

A further telegram of 10 Mar 45, from General Foulkes, in response to a request from Ottawa for further information regarding reinforcement shortages, included a statement that:

... Bns during a battle have from time to time had to reorganize on a three coy basis since otherwise the rifle coys might have been insufficiently strong for the dictates of the tactical situation. The majority of casualties during action are in the rifle coys and may on occasions be largely from one coy. Therefore when a bn is deficient a hundred or so riflemen which is roughly one quarter its effective fighting strength it follows that some reorganization is necessary. Whether the bn is reorganized on a three coy basis or not is decided by the bn comd on the basis of the existing tactical situation. Since this would be a local bn arrangement no record is available. There is no knowledge at this Hq of any bns in this corps reorganizing on a two coy basis but owing to Goldflake further investigation at this time is impracticable (294).

8. The Army Commander had replied somewhat earlier that there had been several cases of battalions being reduced to three rifle companies, or even two companies in a couple of instances, due to heavy casualties in a single operation (295). An example of the latter appears in the war diary of The South Saskatchewan Regiment of 29 Aug 44, when this battalion was trying to advance under constant mortar and artillery fire through the Forêt de la Londe towards Rouen:

... The section of D Coy which was approx half D Coys strength of 19 men, moved up to take an outpost posn at 091042. The men never got that far as they came under heavy SA fire and the Germans then threw in a counter attack on D Coys front which drove the sec back to its original posn, where, with the help of B Coy and tanks, they beat off the counter attack. Word then came through that the planned attack by Fus MR and the Cam of C was postponed. At 1400 hrs the fighting strength of the bn was approx 60 ORs with Major E.W. Thomas as Commanding Officer, Capt. H.P. Williams in charge A Coy, Lt N.A. Sharpe in charge B Coy, CSM Smith in charge C Coy, Lt F. Lee in charge D Coy and Sgt Fisher S.E. acting as bn IO. Word was then sent to F Ech to send up carrier pl, less vehs, as reinforcements. The carrier pl of 20 men arrived at 1430 hrs and was despatched to coys.

During the afternoon two officers and 15 other ranks arrived as further reinforcements. After a withdrawal, night found the remnants of the rifle companies organized into two groups and concentrated about a monastery on some high ground. The enemy having pulled back during the night in accordance with his overall plan, after breakfast The South Saskatchewan Regiment once again reformed four rifle companies -- 23 men in "A" Company, 21 in "B" Company, nine in "C" Company and 12 in "D" Company (296).

9. The official history of the Algonquin Regiment has this to say of the brief rest period experienced after the Falaise Gap was closed:

... Of the original 800 or so officers and men who had landed at Courseulles, we had already lost eleven officers and 234 other ranks killed,

wounded and taken prisoner . . . It had been a costly campaign so far, and doubly so in that we had not as yet received any reinforcements. A sweep through the echelons to release all but the most necessary key personnel did something to relieve the situation, but the sad fact remained we were still operating with only three rifle companies instead of four, and these companies were averaging only about sixty-five men in total strength. To take up the slack, the carrier platoon was called upon on many occasions to do yeoman's work, and they performed every task with a dash and gallantry that savoured of the old cavalry spirit....

The mortar platoon had not had a great deal of employment after we left Hubert Folie, except for the splendid, but short-lived, task of the two detachments on the fatal hill, and on one other occasion on Hill 240. From now on, however, they were to take a larger and more important part in the battalion's operation. Our pioneers had periodically been called upon for mine-sweeping tasks and for assistance in maintaining bridge-sites, but again their full resources had not been called into play. The anti-tank lads had had a few good shoots, and had performed a strong part in our defensive perimeters. Unlike the other specialist platoons, their work was to go into virtual eclipse for a time during the pursuit phase, and while the fighting over the polders was in progress, but their day too was to return. All in all, Support Coy was to prove a reliable mainstay for the weakened rifle companies in the month or so ahead (297).

APPENDIX "M" - THE CANADIAN GENERAL STAFF

The following two articles by Mr. Grant Dexter appeared in The Winnipeg Free Press of 7 and 8 Dec 44 and are reproduced as an example of how one well-informed newspaperman looked at the "conscription crisis" which was being weathered by the Canadian Government.

RESPONSIBILITY AND FAILURE

OTTAWA: If the present sitting of Parliament was more than a special conscription session much would be heard about what is commonly spoken of on Parliament Hill as 'the breakdown of the General Staff.'

Public interest has been focussed first on the conscription issue and, second, upon the fate of the Government. While these points remained in doubt, the members of all parties appear to have decided against raising other and, by contrast, much less important issues. There has been a feeling that nothing should be done to distract or confuse the public mind.

But now that conscription has been adopted and the Government is reasonably assured of a good majority, there is a strong tendency to sort out the information laid before Parliament since November 22, and to attempt to bring about administrative changes which, on the evidence, are long overdue. Among these lesser questions, the most important has to do with the efficiency of the general staff.

The evidence as it now stands in Hansard — chiefly in the Ralston resignation correspondence and the speeches of Mr. King and Mr. Ralston — clearly indicates that there was a breakdown or failure in the general staff in 1944. As a result of this failure this country was plunged without warning into the conscription crisis. The crisis not only caught the Government entirely unprepared — indeed convinced that all was well with the army — but was so urgent that there was not time for remedial measures. And as everyone concedes the sincerity of the generals, the only possible conclusion is that although it was their job to administer the Canadian army, at home and overseas, they were profoundly ignorant of vital facts.

The key to this aspect of the conscription crisis will be found in Mr. King's letter to Mr. Ralston on November 3 (the resignation correspondence). Mr. King plainly could not grasp the urgency of the need of reinforcements. He was dubious of Mr. Ralston's case. In this letter he explained why. The war committee of the cabinet, of which Mr. King is the chairman, had invariably summoned the chiefs of the general staff to discuss all important increases in the size of the army. On every occasion the general staff had asserted, without qualification, that the army could be supported by the voluntary system. Mr. King said assurances were given to the Government by the general staff in the first week of August, 1944, that additional military commitments then under consideration would not adversely affect the reinforcement position.

'I have never agreed,' Mr. King wrote, 'to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking, and receiving, assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements.'

* * *

In his reply, Mr. Ralston pointed out that whatever the general staff had said, he, personally, had never excluded conscription. Both in public and in cabinet he had always said that conscription might be necessary. Mr. King, later on, agreed that this was true of Mr. Ralston. But the Prime Minister over and over again drove home the point that the general staff had always been positive and dogmatic in its opinion that the voluntary system would suffice. In his letter of November 10, Mr. King said assurances had been specifically given at the time (August) by the chief of the general staff to the war committee of the cabinet that the reinforcement position was satisfactory. 'The assurance sought and given had direct reference to the state of the reinforcement pool.' Mr. King went on to point out that at the Quebec conference in September the cabinet had conferred with the general staff and not a word had been said about a shortage of reinforcements.

Mr. Ralston countered this point by saying that the Quebec conference was concerned only with the Pacific war. But Mr. King returned to his point. Was it not common sense that if there was a critical shortage of reinforcements, the general staff would tell the Government about it — whether or no there was an item of this kind on the conference agenda? Why keep the Government in the dark? Was this not a matter of the most vital importance — far transcending the plans of a future campaign in the Pacific — not only to the Government but to the country? Why would the generals bottle up within their own breasts a problem which would plunge the country into the most serious political crisis? Why do so when they were powerless to solve it?

