

make notes on my pad when I am talking to them and have the form made up afterwards by the girl; they do not know that their mobilization status is being checked (145).

Farmers refused to accept jobs in the bush. After being refused permits to work in Sorel or Montreal, one party of eight farmers' sons had replied to this question, as follows: "We know what will happen to us when we get 80 miles into the bush -- a bunch of Mounties will jump on us and we will lose our deferments (146)." Instead, they returned to their fathers' farms to do a bit of cutting on the family wood lot and then loaf.

11. Following the Cabinet War Committee's decision of 6 Dec 43 that the Departments of Labour and Agriculture should endeavour to increase the supply of farm labour, Mr Gardiner suggested the time had come to amend the call-up regulations for home defence so that essential farm workers might be returned to the farm after completing four months' military training (147). This resulted in the admission, within the Department of National Defence that there were 26,747 N.R.M.A. and 13,056 G.S. soldiers performing no useful function. Apart from that portion of the G.S. surplus acceptable as overseas reinforcements there were 30,000 men who might be better employed in civilian life. The release of farmers from "home defence" duties would create a favoured class, however, and would have an unfavourable effect on future voluntary enlistments (148). The Military favoured the return of all surplus over-age and low category personnel to civil life (149) but the members of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference, meeting at Ottawa 6-9 Dec, felt that:

... it would be more advisable from the standpoint of insuring farm labour supply to keep the men in the army rather than discharge them, and that extended farm leaves could be granted and those still employed on Farm Duty should continue on that basis (150).

12. The real answer was to force farmers who were earning high wages in industry to return to the land but this was not easy. The Army view was expressed in the following memorandum of 10 Feb 44:

The only other field in which experienced farm workers may be found is industry, but the thinking appears to be that the farm worker who secured early employment in industry must not be restricted in his choice of further employment if laid off, whereas the farm worker who did not get into war industry before being called for the Army must not be permitted any choice of employment, if discharged from the Army. The farm worker under mandatory postponement must also remain in agriculture or forfeit his postponement (151).

The civilian view was expressed by the Minister of Labour in a letter of the same date to the Minister of National Defence:

... Even if authority was taken to direct these men to farm work or other occupations it is a fact that enforcement of direction would be most difficult. The great difficulty would be that of differential rates of pay. As one member of the Board expressed

it: "discharged soldiers will not be happy about accepting farm work at \$1.00 per day when they see men in war plants who have never been in the Army getting \$1.00 per hour."

It was the unanimous opinion of the National Selective Service Advisory Board that it would be much more effective and much more in the interests of the national effort to give men leave of absence rather than discharge them.

The suggestion specifically is that it be made known to any man in the Army who is not in line for service overseas that he may obtain leave of absence on condition that he go to a farm and remain there during the period of his leave. It is the belief of the members of the National Selective Service Advisory Board that 10,000 or 15,000 men would be obtained in this way for farms and that there would be a definite control which would mean that they would have to stay on the farms or be called back in the Army (152).

13. The matter was closed by Mr Ralston's reply of 24 Feb to the Minister of Labour, pointing out that military policy would be to discharge all those of a non-operational medical category who could not be usefully employed. He added:

This policy has the double object of streamlining the Army and of releasing to the national manpower pool all men who are not or cannot be usefully employed on military duties.

I realize fully your difficulties in the matter of obtaining men for farm work, but I feel sure that you will appreciate the fact that the retention in the Army of a large number of men on extended farm leave who are not physically fit for military service not only creates a false picture of the strength of the Army, and entails a very considerable amount of avoidable administrative detail, but defeats the implementation of the policy outlined above (153).

14. Canadian Army Routine Order 3456 was amended by Routine Order 4259 of 22 Mar 44 so that Farm Leave and Farm Duty might be given for spring planting as well as during the harvest. As of 31 May approximately 6000 soldiers were on "compassionate" farm leave and 500 on agricultural spring leave (154).

15. Once again members of the Armed Forces made a substantial contribution to the task of harvesting. The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles were transferred from Halifax to the Prairies and 600 gunners from the (disbanding) anti-aircraft defences at Arvida were sent to the Brandon area (155). The King's Own Rifles were moved from Pacific Command to Saskatchewan. Le Régiment de Joliette was moved to western Ontario to participate in the tobacco harvest. Mr Ralston informed the Minister of Labour on 21 Aug that approximately 2350 soldiers had been made available for farm duty. He further expected that 3000 men in Pacific Command would be on Harvest Leave by the end of the month and that a further 2000-3000 of its men would be given annual furlough (156). As late as 30 Sep there still were 337 G.S. and 3000 N.R.M.A.

soldiers detailed for farm duty and 3825 G.S. and 7536 N.R.M.A. soldiers on harvest leave or compassionate farm leave (157).

