

Personnel* became its first director. Government departments represented on the National War Labour Board now were to supply representatives for a National Selective Service Advisory Board, which also would have employer and employee members.

132. According to the Prime Minister, National Selective Service would make extensive use of the facilities pertaining to the Employment Service of Canada. In each area possessing an Employment and Claims office of the Unemployment Insurance Commission there would be appointed a National Selective Service Officer. These would be advised by voluntary, unpaid citizen's committees. The mobilization of industrial manpower was to be effected through the Employment Offices, whereas the calling up of men for compulsory military training and service would continue to rest with the Department of National War Services. Since no hard and fast regulations could be devised which would not work hardship in individual cases considerable discretion was being left with the National War Service Boards in deciding appeals. Right of appeal would be enjoyed not only by employers, employees, farmers and farm labourers but also by interested government departments.

133. According to Prime Minister King, the only important reserve of unemployed employables was women and steps were being taken to attract them into industry, on a full or part time basis. Furthermore, any engineer or technician willing to transfer to work of a more essential nature could be removed from his current employment, with the right to reinstatement later. Employers who hired or released any such personnel were required to notify the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel. (This Order could be extended to certain categories of skilled workmen.)

134. The age limit for compulsory military service was extended to include all those single men and childless widowers (on 15 Jul 40) born in the years 1912 to 1921 inclusive. Hitherto, liability for military service had been confined to British subjects; now it was extended to all those resident in Canada and Registrars would make their selection over the entire group (see Appendix "B"). The sole exception was agricultural labour: farmers and farm labourers so engaged on 23 Mar 42 were "frozen" and were not to obtain other employment without the written permission of the nearest National Selective Service officer. Exceptions were open only to men who wished to enlist in the Armed Forces, those who legitimately combined off-season employment in other primary industries (lumbering, trapping, fishing etc.) and those who could not be classified as essential agricultural workers (i.e. unproductive farmers). Persons who returned to agriculture subsequent to 23 Mar, except from normal seasonal employment, would continue to be liable for military training. According to the Prime Minister:

*With the aid of the professional engineering societies, a Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel was established by the Department of Labour in 1941. Using the records of the National Registration of 1940 it worked under the guidance of an Advisory Board composed of representatives of the engineering, mining and chemical institutes, the universities and the Canadian Manufacturers Association. As time went on representatives were assigned to various industrial cities across Canada.

The policy of stabilizing employment in agriculture represents what, in effect, is a block allocation to agriculture of the persons best fitted for food production. It constitutes a form of large scale selection formational service which should go far to ensure the supply of man-power essential to the food production aspect of the national war effort (26).

135. In short, the basic idea behind National Selective Service was to exclude physically fit men of military age from non-essential industry and direct them into the Armed Forces, war industry or some other essential occupation. Therefore it was laid down that on and after 23 Mar 42 no physically fit man between the ages of 17 and 45 could be employed as follows:

... Bookkeepers, cashiers, stenographers, typists, clerks, office appliance operators, messengers, salesmen and sales clerks, taxicab drivers.

Any occupation in wholesale or retail trade, advertising, and real estate.

Any occupation in, or directly associated with, entertainment, recreational or personal service, including but not restricted to theatres; film agencies; motion picture companies; clubs; bowling alleys; pool rooms; sports; barbering and hairdressing; domestic service; dyeing; cleaning and pressing; laundering; hotels and lodging houses; baths; restaurants; cafes and taverns; shoe shining, guide service and funeral service.

Any occupation in the manufacture or production of:

1. Biscuits, confectionery, cocoa.
2. Bread and bakery products.
3. Aerated and mineral waters and other beverages.
4. Liquors, wines, beer.
5. Rubber products.
6. Tobacco, cigars, cigarettes.
7. Leather and fur products.
8. Textile products.
9. Furniture and upholstery.
10. Photography.
11. Printing, publishing and engraving.
12. Radios, refrigerators, washing machines, and vacuum cleaners.
13. Jewellery and watchmaking.
14. Pottery and china.
15. Soaps, and toilet preparations and articles.
16. Mattresses.
17. Musical instruments.
18. Barber and beauty shop equipment.
19. Cameras and films.
20. Sporting goods.
21. Games, toys and novelties.

Any occupation in the repair of clothing, boots and shoes, furniture and household equipment, jewellery or watches, musical instruments (27).

136. In his concluding paragraphs Prime Minister King managed to introduce the implication that willingness to serve

outweighed compulsion:

By applying the negative compulsion of restriction, where possible, in preference to the positive compulsion of allocation, the waste of man-power in unessential activities is prevented. At the same time, men and women are maintained in or directed into the form of service they prefer. It is obvious that the greater the measure of willingness that can be preserved, the more effective the service will be.

May I say, in conclusion, while the government has not hesitated to apply compulsion where compulsion will serve to increase the total war effort, the government has no desire to add unduly—which means wastefully—to governmental machinery. It is essential that at a time of war, the services of men and women should not be consumed in unnecessary tasks. It is imperative that the services of all should be directed into war-time tasks. In those aspects of our war effort in which voluntary methods are working satisfactorily, voluntary selection, including a measure of choice by the individual of the appropriate field of service, has been and will be continued. The more expensive and complicated methods of compulsion have been employed only where it is felt that compulsory selection is necessary in order to increase efficiency in the prosecution of the war. Compulsion, however, will be applied without fear or favour wherever in the opinion of the government its use will aid in the achievement of a maximum war effort (28).

137. In an editorial of 25 Mar, supporting the National Selective Service proposals, The Winnipeg Free Press did, however, inject a drop of cold water: "It may be predicted that Mr King's hope that a good part of the problem will be solved by voluntary action is likely to be disappointed, and that an ever-increasing use of compulsion will be required". Writing in the same newspaper on 27 Mar, in explanation of the extensions to the National Resources Mobilization Act, Mr Grant Dexter concluded:

In fairness to the Government and the officials who are tackling the job, it should be said that they believe the crisis in manpower to be about six months away. They will have time to work things out and gather an efficient organization together so, at least, they believe.

138. The creation of First Canadian Army on 6 Apr provided the next political ammunition. Drawing comparisons with the number of men required to keep a Canadian Corps of 100,000 in France during the First World War and the fact that there had been a wastage of 40,000 since 1939 without the Canadian Army Overseas being engaged in battle, The Vancouver Province (8 Apr) attacked the folly of "setting up a two-corps army when we have in sight little more than adequate reinforcements for one corps". That same day the Minister of National Defence denied such an implication and, according to The Toronto

Evening Telegram, told a press conference that "We gave reinforcements up to the full scale asked for by the Corps Commander (Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton)". The Globe and Mail (Toronto) carried five articles entitled "The Dagger's Point" endeavouring to disprove General McNaughton's earlier statement that "The Canadian Corps is the point of a dagger aimed at the heart of Berlin" (see para 109), however, and even newspapers supporting the Government continued critical. On 10 Apr The Ottawa Citizen suggested that a First Canadian Army could be maintained only by a selective draft. On the following day, an editorial in The Winnipeg Free Press commented that "When our army overseas gets into action and suffers losses, conscription will be necessary to fill the gaps".

139. Next came the National Plebiscite of 27 Apr to obtain an answer to the following question:

... Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service? (29)

The actual voting was preceded by a nation wide campaign. In the English-speaking provinces the Opposition parties and citizens' committees joined with Government spokesmen in urging people to vote "yes" (30). This, despite the fact that the Conservatives had charged the Government with seeking to evade its responsibilities by holding a Plebiscite and the Leader of the C.C.F. had demanded its broadening to embrace "the complete and effective conscription of war industries, accumulated wealth and financial institutions, at the same time and on the same basis of sacrifice as the suggested extension of the conscription of manpower" (31). The Social Credit supporters in the House of Commons had supported the C.C.F. position and its Government in Alberta had passed a similar resolution through its legislature (32). The leader of the Bloc Populaire had spoken out vigorously against the Plebiscite and the aged Henri Bourassa had come out of retirement to add his voice to the protest. In contrast, French-speaking members of the Cabinet had assured the electors that an affirmative vote merely would empower the Government, subject to its responsibility to Parliament, to introduce compulsory military service for overseas if, in its opinion, the need should arise.

140. The final tabulation was 2,945,514 "yes" votes and 1,643,006 in the negative (35). Roughly 64 per cent of those voting had answered in the affirmative* and most of the opposition was from the province of Quebec (where 993,633 had voted "no" and only 376,188 recorded a "yes").