* * *

In his speech of November 27, Mr. King returned to this point. He retold the facts as to the war cabinet consultation with the general staff on August 7. 'The Government,' he said, 'was given the most direct assurance at that time by the chief of staff that there was no need for considering the question of additional reinforcements for overseas by compulsion.' Mr. King repeated his earlier statement that the Government had always consulted the military experts with respect to reinforcements. The general staff invariably had declared there was no danger of a failure of the voluntary system. 'Along with the rest of my colleagues, I have accepted these representations in the best of faith.'

Mr. Ralston, who followed Mr. King in the debate, did his best to defend the general staff. But, as will be shown in a later article, Mr. Ralston's speech was the most damning indictment of the generals. Indeed, it was Mr. Ralston's speech, rather than Mr. King's, which shocked members of the House of Commons, irrespective of party. For, while Mr. Ralston sought only to defend the general staff, his narrative of events from August onward proved that the critical shortage in reinforcements was discovered not by the generals but by himself — the minister, and a civilian. Mr. Ralston sincerely regretted that he had not found out the facts much earlier than he did.

FRUITS OF INCOMPETENCE

OTTAWA: In his speech in the House of Commons on November 29, Mr. Ralston sought to defend the general staff. But he also gave a detailed account of how the conscription crisis arose. At particular points he met Mr. King's criticisms of the generals but, on balance, his own story was not helpful but conclusively and finally critical. It is fair to say, however, that Mr. Ralston appeared to be unconscious of the effect his words produced on the House.

Mr. Ralston disagreed with Mr. King on the nature of the advice given by the general staff on August 7, but (page 6823, unrevised Hansard) said that on August 3 the chief of staff had reported 'the over-all reinforcement position as entirely satisfactory.'

Mr. Ralston recalled advice that had been given to the cabinet in June, indicating a possible shortage of infantry in October. But he overlooked his own statement to Parliament on July 10 (page 4751) in which he said: '... We have overseas a large reinforcement pool, and that pool is calculated on a scale to provide reinforcements for a certain number of months of intense operations.' He believed there were already on hand sufficient volunteers to maintain the overseas armies 'right up to the calendar year end.' Present recruiting — that is, June, July and later months — was for 1945. The reinforcement position, according to his officers, was better than called for in the plans. There were many qualifications in his speech — because Mr. Ralston never made the error of his general staff in this regard — but the impression left on the House was that the voluntary system was working well.

* * *

As the story unfolded, it became clearer that Mr. Ralston, in looking back over August and September, came to realize that, because of the advice given to him by the generals, he had been living in a fool's paradise. There had been a cable in August saying that the infantry situation was serious. The general staff reported, however, that two-thirds of the shortage could be made up in six days and the balance

in two weeks. Everything would be fixed up in three weeks.

Recollection of this cable evidently rankled in Mr. Ralston's mind. As put before him by the general staff, it was just a minor matter. He said that he merely initialed the cable and handed it back to the chief of staff. He didn't even report it to cabinet. He did report it, however, in October.

But later on he realized that he had had no conception of how serious the situation was. 'As a matter of fact,' he said, 'if I had known as much then (in August) as I know now, I would have realized that this meant it would be unlikely that the pools would be built up.' The experts who should have known -- the general staff -- either were in ignorance of the facts or withheld the information.

In September, Mr. Ralston became concerned over the reinforcement situation. A report had come in from overseas on the infantry position. But, apparently, Mr. Ralston could not find out from the general staff what the position was. The headquarters of the army -- the National Defence department -- was incapable of supplying this basic information.

* * *
No statement made in the House of Commons has caused greater astonishment and dismay among members than the passage in Mr. Ralston's speech which follows: 'I should pause here to say that we in Canada do not keep records of the pools (reinforcement pools) in the United Kingdom and Italy.' In a word, no one at defence headquarters knew about, or was responsible for, the most important feature of the army -- how it stood with regard to support.

Because he was concerned, Mr. Ralston flew to Europe on September 23. He was shocked by what he found.

'I cut a trip which would have taken six or seven weeks, at least, down to three and a half weeks. When I got back to London from the continent I stayed only three days, in order that I might come home immediately.' He continued: 'I wish to say to you that it came as a shock to me, too, when I went to the battle areas. And when I came back to CMHQ (London) and went over the figures there with the officers, and found what I believed was a situation requiring radical measures, I came home and so reported.'

That this report to cabinet would have been justified much earlier is not disputed by anyone. That the delay in making the report exposed the overseas army to a serious lack of reinforcements, is demonstrated by the facts of the crisis. This delay explains why the shortage could only be met by the few thousand N.R.M.A. men who, of all those in uniform, were trained and ready to go into battle. If the shortage had been detected in August, there would have been two months of additional leeway.

No one regretted the delay in realizing the seriousness of the shortage more than Mr. Ralston.

'... I admit quite frankly,' he said (page 6825) 'that had the situation been as I discovered since, and as I reported it to the cabinet after I came back, certainly I would have reported it at once. All I can say is that the fact that I did not know it and did not report it sooner means that I did not sooner recommend the action that I did. I would have done it just that much quicker had I known what was the situation.'

What shocked the members of the House of Commons is that the general staff, in this crisis, failed to keep the minister advised with respect to the position of the overseas army. In the end, as Mr. Ralston made clear, a civilian minister, an amateur in military matters, had a hunch that things were amiss. He acted on his hunch and the moment he came into contact with the situation overseas, realized the gravity of it, flew home and brought the facts to the cabinet table. To all intents and purposes, there might just as well have been no general staff at all. In this matter, they were asleep on the beat. Their incompetence prejudiced the purpose they existed to serve.

These facts, no doubt, explain in part the announcement on November 18 of the retirement of Lt.-Gen. Kenneth Stuart, the chief of staff. There will, however, be disappointment on Parliament Hill if the shake-up stops there.

APPENDIX "N" - CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

1. Neither the National War Service Regulations, nor the National Selective Service Regulations which replaced them, required Doukhobors, Mennonites and other Conscientious Objectors to undergo compulsory military training. Mobilization Boards might grant postponement until further notice to such men:

- (a) If upon application for a postponement order, the Board was satisfied that the applicant was a member of the denomination of Christians called Mennonites or a member of the community of Doukhobors.
- (b) If membership in the above organization had been continuous or without interruption.
- (c) If the applicant who claimed to be a Doukhobor or Mennonite resided in Canada without interruption.
- (d) If upon application for a postponement order the Board was satisfied that the applicant conscientiously objected, by reason of religious training or belief, to war in any form or to the taking of human life (298).

2. On 3 Apr 41, however, the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval to a scheme for Alternative Service, in National Parks. Later, the scheme was extended to agriculture and lumbering projects sponsored either by the federal Department of Mines and Resources or the British Columbia Department of Lands and Forests. Work camps were provided for those directed to the latter and the men received \$25.00 a month and board, the remainder of their wages going to the Red Cross (299). Effective 1 May 43 the whole Alternative Service scheme was transferred from National Selective Service's Mobilization Regulations to its Civilian Regulations.

3. As of 25 May 43 Mobilization Boards had postponed 4747 men as Mennonites, Doukhobors and Conscientious Objectors. The number of men employed in work camps had been reduced to a minimum, until there were only 500 engaged in Pacific coastal protection work and 400 located in seven interior camps from British Columbia to Ontario. The bulk of the men were engaged in agricultural production under the direction of National Selective Service officials, at local employment offices (300).

