

In 13 Infantry Brigade it had healed over at Kiska but the moment the pressure was put on, it opened up instantly, and widened progressively. It can be detected with ease in the attitude of the men. The volunteer is conscious of his position. He is proud of it. He is anxious to work. He salutes his officers and speaks to them with self confidence. The N.R.M.A. soldier slouches at his work. He tends to become sullen. He nurses his fancied grudge against "the Army". He hates "the Army". He has little self respect and therefore little respect for his officers.

I have seen this feeling developed to an amazing degree in 13 Infantry Brigade during the month of April, as men enlisted and new drafts of volunteers arrived. On 1 April the 13 Brigade was a unified formation even though Esprit-de-Corps and morale were none too high for the reasons given as above. But three weeks later 13 Brigade was rent into two distinct bodies of men poles apart in feeling and outlook. By 1 May there were 2600 active personnel of high morale, fine bearing and excellent spirit, and on the other hand there were about 1600 or 1700 N.R.M.A. soldiers discontented and unhappy; a solid mass of men who had resisted successfully every appeal to their manhood and citizenship, despised by their former comrades, and finally rejected even by their officers as hopeless material out of which to make a fighting force. These men take pride in only one thing they have beaten "the Army"; they have beaten "the government" (134).

335. The Officer Commanding Le Régiment de Hull did not think that any large number of French-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers could ever be induced to volunteer for overseas service. As regards the English-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers who refused to volunteer Brigadier Macklin wrote as follows:

... they vary all the way from a large number who have no patriotism or national feeling whatever, to a few intelligent men, who, I believe, honestly think that by holding out they will some day force the Government to adopt conscription which they feel is the only fair system.

The great majority are of non-British origin—Germanic, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin predominating. Moreover, most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with a passionate attachment to the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist. Here again the process of converting these men into free citizens of a free country willing to volunteer and die for their country will be a matter of education, and I think it will be slow. At present there is a negligible national pride or patriotism among them. They are not like Cromwell's "Good Soldier" who "knows what he fights for and loves what he knows". They do not know what they are fighting for and they love

nothing but themselves and their land. This fact must be recognized (135).

336. There was the further widespread feeling that the Government's manpower policy was unfair. With thousands of deserters on the loose and "nothing" done about them there was no incentive for these men "to soldier". The policy of granting extended leave to agricultural and other workers had resulted in such a barrage of applications that it was impossible to determine which were deserving. Brigadier Macklin was personally convinced that men would never volunteer as long as there was a possibility of being released to civilian life on extended leave. The whole campaign was a disappointment since the Brigade had been able to provide only 800 G.S. soldiers.

337. On 6 May personnel proceeded on embarkation leave, and, as their homes were mainly in the east, they were allowed to report back at various staging centres.* Writing from Debert on 25 May the diarist of Le Régiment de Hull noted:

Some seven other ranks left camp last night and have not yet reported back. They are considered A.W.L. It had been noticed that these men had received money by telegram the previous day; should men proceeding overseas be permitted to receive money by telegram previous to embarkation?

The Rocky Mountain Rangers reported 14 absentees on 21 May, although two of the men appear to have been delayed by normal causes on the way east. The Brigade sailed from Halifax on 26 May. Following arrival at Gourock the 13th Brigade was concentrated in Yorkshire, retaining its identity.

338. Here it was joined on 30 Jul by Le Régiment de Montmagny, which had been able to take over 484 all ranks to further help the situation as regards French-speaking infantry reinforcements (136). Actually an offer similar to that extended the 13th Brigade had been made in Atlantic Command. Two French-speaking units, Le Régiment de Montmagny in Newfoundland and Le Régiment de Joliette at Rimouski, and The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, from Ontario but stationed at Sussex, N.B., were told that they might proceed overseas as formed units if at least 500 of their personnel would volunteer for general service (137). Despite harangues by Major-General P.E. Leclerc (G.O.C., Canadian Troops, Newfoundland) and the employment of recruiting tactics similar to those resorted to in Pacific Command it was not possible for Le Régiment de Montmagny to obtain 500 volunteers, even after personnel had been exchanged with the nearby Régiment de St. Hyacinthe. Nevertheless, Le Régiment de Montmagny returned to Canada to continue recruiting. In practice it was allowed to sail after receiving the volunteers available in Le Régiment de Joliette which had made a very bad showing in its abortive recruiting campaign (138).

339. The following extracts from the war diary of Le Régiment de Joliette help to explain why this unit could not obtain sufficient volunteers for overseas service:

*War Diary of The Winnipeg Grenadiers for 17 May recounts ... "At 1150 hrs Montreal was reached and the party changed to a troop train for Debert, N.S. Discontent was evidenced by the men when it was discovered that a party of NRMA ptes on draft from a district depot to a basic training camp were travelling in style in a Pullman Coach complete with sheets and a porter while Grenadiers up to and including the rank of WO II were sharing the hard wooden accommodations of a Colonists Car."

- 1 May - The Coy Comds and their Offrs announce the news to our men that our Unit was chosen for Overseas. The news does not strike the recruits as we had expected it would. It left them quite indifferent. Of course, we expected something like that but not quite as much.
- 5 May - Lieut.Col. J. Lafontaine M.C. arrives in camp and starts interviewing each Offr individually as to the reason why the men are not signing active and also interviews the odd man.
- 10 May - All the Offrs are assembled in the Orderly Room and are introduced to Lieuts. Col. Jean Tellier, Dansereau, Boivin, Capt. Lemont P.R.O. M.D. 5 and Mr Leon Trepannier. These Offrs were sent here in order to interview the Offrs and find out what was wrong with the recruiting. They all addressed the Offrs and afterwards we had a friendly discussion as to what should be done. We all told them that the boys were not interested in signing active, but that they would gladly go overseas if they did not have to sign, also that the parents of these boys had made them promise not to sign and if they did some of them could never go back home. Also they are under the impression that the Government does not require their services and if they did would conscript them. From the Offrs point of view sending these Res. Offrs to pep them up was not the wisest move for they more or less told us that we were slackers and are to blame for our men not signing active and if they were in our position maybe they would not have the same attitude. We would like to know on what ground they stand to speak that way to Active Offrs who have repeatedly offered their services to go overseas and have served in areas where their services have been requested, whereas these Res. Offrs have nothing to show for the last war and very little for this war. The only thing their visit did was make the Offrs sore and nothing was gained by it for we are sore enough the way things are turning out without having it rubbed in.

340. Earlier calls for reinforcements had taken the greater part of the (still physically fit) personnel mobilized with the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles in 1940 and the N.R.M.A. replacements now refused to volunteer, stating that the Government could send them overseas as conscripts if it so desired (139). This unit also did not obtain sufficient volunteers to proceed overseas.

341. On 9 Aug 44 a similar offer was made to The Victoria Rifles of Canada and the same difficulty was experienced. The offer was held open, however, and, after its continuing N.R.M.A. personnel had been replaced by G.S. soldiers remustered

from elsewhere, the unit sailed from Halifax on 21 Nov (140). En route to Canada from garrison duty in Jamaica the same proposition had been handed to the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) on 26 Jul: even though the time limit was similarly extended this unit was able to raise its volunteer strength to only 301 other ranks*.

342. As early as 14 Jun 44 the Cabinet Manpower Committee had discussed the future availability of men for the Army, in view of General Stuart's telegram of 6 Jun that the latest War Office activity forecast envisaged an operational situation where Canadian reinforcement requirements for the remainder of 1944 and first six months of 1945 would exceed the number which had been requested from Canada (see para 387). Therefore, the Ministers of National Defence for Air and Naval Services were requested to explore the possibility of curtailing their own needs. On 28 Jun the last named Minister reported that the Navy would not recruit beyond minimum requirements: 2000 men would be required for July and August but thenceforth the intake could drop to 500 per month. The Minister of National Defence for Air had already expressed his willingness to allow those surplus to the R.C.A.F.'s training needs to volunteer for the Army. The original intention was that the Army Recruiting Campaign should run during June and July only, although it might be extended into August if real progress was being made. During the course of a National Campaign Committee meeting on 25 Jul Brigadier Mess stated that:

... Whilst the Districts had got going fairly well by 5 Jun it was felt that the general publicity only commenced to make an impression during the past three weeks. Feeling in the Districts was that the best period for recruiting was from September to November and that a further two months of intensification would be highly desirable now that momentum is under way and publicity ensuing... (142).