141. On 11 May the Prime Minister gave his interpretation of the Plebiscite results to the House of Commons as follows:

By their vote, the people have decisively expressed the view that the government should be released from any such obligation. In other words, there no longer remains any issue which the government or members of parliament, because of past promises or pledges are restricted from considering, discussing and deciding on its merits, in the light of what is best for Canada and for Canada's war effort....

* Personal reasons, such as the inactivity of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, had influenced Service voters to the extent that only 72 per cent of those voting overseas and 82 per cent of those in Canada had voted "yes".

In the plebiscite, the electors were not called upon to vote for or against the government. The result, therefore, is not to be construed as a vote for any political party. In fact, the plebiscite was selected by the government precisely because it afforded the best known means of obtaining an expression of the views of the people on a specific question, regardless of political parties, or party considerations.

As, in some quarters, an effort has been made since the plebiscite to interpret the result as a mandate for conscription for overseas service it is necessary for me to repeat that, in the plebiscite, conscription was not the issue. The government did not ask the people to say whether or not conscription for overseas service should be adopted. That was not the issue before the people. With respect to the issue of conscription, the result can only rightly be construed as leaving to the government and to parliament entire freedom to deal with that question on its merits (36).

142. Mr Mackenzie King followed this statement by the introduction of Bill No. 80* which, by deleting Section 3 of the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 (see Appendix "A") would give the Government "the same freedom of decision and action with respect to the method of raising men for military service overseas which, in the recent plebiscite the government requested, and which the people of Canada have said they desire the government to possess" (37). In elaboration, he stated:

Section 3 contains the one remaining restriction on the government's freedom of decision and action in all aspects of Canada's war effort.

This section was included in the National Resources Mobilization Act, at the time the bill was passed, because of a commitment arising out of promises and pledges from which the government and members of parliament have now been released.

... By their vote on the plebiscite, the people have expressed their readiness to have the sole remaining restriction upon the government's freedom and decision of action removed.

The removal of section 3 of the National Resources Mobilization Act is, in other words, the logical consequence of the vote on the plebiscite. Since the people have indicated that they do not desire any restriction on the freedom of action of the government, there is the strongest of reasons why parliament should be asked to remove any shadow of restriction which remains.

*This decision had resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Public Works, Hon. P.J.A. Cardin, from the Government.

In the plebiscite, the people were asked to give full powers to the government, not to meet a then immediate situation, but to provide against a future emergency. The National Resources Mobilization Act is only enabling legislation. The extent of the use of such power as is conferred upon the government by its provisions is and has, from the outset, been a matter of government policy, to be decided in the light of all relevant circumstances. This will remain true of the unrestricted powers which the amendment, if enacted, would afford.

The government might have proceeded in this matter by order in council under the War Measures Act. Having regard, however, to its responsibilities to parliament, the government has felt that such action as is necessary to bring existing legislation into conformity with the will of the people expressed in the vote on the plebiscite should be taken, not by order in council under the War Measures Act, but by act of parliament. In this proceeding, the government is providing members of parliament, before any amendment to the National Resources Mobilization Act is made, with the fullest opportunity of considering the effect of every aspect of the amendment (37).

143. The Bill was given its first reading at once, as was customary, but during the debate on the second and third readings, and the intervening 'committee' stage, members of all parties took full opportunity of examining and exploring every possible aspect of the measure. Speaking during the debate on 23 Jun, the Minister of National Defence clearly stated his own position as follows:

... Speaking of men for overseas service, I stated in February that I preferred the voluntary system if it worked, and I gave my reasons: first, because it provided volunteers for a voluntary army; and second, because of the division in this country which conscription would produce. These, I think, were substantial reasons. I would always prefer to see our Canadian army overseas purely a volunteer army. But if to maintain and reinforce and strengthen it, it should become necessary to require men to serve overseas, then obviously so far as I am concerned there can be no alternative, because we cannot let the army down, and, what is even more important, we cannot let Canada down (38).

Subsequently Mr Ralston did offer to resign his portfolio because of a difference of opinion with the Prime Minister as to the procedure which would have to be followed should conscription become necessary at a later date. At the request of the Prime Minister, however, Mr Ralston "either withdrew his resignation or agreed not to press it" (39).

144. During these weeks four other events—the shelling of Estevan Point (Vancouver Island) by a Japanese submarine on 20 Jun, Japanese occupation of the Aleutians during the same month, the sinking of ships in the St. Lawrence and the controversy over the Royal Commission on the Canadian Expeditionary

Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong--were exploited by the Opposition Parties within the House of Commons in a further attempt to discredit the Government's manpower policy. These events provided plenty of political ammunition, even though they had but little bearing on the main theme. Bill 80 passed its final reading on 23 Jul by a vote of 141 to 45, with the C.C.F. members voting against it, and the Bill was then referred to the Senate where approval was obtained a week later. On 1 Aug Royal Assent was given to what became the National Resources Mobilization Act, Amendment Act 1942.

(iii) The Adoption of British Wastage Rates

145. On the assumption that, should there be a German invasion of the United Kingdom, intense fighting would not last more than a month the War Office had given Home Forces an activity rate of 11 months "inactivity" and one month "intense" when a new pamphlet was issued on Rates of Wastage of Materiel and Personnel during June 1941. General Montague decided, however, that the reasons which had prompted the adoption of arbitrary Canadian rates in August 1940 (see para 81) still persisted and that no change was necessary for the time being (40).

146. Implementation of the Army Programme for 1942 and the possibility of operations on the continent of Europe caused further consideration to be given the question of Canadian wastage rates. A C.M.H.Q. General Staff memorandum of 5 Jan 42 included a table comparing the Canadian and Home Forces rates for the coming 12 months(41):

<u>Arm</u>	<u>Canadian Percentages</u>		<u>Home Forces Percentages</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
Armd C. and Recce Regts	30	30	28 1/4	18 1/4
Armd Regts and Tank Regts	30	30	22 1/4	22 1/4
Artillery	24	24	18 1/4	13 1/4
Engineers	18	18	18 1/4	13 1/4
Signals	18	18	16 1/4	12 1/4
Infantry, rifle	30	30	28 1/4	28 1/4
Infantry, motor and M.G.	30	30	28 1/4	18 1/4
Army Service Corps*	12	12	11 1/4	11 1/4
Medical and Dental	12	12	12 1/4	12 1/4
Ordnance	12	12	11 1/4	11 1/4
Provost	12	12	14 1/4	14 1/4
All others	12	12	10 1/4	10 1/4

General McNaughton approved its recommendation that the existing somewhat higher rates (43) should be continued, since the following factors still were or had become applicable:

- (a) The distance separating Canada from the U.K., and the consequent time lag involved in shipping.
- (b) The necessity for completion of individual training of all Canadian soldiers, particularly tradesmen and specialists, owing to lack of training equipment in Canada.

* Had been reduced from 18 to 12 percent following adoption of a new R.A.S.C. field organization during the latter part of 1941.

- (c) The formation of larger pools for the specialist arms in relation to infantry than might be required during operations, because of the fact that mobilization of new units would require the provision of trained nuclei from the U.K. (44);

147. Notwithstanding this, however, at the direction of General McNaughton a study of the manpower (45) required for a well balanced First Canadian Army was undertaken during the late spring and early summer (see para 159). By late July General McNaughton had decided that the (British) F.F.C. estimate of wastage incurred as battle casualties during intensive operations should become the basis of providing reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas. The size of the reinforcement pool should equal four months wastage at "intense" rates and be distributed as follows:

- (a) One month's reserve trained and immediately available for shipment, to be held in Canada.
- (b) Two months' reserve to be held in England.
- (c) One month's reserve to be held as first reinforcements to accompany the army abroad and to be maintained as such in the theatre of operations, whenever personnel depots can be established (46).

The Army Commander considered that the policy of holding one month's reserve in Canada could be accepted in view of the expectation that 45 per cent of the total casualties would be returnable to duty after four months (see para 183).

148. Therefore, when the "Third Proposal—Composition of the Canadian Army Overseas" was produced on 5 Aug 42 (see para 170) reinforcement calculations followed the British figures (F.F.C. Sub 73c as amended to 21 Jul 42) for primary theatres:

	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
Armoured Car	20	10	3/4	3/4
Armoured Regts and tank regts	20	14	3/4	3/4
Artillery	15	8	4	3
Engineers, Div and Non-div	10	5	4	3
Engineers, L of C	3	3	2	2
Signals, Div	8	4	3	3
Signals, Non-div, L of C	4	4	3	2
Infantry (rifle)	20	20	6	6
Infantry (M.G.)	20	10	5	5
Infantry (Motor)	20	10	5	5
Recce	20	10	5	5
R.C.A.S.C.	3	3	2	2
R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C.	4	4	3	3
Pioneer Corps	3	3	2	2
R.C.O.C.	3	3	2	2
Provost	6	6	4	4
Any others	2	2	2	2

("No activity" was a uniform wastage rate of 3/4 per cent for both officers and other ranks.)