4. With every source of manpower for the Armed Forces, industry and agriculture being investigated during the summer of 1943, the Minister of National Defence directed that a special committee should be established to study the employment of conscientious objectors (301). An announcement was made in the House of Commons on 14 Jul that they would be employed in hospitals in Canada (302). However, letters exchanged between National Selective Service and the D.G.M.S. on 21 and 22 Jul indicated a readiness by Medical Services to employ conscientious objectors in non-combatant duties, such as was being done in the United Kingdom and United States (303). A number of conscientious objectors had volunteered for general service, and a small number had been enlisted but had not always had an easy time of it. Most of the members of the Committee, meeting on 23 Jul, were opposed to the enlistment of conscientious objectors but the D.D.G.M.S. (A) pointed out that the R.C.A.M.C. was experiencing difficulty finding a good type of man, after the needs of the fighting arms had been met, and considered

that this might be an answer. Agreement was finally reached that conscientious objectors should be enlisted for non-combatant duties, but only by the R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C. (304). An undertaking to serve anywhere would go a long way towards neutralizing any demoralizing effect that their privileged position might have on other soldiers, and on civilians who were clamouring for N.R.M.A. soldiers to be returned to civilian employment. Authority for such action was Order in Council P.C. 7251 of 16 Sep 43. On 27 Sep a circular letter was despatched to G.Os.C.-in-C. and D.Os.C. setting forth the conditions under which men were to be accepted for restricted enlistment (not transferable to other corps). Among these was the following:

Conscientious objectors accepted for service as such are to be treated as ordinary soldiers in every respect, except that they will not be required to bear arms under any circumstances. Training will be carried out under special arrangements at the R.C.A.M.C. training centre (305).

5. As a trial measure arrangements were made to enlist a group of 200 from among those men who should volunteer (306). Details of this plan were circularized among the 7000 odd men who had received postponements as conscientious objectors (307). A total of 227 conscientious objectors served in the Canadian Army under this scheme, probably 70 per cent of them having undergone Alternative Service prior to enlistment (308).

6. So that any conscientious objectors who volunteered for service with the R.C.A.M.C. and then failed to pass the medical examination should not be absolved from returning to Alternative Service a supplementary instruction was issued on 21 Jan 44 that they should not be issued with Rejection Certificates; instead they were to be referred back to the appropriate National Selective Service official (309).

7. Another problem was the "self-styled conscientious objector" who had been enrolled in the Army and then refused to "soldier" in the hope of obtaining a discharge (310). The facts were, however, that either Mobilization Boards had rejected the claim of such men to be conscientious objectors or no such claim had been advanced prior to enrolment. Representatives of the National Selective Service meeting with Brigadier deLalanne on 30 Jun 44 reached an agreement that

When a soldier who is a self-styled conscientious objector is discharged from the Army under C.A.R.O. 1029 (12) "Services no longer required", the Registrar shall be so advised by letter of the date and place of his discharge in sufficient time, should he so desire, to have the man served with an Order Medical Examination immediately his discharge is carried out (311).

If the discharged soldier then applied for postponement on the grounds of being a conscientious objector, and was recognized as such by a Mobilization Board, he would be ordered to perform Alternative Service. If he did not so apply, or if his application was rejected, the Army would again accept him for enrolment, provided that he was not otherwise unacceptable. The procedure to be followed was set forth in the Department of Labour's Circular Memorandum No. 1051 of 18 Aug 44, designed to interpret National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations (312). Since the number of men involved was quite small it was decided within the Adjutant-General's Branch to settle each case on its merits rather than issue a general instruction (313).

APPENDIX "O" - PROVISION OF TRADESMEN

1. Sooner or later every nation participating in a modern war is faced with the problems of whether skilled tradesmen may best be employed in uniform or essential industry, what proportion may be withdrawn from the civilian economy without endangering essential services and how many unskilled men will have to be trained by the Armed Forces. The fact that the Canadian Army initially was composed of volunteers was merely an added complication.

2. At the outset Army requirements were met from skilled tradesmen who volunteered for overseas service and had merely to be instructed in the military aspects of their new employment. In a number of cases, local arrangements were made to have this instruction given in the workshops maintained by commercial and industrial firms for their own requirements. In an effort to avoid complaints from industry and conserve a proper balance in the national economy, the recruiting instructions issued from time to time directed that recruiting officers should not enlist tradesmen in excess of the numbers actually required by units (314). However, the whole picture was changed by the rapid expansion during the summer of 1940. With the exception of the Canadian Signals Training Centre, which was able to attract skilled men from the Bell Telephone Company and the several electrical companies, C.A.S.F. training centres and units were soon faced with a shortage of tradesmen(315).

3. The high wages now paid by industry and the indefiniteness of Army requirements were major contributing factors, which might have been remedied by an appeal to patriotic motives but for General Crerar's conviction that the man producing equipment was contributing just as much to the war effort at the moment as the man in uniform (316). Even though a number of semi-silled men were still enlisting it seemed obvious that the Army would soon have to arrange for the complete training of the tradesmen it required.

4. During the summer of 1940 the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Programme had been broadened into a War Emergency Training Programme. In addition to continuing its youth training centres, the Federal Government made arrangements with the educational authorities of all the provinces, except tiny Prince Edward Island, whereby skilled workers might be trained in the vocational shops of local technical schools (317). During the late autumn arrangements were concluded between N.D.H.Q. and the Department of Labour for sufficient vacancies on these trades courses to be reserved for soldiers (318). More specialized training would be continued at the R.C.O.C. Training Centre at Barriefield, which was being expanded, and a new Canadian Army Trades School slated for Hamilton (319). Army trades training was envisaged as having four distinct phases:

- I - Following enlistment, one or two months basic military training in a unit or training centre.
- II - Three or four months course at a Vocational School in classes conducted under the War Emergency Training Plan.
- III - Advanced trades training for artificers, electricians, fitters, motor mechanics, instrument mechanics and the like at the Canadian Army Trades School.

IV - Return from Phase III in the case of the trades enumerated above, and from Phase II for the others, for employment if a unit vacancy exists.

Otherwise the new tradesman would be posted to an Advanced Training Centre to further the army application of his trade and become a potential reinforcement for the Canadian Army Overseas (320).

During December agreement was reached with the interested corps and the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance at N.D.H.Q. that trades training should be a General Staff responsibility. A separate section (M.T.4) was established within the Directorate of Military Training (321).

5. In order that a first quota might be provided for the enlarged War Emergency Training Programme, Military Districts were instructed on 6 Dec 40 to screen personnel already in uniform, in order to discover soldiers not working at their trade and those who had concealed skilled ability on enlistment (322). Applicants were interviewed by a board of three officers, one of whom was in charge of all trades training in the Military District. Wherever possible, soldiers selected for Phase II training were accommodated in barracks. As of 22 Feb 41 subsistence allowance was being paid to only 457 of the 2374 men then on W.E.T.P. courses (323). Broken down by trades at 6 Mar, there were 136 prospective blacksmiths, 420 carpenters and joiners, 57 coopersmiths and tinsmiths, 45 draughtsmen, 337 electricians, 71 engine artificers, five fitter machinists, 19 fitters M.V., 27 instrument mechanics, 793 motor mechanics, 57 plumbers, 50 welders, 17 wireless mechanics, 239 fitters, 88 artificers R.C.A., 57 tinsmiths, seven driver mechanics, one riveter, one hammerman, two turners, three wheelers, 29 concretors and one fitter A.A. (324). Actually it was 17 May 41 before the Canadian Army Trades School was ready for its first class of 189 students for Phase III training (325).

6. A second quota of potential tradesmen was assembled for Phase II training during late April. At that time it was considered, that in future an even flow of 1000 students should be fed into the Technical Schools monthly (326). Commands and Military Districts were further advised on 5 May that the MacQuarrie Test of Mechanical Ability would soon be given to all applicants admitted to tradesmen classes, except clerks: permission had been received from the United States Army to use this aptitude test (327). During July the responsibility for trade testing those completing trades training was assigned to M.T.4 and a Trade Testing Board established in each Military District (328).