343. By mid-August the Government realized, however, that the type of newspaper advertising carried in this "gloves off" campaign was resulting in a storm of protest across the country. Since N.R.M.A. personnel provided a ready source of trained soldiers much of the advertising had been aimed at the man's family, suggesting that its members do nothing to discourage him from enlisting for general service. In order to avoid further criticism, therefore, the Deputy Minister of National Defence instructed that all further recruiting publicity should be cleared through the Wartime Information Board (143). The tone of the recruiting campaign which had been attempted may be gathered from the following advertisements submitted, but not approved, for distribution (144):

Gratuities for G.S. Soldiers
Black Market
In this Final Hour the Heart of Business Will
Not Fail.

In a further effort to improve the co-operation between the Departments of National Defence and Labour (National Selective

*The C.G.S. decided to move this unit to Debert Camp anyway, complete it with G.S. personnel and despatch it overseas. Actually the decision to send N.R.M.A. infantrymen overseas was made while the Irish Fusiliers still were at Debert so, when this unit finally did depart, it was with a mixed flight of G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements (141).

Service) which had been handled through the Directorate of Organization (R), Lt-Col. A.L. Tosland was appointed Liaison Officer to National Selective Service. As such the recruiting campaign was brought to a close on 30 Sep. Comparison of the following statistics with those for the same months of 1943 (see para 230) indicates the enlistments were higher for the months of July, August and September 1944:

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	3908	1736	5644
May	3593	1025	4618
June	4207	3259	7466
July	4324	1308	5632
August	5163	1595	7758
September	4774	1164	6938

This increase was due largely to conversions from N.R.M.A. however, since after five years of War the recruiting staffs were having to scrape the bottom of the manpower pool where physical and mental specimens were poorest.

344. Again, as in the previous summer, steps were taken to pare further segments from the home defences, as reduced forms and scales of attack were approved by the Cabinet War Committee and notified to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Since operational infantry units were coming to consist more and more of N.R.M.A. soldiers it was necessary to direct attention to further coast defence installations and the larger home war establishments, such as Ordnance Depots and Training Centres. General Murchie's submission to the Minister of National Defence of 19 Jul was far reaching and proposed the elimination of all coast defence installations which would have no post-war requirement: that is, coast and anti-aircraft artillery defences were to be retained only at Halifax, Sydney and Saint John on the east coast and Esquimalt, Vancouver (and Yorke Island) and Prince Rupert on the west coast (145); the protection of industrial areas in Ontario and Quebec (146) was to become the responsibility of the Reserve Army (see Appendix "H"). In addition, all 9.2-in. gun batteries and the third gun of all 6-in. gun batteries at the continuing forts were to be placed in maintenance. As submitted to the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Jul and approved, the number of troops on operational duties and proposed reductions were (147):

TROOPS ON OPERATIONAL DUTIES

CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

(Ecl HQ Defence Areas, etc.)

<u>EAST COAST</u>	<u>Prior to Reductions</u>		<u>Subsequent to Reductions</u>	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
(incl Arvida)				
Saint John	81	1638	11	342
Gaspé	10	324		
Shelburne & Yarmouth	15	468		
Halifax	145	2975	139	2798
Sydney	116	2569	112	2429
Arvida	36	622		
Quebec, PQ	2	66	2	66
	<u>405</u>	<u>8662</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>5635</u>

"W" FORCE

St John's (incl Torbay)	158	2725	149	2498
Gander	52	912	46	748
Botwood	32	398	32	398
Lewisporte	14	242	14	242
Goose	<u>50</u>	<u>1019</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>1019</u>
	<u>306</u>	<u>5296</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>4905</u>

WEST COAST

Vancouver (incl Bella Bella)	91	1977	75	1561
Victoria (incl Tofino- Ucluelet)	209	4457	188	4085
Prince Rupert (incl Alliford Bay)	<u>107</u>	<u>2144</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>2084</u>
	<u>407</u>	<u>8578</u>	<u>368</u>	<u>7730</u>

TOTALS (Excl HQ Defences
 Areas Services, etc.)

	<u>1118</u>	<u>22536</u>	<u>923</u>	<u>18270</u>
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Difference

	195	4266		
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Less Misc Services &
 Maint Personnel

	<u>7</u>	<u>204</u>		
	<u>188</u>	<u>4062</u>		

Add estimated reductions
 in Staffs, Services etc.

	<u>15</u>	<u>200</u>		
	203	4262		

Total Estimated Reductions (say 200 Offrs, 4250 ORs.)

345. Further reductions proposed by D.M.O. & P. during September, and subsequently approved, by the Cabinet War Committee (27 Sep), called for the garrison at Goose Bay to be reduced to 31 officers and 588 other ranks before the freeze-up and the Canadian troops in Newfoundland to be reduced to 3700 all ranks before the end of the year (in line with the United States Army's proposed reduction to 3300 men) (148).

346. During the ensuing conscription crisis it was possible to eliminate the battery of 8-in. railway guns at Prince Rupert, for a saving of two officers and 126 other ranks, and remove anti-aircraft artillery equipments from Sydney and the Vancouver-Sea Island area for a saving of 109 officers and 1959 other ranks. The C.G.S. told a conference of D.Os.C. on 14 Nov that temporary reductions in the strengths of continuing batteries would have to be accepted so that personnel suitable for remustering to Infantry could be withdrawn (149). As of 20 Nov, however, the following troops were employed on operational duty in the North American Area (150):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
Atlantic Coast	404	4,959
Newfoundland	256	3,861
Labrador	35	608
Pacific Coast	747	10,581
Eastern Canada	67	946
Bermuda	6	187
Jamaica	38	761
Nassau	6	159

British Guiana	<u>2</u>	<u>24</u>
	1,561	22,086
Field Units:		
unbrigaded	138	2,780
Brigades-	585	11,128
Pacific Command		
Exercise Eskimo	<u>43</u>	<u>913</u>
Total	2,327	36,907

The strength of non-operational troops on 29 Nov was 8317 officers (and 893 Nursing Sisters) and 54,935 G.S. and 16,277 N.R.M.A. other ranks; members of the C.W.A.C. totalled 492 officers and 8690 other ranks; there were 8833 civilians. Further curtailments of operational troops did not become an actuality until early 1945.

PART IV - ACTIVE OPERATIONS

(1) - Canadians In Italy - Their First Year

347. During the course of early discussions consequent upon the decision to have Canadian troops participate in the invasion of Sicily agreement was reached that reinforcements should be provided against two months' wastage at "intense" rates—396 officers and 5732 other ranks. Although proportionately higher than the authorized British holdings for the Eighth Army this figure had been set deliberately by General McNaughton "in order that battle casualties may be returned to the United Kingdom to educate other Canadian troops in battle craft" (2). The General Officer Commanding, 1st Canadian Infantry Division was unwilling to accept the view that his formation should be a "battle school" through which the "maximum number of untried reinforcements" should be passed but he was assured that a proper proportion of recoverable casualties** would be returned to his command (3).

348. Since Canadian troops in the Mediterranean would be placed "in combination with" British troops under the command of General Sir Harold Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, 15th Army Group, arrangements were made to attach Canadian Sections to its 1st and 2nd Echelons (C.M.H.Q. Report 178). The Officer in Charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was made responsible for carrying out the policies of the Canadian Force Commander and of Canadian military authorities in the United Kingdom. The Officer in Charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was to represent Canadian problems to what was really the Adjutant-General's office at the base (4). The latter was also responsible for ensuring that unit deficiencies in personnel were replenished and the forward stock of reinforcements replaced. Reinforcement deficiencies at the base would be made good from the United Kingdom. Since this involved matters of policy the actual demands went forward from the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon to C.M.H.Q. which would have available men despatched from Canadian Reinforcement Units.

