewitzian era strove for both military superiority and the ability to conduct offensive manoeuvres in order to achieve victory. Given equal strength between attackers and defenders, the defender had the advantage. Aerospace power has changed this dynamic.

An air attacker may strike from virtually any direction, whereas an attack by surface forces can often be constrained over a predictable route. Air attackers can use terrain-masking techniques, electronic countermeasures, careful route selection, and stealth technology to make it even more difficult for a defender to anticipate and prepare for an air assault. Unlike a purely surface defender, the air defender has no implicit advantage. An air attacker does not necessarily require the force superiority required by the land-based attacker. In fact, the air defender may often need more forces than the attacker— the opposite of the situation on the ground. Therefore, the advantage of aerospace power lies in the offensive use of the aerospace domain.

Aerospace power brings capabilities to military operations that are unique. They are both different from and complementary to the capabilities of other environments. It is essential that these capabilities be employed with due consideration for the principles of war,^[11] taking into account the specific characteristics and tenets that govern their use, and that the impact of accomplishing objectives be balanced against the associated risk to friendly or neutral forces. Those principles of war that provide the primary considerations when employing Shape assets are: selection and maintenance of the aim, offensive action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, and cooperation.

The Shape sub-function is that part of aerospace power that captures the offensive advantages of the air environment, primarily using the principles of concentration of force, flexibility, and cooperation to focus limited resources on well-defined critical points across the battlespace. The characteristics of aerospace power that embody these inherent advantages include elevation, reach, payload, precision, and speed.

Reach is measured in terms of distance—hundreds or even thousands of kilometres—and speed is measured in time—minutes or hours; combined, these characteristics demonstrate the responsiveness of aerospace power. This is aerospace power’s greatest strength, providing an ability to coerce an adversary by presenting a continuous risk of being attacked at a time and place of friendly choosing while denying this same capability to an adversary. The resulting freedom of action may be used to strike a wide range of mobile and fixed surface targets across multiple theatres, control airspace, or even strike at the strategic heart of an adversary.

Tenets of aerospace power are fundamental to aerospace operations and facilitate optimal employment of aerospace assets. Those that apply to Shape include centralized control and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility as well as synergy, persistence, concentration, priority, and balance.

Flexibility and versatility are key tenets of aerospace power. Inherently flexible and uniquely versatile, aerospace resources can be quickly and decisively shifted from one objective to another across a broad spectrum at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of conflict.^[12] For example, long-range bombers that were originally designed for strategic attack are also capable of executing close air support (CAS) missions in the tactical battlespace. Similarly, traditionally tactical fighters or attack helicopters are capable of achieving strategic effects if targeting an adversary’s CGs.

Aerospace power is flexible, rapidly employed, versatile, and lethal. For these reasons, attack by aerospace power is often considered the "response of first resort." Economic and political sanctions are often ineffective and disproportionately impact the poor and most vulnerable. Strategic deterrent weaponry or weapons of mass destruction are indiscriminate, unacceptable socially, and have legacy effects (in addition to being contrary to international law). Ground forces of suitable mass to be noteworthy are often slow to mobilize and are high risk to a "casualty averse" state. As a result, a credible aerospace Shape capability can be both a strategic and statecraft tool.

Careful consideration must be given to the question of how aerospace Shape capabilities can contribute to the strategic aim. Aerospace Shape capabilities of any type, while not strategic assets per se, can convey strategic intent and, by association, have a strategic effect of their own. This may be considered the coercive nature of aerospace power. While this effect increases with increased aerospace Shape capabilities (particularly true of stealth technology and special weaponry such as bunker busters and precision land-attack missiles), the strategic effect of aerospace power is not exclusively dependent upon sophisticated means. Aerospace power used to attack the strategic heart of an adversary is dynamic and tailored to the situation. Indeed, the simple unopposed presence of aerospace power in an adversary’s battlespace may be enough to shape the situation in favour of friendly aims and prevent an adversary from making cohesive, strategic decisions, known as strategic paralysis.^[13]

A desired strategic effect might be as easily accomplished through a small operation as by a large operation involving significant forces. The Doolittle raid against Tokyo (see Vignette 1), largely a tactical failure when contrasted against the massive strategic bombardment of Germany, did far more to shape the mostly psychological battlespace in favour of friendly objectives. Thus, the strategic effect should not be measured by the target or the asset being used to strike it, but rather by its impact, intended or not.