7. Demand and supply exceeded the immediate capacity of the Canadian Army Trades School, however, and other outlets had to be found for Phase III and other specialized training. In July 1941 a Mechanics Training Centre was established at London, Ontario (staffed by the Anderson organization of Los Angeles) to handle an intake of 500 motor mechanics for the R.C.O.C. During September an Advanced Driving and Maintenance School was opened at Woodstock, Ont. During the summer of 1940 the Ford Motor Company of Canada had started instructing small classes of motor mechanics on army vehicles of its own manufacture and during the following winter both General Motors and Chrysler of Canada followed suit. Small groups of automotive tradesmen, N.C.Os. and Officers were given specialized training by the International Harvester Company of Canada in its garages at Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, London, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Regina, Calgary, Lethbridge and Vancouver. The John Labatt Garage in London took groups of 20 mechanics; Carter Tire Company Limited of Hamilton continued

to train groups of six vulcanizers; Canadian Westinghouse and General Electric each provided instruction for a group of 14 artificers, and the C.P.R. Angus Shops in Montreal handled five tradesmen at a time (329).

8. During the fiscal year ending 31 Mar 42 the following tradesmen completed training in Canada: approximately 300 artificers R.C.A., 500 blacksmiths, 1200 carpenters, 800 clerks, 2000 cooks, 125 concretors, 50 bricklayers, 300 copper-smiths and tinsmiths, 3000 driver mechanics, 30 mechanical draughtsmen, 30 architectural draughtsmen, 1200 electricians, 50 engine artificers, 1600 fitters, 150 instrument mechanics, 4000 motor mechanics, 800 signals operators, 90 plumbers, 50 operators of engineering equipment, 75 turners, 200 radio and wireless mechanics, 300 welders and 1000 others (330).

9. With the introduction of Personnel Selection techniques and procedures at the beginning of 1942 it had become possible to tag all recruits with an aptitude for trades training while they still were at a Basic Training Centre (331). As a next step administrative procedure was reorganized and a new policy set forth in Canadian Army Routine Order 1903 of 25 Apr 42. After being earmarked as a potential trades trainee at a Basic Training Centre a recruit would continue to an Advanced Training Centre to complete his corps military training before final selection for trades training. As far as possible it was hoped to complete trades training in one establishment. There would be exceptions, but soldiers should not have to attend more than two schools. Separate Vocational Training School establishments were authorized to ensure that the soldier's contact with military training was not broken while attending a technical school. Following completion of courses at a technical school, an army trades school or an industrial school soldiers were returned to their appropriate Advanced Training Centre or unit for further practical trades training and the military application of their trades. On 20 Apr a separate Directorate of Trades Training was established to control this programme. The Directorate of Mobilization and Recruiting became responsible for establishing monthly quotas, both the numbers to be selected by Army Examiners at Basic Training Centres and those to be sent forward from Advanced Training Centres for actual trades training. Initial quotas had to be greater than the numbers actually required, to allow for wastage and the withdrawal of potential N.C.Os. The application of Personnel Selection methods drastically reduced the number of those failing to pass trade tests and the revised administrative procedure reduced the number of days wasted at each step in training.

10. At this time the trades training programme possessed the following capacity: Canadian Army Trades School 2000, Mechanics Training Centre 750, Advanced Driving and Maintenance School 520 and technical schools 3010; small groups totalling 260 attended courses conducted by industrial organizations (332). The various courses were listed in an Appendix to Canadian Army Routine Order 2402 of 30 Sep 42; superseded by C.A.R.O. 3020 of 27 Mar 43, C.A.R.O. 3610 of 15 Sep 43, C.A.R.O. 4501 of 22 May 44 and C.A.R.O. 5320 of 1 Feb 45.

11. The reductions made in the Army in Canada during the autumn of 1943 resulted in a gradual decrease in trades training facilities. Some 50 War Emergency Training Plan classes, with accommodation for 1255 soldiers were given up (333). Classes still continued in 45 army installations (including Advanced Training Centres), 24 technical schools and 21 industrial plants but emphasis was directed towards training N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers to replace tradesmen withdrawn from the Home War Establishment and North American Area for

overseas service (334). By 1 Mar 44 establishments for tradesmen in Canada and the North American Area had been reduced to 50,467 other ranks (335). As of 6 Mar 44 there were 8245 undergoing training (70 per cent of capacity) and broken down as follows (336).

G.S.	63.4 per cent
N.R.M.A.	22.7
C.W.A.C.	5.0
C.T.T.C.	8.9

12. The last named Canadian Technical Training Corps comprised 17 and 18 year old boys enlisted under a scheme commenced in January 1943. Following a three months orientation course at one of six Basic Training Centres, they were given 10 months training in one of the more skilled trades (337). On 19 Jun 44 the first groups were appraised for advanced trades training; by which time, however, the demand was for infantrymen not tradesmen. On 31 Dec 44 the 2082 members of this corps were disposed as follows (338):

Pre-orientation	530
Orientation	568
Technical courses	683
Appraisal	193
<u>Trade courses</u>	<u>108</u>
Total	2082

13. Strangely enough, on the surface, 58,699 were trade tested during 1944, compared with 55,784 during 1943. This brought the cumulative total from the inception of the trade testing procedure to 114,483 (339). During January 1945 only 71 G.S. and 187 N.R.M.A. soldiers were allotted to trades training courses (340). On 31 May 45 the Directorate of Trades Training ceased to exist and its functions were re-absorbed by the Directorate of Military Training (341).

14. Within the Canadian Army Overseas the re-organization effected during the early months of 1941 similarly had accentuated the immediate shortage of tradesmen. Circular letters were issued by Headquarters, Canadian Corps directing that qualified tradesmen not employed as such be given employment and threatening compulsion against those who would not transfer to the R.C.O.C. when requested. In addition to providing initial training for those selected as potential tradesmen from within the Canadian Army Overseas there was the task of providing more specialized training, both of a technical and military nature, to those reinforcements who had been given the minimum classification (group "C") in Canada (342). Training became centred in an Instructional Wing at No. 1 Canadian Ordnance Reinforcement Unit, although technical training also was carried out at the R.C.E., R.C. Signals and R.C.A.S.C. reinforcement units. (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap XI, paras 144-5 and Chap XVI, paras 117-8). In conjunction with local educational institutions courses were arranged for clerks. Vacancies were obtained on courses in the more highly skilled trades being given by civilian and military training establishments under the War Office, where the limited demand did not warrant separate Canadian courses being instituted (343). Although the shortage overseas early in 1942 was estimated as being 11,836 only 4000 were in the trades covered by Phase II and Phase III training in Canada; it was considered that the remainder could be made good from men recruited as tradesmen or trained by the corps concerned (344). Due to continued expansion, the Canadian Army Overseas was still short 10,956 tradesmen as of 14 May 43 (345). Except for a few special trades it was possible, however, to close the gap within the next year (28 Feb 44), providing for both war establishment

vacancies of 64,572 and reinforcements based on three months' wastage at "intense" rates (346). Due to the fact that casualties among Infantry tradesmen were considerably less than had been estimated it was possible, as a temporary expedient, to employ a number as general duty infantrymen during the autumn of 1944.