349. In order to adhere to current (but not yet officially approved) British practice, No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot of four battalions was authorized to accompany

*Due to the current reorganization of the infantry battalions back to four rifle companies and changes within the reinforcement units it proved necessary to withdraw 1563 other ranks from other formations of First Canadian Army to complete this pool. Because of security reasons units were not informed of the reasons for such transfers and took the opportunity of unloading a number of their worst soldiers (1).

**General McNaughton was aware of the COSSAC recommendation, approved by the "TRIDENT" Conference in Washington, that seven battle experienced formations should be returned to the United Kingdom to stiffen the untried formations being assembled there. Therefore, there was an understanding with the War Office that the Canadian troops should be returned to the United Kingdom during the autumn so that the whole of First Canadian Army could participate in the 1944 invasion of North-West Europe (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 182).

the Force: Nos. 1 and 2 Battalions to hold infantry reinforcements, No. 3 those of all other corps, while No. 4 Battalion was to hold a proportion of reinforcements for all corps (117 officers and 1338 other ranks) in order to be able immediately to supply replacements to the Field units (5). In spite of initial objections from both the War Office and A.F.H.Q. against reinforcements being landed so close behind the assaulting formations agreement was reached that No. 4 Battalion might be landed in Sicily on D plus 3. Heavy casualties did not occur during the early stages of this operation but it was possible to employ the reinforcement personnel on beach maintenance duties (6). The remainder of No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot was established in and around Philippeville, North Africa, where British base installations for the Eighth Army were located.

350. On 22 Jul the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was ready to send forward from North Africa a number of drivers for replacement vehicles and on the following day instructed the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to prepare a general draft against a demand for 600 reinforcements. No priority having been given this demand, however, shipping space could not be obtained and continued delays prevented Canadian reinforcements from sailing until 5 Aug, only one day before the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was withdrawn into Army reserve (7). On 29 Aug the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was informed that henceforth 5000 reinforcements would be despatched fortnightly from Philippeville for the Eighth Army's three infantry divisions (including the 1st Canadian Infantry Division) (8).

351. Further change proved necessary as a result of the agreement reached early in October that the balance of 1st Canadian Corps might be despatched to Italy. Although early plans called for the provision of only one month's reinforcements at "intense" rates of wastage to accompany the "TIMBERWOLF" Force the availability of shipping space made it appear desirable to collect further reinforcements (9). Finding the additional men proved even more difficult this time and a number had to be taken from G.S.D. 602 units and the permanent establishment (P.E.) of Reinforcement Units. In the end a total of 806 officers and 8160 other ranks were despatched as reinforcements with the first two "TIMBERWOLF" convoys, leaving 77 officers and 733 other ranks to follow in December to complete the pool for 1st Canadian Corps to two months' wastage at "intense" rates (10). On 6 Nov, however, Brigadier A.W. Beament, who had reached Naples where he was to assume the appointment of Officer i/c Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon (15th Army Group), despatched a telegram back to C.M.H.Q. pointing out that the number of reinforcements on the "TIMBERWOLF" sailings had created a sufficient pool in the Mediterranean, making it unnecessary to provide further replacements until he had had time to assess the whole situation (11). Therefore, only 10 officers and 329 tradesmen were collected for the December sailing of convoy KMF 27 from the United Kingdom (12).

352. A second Base Reinforcement Depot of four battalions had been authorized, along with a No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group to command the two depots and a number of small miscellaneous units (13). Brigadier Beament's telegram of 6 Nov also pointed out that it had been decided to land the base units and reinforcements on the first "TIMBERWOLF" convoy (KMF 25A) on the Italian mainland and do the same with Nos. 7 and 8 Reinforcement Battalions. This action, the telegram had

continued, would start the "highly desirable change of base area from North Africa" (14).

353. There was no doubt in Brigadier Beament's own mind that the Canadian reinforcement situation had been "greatly embarrassed by the failure of British staff to meet our reasonable demands for movements from North Africa to Italy" (15). Only 350 reinforcements had been forwarded during November instead of the 1250 requested and Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes was alarmed lest future operations of his 1st Canadian Infantry Division should be jeopardized: on the eve of current operations General Vokes had been advised that there were insufficient reinforcements to meet existing deficiencies, let alone replace the inevitable battle casualties (16). He managed to have the matter drawn to the personal attention of General Montgomery (G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army), as well as requesting action by Brigadier Beament to do something at G.H.Q. 1st Echelon. After a talk with the D.A. & Q.M.G. at Headquarters, Eighth Army on 11 Dec, however, Brigadier Beament concluded that General Vokes had taken "entirely too gloomy a view" (17). According to Brigadier Beament's subsequent report:

Although, admittedly, 1 Cdn Inf Div was slightly below fighting scales, they really had no perturbation about it. Their concern about the situation was largely due the fact that they did not know:-

- (a) The presence of 5 and 6 Rft Bns in Italy.
- (b) The recovery and despatch to 4 Rft Bn of approximately 400 personnel from the rest centre at Catania.
- (c) The fact that approximately 1600 infantry reinforcements for 1 Div were due to arrive in Naples 20 Dec (18).

Later in the day General Montgomery told Brigadier Beament that all Canadian reinforcements should be moved from North Africa at the earliest possible date. The Eighth Army Commander already had "pressed 15 Army Group to speed up priorities of movement of Canadian reinforcements" and action was taken on 13 Dec to begin moving the base (19).

354. It was 31 Dec 43, however, before the Base Reinforcement Battalions of No. 1 C.B.R.D. reached Naples and were sent on to Avellino, which was being developed as a Canadian base area. Henceforth, the actual method of reinforcing the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, as described by Brigadier Beament, was to be as follows:

- (a) 4 Bn is now established at LUCERA and will be moved later on to TERMOLI as accommodation and railway facilities permit.
- (b) At the present time there is a Transit Camp at railhead at TERMOLI and railway facilities exist between LUCERA and TERMOLI.
- (c) 4 Bn will provide a company in the DMA* 1 Cdn Inf Div and a company in the FMC**

*Divisional Maintenance Area.

**"The Field Maintenance Centre, a sort of administrative township with a headquarters to control it, comprised those installations which were necessary for the support of a Corps" - Montgomery, El Alamein to the River Sangro, Germany, 1945, p. 78.

5 Corps. These companies will be respectively under the Commanders of the DMA and FMC for local administration but the control of personnel flowing through them will be maintained by the O2E LO* at 1 Div and O2E LO at 4 Bn respectively.

- (d) Each of the two forward companies will hold approximately 300 reinforcements of which approximately 75% will be infantry. The balance of 4 Bn will hold approximately 600 reinforcements of which approximately 2/3 will be infantry.
- (e) The DMA and FMC holdings will be comprised largely of non-tradesmen and non-specialists. Small numbers of the more common type of tradesmen and specialists, eg. Cooks, Drivers I.C., will be held forward. A small pool of tradesmen will be held at 4 Bn but fundamentally, highly skilled personnel will be obtained specially from the main base at AVELLINO. The previously existing practice of trying to keep a complete cross section at reinforcing echelons has resulted in skilled tradesmen being tied up for long periods without any opportunity of being refreshed in their trades.
- (f) The Canadian element of the Transit Camp at railhead will be operated by 1 Cdn Inf Div Section of the Corps Reinforcement Camp (less its increment).
- (g) The policy will be to keep forward echelons filled up in the same manner as is done in the case of ammunition. By adopting the system outlined above two advantages emerge:
 - (i) The forward reinforcing echelons are under a definite commander who is responsible for calling for them at all times and moving them when the DMA or FMC moves.
 - (ii) Personnel to replenish forward echelons can normally be forwarded on supply and ammunition lorries without difficulty.
- (h) 4 Bn at LUCERA will be kept filled by a milk run from AVELLINO about 3 times a week. The lift of one run being approximately 240 all ranks (20).

355. On 6 Nov Brigadier Beament had assured General Crerar (in Sicily with Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps) that effort would be made to assure that units possessing a territorial affiliation would be reinforced on that basis, "bearing in mind the resources available" (21). Brigadier Beament did not think that such action would place an undue burden on 2nd Echelon. In his letter of 18 Dec (see para 354) he wrote:

I was almost placed in the position yesterday of having to send forward to 1 Cdn Div the reinforcements held at AVELLINO with the 11 Inf Bde.