Vignette 1: Strategic "value added." The Doolittle raid (dubbed the "do-nothing raid" by the Japanese) was an attack on Japan in April of 1942 and was the first strike by American forces on the Japanese homeland during the Second World War (WWII). Targets included 13 different industrial and military sites in and around Tokyo. The raid was composed of 16 B-25 bombers launched from the aircraft carrier United States Ship (USS) Hornet; due to the range of the mission, each bomber carried only one-third of its possible bomb load.

The raid had two aims: to impact Japanese industrial production (specifically, oil refinement) and demonstrate American resolve and ability to strike. The actual physical damage was inconsequential; the only damage of military significance was to the dry-docked light aircraft carrier Ryūhō, bomb damage delayed its launch by six months. The impact on morale was significant, and the strategic effects were considerable:

The raid was a blow to the previously held belief that the islands were impregnable; Japanese naval, army, and air force assets were subsequently recalled for homeland defence:

• The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) high-seas carrier fleet was withdrawn from the Indian Ocean even though the IJN was on the verge of defeating the Royal Navy in that theatre. Removal of the IJN main fleet allowed the British to regain control of shipping in the Indian Ocean, solidifying their supply lines while denying the Germans and Japanese the same.
• A portion of the already strained Japanese submarine fleet was recalled for patrol duties around the home islands. This significantly reduced intelligence gathering aimed at the United States (US) and counter-shipping operations attempting to isolate Australia.
• Air Force assets in China were reduced; this included fighters but also medium transport aircraft whose role was now rapid evacuation of senior military and political leaders at home. This reduced air mobility capability in China, slowing the operational tempo there.
• Infantry divisions, earmarked for the invasion of New Guinea and, thence, Australia, were recalled. This made invasion of Australia impossible without first freeing units in China (still years away from happening). Invasion of Australia certainly would have drawn Commonwealth and probably US troops, reducing the available forces for fighting in North Africa and Southern Europe, prolonging (or potentially changing) the war there.

Japanese intelligence resources were diverted to analyse the attack. The (incorrect) assessment that the bombers originated from Midway Island was said to be fundamental to Yamamoto’s unrelenting resolve to capture Midway and the ill-fated mission therein.

American relations with other allied combatants (Russia, in particular) were improved sharply and American morale, still stinging from the attack on Pearl Harbor, was significantly boosted.^[14]

In some cases the outcome / strategic impact of an operation is neither planned nor intended. German bombardment of British cities (including the Royal personage) was intended to compel the British population to negotiate an end to the conflict with Germany (British popular support for an ongoing war with the Germans was low). However, the German campaign had a pronounced opposite effect; British citizenry support for the conflict was galvanized and anti-Nazi sentiment reached fever pitch; a negotiated peace was no longer a realistic goal. In Afghanistan and Iraq, aerospace force application missions, particularly close air support (CAS) missions, were of primary importance to the combat effort. However, errant bombs in urban areas can and have caused significant collateral damage. This collateral damage substantially erodes local support for allied operations. As such, strict rules on the use of aerospace force are imposed, particularly with respect to CAS in urban situations, in some cases rendering it tactically ineffective.

At the national level, the potential threat or application of aerospace power can be used for political signalling and serves as a flexible and responsive instrument for crisis management. Aerospace power can punish aggression, deter impending aggression, signal resolve, threaten escalation, and demonstrate capability. Such strategic effects are often associated with CGs; however, they are not limited to these. Striking an adversary’s vital points or acting in any manner that changes the behaviour of the opposing forces at the strategic level is strategic in effect. Within a campaign, aerospace operations for strategic effect are balanced against required tactical and operational levels of activity to achieve overall mission success.

The aerospace Shape sub-function seeks to influence the battlespace to create favourable circumstances for friendly forces and unfavourable circumstances for an adversary. These efforts can be focused at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Air forces shape the physical, moral, and informational domains by applying the following capabilities: control of the air, air attack,^[15] and aerospace information operations. Shape-related aerospace operations can be offensive or defensive and can be applied either directly or indirectly. Figure 1-2^[16] depicts the three Shape capabilities and their subordinate aerospace roles, which will be explained in subsequent chapters.