APPENDIX "P" - CORPS OF (CIVILIAN) CANADIAN FIRE FIGHTERS FOR SERVICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Proposals to send Canadian fire fighters to help fight the London Blitz of 1940 had emanated from several points across Canada but until the beginning of 1941 no official approach was made by the British Government (347). Negotiations were begun between the two Governments in January but it was not until 29 Jul that the War Committee of the Cabinet decided that an initial unit of 400 to 500 should be formed under the aegis of the Department of National War Services, rather than of the Department of National Defence (348). Organization was commenced in the autumn but various difficulties arose. Finally F/L Gordon E. Huff, M.M., Fire Prevention Officer of the Winnipeg Command R.C.A.F., was appointed commanding officer by P.C. 1/778 of 30 Jan 42. Regulations for this civilian unit were approved by Order-in-Council P.C. 76/1656 of 3 Mar.
2. Recruiting opened on 11 Mar 42 but due to the response from professional fire-fighters it was feared that municipal fire brigades might become seriously depleted; therefore consideration was given to taking personnel of part-time and voluntary fire brigades in smaller towns and rural districts. Men were accepted in medical categories of "B.1" or higher; final medical examination was conducted in Ottawa. The initial strength of the Corps was 422, drawn from 107 municipalities across Canada but only 406 actually served overseas. Recruiting came to an end on 21 Sep 42. Of the 411 men who remained on strength only 143 were professional fire fighters (35 per cent); another 30 per cent came from voluntary fire brigades and 35 per cent had no previous experience in fire fighting (349). Since this was a non-combatant organization some 20 conscientious objectors enlisted and served overseas. They were given no encouragement to enlist; neither were they listed as "conscientious objectors". Being inexperienced they were given the rank of Junior Firemen but were promoted as they became efficient (350).
3. Preliminary training was carried out in co-operation with the Ottawa City Fire Department. The first of the eight groups left for the United Kingdom on 13 Jun 42 and the last on 10 Dec 42. Upon arrival in the United Kingdom the drafts were sent for four weeks further training at Testwood Training Ground under the control of the National Fire Service, following which they were posted to six fire stations -- Southampton (2), Portsmouth (2), Plymouth and Bristol -- while headquarters went to London. As soon as the Canadians became familiar with their duties the British personnel were withdrawn and these stations became completely Canadian.
4. The worst of the bombing was over by the time the Canadian Fire Fighters had arrived; thus they did not have many opportunities to fight fires. This prompted Mr. T.L. Church (Toronto, Broadview) to question the need for the further existence of such a corps. In his reply the Minister of National War Services (General Lafleche) said:

... Some time ago inquiry was made of the proper authorities in Great Britain to survey the situation with a view to our possibly being able to employ their services otherwise in view of our limited man-power. I do not mean to say that we are necessarily going to disband this corps, but I think it is proper to say in reply to the hon. gentleman that should the fire fighting services of Great Britain advise the Canadian authorities that the probabilities of action of

the kind that existed when this corps was formed and sent over have greatly diminished, it may be necessary to consider taking some action with respect to the members of this corps. But may I say that Canada will never forget the fact that these men volunteered for a service considered then to be as dangerous as that performed by any human being in the British Isles, whether in uniform or not. Most of the members of the corps were members of city fire brigades, and with the experience they have gained in Great Britain I have always thought that when they returned they would make splendid fire chiefs in a great many of our cities in the future. A total of 107 municipalities supplied the 400 members of the corps (351).

5. In conjunction with the coming invasion of North-West Europe a contingent of volunteers was being supplied by the National Fire Service and the opportunity of furnishing a section was offered to the Canadian Fire Fighters. Permission having been obtained from Ottawa and the whole Corps having volunteered arrangements were made to have the Canadian component increased to the size of a company of 102 all ranks. However, this Company never was despatched to the continent.

6. Meantime, it was ascertained that enemy air activity was still greater than was reported in the press back in Canada and that the National Fire Service would have to provide replacements if the Canadians were withdrawn. From a manpower standpoint it was subsequently learned that very few of the men would agree to enlist in the Canadian Army Overseas, rather than go back to Canada, should it be decided to disband the Corps. No further action was taken to recall the Corps at this time although its Commanding Officer was requested to encourage his men to volunteer for Army service (352).

7. At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 5 Jan 44 it had been decided to recall the Canadian Fire Fighters. With invasion plans under way, however, there was an increased danger of enemy air raids against dock areas and dumps so that the British Government requested that the carrying out of this decision should be postponed (353). This request was acceded to and it was not until 5 Oct that the Cabinet War Committee again agreed that the Corps should be returned to Canada (354). By this time the strength of the Corps was down to 342 all ranks. Withdrawal took even longer than the despatch and it was not until 19 Aug 45 that the last of 328 men reached Canada. Only five men* had enlisted in the Canadian Armed Forces but 19 more applied for discharge overseas in order to take up employment or continue their studies (355). The Corps was well disciplined, efficient and a credit to Canada in every respect, but the fact cannot be ignored that its total strength was 400 odd as compared with the 150,000 members of the National Fire Service and that it experienced a very small number of air attacks.

*Only 200 members of the Corps were of military age at this time.

APPENDIX "Q" - LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING UNITS AS AT 1 MAR 44

Canada

Artillery

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Unit</u>	
883	12 AA Bty (Type 2L)	RCA
882	17 AA Bty (Type 2H)	RCA
779	41 AA Bty (Type 2F)	RCA
791	52 AA Bty (Type 4L)	RCA
1128	60 AA Bty (Type H)	RCA
1129	61 AA Bty (Type 2L)	RCA
1338	63 AA Bty (Type 3L)	RCA
533	HQ 24 AA Regt	RCA
537	HQ 26 AA Regt	RCA
1344	4 AA GOR	RCA
1343	3 AA GOR	RCA
747	29 AA Tp LS	RCA
322	59 Coast Bty	RCA
811	20 Fd Regt	RCA

Engineers

817	15 Fd Coy	RCE
1356	22 Gen Pnr Coy	RCE

Infantry

1067	Fus Sher	
1047	Fus St L	
1036	R de Hull	
1045	R de Jol	
1064	R de Monty	
1065	R de Q	
1046	R de St H	
1071	R de Chat (Airfd Def Bn)	
371	B Coy St John Fus (MG)	

RCASC

553	1 Bakery Sec (Mech)	
5205	5 Coy RCASC	

RCAMC

1466	19 Fd Amb	RCAMC
3006	5 Coy RCAMC	

C Pro C

2015	36 Pro Coy	C Pro C
2025	46 Pro Coy	C Pro C

V G of C

16 Coy - 75% FS
12, 13, 14 & 15 Coys - 50% FS

Miscellaneous

2945	No 5 Dist Dep	
3505	25 Coy CDC	
3306	5 Ord Dep	
2409	105 Dep Coy CWAC	
1328	9 Coy CWAC	
323	8 Spec Empl Coy	
3830	Quebec Arsenal Protective Coy	
2066	5 Dist Recruiting Coy	
3647	66 Mil Det Bks	
3648	Quebec Mil Hosp	
	Valcartier Mil Hosp	

OVERSEAS (a)

Artillery

458B	57 Lt AA Bty	RCA
908D	62 A Tk Bty	RCA
1051	4 Med Regt	RCA

Engineers

984	3 Bn RCE	RCE
-----	----------	-----

Signals

1056	4 Med Regt Sig Sec	RCCS
------	--------------------	------

Infantry

187	Fus MR	
188	R de Mais	
41	R 22e R	
743	R de Chaud	

RCASC

196	4 Coy	RCASC
1058	4 Med Regt Pl	RCASC

RCAMC

285	1 Convalescent Depot	RCAMC
866	6 FDS	RCAMC
200	18 Fd Amb	RCAMC
218	5 Fd Hyg Sec	RCAMC
282D	17 Gen Hosp (600 beds)	RCAMC

RCOC

1114	104 LAD	RCOC
------	---------	------

C Pro C

833	9 Pro Coy	C Pro C
-----	-----------	---------

Note (a) All the undermentioned units were formed in Canada and sent overseas as French speaking units. They are believed to be still composed predominantly of French speaking personnel. However it is not known whether, with the exception of the 4 Inf Bns they are still French speaking units.