*Liaison officer from 2nd Echelon.

Before doing so I informed General Robertson [Chief Administrative Officer at Headquarters, 15th Army Group] of your view regarding territorial reinforcements and told him I was not prepared to send them forward unless he informed me in writing that Eighth Army regarded it an operational necessity. He took the matter up with Eighth Army and they, particularly in view of the provision of infantry mentioned above [see para 353], were not prepared to so certify. Consequently, these reinforcements are not being moved (22).

356. British practice was to hold reinforcements in Italy for only 21 days wastage at "intense" rates, exclusive of the "X" List (see Appendix "J") and during November there was a suggestion by Brigadier E.G. Weeks (A.D.A.G.(A) at C.M.H.Q.) that the Canadian reinforcement holding should be reduced from the equivalent of two months at "intense" rates to either six weeks at "intense" rates or one month at "intense" rates exclusive of the "X" List (23). Brigadier Penhale (B.G.S.) successfully argued, however, that no change should be made at the moment since:

Decision to hold two months' rfts in the Med theatre was based upon factors such as the long sea voyage from UK to North Africa and Sicily and the uncertainty of shipping allotment. Movement of our rft pools from North Africa to the Italian mainland will not alter the importance of this consideration. The water gap still exists and the journey from the standpoint of distance still equals the passage of the Atlantic. Although the submarine menace has been reduced both in the Atlantic and Med it still exists, and the hazards involved have increased due to adoption by the enemy of the glider and radio controlled torpedo dropped from aircraft (24).

Furthermore, while a large force might be able to subsist on a smaller proportion of reinforcements because all formations and portions of a front are seldom equally engaged at once the situation was different for a small Canadian force which might be decimated in a single engagement. He further argued that it would take time for reinforcements to become acclimatized to the change from the United Kingdom and they should not be rushed into action too quickly. In any event General Montague decided on 30 Nov that there should be no change for the present (25).


357. As yet Canadian casualties had been far from heavy. The month 5 Dec 43-4 Jan 44 now brought severe fighting (from the crossing of the Moro river to the capture of Ortona) and the following casualties*:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fatal	55	754	809
Wounded	158	1895	2053
Prisoners of War	<u>10</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>100</u>
Total	223	2739	2962

*Casualty figures throughout are based on statistics supplied by War Service Records.

APPENDIX "A" to
1 Cdn Corps Adm Instr No 32
dated 13 May 44


DEMAND & SUPPLY OF REINFORCEMENTS OTHER THAN CAC



LEGEND

- Flow of Rfts
- AFsW 3008-3009
- Demands
- + - AFsW 3006-3007

DEMAND & SUPPLY OF CAC REINFORCEMENTS



In comparison, casualties for the four months' old Italian campaign totalled only 307 officers and 3940 other ranks. This change did something to reinforce Brigadier Penhale's opinion. There was the additional fact that a total of 81 days could elapse from the time the original bid for troop space on a convoy was submitted by Brigadier Beament at 1st Echelon and the date the reinforcements actually reached Italy. Thus it was that reinforcement needs until 15 May had to be considered on 23 Feb in making a bid for space on convoy KMF 30 (26).

358. Due to the higher priority accorded the coming operations in North-West Europe it proved necessary to establish a 'manpower sub-ceiling' of approximately 61,483 all ranks for Canadian troops in Italy, including only 5175 reinforcements or one month's wastage at "intense" rates. As already noted, this was in spite of General Crerar's opinion that "it would be most dangerous to reduce reinforcement holding ... below two month's intense" (see paras 280 and 282). A fair proportion of general duty infantry originally had been provided for draft KMF 29 and, as had been urgently requested by Brigadier Beament on 30 Jan, 1900 infantrymen were added to provide a cushion against forthcoming operations in the Liri Valley, bring units to full strength in accordance with Eighth Army policy (instead of "light scales") and restore the shortage of French-speaking reinforcements for the Royal 22e Régiment and the two English-speaking battalions from the Maritime Provinces (27). This increased the Canadian component sailing with KMF 29 to approximately 7200 all ranks and resulted in only 2200 men being despatched on the succeeding draft (KMF 30) (28). (It might be noted that, in order to provide the additional 1900 general duty infantrymen ahead of time it had been necessary both to depart from the principle of reinforcement on a territorial basis and also to despatch men who had not completed one month's refresher training in the United Kingdom) (29). Some 1648 other ranks (including 1189 English-speaking and 122 French-speaking infantrymen) left the United Kingdom on 5 May with convoy KMF 31.

359. By this time General Crerar and Brigadier Beament had left Italy and their places had been taken by A/Lt-Gen E.L.M. Burns and Brigadier E.G. Weeks. A new reinforcement organization was instituted, re-establishing the divisional and corps reinforcement camps and (temporarily) returning the advanced 4th Reinforcement Battalion to Avellino*. The British system of holding and training other than infantry reinforcements was adopted in order to obtain the benefit of their equipment and instructional facilities (31). For example, No. 6 Battalion holding artillery reinforcements was placed alongside a R.A.T.D. (Royal Artillery Training Depot). In the case of Armoured Corps reinforcements basic training was to be carried out at No. 5 Battalion at Avellino, individual special training at an R.A.C.T.D. (Royal Armoured Corps Training Depot) and collective training at a C.A.C. Training Unit** attached to a British

*During May 1944 it once again became a "forward" reinforcement battalion to comply with Eighth Army policy, before pending operations, of holding five officers and 50 other ranks for each Infantry battalion, and a proportionate number for R.C.A. and R.C.E. units, in a forward location. C.A.C. reinforcements were never, however, held by this battalion (30).

**The sole deviation from British practice was the holding of complete tank crews of five, instead of merely three men, for each of the 29 cruiser and five light tanks maintained by a forward squadron.

Armoured Reinforcement Regiment. From there these C.A.C. reinforcements proceeded direct to units as crews for replacement tanks being forwarded from the tank delivery squadron (32).

360. An added complication had arisen because of the decision that the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force, which had sustained considerable casualties as part of the United States Fifth Army, should be reinforced from the pool of general duty infantry reinforcements within No. 1 C.B.R.G. (33). Some 52 officers and 728 other ranks volunteered to join the First Special Service Force but only a proportion were able to meet the rigid physical standards demanded for parachutists (34). It was then necessary to undergo three weeks training in American tactics and weapons. Therefore, it was 27 Apr before a draft of 15 officers and 240 other ranks reached the First Special Service Force at Anzio*.

361. On 5 May General Burns had a serious talk with Brigadier Weeks regarding the reinforcement situation which was complicated by the fact that the reinforcement bid for June arrivals (KMF 32) had been cut to 250 other ranks. In his own diary he noted that if operations "continue throughout Jun and into Jul, so that wastage rates are intense, we shall be at the end of rfts before further drafts can arrive" (36). On 10 May they decided that general duty reinforcements for other corps would have to be remustered to Infantry (37): a week later H.Q., 1 C.B.R.G. received orders to remuster 800 general duty other ranks**.

*When the First Special Service Force sailed for the Mediterranean in November 1943 as a 'task force' of highly trained specialists it was decided at N.D.H.Q. that no steps should be taken to train and provide further reinforcements: the output from the Canadian Parachute Training Centre (A-35) was earmarked as reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion of the British 6th Airborne Division. As a result of heavy casualties suffered during December it was feared that the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force might wither away. General Stuart's recommendation to disband this component was rejected in Ottawa and, after General Eisenhower had recommended its retention, it was decided to follow the American example and provide reinforcements from the general infantry pool. Ministerial approval was given to this recommendation on 14 Feb 44.

The First Special Service Force fought as shock troops at Anzio and during the advance to Rome. Further Canadian reinforcements were supplied from No. 1 C.B.R.G. as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
June	4	206
July	1	36
August	8	62

On 15 Aug the First Special Service Force landed in Southern France (Operation "ANVIL") and remained in an operational role for 107 days without receiving further Canadian reinforcements. The Force was disbanded early in December 1944 (35).