The aerospace activity of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)^[17] is described primarily from an intelligence perspective in B-GA-402-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Aerospace Sense Doctrine. For Shape, it is important to differentiate between the overall ISR activity^[18] and its constituent parts; each of the three parts can be individually defined and is distinct from the others. Coming together in the ISR activity, they form a more complete collection capability that, through the intelligence cycle and well-defined collection management principles, provides the warfighter with decision superiority. Accurate and timely intelligence is critical to maximizing the inherent offensive advantages of aerospace power.

While the intelligence effort is the cornerstone of effective Shape-related aerospace operations, these same operations can also make significant contributions to that effort. Streaming video from UA flying overwatch above a convoy and an electronic warfare support measures (ESM)-equipped aircraft triangulating the position of an adversary’s air defence emplacement are examples of combat information that can be provided by assets conducting Shape-related aerospace operations. A common thread seen in many of these contributions is that they provide real-time (RT) or near-real-time (NRT) information to the commander. This is where the specific capabilities of a sensor platform create overlap between Shape and Sense. A platform which is capable of both collecting information and acting upon it blurs the line between intelligence collection and operations, emphasizing the flexibility, versatility, and responsiveness of aerospace power.

This blurring of the line between ISR activities and the operations they underpin has resulted in the term "ISR" being applied to the operations themselves, which is somewhat confusing but nonetheless understandable. Within the Shape sub-function, ISR is not presented as a unique capability, role, or mission. The ISR capabilities inherent to modern sensors and aerospace platforms are enablers; they enable the aircraft and crew to locate, identify,^[19] track, and target; all key elements of a successful Shape mission. That said, the overwatch mission mentioned above can be considered an ISR mission, as can a pattern-of-life mission providing real-time video to a special operations force (SOF) strike team. From a maritime perspective, the development of the recognized maritime picture (RMP) or an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) prosecution can also be considered ISR operations. The Shape aspect of these ISR efforts is their immediate utility to the warfighter and the mission. The intelligence cycle and cognitive hierarchy defining the Sense function are accelerated, sometimes even being conducted within a single aerospace platform and crew.

This overlap between collection operations and the operations themselves creates command and control challenges. Both the importance of the product and the scarcity of available resources require well-defined apportionment, allocation, and prioritization at the command level. Aerospace ISR assets—whether fixed or rotary wing, manned or unmanned—are rapidly becoming the most sought-after battlespace enablers. Managing these resources carefully and using them effectively is a key requirement of the Shape sub-function.

Shape is a sub-function of Act. By definition, Shape optimizes agile manoeuvre and information operations in the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic aerospace power. Aerospace forces shape the battlespace through the use or threatening the use of force as well as through force application and information operations.

Force application operations are primarily focused on the physical domain. This is the tangible battlespace within which all military forces manoeuvre. Shaping within this domain may be broadly defined as the application of military force by aerospace assets against airborne, surface, or sub-surface targets. Force application does not necessarily result in the destruction of a target; rather, it is the selective application of the required, proportional force to achieve the desired effect. It can be kinetic or non-kinetic and lethal or non-lethal. Force application operations can also have effects on the moral and informational domains. A successful application of force will have an obvious effect in these domains, undermining both an adversary’s leadership and morale.

Info ops are designed to shape the physical, moral, and informational domains by focusing on specific sub-domains within each. Info ops, a series of processes and technologies integrated with force application campaign planning, influence the perception and capability of an adversary to render and transmit decisions, affect the will of the opposing populace, while protecting friendly information capabilities.

The RCAF identified a Shape sub-function because air assets can shape the battlespace throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict in ways that surface forces cannot. Canada’s commitment to domestic and international security and defence demands a robust, agile, flexible, and interoperable force equipped to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic aerospace power, optimizing both agile manoeuvre and integrated information operations.

Aerospace power influences the battlespace from the air environment, exploiting the offensive advantages inherent to it. The aerospace characteristics of reach, speed, and elevation contribute to this superior application of force but also present a need for specialization in planning and execution. Aerospace power used to attack the strategic heart of an adversary is dynamic and tailored to the situation. The simple, unopposed presence of air power in an adversary’s battlespace may be enough to shape the situation in favour of friendly aims and prevent an adversary from making cohesive decisions or taking effective action. A strategic target can be of military, political, or economic significance and is specifically selected in order to achieve military strategic objectives.

The aerospace Shape sub-function seeks to influence the battlespace to create favourable circumstances for friendly forces and unfavourable circumstances for an adversary. Air forces shape the physical, moral, and informational domains by applying the following capabilities: control of the air, air attack, and aerospace information operations.