Table No. 1

APPOINTMENTS AND ENLISTMENTS
FOR GENERAL SERVICE,
1939-1945*

Month and Year	APPOINTMENTS			ENLISTMENTS -- OTHER RANKS	
	Officers Direct	From Ranks	Nursing Service	Volunteers Direct	Transfers from N.R.M.A.
1939					
September	2943	55	81	54844	
October	243	12	1	4376	
November	387	11	4	3633	
December	287	12	65	2049	
Total 1939	3860	90	151	64902	
1940					
January	479	63	8	6412	
February	198	14	2	3810	
March	181	13	2	4924	
April	198	14	5	4475	
May	375	23	48	6909	
June	1213	55	54	29319	
July	1305	54	10	29171	
August	744	99	20	15934	
September	659	77	29	9677	
October	335	68	89	4966	
November	221	86	57	3202	
December	240	45	45	3024	
Total 1940	6148	611	369	121823	
1941					
January	302	89	39	5863	
February	684	58	35	6318	
March	416	104	21	4885	5
April	509	125	12	6009	93
May	442	63	17	7703	305
June	510	73	83	13193	1023
July	570	71	39	10643	1259
August	261	193	6	4647	858
September	445	281	14	7362	1260
October	577	225	50	5439	1097
November	301	192	25	6479	937
December	238	79	39	5895	1031
Total 1941	5255	1553	380	84436	7868
1942					
January	359	222	59	8594	1988
February	332	279	37	6892	1591
March	299	361	29	6792	1824
April	451	350	27	9467	1791
May	546	380	82	9581	2524
June	420	402	65	9348	1649
July	491	487	63	11316	1584
August	478	567	97	12328	1498
September	427	444	78	8744	1056
October	327	504	55	7941	1089
November	282	632	30	9204	939
December	185	595	37	4495	740
Total 1942	4597	5223	659	104702	18273

*Based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.

APPOINTMENTS				ENLISTMENTS - OTHER RANKS	
Month and Year	Officers Direct	From Ranks	Nursing Service	Volunteers Direct	Transfers from N.R.M.A.
1943					
January	224	634	63	10489	1003
February	155	1105	58	7872	761
March	194	632	71	6739	667
April	172	755	41	5462	599
May	369	956	30	5423	725
June	211	695	35	4495	451
July	146	712	35	3920	433
August	83	685	151	4069	446
September	71	800	113	4321	392
October	51	716	29	3794	419
November	49	448	38	3682	370
December	34	395	23	2375	295
Total 1943	1759	8533	687	62641	6561
1944					
January	36	69	156	3804	398
February	26	291	257	3015	422
March	25	75	151	2787	436
April	19	239	178	3908	1736
May	180	397	159	3593	1025
June	50	212	97	6207	3259
July	31	338	60	4324	1308
August	41	248	24	5163	1595
September	37	235	29	4774	1164
October	27	152	12	4522	967
November	8	172	10	6901	3294
December	19	148	7	4743	1878
Total 1944	499	2576	1140	53741	17482
1945					
January	19	159	10	7987	1692
February	24	254	47	7230	2164
March	54	163	76	7280	2131
April	18	93	57	5966	1287
May	63	206	51	2461	328
June	10	124	20	847	242
July	3	141	5	773	154
August	13	78	2	349	66
Total 1945	204	1218	268	32893	8064

Table No. 2

GENERAL SERVICE DISCHARGES (ALL RANKS)
1939-1945*

QUARTER AND YEAR	Medically Unfit	Other Forces**	Adminis- trative	Deaths	Deserters***	Total
1939 (Sep)	421	12	654	8	1	1096
Fourth	1350	18	2233	27	66	3694
Total 1939	1771	30	2887	35	67	4790
1940						
First	2458	20	1115	31	43	3667
Second	1812	49	612	46	80	2599
Third	2823	153	1577	119	147	4819
Fourth	3439	766	2330	139	144	6818
Total 1940	10532	988	5634	335	414	17903
1941						
First	3492	215	1111	108	111	5037
Second	4981	288	587	201	141	6198
Third	3602	368	750	140	377	5237
Fourth	3342	331	824	416	380	5293
Total 1941	15417	1202	3272	865	1009	21765
1942						
First	3483	253	1127	162	259	5284
Second	5103	632	1030	173	270	7208
Third	6079	535	893	1108	241	8856
Fourth	6196	329	770	279	174	7748
Total 1942	20861	1749	3820	1722	944	29096
1943						
First	4388	446	624	171	117	5746
Second	5192	337	789	236	170	6724
Third	5002	353	957	822	287	7421
Fourth	4938	1022	2838	1277	158	10233
Total 1943	19520	2158	5208	2506	732	30124
1944						
First	6344	947	4375	728	135	12529
Second	8085	341	3877	2446	181	14930
Third	6818	154	2705	6693	291	16661
Fourth	5605	32	2906	2825	223	11591
Total 1944	26852	1474	13863	12692	830	55711
1945						
First	5520	50	2606	2231	357	10764
Second	6969	30	11632	1546	298	20475
Third	6607	25	58530	268	244	65674
Fourth	3637	14	89028	151	118	92948
Total 1945	22733	119	161796	4196	1017	189861

*This Table is based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.

**Those going to the R.C.N. numbered 1009; those going to the R.C.A.F. numbered 5166.

***Only includes those deserters actually struck off strength as never having been apprehended. This is not a guide to the number of men who actually deserted during any one month, or quarter, of the year.

Table No. 3

N.R.M.A. ENROLMENTS

BY MONTH AND YEAR OF ENROLMENT*

MONTH	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	TOTAL
January		7331	5834	2145	1082	
February		4928	3870	1916	778	
March	4668	5292	3325	1353	712	
April	4373	6733	3114	1582	650	
May	3791	6385	2835	1996	259	
June	2712	4770	2549	1528	32	
July	3290	6832	2430	1321	17	
August	4140	6752	2079	1262	6	
September	153	5073	1862	982		
October	4322	4163	2028	1119		
November	228	6234	2211	1244		
December	3812	5863	1634	758		
TOTAL	31994	70356	34271	17711	7226	157868

*Based on information received from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.