**Only those having had less than three months' service in a field unit were selected for remustering. Drivers I.C. were classified as general duty privates for purposes of remustering (38).

362. The Eighth Army already had been forced to begin remustering personnel to Infantry. During April 1944 it had received 13,000 Infantry reinforcements from the United Kingdom and a War Office statement that no more would be forthcoming. Realizing that this number would be exhausted by the end of July General Alexander instituted a vigorous remustering programme: by disbanding a number of light anti-aircraft and armoured units he was able to collect some 17,000 reinforcements, of whom roughly 9000 were sent to infantry units (39). (During August a further 5000 gunners were remustered to Infantry.)

363. The work of remustering* at No. 1 C.B.R.G. was delayed by bottlenecks and the fact that a considerable part of the "paper" surplus of general duty personnel actually was serving in temporary G.S. 778 units (see para 282): although theoretically available as reinforcements many of the so-called temporary tasks (V.D. and malarial control, special employment companies) were continuing liabilities (40). Then again, the state of training of a number of the reinforcements received from the United Kingdom left much to be desired. According to the entry made in the war diary of Headquarters, 1 C.B.R.G. for 20 May the personnel of a recent draft would require further **trainings as follows:** one week refresher for 10 per cent, two or three weeks for 70 per cent and up to six weeks for the remainder. As its commander was informed by Brigadier Weeks on 24 May, however, no untrained reinforcements were to be sent forward and cross-posting was to be resorted to only as a last resort (41). Three days later the diarist complained that so many infantry officers had had to be sent forward that there were not enough remaining to train the other ranks then being held (42).

364. On 31 May the Corps Commander's desire for an additional 100 general duty infantrymen per battalion to be added to the reinforcement draft about to sail from the United Kingdom on KMF 32 (43) was forwarded to C.M.H.Q. (see Table 6). The above mentioned delays in remustering were explained and it was stressed that, in view of the heavy fighting expected in June, there would not be sufficient infantry reinforcements to last until the arrival of convoy KMF 33 in July. Experience to date, according to the telegram, had shown that actual Infantry wastage over a three months' period of "intense" fighting was 32 per cent for the officers and 25 per cent for other ranks, plus an overall allowance of one and a half per cent to offset malaria and dysentery (44).

365. A few quick calculations at C.M.H.Q. disclosed that, even after the anticipated arrival of the 13th Brigade from Canada, there would be insufficient reinforcements in the United Kingdom to provide replacements for two months' wastage at "intense" rates for the infantry battalions with First Canadian Army** and an additional 17 days' wastage for those of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division taking part in the actual assault (see paras 304-8). It was considered that the existing reinforcement pool in Italy must be equivalent to six weeks' wastage at "intense" rates and therefore the answer sent to

*With effect from 25 Feb 44 No. 2 Canadian Reallocation Centre was authorized under No. 1 C.B.R.G. to re-assign personnel, particularly neuro-psychiatric casualties.

**Total of 21 infantry (rifle) battalions, two infantry (machine gun) battalions, one infantry (motor) battalion, an Independent machine gun company, an Army Headquarters defence company, a corps defence company and defence and employment platoons for each divisional and brigade headquarters.

Italy was no. This telegram of 2 Jun further stated:

You will appreciate that availability here considered in relation to highest operational priority accorded this theatre will inevitably limit flow of personnel to AAI. Cannot therefore reinforce against casualty forecasts nor can we afford accumulation of surplus in your theatre (45).

Only 50 officers and 160 other ranks (including 127 infantrymen) eventually sailed with convoy KMF 32. A further telegram (of 2 Jun) pointed out that, as no further tradesmen would be available for six months, surplus tradesmen in kindred trades would have to be remustered and given ad hoc training in Italy (46).

366. The fight through the Liri Valley for Rome was the first occasion during which 1st Canadian Corps attached as such (even though the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade continued to be detached) and casualties during this period 11 May-4 Jun were (47):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>All Ranks</u>
Fatal	63	784	847
Wounded	181	2555	2736
Prisoner of War	<u>11</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>130</u>
	255	3458	3713

The holdings of No. 4 Reinforcement Battalion had been increased for this offensive but even then urgency had necessitated 56 officers and 1764 other ranks being despatched direct to field units from the base. A total of 255 officers and 5989 other ranks were despatched to field units during the period 12 May-7 Jun, of whom 150 officers and 3118 other ranks were infantrymen.

367. With the exception of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, which continued to fight its way north under the command of the British 13th Corps, Canadian troops experienced no further action until the battle for the Gothic Line opened on 25 Aug 44 (Operation "OLIVE"). During the intervening period remustering to infantry continued, recoverable wounded returned to the reinforcement stream and a draft of 1039 other ranks (including 827 general duty infantrymen) arrived on convoy KMF 33.

368. Even before the fight for Rome was completed, however, General Burns had queried General Stuart at C.M.H.Q. as to the feasibility of adding an infantry brigade and an engineer field company (or squadron) to the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. General Burns' telegram of 3 Jun stated that the existing armoured division was too weak in infantry to operate for more than two or three days in the Italian terrain and cited the experiences of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in its drive to the Melfa River—the breakout phase of the assault through the Hitler Line (48). The Eighth Army had provided additional infantry* for the British 6th Armoured Division

*The 1st and 24th Independent Guards Brigades were added to the 6th Armoured Division and the South African 6th Armoured Division respectively. For a short time the 43rd Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade served with the 1st Armoured Division, before that formation itself was broken up. On 16 Sep the 1st Guards Brigade left the 6th Armoured Division, then serving with the Fifth Army, and returned to Eighth Army control. During the winter of 1945 the South Africans were provided with a further (13th) infantry brigade of their own.

and the South African 6th Armoured Division and General Alexander asked the C.I.G.S. to support this request. The C.I.G.S. ruled however, that no "diversions" from 'OVERLORD' could be agreed to and informed General Alexander accordingly (49). In a letter of 13 Jun the D.C.I.G.S. requested General Stuart to make a similar reply to General Burns. Generals Crerar and Stuart already had refused, in a telegram despatched to General Burns on 5 Jun: in addition to the inadvisability of increasing the number of infantry reinforcements required by 1st Canadian Corps there would be difficulties in restoring formations to their original composition should they be withdrawn from the Italian theatre to rejoin First Canadian Army*.

369. The next proposal from Italy (2 Jul) was that an additional Infantry brigade should be formed from Canadian units already there: the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, R.C.A., the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) and the Westminster Regiment (Motor). The latter two could become effective Infantry battalions quite quickly whereas the conversion of the corps L.A.A. regiment (being eliminated from British formations) would require the transfer of officers and key personnel from the Infantry reinforcement pool and a longer period of training. According to the telegram despatched to C.M.H.Q. on 2 Jul a brigade headquarters, a signal section and other supporting units could be provided locally (51).

370. Before proceeding by air to Italy, in order to see for himself, General Stuart visited the War Office and then sent a telegram to the C.G.S. in Ottawa (52). Since General Alexander was endeavouring to obtain more troops it did not seem likely that there was much likelihood of 1st Canadian Corps re-joining First Canadian Army. On the other hand, General Stuart's telegram of 5 Jul asked, could an additional Infantry brigade be adequately reinforced? While conceding that the manpower implications of converting these three units into Infantry rifle battalions would be a decrease of 14 officers and an increase of only 15 other ranks those at N.D.H.Q. were quick to point out that the Infantry reinforcement pool would have to be increased by 90 officers and 1578 other ranks (53). While reinforcement holdings for other corps would be reduced there would be an actual increase in the number of men being held. On the following day, therefore, the C.G.S. replied that such a proposal was unlikely to gain acceptance, unless militarily necessary (54).

371. On 15 Jul, however, General Stuart cabled from Italy, where he had discussed the problem with Generals Alexander and Leese, that such a step was operationally necessary. Therefore, he had given General Burns permission to go ahead with the necessary reorganization, subject to reversion to original status if approval was withheld in Ottawa. His telegram went on to explain:

*Instructions telegraphed to the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army from N.D.H.Q. on 25 May 44 had noted that ... "the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable that as soon as military considerations permit such formations serving in the Mediterranean Theatre ... should be grouped under unified Canadian Command". This fact had been communicated to the C.I.G.S. who replied on 17 Jun, in connection with the question of the relationship between Generals Montgomery and Crerar, that steps would be taken to re-unite all Canadian formations under the command of First Canadian Army "as soon as military and shipping conditions make it possible" (50).