No separate rate being shown for headquarters, the General Staff at C.M.H.Q. selected Divisional Signals as the appropriate percentage to be applied to those of infantry and armoured brigades and divisions. Rates of wastage for C.M.H.Q. units were to be two per cent per month, plus the overall four per cent for non-effectives.

149. As early as 27 Jun 42 Lt.-Col. W.J. Megill (G.S.O. 1 (SD), C.M.H.Q.) had learned at the War Office that the existing F.F.C. rates of wastage might be revised (48) but it was 18 Dec before the Research Committee headed by Major-General J.F. Evetts submitted its findings to the Executive Committee of the Army Council (49). While certain points still required clarification or modification it was considered at C.M.H.Q. that the proposed percentages might be used for planning the completion of the Canadian Army Overseas. On 22 Dec a telegram to that effect was despatched to N.D.H.Q. (50).

150. General Evetts' Committee had recommended that any variations in the application of the three possible periods ("quiet", "normal" and "intense")* to any theatre of operations should be met by adjusting its operational forecast, rather than establishing separate activity rates for secondary theatres and for India and Burma as heretofore. Periodically the General Staff at the War Office would prepare an operational forecast for each theatre and then obtain an annual average activity figure by calculating the number of divisional months for each of the three types of period and dividing by the number of divisions in the theatre (52). The following example was used by the Committee:

6 Divisions in the theatre.

G.S. activity forecast - 3/4 total force for 6 months Intense and 6 months Normal.

Average activity over 12 months for the whole force.

*F.F.C. definitions:

- "Intense" - The conditions of "battle" offensive or defensive against a first class enemy, of strength not greatly less than our own, with all forces land and air engaged. (The definition applies to a month's activity and allows for the "roulement" of reserves during the period.)
- "Normal" - Local land forces in close contact but no major engagement expected. Air action limited to close contact and periodic bombing and ground "strafing", which may be intense for short periods against specific limited objectives, e.g. ports, railheads, gun-positions.
- "Quiet" - Local land forces NOT in contact. No operations, other than minor air activity, expected. Training requirements and day to day wear and tear included in F.F.C. rate (51).

$$\frac{3/4 \times 6 \times 6}{6} = 4 \frac{1}{2} \text{ months Intense}$$

$$\frac{3/4 \times 6 \times 6}{6} = 4 \frac{1}{2} \text{ months Normal}$$

$$\frac{1/4 \times 6 \times 12}{6} = 3 \text{ months Quiet}$$

Although Canadian officers did not always appear cognizant of the fact, these War Office forecasts did not specify degrees of activity in the sequence they would necessarily occur.

151. It was 16 Apr 43, however, before the Executive Committee of the Army Council gave final consideration to the Committee's work. New casualty rates showing casualties (killed, died of wounds, wounded, prisoners of war and sick) as a monthly percentage of the war establishments and requiring replacement were approved and promulgated as F.F.C. Sub. 73D, dated May 1943 (53). As applicable to the Canadian Army these were as follows (54):

	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
1. C.A.C. (excl. Recce Regts and Armd Recce Regts)	25	14	5	4
2. R.C.A.	15	8	5	4
3. R.C.E. Field and Survey	10	5	4	3
4. R.C.E., L. of C. Transportation and Movement Control	3	3	2	2
5. R.C. Signals, Divisional and Army Tk Bde	8	4	4	3
6. R.C. Signals, Non-Divisional and L. of C.	3	3	2	2
7. Infantry (Rifle) and S.S. Bns., Corps and Army Def. Coys, Div Def and Empl Pls and Bde Def Pls.	25	20	7	6
8. Infantry (M.G.) and Sp. Bns	20	10	5	4
9. Infantry (Motor)	20	10	5	4
10. Recce Regts (incl Armd Recce Regts)	20	10	5	4
11. Parachute Bn	25	20	7	6
12. R.C.A.S.C.	5	4	4	3
13. R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C.	5	4	4	3
14. R.C.O.C.	3	3	2	2

15. C. Pro. C.	6	6	3	3
C. Pro. C.- Mil Prisons and Det. Bks	2	2	2	2
16. Pioneers	4	4	2	2

British Headquarters had the same rate as "any other units" [see below] but, as the result of agreement with N.D.H.Q. the following special rates were established at C.M.H.Q. (55):

	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	<u>Offrs.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>	<u>Offrs.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
H.Q. Units				
Inf Bde	25	20	7	6
Armd Bde	25	14	5	4
Inf Div (incl FS Sec)	8	4	4	3
Armd Div (incl FS Sec excl HQ Sqn)	8	4	4	3
Corps (excl Def Coy)	3	3	2	2
Army (excl Def Coy)	2	2	2	2
C.M.H.Q.	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
Misc Units in U.K.	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
Any Other Units	2	2	2	2

152. In every case, however, these "intense" and "normal" rates included, and were not additional to, the "quiet" rate [formerly "no activity"] which was 3/4 per cent for all corps. It was distinctly specified in F.F.C. Sub 73D, however, that no allowance had been made for wounded and sick returning to duty, or for any other factor which, while decreasing the total manpower required to maintain the forces, has no effect on the number of personnel to be immediately replaced in units (56).

153. (The War Office made only two minor amendments to F.F.C. Sub. 73D and only one of these affected a corps with a Canadian counterpart. As a result of further lessons from the North African campaign Amendment No. 1 of 10 Sep 43 subdivided Artillery and gave lower rates to anti-aircraft and coast units--4 and 3 per cent for "intense" and 2 and 1 1/2 per cent for "normal". N.D.H.Q. queried adherence to this lower rate since there would be no Canadian A.A. units in rear of Army and it was not until 25 Nov that acceptance was telegraphed to London.) (57)

154. Initially dead wastage had been reckoned as 55 per cent of total casualties, with the remainder recoverable within six months, and this was the figure used at C.M.H.Q. for planning purposes during the winter months. The Research Committee decided that there would be a higher proportion of recoverable wounded in future campaigns but the Executive Committee of the Army Council agreement of 16 Apr 43 that the "assessment of recoverable wounded be taken as 50 per cent of the total wounded" would seem to have been "inaccurately reported". Therefore, the D.C.I.G.S. managed to secure agreement that the proportion of recoverable wounded should be increased and the figure of dead wastage reduced from 55 to 50 per cent. This resulted in 50 per cent of all wastage, and not just wounded, being regarded as recoverable. The breakdown was as follows (59):

Killed	15 per cent
Missing and P.O.W.	15
Wounded (non-recoverable)	<u>20</u>
Total dead wastage	50
Wounded (recoverable within six months)	<u>50</u>
Total	100 per cent

155. The change from 45 to 50 per cent for recoverable casualties meant that the projections prepared at C.M.H.Q. would have to be altered. A far more serious matter, however, and one which was not appreciated for almost a year, was the fact that the War Office was not counting on all these recoverable casualties being fit to return to operational duty (see para 509).

(iv) Manpower Ceiling for the Canadian Army Overseas

156. On 18 Feb 42, Prime Minister King told the Cabinet War Committee that he wished it clearly understood that the presently authorized army programme should be recognized as comprising the maximum force which could be made available for service overseas. Stated briefly, this proposed contribution to the Field Force being planned by the British under F.F.C. 36 (see para 68) was:

- (a) Three divisions.
- (b) Two armoured divisions.
- (c) Two army tank brigades.
- (d) Corps troops for a corps of three divisions and two army tank brigades.
- (e) Corps troops for an armoured corps of two armoured divisions.
- (f) Army and G.H.Q. troops for a corps of three infantry divisions and two army tank brigades and a corps of two armoured divisions.
- (g) Some line of communication and base units (60).

Then, on 26 Feb the Cabinet War Committee rejected renewed request by the British Government for railway transportation units: the C.G.S. had advised rejection since it would involve an additional 3500 men and the railways already were short handed.

157. In reply to the Prime Minister's direct question as to whether, once the existing army programme was completed further increases would be sought apart from reinforcements, General McNaughton told the Cabinet War Committee on 6 Mar that the existing programme represented the top limit of the force which Canada could deploy and maintain in a war of long duration. While certain further ancillary units might be required, no major increases would or should be made.