Table No. 4

N.R.M.A. DISCHARGES

REASON	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	Total Decrease
Medically Unfit	1254	5223	7007	7212	2722	254	1	23673
To R.C.N.	376	240	55	72	4			747
To R.C.A.F.	3725	1074	207	72	1			5079
To Other Forces	1	7	8	15	5			36
To General Service	7868	18273	6561	17482	8067	165	20	58436
Administrative	405	870	2558	4258	12461	41310	435	62297
Deaths	9	26	96	96	126	9	1	363
Deserters	286	1104	794	1235	3702	107	9	7237
Total	13924	26817	17286	30442	27088	41845	466	157868

*Based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51

Table No. 5

SECRET

Growth of Infantry Gdn Army Overseas 1942 - 44

Part I - Before Reorg of Armd Divs - 1942

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			MG Bn			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	999	21114	3	90	2133	-	-	-	30	1089	23247
2 Armd Divs	2	74	1564	-	-	-	4	140	3236	6	214	4800
Army Tps	-	-	-	1	37	711	-	-	-	1	37	711
Total	29	1073	22678	4	127	2844	4	140	3236	37	1340	28758

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 37 Offrs - 782 OR (1 Sp and 3 Rifle Coys)
 (b) WE of MG Bn 30 Offrs - 711 OR
 (c) WE of Mot Bn 35 Offrs - 809 OR

Part II - After Reorg of Armd Divs - 1943

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			Sp Bn			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	999	21897	3	213	3342	-	-	-	30	1212	25239
2 Armd Divs	6	222	4866	2 coys	44	708	2	70	1618	8 + 2 coys	334	7192
Army Tps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	33	1221	26763	3 + 2 coys	257	4050	2	70	1618	38 + 2 coys	1548	32431

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 37 Offrs - 911 OR (Increased to 4 Rifle Coys)
 (b) WE of Sp Bn 71 Offrs - 1114 OR (MG Bn converted to Sp Bn)
 (c) WE of Sp Coy 22 Offrs - 354 OR (Allotted to Inf Bd of Armd Div)
 (d) WE of Mot Bn 35 Offrs - 809 OR

Part III - After Formation of 12 Inf Bde - 1944

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			MG Bn & Indep MG Coys			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	1026	21928	3	111	2121	-	-	-	30	1137	24049
4th Armd Div	3	114	2448	1 coy	9	202	1	36	815	4 + 1 coy	159	3465
5th Armd Div	5	190	4080	2 coy	18	404	1	36	815	6 + 2 coys	244	4299
Total	35	1330	28456	3 + 3 coys	138	2727	2	72	1630	40 + 3 coys	1540	32813

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 38 Offrs - 812 OR (4 OR additional for Armd Div)
 (b) WE of MG Bn 37 Offrs - 707 OR (Sp Bn converted to MG Bn)
 (c) WE of Indep MG Coy 9 Offrs - 202 OR (Sp Coy converted to Indep MG Coy)
 (d) WE of Mot Bn 36 Offrs - 815 OR (Mot Bn in 5th Armd Div employed as Rifle Bn in 12 Ind Bde)

Table No. 6

OTHER RANK RFTS A A I.

T C P S E C R E T
44/AAI/1/5

DEMANDED AND DESPATCHED MAY 44 - JAN 45

CONVOY DRAFT DATE OF EMBARKATION	KMF 31 "WARD" 5 May 44	KMF 32 "UKIT/1" 8-9 Jun 44	KMF 33 "UKIT/2" 16-18 Jul 44	KMF 34 "UKIT/3" 20-21 Aug 44	KMF 35 "UKIT/4" 26-28 Sep 44	KMF 36 "UKIT/5" 1-5 Nov 44	KMF 37 "UKIT/6" 10 Dec 44	KMF 38 "UKIT/7" 5 Jan 45	KMF 39 "UKIT/8" 28 Jan 45	KMF 40 "UKIT/9"	KMF 41 "UKIT/10"
AAI Bulk Bid											
CIC Eng							6135		4825		1781
CIC Fr							350		310		250
Other Arms							950		1096		730
Total	4340(a)	5395(a)	8439 (a)	3700 (a)	6296 (a)	7593 (a)	7435		6231		2761
Bid Reduced by CMHQ to											
CIC Eng						{ 1250 (a)	{ 1050 (a)				
CIC Fr											
Other Arms						750 (a)	1050 (a)				
Total	2250(b)	150(c)	1500			2000	2100 (a)				
AAI Demand											
CIC Eng	1324	250(d)	{ 1052	{ 2338		{ 1044	775				
CIC Fr	124		{	{		{	65				
Other Arms	560	167	1039	1299		662	964				
Total	2008	417	2091	3637		1706	1804				
Demand Reduced by CMHQ to											
CIC Eng			{ 800			{ 950 (e)	900		1500	1000	1781
CIC Fr			{			{	65		50	50	250
Other Arms			239	60		446	964	255 (g)	576	362	667
Total		160	1039	60		1396	1929	255	2126	1412	2698
Despatched											
CIC Eng	1189	127	752			{ 947 (f)	{ 867		1499		
CIC Fr	122		75						50		
Other Arms	337	33	212	60		384	316	297	106	315	
Total	1648	160	1039	60		1531	1183	1063	109	1864	

(a) incl offr.

(b) incl 250 for SS Bn

(c) Misc Tradesmen

(d) for SS Bn

(e) incl 500 RCOG & RCEME for remuster in AAI

(f) incl 496 RCOG & RCEME for remuster in AAI

(g) demand settled at CMHQ as other arms deficiencies on KMF 37

Table No. 7

CANADIAN REINFORCEMENT DRAFTS TO NORTH-WEST EUROPE

Draft No.	Date	Total		Infantry	
		Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
UKAG/1	5 Aug 44	25	825	15	656
UKAG/2	11 Aug 44	244	1285	226	813
*UKAG/3	17 Aug 44	83	1198	27	682
UKAG/4	25 Aug 44	168	1543	100	697
*UKAG/5	31 Aug 44	98	2497	43	1906
*UKAG/6	8 Sep 44	127	1054	17	562
*UKAG/7	15 Sep 44	72	1016	25	692
*UKAG/8	23 Sep 44	67	1597	37	973
*UKAG/9	30 Sep 44	112	1585	35	1132
*UKAG/10	10 Oct 44	84	1553	39	1139
*UKAG/11	11 Oct 44	103	1843	59	1443
*UKAG/12	24 Oct 44	49	281	6	1
UKAG/13	27 Oct 44	41	605	14	280
UKAG/14	3 Nov 44	186	1371	98	919
*UKAG/15	9 Nov 44	174	1608	62	980
*UKAG/16	19 Nov 44	71	1338	32	1005
*UKAG/17	24 Nov 44	104	906	13	437
*UKAG/18	2 Dec 44	101	503	3	233
*UKAG/19	12 Dec 44	70	353	5	41
UKAG/20	15 Dec 44	63	515	19	353
*UKAG/21	27 Dec 44	58	538	11	292
*UKAG/22	1 Jan 45	55	874	19	678
*UKAG/23	6 Jan 45	32	490	10	403
*UKAG/24	12 Jan 45	74	577	41	191
*UKAG/25	25 Jan 45	82	680	23	557
*UKAG/26	3 Feb 45	71	586	35	434
*UKAG/27	9 Feb 45	97	997	28	747
*UKAG/28	13 Feb 45	50	791	9	210
*UKAG/29A	14 Feb 45 (air)	50	1039	50	1089
*UKAG/29	17 Feb 45	177	1778	49	1031
*UKAG/30	23 Feb 45	194	2093	88	1283
UKAG/31A	1 Mar 45 (air)	22	267	0	0
*UKAG/31	2 Mar 45	128	632	77	270
UKAG/32A	6 Mar 45 (air)	6	208	6	208
*UKAG/32	9 Mar 45	71	793	10	329
UKAG/33A	15 Mar 45	1	40	0	0
*UKAG/33	18 Mar 45	92	1111	30	501
UKAG/34B	20 Mar 45	1	110	0	0
UKAG/34A	22 Mar 45	40	188	0	0
*UKAG/34	26 Mar 45	205	2424	70	1765
UKAG/35B	29 Mar 45	26	0	0	0
UKAG/35C	29 Mar 45	11	0	0	0
UKAG/35A	4 Apr 45	0	9	0	0
UKAG/35D	4 Apr 45	0	19	0	0
UKAG/36A	4 Apr 45	5	99	5	99*
*UKAG/35	4 Apr 45	209	963	154	290
UKAG/36B	9 Apr 45	2	58	0	0
UKAG/37A	9 Apr 45	12	91	0	0
*UKAG/36	10 Apr 45	101	1727	53	1149
UKAG/37B	12 Apr 45	1	20	1	20
*UKAG/37	15 Apr 45	172	1094	40	349
*UKAG/38	21 Apr 45	101	1832	47	1304
UKAG/38B	24 Apr 45	0	25	0	25
*UKAG/39	1 May 45	111	2228	51	1634
*UKAG/40	9 May 45	104	1416	46	780

*Departure of serials comprising draft was spread over more than one day.