... Have informed Alexander and Leese that Cdn reinforcements to this theatre cannot be increased over present figure and that reinforcements on present basis will have to be spread thinner and cover the extra bde. Both willing to accept under these terms

Reinforcement situation here is good. Units all up to strength and two months supply at intense rates are available in reinforcement units. This situation will improve as result of whole corps being held in general reserve for period about two months (55).

372. Following his return from the Mediterranean General Stuart spent part of a day with the Army Commander in France and then flew back to Ottawa to discuss manpower accounting (see paras 396-7). On 3 Aug the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval to this reorganization of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Work of reorganization* already had got under way and the new 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade was able to undergo slightly better than a month's training before being plunged into the attack on the Gothic Line on 25 Aug.

(ii) Reinforcement Organization in North-West Europe

373. Because of the comparative nearness of the 21st Army Group's scene of operations to the United Kingdom it was decided at C.M.H.Q. on 15 Mar 44 that a base reinforcement organization similar to that existing in Italy would be unnecessarily large (57). The deciding factor appears to have been the views expressed by Brigadier A.W. Beament, who had recently vacated the appointment of Officer in charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, A.A.I. in order to assume the similar appointment for 21 Army Group. As later given in writing Brigadier Beament's argument was that such an organization was:

... capable of holding in excess of one month's wastage for the force calculated at intense rates. It is my view that it is always desirable to hold rfts as far back as possible consistent with the primary liability to keep units constantly at full str. It is unquestionable that the trg of rfts deteriorates the further fwd they get. Consequently they should be retained in rft units as long as possible so that their stay in fwd holdings will be reduced to a minimum period. The cushion that must be held fwd bears a direct relationship to the interval at which it can be expected rft drafts will arrive. In the proposed op there will be a constant ferry service so it should be possible to count on replacement drafts weekly. It should therefore be possible to carry on safely with a fwd holding of between two and

*One of the three troops in each battery of the 2nd and 5th L.A.A. Regiments also was disbanded in line with British practice. After the "key" Artillery personnel had been posted to No. 1 C.B.R.G. to become reinforcements the general duty personnel who were physically fit for service as infantrymen joined their fellows in the 1st L.A.A. Regiment, which had received a quota of battle experienced Infantry Officers and N.C.Os. This unit was soon to be redesignated The Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment (56).

three weeks' rfts. Precise holdings will have to be determined later in the light of certain factors, the most important of which is the operational emp of the Cdn force. If, or while, the Cdn force is split the flexibility of emp of rfts will decrease. Consequently it will be advisable to hold slightly more than a minimum cushion. Further, at such a period the commitment for fwd rft units will be disproportionately large (58).

On 24 Mar, therefore, the newly appointed Army Commander gave his approval to the establishment of Headquarters, No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group and five Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalions*. In selecting staff for the Headquarters of 14 officers and 50 other ranks and the five battalions (each of 13 officers and 101 other ranks) preference was given to those who had given "long and faithful service" at the several Reinforcement Units in the United Kingdom but who, because of age or physical disability, were unlikely to have any opportunity for service with a field force other than in the base area (60).

374. With effect from 1 Apr 44 the Canadian Sections, G.H.Q. 1st and 2nd Echelons and the whole of No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group came under command of 21st Army Group, although it was not possible to introduce immediately the desired procedure for demanding reinforcements (61). Normally the five Base Reinforcement Battalions would hold in the neighbourhood of 7000 reinforcements, a number slightly in excess of two weeks wastage at 'intense' rates. It was considered by the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon that, during the period from D-Day to D plus 17, a total of 7900 all ranks should be available to meet possible replacement needs of the assaulting 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. A letter of 23 May to C.M.H.Q. mentioned further that:

Up to date no demands have been submitted for rft holdings for units of the Cdn fd force other than units within 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 CAB. For the rest of the army, we have demanded only sufficient personnel to fill existing deficiencies in fd units, and to provide a small pool of holdings composed of gen duty and less skilled tradesmen, to be readily available to fill emergency demands. It is expected that demands will be submitted in the very near future to build up the rft holdings of some 4500 all ranks for 11, 12 and 13 Cdn Rft Bns (62).

375. The 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion was selected to follow up the assault formations with reinforcement holdings equal to seven days wastage at "intense" rates. One of its companies landed on each of the first three days of operations and all its reinforcement holdings were ashore by 9 Jun. On 13 Jun it was joined by No. 9 Battalion and the two units began to phase their reinforcements through "forward" companies attached to the British 1st Corps Reception Camp. The number of "forward" companies was increased during late July in order to cater to the needs of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and Corps Troops. When the last (13th) Base Reinforcement Battalion reached France on 3 Aug it became a "forward"

*Since the battalions of No. 1 C.B.R.G. were numbered 1 to 8, and the companies 1 to 40 the battalions authorized for No. 2 C.B.R.G. were given the numbers 9 to 13 and the companies 41 to 65 (59).

battalion, controlling from army roadhead companies in corps and divisional areas as was done in Italy (see para 354). Headquarters, No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group and the other four battalions remained in the base area where the final finishing touches could be given to reinforcement training. It should be noted, however, that Armoured Corps reinforcements moved forward from the base through the 25th Armoured Delivery Regiment, C.A.C. (The Elgin Regiment) whose forward delivery squadrons moved tanks and crews to units.

376. For a time it looked as though General Crerar's instruction of 6 Jun on reinforcement policy (see para 355) might be carried out in the main:

While on active service, a flow of reinforcements from Canada from the "home station", or its vicinity, to the unit in the field means a lot to the reinforcements (who find mutual friends) to the officers and men in the unit (who obtain news of family or friends) and to the locality (which maintains an active, practical interest in the unit which largely represents it). These are "morale building" factors and every effort should be made to retain them.

When the war comes to its victorious end--as one of these days it will--the movement back to Canada, and the subsequent demobilization, of a territorially-composed unit is an "administrative dream". It can be a tidy show from start to finish. Everything under control and everybody happy, an organized welcome and efficient arrangements for reception and demobilization at the appropriate locality. Every officer and man finishing his Army job, or going on leave, with great, and good, feeling.

Finally, after demobilization, there can be no more stabilising influence in any community than the presence of "all ranks" of a unit which represented that locality overseas, who have returned to civil life in that locality. Incidentally--though quite an important matter to those who do return--regimental re-unions can be arranged in after years with a minimum of travelling, or other difficulties.

Cdn Sec GHQ 2 Ech has been fully apprised by Brig Beament, OIC Cdn Sec GHQ 1 Ech 21 Army Group, of the importance which I attach to the maintenance of territorial reinforcement, and also to the return to their own units of recovered casualties. There are emergent situations when this is not possible and when unit requirements in special trades interfere. These should be exceptional, however, and even in such cases, reinforcements on a basis of Provincial domicile should almost always be feasible (63).

D-Day casualties had been considerably less than the planners had feared (64)--335 dead, 550 wounded and 61 missing--and for the whole month of June battle casualties were only 301 officers and 3142 other ranks (of whom 10 officers and 26 other ranks

remained on duty) instead of the "planners" (May) estimate of 481 officers and 7092 other ranks for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade during the first 17 days of fighting. Only on the night 11/12 Jul did the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division move into the line. (Headquarters, 2nd Canadian Corps had become operational on the previous afternoon.) And not until 31 Jul did the 4th Canadian Armoured Division relieve the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (until then continuously in a forward role) and First Canadian Army assume command of the left flank in the bridgehead. This was D plus 55, whereas the "planners" had envisaged such activity any time after D plus 17. Battle casualties for July were higher—605 officers and 7213 other ranks (including 28 officers and 139 other ranks who remained on duty)—but the delay in committing the balance of First Canadian Army did put back the date when wastage might reach a peak (65).