158. Following General McNaughton's return to the United Kingdom a headquarters for the new First Canadian Army was established. An N.D.H.Q. telegram of 23 Mar authorized

General McNaughton to vary existing establishments by 5 per cent, or 10 per cent where they were being made to conform to new British establishments, and to establish new units on a temporary or experimental basis. The new units came to be referred to as "GSD 602 units" (after the "originator's number of the telegram") and their personnel were counted against reinforcement holdings (61).

159. Apparently the complete facts on the overseas manpower situation had never been consolidated. Therefore, when General Montague (Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.) was advised by his D.A.G. (Brigadier A.W. Beament) on 17 Jun that First Canadian Army would not be able to fight for any extended period without either "wasting" its formations or breaking up some in order to reinforce the remainder he directed that the facts should be summarized for despatch to N.D.H.Q. (62). The resultant memorandum despatched on 11 Jul by airmail* (after General McNaughton's approval had been obtained), stressed the fact that the overseas manpower situation "appears to be definitely unsatisfactory" (63). As of 30 Jun only 8,432 officers and 138,379 other ranks actually were serving against the 9,136 officers and 148,966 other ranks required for war establishments, reinforcement quotas and an overall four per cent to offset the number of 'non-effectives**' at any one time. And this did not take into account adjustments which would have to be made for the following: return to Canada of illiterates, over-age and low medical category personnel and the existing overseas shortage of specialists and tradesmen (some of whom had not completed basic training in Canada).

160. The following excerpts from General Montague's letter are self explanatory:

... It must be accepted that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Personnel must be of an appropriate physical and mental standard, and must have aptitudes for or be actually trained in the numerous trades and specialties which a modern Army requires. Furthermore, before being put into a zone which may become a battle zone, or before being treated as reinforcements, they must have completed the necessary training.

The mental standard of recent reinforcements arriving in this country makes worse, rather than improves, the situation... These considerations have led to my recent recommendation for the formation of General Pioneer Companies*** which recommendation has been approved by you. One of

*A copy was handed to Brigadier G.B. Chisholm who was visiting the Canadian Army Overseas. After serving as the first Director of Personnel Selection at A.H.Q. he had become a D.A.G.

**Non-effectives were all those not actually available for duty on an authorized establishment or as reinforcements: e.g. those hospitalized, awaiting medical re-categorization, in detention or awaiting return to Canada.

***No 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed in March 1942. It consisted of illiterates and others whose mental standard was considered to be too low for training as combatants. Eventually a total of six companies were formed in the United Kingdom (CMHQ Report 164).

the companies has been formed and the other is in the process of formation. In the general strength figures... these companies are treated as reinforcements and not as part of the authorized establishment.

I cannot stress too strongly the danger in permitting soldiers to be despatched as reinforcements without adequate medical inspection to ensure that they are of the proper categories. I have had occasion in the past to draw attention, in my reports on reinforcement drafts, to cases where soldiers have been despatched as category A and who have been placed directly into category E on arrival.

The conditions of present day warfare have clearly shown that soldiers must not only be fit to stand the strain, but also remain fit during protracted periods of intense activity. The necessity for resilience, to enable them to recuperate quickly during the short periods of repose, if any, which may be available in modern battle conditions, make it essential that soldiers be not only fit as to category and physical condition, but also of an age which will permit that resilience (64).

161. Personnel selection techniques had been introduced into the Canadian Army Overseas only late in 1941 and the process of 'screening' was still going on but it seemed likely that some 10,000 men would be found with too low a mental capacity to become adequately trained soldiers*. Almost double that number were estimated as being over 35 years of age (with 8560 over 40 years of age) and therefore unsuited for service in field units. Although it had been possible to find employment at the Reinforcement Units for men with medical categories 'B-2' and 'C' it was believed that unless such men could be employed as specialists they would not continue to be satisfactory soldiers.

162. In short, the formations presently in the Order of Battle could not be maintained during "anything in the nature of continuous operations" and the situation would be aggravated, instead of improved, by further arrivals from Canada unless drastic action were taken to improve the physical and mental standards of men being despatched (65). Reference also was made to the fact that new wastage rates were being studied, in conjunction with the War Office (see paras 147-9).

*As a temporary measure 75 teams (one officer and two N.C.Os.) were given a one week course in personnel selection techniques and then assigned, during the winter and early spring of 1942, to eliminate misfits from Canadian Corps and Canadian Reinforcement Units. It was considered that those scoring under 50 out of a possible 211 on the 'M' Test of aptitudes could not be brought to a fair standard of training, even under special conditions, and that all those scoring less than 80 required special handling. By the time the field units had been screened there were sufficient trained Personnel Selection Officers available to carry on this work permanently at the several Reinforcement Units where "bad actors" and other undesirables had been congregated (CMHQ Report 164).

163. In his complementary telegram to the Adjutant-General of the same day (11 Jul) General McNaughton requested that, in future, reinforcements should all be under 35 years of age, medical category 'A', and sufficiently literate to reach the standard of intelligence already prescribed.* In conclusion he stated:

As matters stand it seems probable that we still have the balance of this year to put matters right before incidence of large scale operations. This should be sufficient if the problem is tackled now (67).

164. An earlier message of 12 Jun from General McNaughton had requested information as to the total establishment that could be expected, for First Canadian Army, so that it might become the well balanced and self-contained Force he had been attempting to create (68). The British Army was experiencing manpower difficulties and was counting on the Canadians to supply their full quota of corps, army and L. of C. units** for the new Field Force being planned. This telegram had been the subject of **considerable discussion by the Cabinet War Committee** on 8 Jul, and the possibility of recalling General McNaughton for consultation had been raised.

165. General Stuart's answer of 13 Jul to the effect that he was "seriously disturbed", now came, however, as something of a shock to those overseas. He wrote:

... It seems to me that it is open to a much wider and more far reaching interpretation than you may have intended. Obviously to cut down the age limit and to eliminate all categories below A makes a very much heavier demand on manpower. In fact it would call for a drastic recomputation by National Selective Service of the personnel available for Armed Service, vis-a-vis industry, agriculture, and essential civilian occupations. I am sure that you did not intend to have this four point specification put forward as decided on until there had been a necessary exploration and considered consultation...

Suggestion to restrict reinforcements to men under 35 is new and drastic and is being carefully studied in relation to its effect on the available supply of manpower. It is obvious however that the effect of adoption would be very considerable and might be serious. Especially in case of skilled tradesmen etc (70).

*General McNaughton suggested in July, however, that some hundreds should be re-assessed by properly qualified examiners since he wanted to "be certain that there is reality between this mark and the lowest standard that we can reasonably accept". He further observed that "there is room in certain units for a considerable number of personnel of the stolid, steady type who have sufficient intelligence to carry out the work required of them but at the same time are not sufficiently quick mentally to obtain a mark of 80 or more on the 'M' test" (66).

**While General McNaughton recommended that the Canadian Army "should conform as closely as possible to War Office Unit W.Es. unless we have strong reasons to the contrary", it was his considered opinion that the new British divisional organization was a retrograde step and should not be followed. General Sir Bernard Paget, G-in-C. Designate of the Expeditionary Force, had agreed that there would be no difficulty on the divisional level in co-operating with British formations (69).

Furthermore, according to the medical standards established by Canadian Army Routine Order No 1350 of 4 Oct 41 category 'B-1' personnel could be employed in Base and L. of C. units and in certain other tasks (particularly as tradesmen) while category 'B-2' personnel were acceptable for the Canadian Forestry Corps.

166. Meeting on 15 Jul the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General should proceed to the United Kingdom to discuss manpower problems with the Army Commander. It was hoped that Generals Stuart and Letson would be able to find out:

- (a) The role which the Canadian Army will have in the proposed Expeditionary Force.
- (b) The necessity for additional units in order to permit the Army to perform its role.
- (c) The extent to which the British Army can provide rearward services (71).

167. Meanwhile, General Montague had forwarded General Stuart's telegram to the Army Commander, with an explanatory letter. Although it was possible to employ over-age and low category personnel overseas there already were enough such men serving in the United Kingdom to meet possible needs. Moreover:

... The comparison of the intelligence of the Canadian Army with the job analyses standards of the War Office indicates that we have a tendency to be very short in the middle intelligence brackets, and that in some cases we are trying to employ more low intelligence personnel than the job analyses indicate is desirable.