**Paratroopers.

The above statistics were taken from a Movement Control compilation turned over to Director, Historical Section by Director, Supplies and Transport, Army Headquarters. In order to obtain as complete a picture as possible from the information available, however, it is necessary to include the following drafts included in a compilation made by A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q.:

Date	Draft No.	Reinforcements		Miscellaneous		Total	
		Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
8 Jun 44		61	1084	-	-	61	1084
11 Jun 44		-	70	-	-	-	70
15 Jun 44		68	754	-	-	68	754
16 Jun 44		102	882	1	23	103	905
22 Jun 44		14	826	1	17	15	843
29 Jun 44		7	596	2	9	9	605
6 Jul 44		3	293	-	5	3	298
13 Jul 44		92	1732	-	-	92	1732
20 Jul 44		20	965	-	6	20	971
21 Jul 44		68	320	-	-	68	320
27 Jul 44		78	1038	-	2	78	1040
						517	8622
27 Aug 44	Sp Inf 1	4	100	-	-	4	100
28 Aug 44	Sp Inf 2	1	100	-	-	1	100
29 Aug 44	Sp Inf 3	8	399	-	-	8	399
2 Sep 44	Sp Inf 4	91	562	-	-	91	562
5 Sep 44	Sp Inf 5	35	333	1	-	36	333
7 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	7	867	-	5	7	872
9 Sep 44	Sp Inf 6	22	426	-	-	22	426
11 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	6	186	-	-	6	186
12 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	-	200	-	-	-	200
1 Oct 44	Sp Arty	5	12	-	-	5	12
						180	3190

Table No. 8

Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks
North-West Europe 27 Aug - 14 Nov 44

Date	Unit Deficiencies			Total	Holdings at 2 C.B.R.G.
	2 Cdn Inf Div	3 Cdn I Inf Div	4 Cdn Armd Div		
27 Aug	1999	604	522	3125	1726
29 Aug	2495	836	846	4177	1306
30 Aug	2522	878	846	4246	1231
31 Aug	2612	875	831	4318	1354
3 Sep	2645	752	761	4158	876
4 Sep	1960	736	755	3451	731
5 Sep	1960	737	761	3458	1785
6 Sep	1450	630	706	2786	954
7 Sep	1478	666	706	2850	882
8 Sep	1478	770	715	2963	987
11 Sep	1794	741	872	3407	1841
12 Sep	1727	759	865	3351	1317
13 Sep	1727	788	729	3244	1141
14 Sep	1550	806	719	3075	1781
16 Sep	1495	733	713	2941	1829
18 Sep	1482	814	641	2937	1710
19 Sep	1553	783	641	2977	2746
20 Sep	1523	711	707	2941	2227
22 Sep	1464	621	624	2709	2492
23 Sep	1299	602	629	2530	1535
26 Sep	1408	673	282	2363	2363
27 Sep	1452	802	318	2572	2363
28 Sep	1442	809	324	2575	2288
29 Sep	1470	761	180	2411	2053
2 Oct	1267	816	125	2208	2814
5 Oct	1165	552	106	1823	2028
7 Oct	1224	540	112	1876	1889
10 Oct	1058	464	161	1683	1160
11 Oct	973	624	182	1779	2124
12 Oct	934	646	179	1759	3053
13 Oct	979	749	150	1878	2181
14 Oct	869	851	94	1814	2234
16 Oct	753	747	119	1619	1947
17 Oct	820	793	103	1716	1858
18 Oct	852	548	119	1519	3512
19 Oct	681	566	131	1378	1985
20 Oct	652	415	141	1208	2735
23 Oct	478	410	288	1176	2419
24 Oct	474	385	274	1133	2352
25 Oct	548	426	294	1268	2476
26 Oct	657	533	285	1475	2042
30 Oct	679	670	554	1903	1921
31 Oct	679	724	557	1960	1949
1 Nov	755	768	571	2094	2064
2 Nov	815	787	635	2237	2070
3 Nov	858	776	615	2249	2358
4 Nov	798	805	697	2300	2398
6 Nov	803	678	635	2116	2748
7 Nov	803	519	639	1961	2754
8 Nov	803	424	127	1354	2000
9 Nov	632	424	227	1283	2153
10 Nov	530	278	262	1070	1325
11 Nov	579	278	188	1045	1456
13 Nov	424	90	134	648	2323
14 Nov	463	95	147	705	2301

(HQS 20-6, vol. 81)

Compiled at C.M.H.Q. from details reported by cable from Headquarters, First Canadian Army and Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group. It must be remembered, however, that not all of the reinforcement holdings shown under No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group were physically available for posting to units.

Table No. 9

Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks
A.A.I., 2 Sep - 4 Nov 44

Date	Unit Deficiencies			Total	Holdings at 1 C.B.R.G.
	1 Cdn Inf Div	5 Cdn Armd Div	1 Cdn Corps Tps		
2 Sep	156	nil	42	198	3757
9 Sep	338	355	23	716	3124
16 Sep	298	230	24	552	2620
23 Sep	681	145	20	846	2240
30 Sep	612	327	21	960	1642
7 Oct	591	283	32	906	1247
14 Oct	363	368	33	764	1048
21 Oct	382	255	36	673	1836
28 Oct	761	269	22	1052	1977
4 Nov	840	340	29	1209	2013

(HQS 20-6, vol. 81)

Compiled from weekly strength states available at C.M.H.Q. It must be remembered that not all of the reinforcements shown within No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group were trained or available for posting to units.

Table No. 10

TOTAL STRENGTH - CANADIAN ARMY

<u>OVERSEAS</u>	<u>30 Sep 44</u>	<u>30 Nov 44</u>	<u>INCREASE OR (DECREASE)</u>
Effectives (a) 21 Army Gp	108,429	109,679	1,250
(b) AAI	64,560	63,110	(1,450)
(c) UK	52,895	50,700	(2,195)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total effectives	225,884	223,489	(2,395)
Non-effectives	35,631	42,744	7,113
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total overseas	261,515	266,233	4,718
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>CANADA AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES</u>			
	<u>27 Sep 44</u>	<u>3 Jan 45</u>	
(a) Officers	17,682	17,118	(564)
(b) Other Ranks GS	120,604	117,491	(3,113)
(c) " " NRMA	59,746	53,539	(6,207)
(d) " " CWAC	11,591	11,452	(139)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	209,623	199,600	(10,023)
Missing & POW - Hong Kong	1,628	1,624	(4)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Extended Leave (or Duty) from Depots			
Officers	13	11	(2)
GS	5,857	3,182	(2,675)
NRMA	8,743	6,846	(1,897)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	14,613	10,039	(4,574)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Canada and adjacent	225,864	211,263	(14,601)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
In transit - not included above	1,304	15,017	13,713
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
GRAND TOTAL	488,683	492,513	3,830
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

HQS 9011-7-4 (DAG(A))
9011-7-8
9011-8-4

16 JAN 45