377. Even so, however, the losses suffered by the rifle companies were considerable. The war diary of The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders records on 26 Jul that, due to the rapid turnover of men, its rifle companies were only 40 to 50 per cent as efficient as on D-Day. On 31 Jul the war diary of The Queens's Own Rifles of Canada reported its cumulative casualties as seven officers and 162 other ranks killed or died of wounds, 17 officers and 278 other ranks wounded and 39 other ranks sent back as "battle exhaustion" cases* Again on 4 Aug, this diary records that only five of the original sergeants remained with the rifle companies. When the North Nova Scotia Highlanders received four officers and 209 other ranks on 1 Aug the diarist recorded that this return to full strength was "very gratifying. We will soon be able to start training again, with a full battalion".


378. With casualties thus mounting the leaven of battle experienced men remaining with units was becoming dangerously small and 1st Echelon, G.H.Q. 21 Army Group began to stress the necessity for (slightly wounded) 'recoverable casualties' to be returned to their units as soon as possible instead of being kept hanging around reinforcement units and battalions "until their turn" came to go forward. As early as 7 Aug Brigadier Beament advised C.M.H.Q. that 50 per cent of each reinforcement draft should consist of recoverable casualties, even though the morale of "green men" would suffer as a result of being kept hanging around indefinitely (66). This situation did not apply to general duty infantrymen, of course, since they were in demand as quickly as they became available. Then, on 4 Sep the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon recommended that at least 50 per cent of the officers going forward to units from No. 2 C.B.R.G. should have had previous battle experience: due to the particularly heavy casualties of the preceding three weeks all such captains and above should be sent forward at once, together with sufficient experienced subalterns to make up 50 per cent of each draft (67).

379. Special mention should be made of the difficulty experienced in restoring The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada to full fighting efficiency after 324 casualties had been suffered on 25 Jul during the course of Operation "SPRING"

*War Service Records show fatal casualties as nine officers and 175 other ranks, non fatal casualties as 17 Officers and 296 other ranks.

(Crerar file GOC-in-C 6-2)

2 CDN BASE RPT GP



(C.M.H.Q. Report No. 150). Of the four rifle companies committed to the attack only 15 all ranks returned safe and sound. These, and the "left out of battle" parties (L.O.Bs.), were available to reform the fighting component but there were not sufficient "allocated"* reinforcements available within the base reinforcement battalions to bring it up to strength immediately. On 1 Aug the unit diarist wrote that reinforcements were still arriving and that the battalion was "slowly approaching fighting strength. The day was spent once more in reorganizing and re-equipping and the men were occupied in cleaning up the new weapons". On the following day the companies commenced training but 4 Aug found The Black Watch taking over the positions of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal in St. André-sur-Orne. The unit came under fire when it advanced into May-sur-Orne on 5 Aug, following up a retiring enemy, and the diarist noted that "some of the new lads whom we have recently received as replacements are taking this action quite hard, for most of them are fresh from Canada".

380. On the other hand, even though the 28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment) was decimated in its first real action replacement had not been as great a problem. On 9 Aug this unit lost its commanding officer, adjutant, all squadron commanders and rear link captains, six subalterns and 101 other ranks, 47 tanks and one scout car. Only 12 tanks remained (including those left out of battle) but on the following day 26 tanks with crews arrived from the Armoured Delivery Squadron to begin the task of rebuilding the unit**

381. Although the worsening reinforcement situation is described elsewhere (see paras 412 and 413) mention should be made of General Stuart's decision of 26 Aug that the policy of despatching weekly reinforcement drafts from the United Kingdom should be relaxed temporarily and general duty infantrymen sent forward in lots of 100, as often as that minimum number could be collected (68).

382. At the same time the practice of sending reinforcements from the base to the forward Base Reinforcement Battalion only to meet specified demands became less satisfactory. During the advance up the Falaise Road it had taken only a few hours to transfer reinforcements to field units (see Chart). The interval began to grow progressively longer, however, since men and supplies still had to be landed over the Normandy beaches and taken forward by road. Pending the opening of another port this journey to Belgium came to consume three or four days and tax overworked transport which could not always be made available to move unexpected drafts (69).

383. By early September the situation had become acute and General Crerar authorized the formation of a temporary transport unit of 72 sections (70): 1500 lorries were made available but on 9 Sep he was forced to request C.M.H.Q. to despatch 1200 drivers immediately (71). On 1 Oct Brigadier Beament explained in a telegram to General Stuart how seven days elapsed from the time a reinforcement reached Headquarters, 2 C.B.R.G. until he could be shown on a unit strength return: the first day was spent in documentation, the next four in travelling to the forward battalion, the sixth in reaching a field unit which would not show a changed strength for another 24 hours (72). All Infantry reinforcements were concentrated in the forward battalion but had to remain there until

*Allocated personnel were those who had served previously, either in the United Kingdom or the theatre of operations, with a unit then in North-West Europe. Unallocated reinforcements were those going forward to units for the first time.

**Based on both the unit war diary and (its regimental history) The Story of The British Columbia Regiment, 1939-1945 (n.p.).

further transport was available. During that past week, Brigadier Beament pointed out, 2000 infantrymen had been bogged down there for as long as five days: on 28 Sep sufficient vehicles had been withdrawn from other commitments to move 1700 of them to field units. With the port of Dieppe open, however, the base could be moved there to shorten the journey by road to two days. With the port of Antwerp available it should be possible to return the 1200 drivers temporarily loaned by C.M.H.Q. In practice they could then be used as reinforcements for their own corps (73). Ostend fell on 9 Sep but, due to serious damage to its harbour installations, could not be utilized for some time. Although the port of Antwerp was captured undamaged it could not be used until the Canadians had cleared the Germans from both banks of the Scheldt down to the sea. Severe fighting and a large number of casualties resulted before this was accomplished. Meanwhile, Canadian reinforcements landed at Dieppe and Ostend had to be trucked overland to units of No. 2 C.B.R.G. which had moved forward to Ghent.

384. Regarding the absorption of "green" reinforcements by field units one can not do better than quote from a letter the acting army Commander (Lt -Gen G.G. Simonds) sent to all his formation Commanders on 28 Oct:

1. Occasionally I have had instances reported to me purporting to prove that the training of reinforcement officers and soldiers on joining their units in the field, has been wrong, or inadequate I am satisfied that most of the officers now responsible for training and testing remustered personnel, or drafts arriving from Canada, are officers who have had considerable infantry fighting experience in this war, know what is required and all are conscientious in their duty. I have discussed this problem with some commanding officers and senior formation commanders and I believe that the way in which reinforcements are posted within units has much to do with their unsatisfactory performance in cases where they have fallen short of expectations. I do not believe that commanding officers have given enough consideration to the human aspects of the problem.
2. Commanders and commanding officers must realize that when the reinforcement officer or soldier joins the unit with which he is going to fight, it is one of great moments of his life—comparable with birth, marriage or death. The position of a new reinforcement joining a unit is quite different from that of a soldier who has served with a unit for a considerable time and goes into battle beside officers and N.C.O.'s who have trained him and with men whom he knows. The reinforcement (unless he is a recovered casualty returned to his own unit) comes as a stranger. Regardless of how thorough his preliminary training may be, in the stress of his first battle, he may react in a way contrary to his training unless steps have been taken to win his confidence. It is well known, and only human, that the experienced fighting soldier is inclined to "lay it on a bit thick" in describing his battle experiences to the new arrival. This adds to the tension under which the inexperienced soldier goes into his first engagement. He may do things in the stress of the moment which afterwards he may well realize were contrary to what he had been taught.
3. Unless proper steps are taken within a unit, the reinforcement officer, or soldier, goes into action as an individual rather than as a member of a unit team.