... the present method of producing personnel in Canada is not such as to permit an adequate supply of personnel of the proper type. If this be so, I suggest that the answer is not for us to amend our views and express willingness to accept a standard lower than that which is required, but rather for N.D.H.Q. to devise some other method of obtaining manpower which will provide the legitimate requirements of the Army Overseas (72).

The view held at C.M.H.Q. is best expressed by Brigadier Beament's memorandum of 19 Jul:

There is no doubt that the conclusions which must inevitably be drawn are of a nature greatly to embarrass the Government of Canada. I feel, however, that this is not a matter with which we can concern ourselves. We must content ourselves with pointing out the facts, indicating the result of these facts, and leaving it to the Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada to find a solution. Whether the solution will be the production of sufficient man power, and man power of sufficiently high quality to meet the present Army programme requirements, or whether it will be a reduction of their present programme to fit into the man power they can provide I can not say, but I feel that we would be doing less than our duty were we to give any false comfort by whistling

away the position we have already properly taken (73).

168. On 3 Aug the C.G.S. and General McNaughton visited the War Office and were advised by the V.C.I.G.S. that invasion of North West Europe ("ROUNDUP") would be possible in 1943 only should there be a visible crack in German morale (due to the strategic bombing offensive): in that event the question of battle reserves would have little significance and such a virtually unopposed operation could be conducted without the authorized quota of reinforcements. Thereupon Generals Stuart and McNaughton agreed that emphasis should be given to completing the units required for First Canadian Army and that the provision of the required scale of reinforcements could be left until later (74).

169. During the course of a meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, on 10 Aug the Army Commander spoke generally of the "important assignment tentatively allotted in combination with other Allied Forces" and stressed the necessity of completing the two corps army of three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades:

... any reduction from this composition would mean that the Cdn force proceeding abroad would, from necessity, be allotted a less important role and probably would be decentralized under British or other Allied cmd. This could only result in an acceptance by Canada of an inferior role in the total allied war effort, which would reflect adversely upon public opinion generally at home and abroad (75).

Further elaboration was given to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa when the C.G.S. reported on 19 Aug that for the first time General McNaughton was able to envisage First Canadian Army's prospective role—serving on the continent between British and American Armies.

170. As early as 5 Aug a "Third Proposal" for the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas had been prepared by the Planning Committee. Henceforth the corps headquarters would be interchangeable: increments for each infantry and armoured division under command would be added to the "basic corps troops". This would permit any grouping of divisions which the tactical situation might necessitate. Although the Canadian Army Overseas was still using the non-operational wastage rates concocted in August 1940 (see para 82) the Army Commander had secured approval for the Planning Committee to calculate reinforcement needs from the percentages set forth in the War Office's current F.F.C. rates, which themselves were under review (see para 149). This "Third Proposal" became the basis for future planning and therefore its manpower implications are summarized as follows (76):

*A Conference at C.M.H.Q. of 18 Jul had directed that plans be drawn up immediately for a well balanced force. A "First Proposal" was submitted as early as 25 Jul. Subsequently the work was formalized under a Canadian Army Planning Committee (CMHQ Report 168).

Present Fd Force W.E. (22 Jul 42)	136,746	
Approx. proposed increase to Fd Force	<u>41,345</u>	
Total Fd Force	178,091	178,091
C.M.H.Q. units W.E. (22 Jul 42)	20,032	
Approx. increase to C.M.H.Q. units (incl. B.O.W. and B.O.D.)	<u>11,797</u>	
Total C.M.H.Q. units	31,829	<u>31,829</u>
Total W.E.		209,920
Three months reinforcements in U.K. (Fd. and C.M.H.Q. units)	43,196	<u>43,196</u>
Total W.E., and reinforcements		253,116
Non-effectives, wastage, illiterates	27,624	
One month reinforcements in Canada	<u>13,762</u>	
Total	41,386	41,386
Total W.E., Reinforcements etc.		294,502
Less approx. provision (22 Jul 42)		<u>167,365</u>
Approx. net requirements (1 May 43)		127,137

Certain of the C.M.H.Q. units were slated for eventual service with the Lines of Communication of the Field Force while others would perform base functions.

171. Subsequently, the estimated number of reinforcements required for this programme was amended to read 42,646 all ranks in the United Kingdom and 13,579 in Canada (77). General McNaughton was prepared to accept a temporary reduction of reinforcement holdings: possibly two months' holdings in the United Kingdom and one month's in Canada. It would be necessary, however, to replace 2500 illiterates* and a further 15,000 lost by normal wastage prior to 1 May 43: a further 10,112 all ranks would be required to compensate for the continuing 'non-effectives' shown against field and reinforcement units. It was further agreed that, until the commencement of active operations, the rate permitted for wastage from normal causes in the United Kingdom should be reduced from one per cent to three-quarters of one per cent (following British practice). The completion of this programme by 1 May 43 would require the monthly despatch overseas of 8,000 all ranks (3,000 in formed units and 5,000 reinforcements) for a total of 64,000 all ranks. At that time there would be a further 16,000 trained personnel available for despatch from units serving in the North American Area.

172. During a last meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army it was agreed that this programme should be initiated at once, even though General McNaughton would not be able to supply a reasonably firm statement of requirements

*The success in training illiterates to read and write, and to become satisfactory soldiers, is described in the Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap XVI, Appendix "B".

until the end of the year (78). General Stuart then returned to Canada, leaving the Adjutant-General to settle further details. After reporting on his trip to the Cabinet War Committee on 19 Aug the C.G.S. officially submitted these proposals on the following day:

In the light of the proposed offensive operations of the Army Overseas, it has also become necessary to review the provision of reinforcements. Up to the present, reinforcements have been provided on an arbitrary scale based upon the anti-invasion role of the Army. The rates presently in force were not predicated upon the assumption of an offensive role, and the Army Commander considers that reinforcements should be provided on the basis of

(a) In the United Kingdom

- i. Three months reinforcements for all arms and services of the Field Force calculated at "intense" rates. (Of this three months provision, one month will accompany the Field Force.)
- ii. Three months reinforcements for units remaining in the United Kingdom under CMHQ at existing rates.

(b) In Canada

One month's reinforcements for all arms and services of the Field Force at "intense" rates (79).

173. Manpower continued a vexing problem on the Cabinet War Committee's agenda during the ensuing weeks (see paras 191-199). At the meeting of 21 Oct the Minister of National Defence reported on his autumn visit to the Canadian Army Overseas: although he was considering the necessity of General McNaughton's request for additional units no commitments had been made. The impossibility of establishing a definite overseas programme before the end of 1942 had been accepted by General McNaughton as a corollary to the uncertainties of the manpower situation in Canada (see para 188) but agreement had been reached that the 'Third Proposal' of 5 Aug, as amended from time to time, should be the basis for planning and development. However, the target date was moved back from 1 May to 1 Oct 43 (80). Making use of the authority granted by telegram GSD 602, General McNaughton could form additional units on an ad hoc basis (see para 158) to train personnel as army troops but their continuance rested on the availability of manpower to reinforce the Canadian Army Overseas.

174. A further difficulty which now made itself felt was limitation of shipping. The shipping space allotted to the Canadian Army for the period ending 31 Apr 43 would suffice only to complete the authorized reinforcement pool in the United Kingdom and leave First Canadian Army without the rearward units necessary for participation in early operations as the

completely self-contained organization always envisaged by General McNaughton. Therefore, on 15 Nov the C.G.S. despatched the following telegram to General McNaughton:

1. Obviously our plans must be based on information presently available regarding governing factors of manpower and shipping to lead to a practical composition of the First Canadian Army having regard to a target date as early as possible in 1943.
11. The conclusion reached on this review (of manpower) is that we are not justified in making commitments for fresh capital in the form of new units beyond the limitations expressed in Para VI.
111. Consequently and without waiting to end of year we have to accept the conclusion that it is not feasible to plan for a composition of the first Canadian Army such that it could operate wholly independently with all Canadian Base L. of C. and Army troops which after all could seem to be envisaging the ideal.
- IV. As regards shipping....it must be accepted that there is little chance of any increase beyond the allotment now anticipated. If the rate of 5000 per month prevails throughout 1943 it will permit at most of provision of reinforcements for 1943 at battle casualty rate and transportation of units now authorized or their approximate equivalent in numbers. I would point out however that we shall accept any additional shipping space made available even if to fill it means a serious dislocation of our home defence units and formations.
- VI. Based upon above consideration I have recommended and A.G. agrees that our objective as to the strength of the First Canadian Army overseas should be limited first to presently authorized formed and forming units overseas. Second to presently authorized units designed for overseas service formed or forming in Canada. Third to personnel for establishment increase.... Fourth to units that we might be able to make available directly or by conversion from home defence formations. Fifth reinforcements at proposed new battle casualty rate. (81)

175. Following the receipt of this intelligence General McNaughton made a special trip to the War Office on 19 Nov in order to learn from the C.I.G.S. whether he considered the continuance of First Canadian Army to be worthwhile (82). In General Brooke's opinion the First Canadian Army should remain in being but consideration would have to be given to the increasing possibility of one or more divisions being detached to operate as a separate component with a British force (83). General Brooke desired to see the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade brought overseas and suggested that shipping should be easier in a few months.