16. Consequent to the conscription crisis of November 1944 it became necessary to review the whole policy of extended leave. In some Military Districts all men were being recalled and there was considerable confusion until a temporary ruling was issued by telegram on 29 Nov. For the moment only those whose permits were about to expire would be recalled. Those obviously unfit for overseas service could be returned to civilian life while the remainder would be given temporary 60-day extensions until a firm decision was possible on future policy (158).

17. On 7 Dec, Brigadier deLalanne told the delegates to the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference in Ottawa that, although no change would be made in basic policy, it would be necessary to provide sufficient reinforcements for overseas until the end of hostilities. In future, Farm Duty would be performed only by low category personnel belonging to Employment Companies, since it had been found that men did better work under the supervision of officers and N.C.Os. (159).

18. On 4 Apr the Army's policy on leave was amended by Routine Order 5529 to provide for the granting of "Hog, Dairy and Beef Production Leave" to low category personnel (without pay and allowances) in an effort to ensure that Canada met her food commitment to the United Nations. Routine Order 5590 of 20 Apr consolidated the instructions concerning all forms of leave without pay and allowances.

19. The War in Europe came to an end before it was time for the harvest and serving soldiers were given agricultural leave pending discharge, which could not be justified until the troops had been repatriated from Overseas.

(ii) Combatting Fuel Shortages

20. As a result of the industrial expansion and increased prosperity within the country consumption of coal had increased greatly during the first two years of war. Coal mining did not keep pace and the continuance of increased imports from the United States became uncertain after 7 Dec 41. The decline in wood cutting operations further increased the consumption of coal for domestic purposes. When the question of fuel shortages was debated in the House of Commons on 16 Mar 43 most of the attention was directed to shortages of fuel wood, with members pointing out how some inhabitants of small localities had been compelled to move in with their neighbours and others forced to burn fences, doors and flooring in their stoves. A press release issued by the Minister of Munitions and Supply was quoted to show that the situation might become:

... no less serious for those who have been burning wood in furnaces and stoves in which either coal or wood may be consumed, for the shortage of coal has been critical this winter, and there is every likelihood that it may become more critical in the coming winter. Because less coal may be available, the demand for wood fuel is likely to rise (160).

21. During November 1942 instructions had been sent to Divisional Registrars across Canada to grant postponements to all coal miners and loggers but a number of the latter appear to have gone ahead and enlisted anyway (161). On 24 Nov 42 the Adjutant-General issued instructions permitting ex-coal miners in the Army to return to the mines of western Canada on six months leave (renewable for three month periods) and similar action for eastern Canada was taken during January

1943 (162). Although leave was arranged for upwards of 1200 of the 3000 ex-miners serving with the Army in Canada, 100 of these soon returned to military duty at their own request (163).

22. During the course of a meeting in Mr MacNamara's office on 15 Apr 43 the Coal Controller stated that some 2748 coal miners had enlisted during the 12 months ending 31 Mar 43. In Nova Scotia alone some 1700 had enlisted and the industry was short 1600. Whereas Maj-Gen H.J. Riley, Joint Associate Director of National Selective Service wanted to have the enlistment of coal miners prohibited, the Coal Controller admitted that some of the men who had returned to the mines on leave from the Army had been dissatisfied and left again; there also was trouble about miners taking other employment where wages were higher. National Selective Service had allotted some 3000 men to coal mining during the year but, as the industry across Canada had shrunk by 2000, there had been a total loss of 2250 (164).

23. Both Mr Ralston and Mr Power stood firm in the Cabinet War Committee against Mr Powe's request that coal miners should not be permitted to enlist and that those already in uniform should be returned to the mines. It was agreed on 5 May, however, that coal mining should be granted a higher priority than gold mining and that action should be taken to prevent coal miners from taking other jobs. Order in Council P.C. 4092 of 17 May 43 froze all coal miners in their jobs and declared that all ex-coal miners should vacate existing jobs by 1 Jun to return to mining. Until 1 Feb 44 coal miners would not be conscripted for military service and would be discouraged from enlisting. This was extended by further Orders in Council until 1 Aug 45 (165).