4. Commanding officers will take steps to ensure that their unit arrangements for the reception and absorption of reinforcement officers and soldiers are properly organized. Reinforcement personnel arriving at a unit must:
 - (a) be made to feel that they are part of the unit and no longer just individuals. A responsible officer who has served with the unit for some time must interview them and explain the practical side of soldiering in the field and make the new arrival feel that he belongs there. If this matter is properly handled, confidence is won from the outset and each man feels that he has become a part of a unit which takes an interest in him.
 - (b) have a final check over of their individual weapon training and be given a few talks from experienced officers and N.C.O.'s, on practical pointers.
 - (c) be given time to adjust themselves to their new surroundings before they are faced with action itself.
5. I have previously issued instructions that every infantry battalion and armoured regiment shall have a strong "left out of battle" party, including TIC's and selected officers, N.C.O.'s and men. From this "left out of battle" party can be formed the "unit reception school" to deal with arriving reinforcements. If properly organized within the unit, this party should be able to provide just the type of officer and N.C.O. needed to test and initiate the new soldier. I am satisfied that the means to handle this problem are there, if there is proper organization within the unit.
6. Except in extreme emergency, i.e. when it is a question of winning, or losing, a battle, reinforcements will NOT be posted into fighting echelons in infantry battalions, or armoured regiments until they have spent a minimum of forty-eight hours in the LOB "school". I stress forty-eight hours as the minimum. Four or five days is preferable, whenever operational circumstances allow.
7. Whilst during prolonged active periods, the urge may be very strong to bring up to strength depleted fighting echelons as soon as a draft of reinforcements arrives, I am convinced that if the steps are taken, which I have outlined above, a far greater fighting value will accrue to the unit and casualties will be fewer.
8. I fully appreciate that during the period of intense activities through which we have been going that commanding officers have had little time to think about things other than the battle in which they are engaged. But, once proper arrangements have been made for reinforcement absorption, and a "unit reception

school" formed, the senior LOB officer can command it (74).

385. With the port of Antwerp available for landing reinforcements and First Canadian Army engaged in a static role on the Maas the Army Commander considered it desirable early in January 1945 to effect a further reorganization of No. 2 C.B.R.G. (75). He considered that it was preferable to hold all reinforcements in one large pool at Ghent since it would now be possible to deliver them to divisional maintenance areas in less than 48 hours. By holding all C.A.C. reinforcements, except C.A.C. (Recce), in the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), it was possible to disband all but one company of the 12th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion. Henceforth, Nos. 10 and 11 Battalions were to hold Infantry Reinforcements only while No. 9 Battalion would hold reinforcements for all other corps. The forward No. 13 Battalion was reorganized into four companies on the basis of one per each division and one for corps and army troops and small Transit Camps established in each of these maintenance areas, through which reinforcements would pass to units. As explained by Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns (then General Officer in charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon 21st Army Group) in a letter to C.M.H.Q. of 19 Jan 45 the method of operation would be as follows:

... all rfts for First Cdn Army will pass through 13 Bn and will be delivered to the appropriate transit camps. All rfts for Cdn base and L. of C. units will be delivered direct from the bn in which they are held direct to the unit concerned. 13 Bn may thus send one or more coys fwd, or the whole bn may move fwd as required, without disturbing the normal procedure.

Due to a serious lack of accn and trg facilities it is not proposed, during normal times, to demand CIC rfts above a three weeks', at intense rates of wastage, holding (approx 4400 all ranks). When, however, anticipated cas are such that it is desired to hold the full theatre authorization (approx 6000 all ranks) the two res coys (one found from the re-org of 13 Bn and one retained from 12 Bn) will be called upon to hold these additional personnel who will be demanded as soon as the requirement is known. This additional personnel will not necessarily be all CIC rfts (76).

386. The reinforcement holdings at No. 2 C.B.R.G. were built up in anticipation of the casualties predicted from Operation "VERITABLE". A considerable backlog which had been detained in the United Kingdom by bad weather was flown to nearby landing strips by the R.A.F. during the four days 9-12 Feb while larger parties proceeded by sea (77).

387. With the transfer of 1st Canadian Corps to North-West Europe it became desirable to make further changes. While Headquarters, No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group remained in Italy to handle recoverable casualties and wind up its administrative functions a No. 3 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group was formed from the Headquarters of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which was being disbanded to conform to the divisional organization within 21st Army Group. The result was two Base Reinforcement Groups of three reinforcement battalions each plus other units under command) and organized as follows (78):

2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group

10 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)
11 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)
13 Cdn Base Rft Bn (Fwd Bn)

3 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group

2 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)
4 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC and CAC (Recce))
9 Cdn Base Rft Bn (Others)

Henceforth, drafts of general duty infantrymen were so organized before they left the United Kingdom that men should reach the Base Reinforcement Battalion of the correct territorial affiliation.

(iii) Revising the Wastage Rates, 1944

388. General Stuart had been able to give almost undivided attention to the reinforcement question following General Crerar's assumption of the command of First Canadian Army on 20 Mar 44, although delegating certain of the work to subordinates through Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale (D.C.G.S.) and Brigadier W. N. Bostock (A.D.A.G.(A)). While well aware of the problems involved and of the necessity of remustering and training as general duty infantrymen all those surplus to three months wastage at "intense" rates for other corps, these officers considered that the situation was under control. This view was conveyed to the Chief of the General Staff in a telegram of 2 Jun. General Stuart did concede that, according to the latest War Office activity forecast for 1944 and the first six months of 1945, the number of reinforcements requested from Canada would be less than the monthly requirement. He did not think, however, that it would be necessary either "to cut our cloth in accordance with our ability to reinforce or to press for an extension of compulsory military service". His reasons were:

- (a) Fighting in the next three or four months I am convinced will indicate whether or not the war with Germany will continue to 1945.
- (b) With our present reserves and a continuation of present flow from Canada I am confident that we can meet demands during next four months giving priority of course to 21 Army Group over AAI.
- (c) Must not eliminate a formation from our order of battle. At present time it just cannot be done. It would not be understood either here or in the US or in Canada and would be detrimental to morale of whole Canadian Army.
- (d) It would be most unwise to advocate an extension of compulsory military service now when there is an excellent chance of our being able to finish the war with Germany on a voluntary basis (79).

His recommendations were:

- (a) Do everything possible in Canada without departing from voluntary system to increase the flow of reinforcements particularly infantry.

- (b) Do everything possible in Canadian Army Overseas to deflect the greatest possible number of fit men in static units and establishments into the reinforcement stream.
- (c) CMHQ to re-examine reinforcement situation at end of June and at end of each subsequent month and to forward results of each examination together with recommendations to NDHQ.

389. In a memorandum of 7 Jun the Adjutant-General advised the Minister of National Defence as follows:

I concur in Gen. Stuart's opinion that we can meet demands during the next four months from present available sources, and therefore see no necessity to contemplate elimination of any formations at the present time.

On account of the many variables involved, it is both difficult and inadvisable to predict with confidence the number of G.S. personnel that can be made available up to the end of 1945. However, I can state with confidence that from our present resources, we will meet our commitments for the year 1944. Also if recruiting remains at the present level, there will be a continuing output from Training Stream available for Overseas of approximately 2,500 per month during 1945. This can be supplemented by continuing withdrawals from G.S. personnel in Operational and Non-operational Units. It is estimated that this source will, by the end of 1944, have shrunk to below 20,000 and will be approaching the point where further withdrawals may not be feasible (80).

390. On 13 Jun the Adjutant-General reiterated how 23,000 all ranks had been despatched overseas since the beginning of the year and 28,000 more were earmarked to go (including 2000 on the strength of seven general hospitals). After making allowance for training injuries General Letson estimated that 35,000 of the 50,000 men in the training stream and a further 10,000 to be withdrawn from units in Canada should provide sufficient reinforcements for the balance of 1944 and contribute 17,000 for despatch overseas during early 1945. Future recruiting alone could determine how many reinforcements would be available for further despatch during 1945. If it remained at the same level it should be possible to produce about 2500 trained reinforcements every month (81).

391. Although plans called for action similar to that already initiated in Italy (see para 282) not until 27 Jun was General Stuart able to advise the Army Commander officially that the 'manpower sub-ceiling' for Canadian troops within 21st Army Group, would be the total personnel required to meet:

- (a) The war establishment of all units currently or subsequently approved for inclusion in the composition of Cdn troops serving within 21 Army Gp.
- (b) One month's rft holdings for this force based on one month's wastage at intense activity calculated on the approved Cdn rates of wastage of personnel as applied to the approved current composition of the force