176. It had already been decided to reorganize the two

armoured divisions on similar lines to those of the British but now General McNaughton was forced to the realization that British organization and establishments would have to be adopted throughout (except for a few minor variations). Only a small saving in manpower was achieved as a result of this reorganization, however, since the reduction in the number of armoured brigades (from four to two) was almost completely offset by the increased requirements for Infantry. The three surplus armoured regiments were utilized to form an ad hoc 3rd Canadian Army Tank Brigade and, following the arrival of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade from Canada, the final size of First Canadian Army was seen as three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and three army tank brigades (84).

177. General McNaughton had taken up the question of shipping space with the War Office and was able to report to the C.G.S. in a telegram of 21 Dec that plans were underway to give the Canadian Army an immediate priority for 10,000 men per month (85). Although a target date had been set for 1 Apr 43 and both the C.I.G.S. and C.-in-C., Home Forces were counting on the bulk of First Canadian Army then being available for an Expeditionary Force, there was no certainty as to when operations actually would begin (86). In view of the shortage of reinforcement holdings top priority was given, therefore, to their despatch from Canada (87).

178. Owing to uncertainty as to the future role of First Canadian Army (CMHQ Report 182 discusses this question in considerable detail) it was not possible at this time to plan in detail for the rearward units that might be required. Accordingly, it was proposed to carry through the reorganization of First Canadian Army in the following order (with effect from 11 Jan 43):

- I. The completion of the five divisions on an organization that would facilitate their employment with a British force.
- II. The completion of the two corps troops and divisional increments, also on British establishments so that they could be used individually in a British force.
- III. The provision of such army troops as would be needed for service with detached corps.
- IV. The provision of other units needed for army, L. of C., and base to the extent which Canada could supply (88).

The first three tasks could be completed with reasonable certainty but the only thing definite about rearward services was the undertaking given by War Office during December to supply up to 9,000 men per division* for the "tail" (89). Units thus to be supplied by the British Army would mainly be anti-aircraft and heavy artillery*, engineer and labour units. It was considered preferable to employ, in this manner, lower category British soldiers than to use the limited shipping space to send such men from Canada.

*The Canadian Army Overseas possessed no heavy artillery units. The British were planning to withdraw anti-aircraft artillery units from A.D.G.B. sites for service with the Field Force.

179. On 6 Jan 43 the Cabinet War Committee was asked to approve the reorganization outlined above, as well as certain changes at home. These were (90):

(a) Overseas

- (i) The organization of an Army of three Inf Divs (each of three Inf Bdes), two Armd Divs (each of an Armd Bde and an Inf Bde) and three Army Tk Bdes (each of three Army Tk Regts), together with Corps Troops, and a Canadian quota of Army and L. of C. units, within the figure mentioned in sub-para (iii) below, augmented by British troops on a scale of 9,000 per Division.
- (ii) The completion of the pool of reinforcements based upon three months overseas at the intense rate.
- (iii) This would involve the despatch of 64,000 during the first 8 months of 1943 which, taking into account normal wastage and the replacement of illiterates, would result in the completed force (including reinforcements overseas) totalling 226,500 less such battle casualties as occur in the meantime.
- (iv) On completion of the foregoing programme, the despatch abroad of 5,000 per month commencing 1 Sep 43 for the maintenance of this force, allowing for battle casualties on the scale of 6 month's intense, 3 months' normal and 3 months at the "no activity" rate.

(b) Canada

- (i) The completion of the already authorized 6, 7 and 8 Divs, Coast and A.A. units and Home War Establishments by 1 SEP 43.
- (ii) The provision in Training Centres of the necessary reinforcements to complete the requirements overseas and in Canada by 1 SEP 43.
- (iii) The provision of one month's reserve to be held in Canada for the Canadian Army overseas (available after 31 Mar 44).
- (iv) Following the provision of the requirements in sub paras (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the reduction in Training Centres of the reinforcements to a number adequate to provide an output of 6,500 per month as replacements for battle casualties for the Army overseas, and normal wastage for the Army in Canada. It will be noted that of the output, 5,000 are required for overseas. This will entail a continuing estimated intake into the Training Centre system of 8,000 per month from 1 SEP 43.
- (v) The following table is an estimate of the distribution of personnel in the Army in Canada in consequence of the above programme:-

	<u>31 Dec 42</u> (19 Dec)	<u>31 Aug 43</u>	<u>31 Mar 44</u>
In H.D. units and formations	64370	88000	88000
In H.W.Es.	73182	88000	88000
In Training, etc.	85512	79000	70500
Units still in Canada	7156	-	-
One month's reserve to be held in Canada for overseas.	-	-	<u>16500</u>
	<u>230220</u>	<u>255000</u>	<u>263000</u>

General Stuart stated that this programme should be adequate but adjustment could be made if casualties proved to be greater.

180. The Cabinet War Committee gave its approval at once. The completion of the overseas portion of this programme—the despatch of 64,000 men prior to 1 Sep 43—would permit a maximum force, including C.M.H.Q. units and reinforcements, of 226,000 all ranks. Further manipulation raised this total to 232,100* which became the accepted 'manpower ceiling'. Within this 'ceiling' the Army Commander could form new units and alter existing establishments subject to the following limitations imposed by telegram C.G.S. 139 of 6 Mar 43:

First, confirming authority must be obtained from N.D.H.Q. as soon as establishments available; second, total strength plus 3 months' reinforcements at intense rate must come within above stated manpower ceiling; third, capital increases must be limited so that estimated reinforcement commitments for battle casualties and wastage over 12 month period subsequent 1 September 43 will not exceed monthly average of 5000.

This was complementary to telegram G.S.D. 602 of 23 Mar 42, which had authorized General McNaughton to create temporary units from reinforcement personnel, and provided for their conversion, where necessary, into C.G.S. 139 units (see para 77). It might be noted that the unfilled portion of the 'manpower ceiling' at any one time became known as the 'contingency reserve'. An additional reserve equal to four per cent of authorized establishments was to be held in the United Kingdom to offset the number of non-effectives at any one time (reduced to three per cent by C.M.H.Q. during March 1943).

181. During June the 'manpower ceiling' was raised to 233,200 all ranks in order to make provision for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion (1100 all ranks) which would be serving as part of the British 6th Airborne Division.

182. It was decided in Ottawa, however, (and communicated to Generals McNaughton and Montague in a telegram of 7 Oct 43) that members of the C.W.A.C. and male personnel not serving with units of the Canadian Army Overseas, such as Canadian Dental Corps detachments with the R.C.A.F. and personnel on loan to the British Army, should be included within the 'manpower ceiling' (93). The greatest complaint centred around the C.W.A.C. since, in the popular mind, they had been recruited to replace soldiers. British experience had shown that five (female) members of the A.T.S. (Auxiliary Territorial Service) were required to replace four soldiers and, therefore, according to those at C.M.H.Q., the Ottawa decision was unfair.***

*The difference was made up largely by a decision to absorb overseas 4000 illiterates whom it had been intended to replace.

**Nursing Sisters were members of the R.C.A.M.C. and, as such always had been accepted as counting against the 'manpower ceiling'.

***During his visit overseas in July 1943 the C.G.S. expressed the opinion that the then 260 odd members of the C.W.A.C. in the United Kingdom should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling'.