The aerospace activity of ISR provides the warfighter with decision superiority. The ISR capabilities inherent to modern sensors and aerospace platforms are enablers. That is, they enable the aircraft and crew to locate, identify, track, and target; all key elements of a successful Shape mission. A platform that is both capable of collecting information and acting upon it blurs the lines between intelligence collection (Sense) and operations (Shape), emphasizing the flexibility, versatility, and responsiveness of aerospace power.

1. B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 2nd ed. (December 2010), 39. (return)

2. From B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (September 2011), 2-7. (return)

3. The B-GA-400 series of operational-level aerospace doctrine provides a detailed discussion of each function. (return)

4. "Info ops" is included within the RCAF’s Act function as presented in B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 39. Info ops is, however, at minimum, a joint activity and encompasses actions across the breadth of military operations (not specific to aerospace power) to dominate the informational domain. Ideally, information operations are also coordinated and synchronized with coalition partners, other government departments (e.g., Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), and willing non-governmental organizations (NGOs). (return)

5. The domain concept continues to evolve within CF and RCAF doctrine. For the RCAF and the purposes of this manual, the physical domain includes the air, maritime, land, space and electromagnetic sub-domains. The moral domain includes the psychological, conative (will), cognitive (understanding), and ethical sub-domains. The informational domain includes the information and cyber sub-domains. (return)

6. As defined by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn in "Complexity Squared: Operating in the Future Battlespace," Canadian Military Journal 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), (accessed August 20, 2013). (return)

7. Refer to the Strategic Attack section in Chapter 3 of this manual and the associated footnote 45 for an explanation of the term "centre of gravity." (return)

8. Where the terms "information operations" and "info ops" are used they should be understood as referring to joint info ops. The aerospace contribution to joint info ops is introduced in this section and later in Figure 4-2 as the aerospace information operations capability. (return)

9. Defence Terminology Bank (DTB) record 31721. The abbreviation "info ops" has been accepted for use by the CF and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while "IO" is used by United States (US) forces. In NATO doctrine the abbreviation IO refers to international organizations. (return)

10. United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-01, Counterair Operations, 1 October 2008, 22. (PDF, 2.30 MB) (English only) (accessed August 20, 2013). (return)

11. Defined in B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 23 and 69. (return)

12. B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 28. (return)

13. The notion of strategic paralysis in contemporary military philosophy can be found in the theories of John Boyd and John Warden. Boyd emphasizes the psychological isolation of an adversary’s decision-making process, while Warden emphasizes an unrelenting assault on the pillars of an adversary’s warfighting ability (leadership in particular). Both strategies are complementary, both require shaping of the psychological and physical battlespace, and the aim of both is strategic paralysis of an adversary. See Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: Routledge, 2007); and John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Airpower Journal 9, no. 2 (Spring 1995). (return)

14. For additional information on the Doolittle Raid, see Clayton Chun, The Doolittle Raid 1942: America’s First Strike Back at Japan (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006). (return)

15. "Air attack" has been chosen as an RCAF Shape capability since it is more descriptive than "support to land and naval forces" as described in B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 41. Additionally, air attack is more consistent with NATO terminology and that of the CF’s closest allies (the Royal Air Force uses "attack" and the Royal Australian Air Force uses "strike"). (return)

16. A placement within this schematic is not meant to reflect the significance of the capability or role, but only how it relates to other capabilities and roles. (return)

17. In Air Force Vectors (http://airforce.mil.ca/dairsp/Documents/AFV_e.pdf) (PDF, 3.31 MB), the RCAF’s strategic guidance released in 2012, the ISR activity is presented as the surveillance and reconnaissance air-power capability. Whether ISR is a capability or activity will continue to be debated, but the outcome is not critical to understanding the information presented in this manual. As the ISR concept is developed further, by both the intelligence and operations communities, it will be introduced appropriately within operational-level doctrine. (accessed August 20, 2013). (return)

18. Canadian Army doctrine also uses the term intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) to describe this activity. See DTB record 35628. (return)

19. Where the word "identify" is used in this context, it encompasses a number of specific requirements. Theatre rules of engagement (ROE) will specify the degree to which positive identification (PID) must be achieved under various circumstances, particularly where a target is to be engaged as opposed to simply being tracked. In modern conflict, the requirement to avoid mistakenly engaging a non-combatant often overrides any other military consideration. (return)