183. Furthermore, back on 7 Jul 43 Colonel L.M. Chesley pointed out to the C.G.S. that the holding in Canada of one month's reinforcements for overseas, as approved by the Cabinet War Committee, no longer was included in the 'manpower ceilings'. In effect, however, this additional reserve existed in the N.R.M.A. personnel posted to operational units in Canada and available for despatch overseas if necessary. As Colonel Chesley pointed out, however:

We could not very easily keep a large group of 15,000 N.R.M.A. personnel indefinitely segregated for possible employment abroad at some future date, and I presume that the abandonment of the original intention was due to this factor (95).

v - Recruiting and National Selective Service, 1942

184. The revised 1942 Army manpower programme was based on an intake of 7,250 recruits for each of the 22 training periods, or 13,500 'A' and 'R' soldiers per month (96). Training wastage was high, and it was estimated that a monthly intake of 8,000 volunteers would be required to produce 5,000 trained reinforcements of "A" category, capable of proceeding overseas as such or as members of units destined for service with First Canadian Army. The balance would fall by the way-side as follows: 10 per cent discharged from the Basic Training Centres and a further 10 per cent with a lowered medical category absorbed into the Home War Establishment; of those continuing to Advanced Training Centres 10 per cent discharged on medical grounds and another 10 per cent absorbed into home defence operational units, as no longer acceptable for overseas service*. Thus, only 64 per cent of those accepted from civilian life became available for overseas service.

(cont'd from page 81)

This prompted the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. to obtain the following explanation from Brigadier Beament (D.A.G.):

... The existence of C.W.A.C. imposed a special CWAC overhead, which would not exist if soldiers were employed, thus, the number of individuals employed in London by reason of the employment of CWAC is greater than the number that would be necessary if men only were employed, the excess being the personnel required to administer and housekeep for the CWAC. This additional overhead is inherent in the nature of the Service.

It will be necessary, therefore, if CWAC are to be counted against the manpower ceiling, for a percentage to be based on the personnel which would be available to take the place of soldiers in the Order of Battle (94).

General Stuart remained determined, however, that one member of the C.W.A.C. would replace one soldier when employed within a unit.

*The rather alarming fact was disclosed during September that the number of men actually being trained at Basic Training Centres was considerably less than the intake: only 14,784 of the 16,677 'A' recruits and 4,824 of the 5,947 'R' recruits (97).

185. Voluntary recruiting during the normally lean winter months had been stimulated by the entrance of Japan into the War. A certain amount of enthusiasm also had resulted from the trans-Canada tour of a 15-car "Army Train", visited by just over 800,000 people during the period of 3 Feb-10 May (98). The "Army Day" of the previous June (see para 94) became an "Army Week" (29 Jun-5 Jul) featuring "open house" at Training Centres and military parades by both Canadian and visiting American personnel: a good deal of advertising and publicity was contributed by private business firms (99).

186. Compulsory enrolment had dropped behind as deficiencies between the numbers called and the numbers reporting for military training increased. In June it was believed that the 6th Division could be completed by mid-July 1942 and the remainder of the home defence units by October (100). Even with the issuance of Supplementary Requisitions in July and September (and each succeeding month up to and including April 1943) and the lowering of the call up age from 21 to 20 (those born in 1920) by Orders in Council P.C. 5840 and 5841 of 7 Jul, however, insufficient men were actually enrolled (101). (In a further effort to obtain the maximum number of men from callable classes Order in Council P.C. 2229 of 23 Mar 42 had authorized District Registrars to offer free medical and dental treatment to men who otherwise would be rejected for hernia, defective teeth and other remedial conditions if they would consent to be enrolled (or enlist) in the Canadian Army later).

187. The following table gives the enlistments and enrolments during these months and should be studied with the above paragraphs in mind:

	<u>Voluntary Enlistments</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>N.R.M.A. Enrolments</u>
January	8594	1988	7331
February	6892	1591	4928
March	6792	1824	5292
April	9467	1791	6733
May	9581	2524	6385
June	9248	1649	4770

188. By mid-July the manpower situation had become a serious problem and the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General should proceed to the United Kingdom to hold personal discussions with General McNaughton (see para 166). On 17 Jul Mr Ralston told a special meeting that the time had now approached when the manpower needs of the army could be met only by curtailing non-essential industry and replacing physically fit workers elsewhere by women or men not physically fit for military service. He explained that demands were greater than originally anticipated because of the heavy wastage in training, lag in training schedules and the increased demands for home defence occasioned by the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The Minister of Munitions and Supply expressed the hope that the overall number of persons in essential war industry (910,000) would remain fairly constant while the Minister of Agriculture noted that the number of agricultural workers had decreased by 12 per cent during 1940-41 and that the present total was necessary to maintain the level of agricultural production. The Minister of National War Services pointed out that even though the age groups subject to military training had been extended to include all those single men aged 20-40 inclusive the majority now sought deferment when furnished with call-up notices. In the 35-40 age group not more than 7000-10,000 recruits could be anticipated from the 93,000 available; out of 140,000 in the age group 30-35 some 20,000-25,000 might be obtained; out of 100,000 in the 20 year group some 20,000 might be obtained

for the Army (in the face of active competition from the Navy and R.C.A.F.). In short, the numbers actually available were far less than the statistics would indicate. The Minister of Labour stated that the curtailment of non essential industry was the obvious step, but the Prime Minister decided that the problem should be referred to the Cabinet Manpower Committee for a further report.

189. At the meeting of the full Cabinet on 31 Jul it was agreed, upon the recommendation of Prime Minister King, that the Employment Service of the Unemployment Insurance Commission be transferred to the Department of Labour and strengthened in personnel so that it might handle National Selective Service. During the two or three months required for this reorganization the National War Service Boards would continue but thereafter their functions of selection and postponement would be transferred to the Employment Service (under the Director of National Selective Service) and the Boards become appellate tribunals, responsible to the Department of Justice for hearing appeals.

190. Agricultural and labour priorities divisions had been established but not until July were instructions issued for employers to hire individuals only through an Employment Office (except for agriculture and certain allied tasks) (102). The so-called "DRASTIC CONTROL OF CANADA'S MANPOWER" announced by the press for 1 Sep proved to be little more than the establishment of a schedule of labour priorities—very high, high, low or none—for industries as a whole and for certain selected firms (103). So-called labour "poaching" was to be checked by a regulation which forced both employers and employees in most trades to give seven days' notice of separation from employment. Canada was moving along the road of industrial and labour controls but, as was pointed out by The Ottawa Journal on 2 Sep, the general opinion was that there could not be a real mobilization of manpower without outright military conscription.

191. Army Manpower Memorandum No. 5 of 8 Aug was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 17 Sep, at which time the manpower requirements of the Navy, R.C.A.F. and industry also received attention. Mr Ralston emphasized that the reinforcement situation would be serious for the next few months and that it might prove necessary to withdraw "active" soldiers from Canada: no allowance had been made for casualties occurring before 1 Apr 43 but wastage during this period had been estimated as being 41,802 all ranks. Mr Elliott M. Little, Director of National Selective Service believed that there was still a substantial manpower pool (427,000 fit males) but that it would remain inaccessible unless drastic action were taken to curtail civilian employment. It was decided that Mr Little and Mr Donald Gordon, Chairman, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, should make detailed studies of the situation.

192. At the next meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 23 Sep both Mr Little and Mr Gordon submitted reports (104). Mr Little suggested that almost 50,000 men and women would be needed monthly for the Armed Forces and war industry until 30 Apr 43 and argued that the only way to obtain them was by curtailing employment in non-essential industry. In addition to the fact that the Navy, Army and R.C.A.F. were unable to fill their monthly quotas there were 100,000 unfilled jobs posted with the Employment Offices. The only untapped source of workers was women. Apart from the curtailment of non-essential industry there would have to be a more efficient utilization of the men already in uniform and in essential industry. Mr Little believed that it would be necessary to

release 11 per cent of the labour force in non-essential industry, or 27 per cent of its male labour force,* as well as withdrawing workers from agriculture. The introduction into industry of part-time workers and the transfer of workers from one seasonal job to another were being studied (105).

193. Mr Gordon's study was based on the implications of the Little Memorandum and argued that the only way to get 50,000 more bodies per month would be by direct draft, irrespective of the dislocation caused to industry and commerce (106). Since many so-called civilian services and supplies were used both by industry and the Armed Forces, however, it would be difficult to plan their curtailment. Implementing Mr Little's programme would result in the withdrawal of practically every able-bodied man, aged 16-44, from all industries and services which could be regarded as non-essential and would leave Canada with a "Spartan-like" standard of living. The following situation was envisaged by Mr Gordon: widespread rationing (by coupon) of consumer goods; disappearance of certain goods from the market when the existing supply was exhausted; decline in the quality of goods; dislocation in supply due to production curtailment in certain areas; simplification and standardization of products; industry concentrated in those plants where manpower could most readily be made available; certain exports (newsprint, furs, rye whiskey) would be curtailed; increased domestic subsidies necessary to offset the increased costs resulting from lowered production; inequitable treatment of certain firms within an industry would be unavoidable. The administrative burden would be tremendous and industry would have to release top executives to serve as controllers. Such a system of regimentation could be made to work only if the co-operation of industry were secured and the Canadian people made to understand that drastic controls over their lives were necessary.

194. The Minister of Munitions and Supply protested that such action would create a crisis, while the Minister of Finance pointed out that the public's attitude would have to undergo changes. Two days later (25 Sep) the Cabinet instructed that National Selective Service should be empowered to make available to the Armed Forces and war industry the numbers of men required but without taking such drastic action as to dislocate the nation's economy. On 29 Sep the Cabinet agreed on the extent to which the Wartime Prices and Trade Board should exert control over civilian life and industry. For example, on 14 October the Cabinet War Committee agreed that action should be taken to curtail gold mining.

195. Following their return from the United Kingdom Mr Ralston and General Stuart were presented (on 19 Oct) with further manpower estimates by the Adjutant-General (107). Even though a definite decline had been noticeable since 29 Aug, voluntary enlistments still were adequate. Compulsory enrolment

*Men could be removed from subsistence and sub-marginal employment, chiefly on farms which produced only enough for a bare living or whose produce was non-essential (e.g. flower gardens), and reductions could be made in the following employments--gold mining (10,000), pulp and paper (9000), construction and maintenance (25,000), wholesale and retail trade (35,000), taxi drivers (9,000), personal services (11,000), and banking, investment insurance and real estate (15,000).

was insufficient, however, even though Order in Council P.C. 8919 of 30 Sep had made 19 year olds (born in 1923) subject to military training. In a further memorandum dated 21 Oct the Adjutant-General summarized the results of N.R.M.A. Requisitions from 20 Mar 41 (when the four months training programme commenced) to 9 Oct 42 as follows (108):

Requisitioned (including 30-day recruits recalled)		132,390
Reported	107,671	
Rejected (15.6% of number reported)	<u>16,836</u>	
Accepted (84.4% of number reported)		<u>90,835</u>
Deficiency (31.4% of number requisitioned)		41,555

According to the Adjutant-General "exactly 40,000" of the deficiency had resulted since May 1942. In addition to the fact that even Supplementary Requisitions were not producing the required number of men was the fact that the percentage of men rejected by the R.C.A.M.C. was now quite large*.

196. Mr Ralston reiterated his worries over the reinforcement situation during the course of the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 4 Nov and urged that requisitioning of N.R.M.A. personnel should be accelerated. At the meeting of 18 Nov he read an Army memorandum which had been prepared by the Director of Requirements (Colonel J.A. deLalanne) (110). Whereas the Army planners had assumed that 159,750 men would be enlisted or enrolled into the Canadian Army between 8 Aug 42 and 30 Apr 43 to complete the Canadian Army Overseas (both establishments and reinforcements) and provide a total strength at home and abroad of 474,786 all ranks** plus 4,949 members of the C.W.A.C., it now seemed likely that there would be a shortage of 30,000 men. This could be overcome only if an additional 5,000 men were obtained during each of the next six months. Any change in the situation would depend upon the speed with which National Selective Service could take over the complete administration from the Department of National War Services. During the year ending 30 Apr 44 some 90,000 men would be required to replace battle casualties and normal wastage, build up a reserve of 12,000 in Canada and provide for increases totalling 16,500. As a result of training and normal wastage, however, some 25,500 men would be returned to civilian life and decrease the net drain on manpower to approximately 64,500.

197. It was considered that total strength of the three Armed Forces on 30 Apr 43 should be 689,086 men; allowing for discharges during the three and a half years of war this would indicate that a total of 814,000 men had been enlisted or enrolled, or appointed to commissioned rank, since 1939. The cumulative total strength of the Armed Forces would have to reach 980,000 men to provide the required actual strength of

*The 21st N.R.M.A. Requisition of 4 Aug 42 called for 20,000 men to report during the period 14 Sep-9 Oct 42. Only 7982 men actually reported, however, and 2434 of these were rejected by the R.C.A.M.C., although passed as physically fit by civilian practitioners. Actual shortages, therefore, totalled 14,452 men (109).

**Includes Nursing Sisters, R.C.A.M.C.

769,736 all ranks by 30 Apr 44. By that time cumulative enlistments and enrolments would have taken 8.7 per cent of the total population (projected actual strength would be only 6.82 per cent) as compared with 8 per cent in the United Kingdom and 7 per cent in the United States. Total enlistments and enrolments during the First World War had been 649,636* but the population of military age had increased only by 25 per cent (against a general increase of 47 per cent) and, moreover, there had then been only 250,000 Canadians engaged in war industry whereas there now (1942) were 900,000 men and women so employed. Thus there already was almost a 30 per cent increase over 1918 in the relative numbers of those in the Armed Forces and war industry. A further, and different, complication was the fact that the availability of shipping space was limited. Therefore the following conclusions were drawn:

- (a) The present Army Programme cannot be increased.
- (b) The present manpower pool of single men, even with a generous increase of women serving in the Armed Forces, is insufficient to supply the needed men for the present Army programme.
- (c) The manpower pool must be enlarged by the introduction of the 18-year olds and married men.
- (d) Even with the above, a sufficient number of men will be difficult to obtain without a more rigid enforcement of the N.R.M.A.
- (e) Rigid economy in the use of manpower in Depots, Training Centres, and H.W.E's. must be exercised to release men for Overseas, and thus improve the reinforcement situation.
- (f) The maximum employment of civilians of non military age and category is necessary.
- (g) It is essential to formulate a policy which will preclude further capital commitments Overseas and in Canada; and while it might be the ideal to provide an Army with all the perquisites by way of Army, Corps and L. of C. Troops in order to fight independently and in any theatre of war without assistance of British or other troops, this cannot be provided for from the present apparent manpower pool and, therefore, it will be necessary to adjust the Army in such a way that it would fit into the manpower picture.
- (h) The control of the size of the Army must be so rigid that only in most extreme or urgent circumstances should requests be granted for new formations or units, or for increases in existing formations or units.

*This must include Canadians who enlisted in British and other Forces, since only 628,462 men served in the Canadian Forces during the First World War.

- (i) If from an operational standpoint, a new formation or unit is required, it should be restricted to a conversion of an existing formation or unit.
- (j) If conditions regarding the release of manpower from non essential industry are materially changed and in this way more manpower becomes available, or if by the exercise of greater enforcement of the N.R.M.A. additional men are found, further consideration might be given to further demands--not otherwise. On the other hand, if experience shows that the present estimates of available manpower are too optimistic, it may necessitate a downward adjustment of the present Army programme (111).

198. After reading this memorandum to the Cabinet War Committee (18 Nov) Mr Ralston went on to point out that unless units in Canada were completed with N.R.M.A. personnel it would not be possible to send sufficient "general service" men overseas. Present deficiencies in Canada, he continued, were 31 per cent of the 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions, 24 per cent in coast defence units, 19 per cent in Basic Training Centres and nine per cent in Advanced Training Centres. He argued that one of the major causes for the deficiencies was "non enforcement" against defaulters: others were the system of medical examination by local practitioners and incompleteness of the present registration which was getting so out of date that many notices could not be delivered.

199. Agreement was reached that vigorous action should be taken against defaulters and that blanket proclamations should be made, covering all those in the callable age groups who previously had escaped attention. The Army's willingness to accept a proportion of 'R' recruits in medical categories 'B-1' and 'B-2' was noted and it was agreed that henceforth the R.C.A.M.C. should conduct initial medical examinations.* It was further

*During the winter of 1942 the Minister of National War Services (now Maj.-Gen. L.R. LaFleche) had endeavoured to persuade the Army to enrol men for home defence with medical categories lower than "A". Seemingly, however, the issue had been closed by Mr Ralston's letter of 29 Apr that sufficient "B" and "C" category men were obtained from the training stream to meet requirements.

By autumn the manpower situation had deteriorated sufficiently for the Adjutant-General to suggest to Mr Ralston (5 Nov) that all men placed in category "B" by civilian practitioners should be recalled for examination by R.C.A.M.C. doctors. On 11 and 14 Nov 42 the Minister of National War Services was requested to include such men in forthcoming Requisitions.

Although N.D.H.Q. had wished to enrol men with medical categories "B-1" and "B-2" only until the immediate deficiency was met it proved necessary to accept it as a permanent arrangement. Henceforth, up to 15 per cent of those enrolled might be taken from those given a "B" category by R.C.A.M.C. boards. (As of 15 Dec 42 civilian medical revision boards had ceased to operate, except in isolated communities, and the whole work of medical examination devolved on the R.C.A.M.C.)

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