24. According to Department of Labour statistics, as of 9 Sep 43 there were 970 soldiers actually working on coal mining leave and a further 430 awaiting allocation. A total of 2200 men had been granted leave since the inception of the scheme but 700 had withdrawn their applications or proceeded overseas and 100 had returned to military duty after giving it a try (166). The number of soldiers employed in the coal mining industry continued to increase, however, until by 20 Feb 44 there were 1481 G.S. and 548 N.R.M.A. soldiers so employed (167). Despite the mildness of the winter and a lessened demand for coal, with consequent lay-offs at some Alberta mines, there still were 1992 soldiers on coal mining leave on 31 May 44, all but a dozen of whom were on the strength of District Depots (168).

25. Throughout the "conscription crisis" coal mining was still considered work of sufficient national importance to have the soldiers then working in the mines retained there, instead of being recalled for military duty (169). Approximately 1900 soldiers were on coal mining leave at the end of March 1945 (170).

(iii) Logging

26. Both firewood to combat the fuel crisis and lumber to meet the needs of war industry and the civilian economy were in short supply by early 1943. On 5 Mar, therefore, the Cabinet War Committee decided that lumbering should be treated as an essential industry. National Selective Service was to use every means to induce loggers to return from other industries and was to work out satisfactory arrangements with the Armed Forces to permit experienced personnel to return to the bush, just as arrangements had been made for ex-coal miners (171).

27. During the course of a conference held on 18 Mar to arrange details Mr MacNamara told Brigadier Nash that some 2000 loggers were required in British Columbia: 680 already were registered with Selective Service offices there and it was hoped to obtain a further 650 from among the 2000 odd lumbermen then employed in Vancouver shipyards (172). Although a list had been obtained of 2930 soldiers who had given their previous occupation as the lumbering industry, a considerable number were either serving with the Canadian Army Overseas or of an age and medical category acceptable for the reinforcement stream. It was finally agreed that leave should be sought only for those who had experience in logging and lumbering in British Columbia. It was 30 Mar, however, before the Adjutant-General's Branch issued a circular letter. The applications of both G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers were to be referred to the Registrar of Division "Y" (Vancouver) for screening by the National Selective Service Mobilization Board: if found acceptable for placement with a logging camp, three months' leave without pay would be granted by the soldier's unit, subject to military exigencies (173). The R.C.A.F. had agreed to adopt a similar policy but the Navy decided to discharge any applicants, since it was already carrying a number of men who would never return to duty (174).

28. A return of 19 Jul noted that 585 applications for leave had been made; 220 had been rejected by the National Selective Service authorities, 66 were still pending and 290 had been approved; 266 of the last had been assigned to logging camps but only 221 had as yet been released by the Army (175). A further Adjutant-General Branch letter of 23 Jul provided for extensions of such leave (176).

29. Order in Council P.C. 4861 of 17 Jul added wood cutting to the list of occupations to which men might be directed by National Selective Service. Arrangements also were made for Japanese-Canadians, Doukhobors and Indians to be employed cutting wood (177). An earlier proposal that Engineer Works Companies should be so employed had been rejected by the C.G.S., who pointed out to Mr Ralston on 18 Apr that they were needed to assist contractors where civilian labour was short and that the pulp and paper companies possessed an organization that might be used for cutting wood (178). The subject was raised again in July, however, and, after a number of inter-departmental conferences, it was agreed that the personnel of the 10 Canadian Forestry Corps companies being returned from Scotland could be utilized to cut fire wood for the coming winter. Rather than place them in competition with civilian labour and incur trade union hostility, however, it was agreed that they should be given leave without pay in order to accept employment as individuals or groups (179). Many of the men actually returned, however, were those whose services no longer could be utilized overseas for medical reasons or who may not have been loggers in the first place (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 117). On 31 Dec 43 there were only 129 G.S. and 144 N.R.M.A. soldiers on logging leave (180).

30. By this time the lumbering industry was not in nearly as bad a position as had been made out, increased costs now limiting production in British Columbia. Therefore, N.D.H.Q. rejected a request that logging leave be extended to include operations in other parts of Canada (181). Yet the Vice Adjutant-General informed National Selective Service officials on 14 Apr 44 that sympathetic consideration would be given to requests that a limited number of N.R.M.A. soldiers who were skilled loggers might be returned to the lumbering industry from time to time, either as "key men" under the provisions of Routine Order 1935 (see below) or by discharge on medical grounds. At the end of July 445 G.S. and 149 N.R.M.A. soldiers were working as loggers (182). The month of January 1945 found 333 men still employed on logging leave: however, 112 completed their leave and, with only six new applications approved, the total number working during February dropped to 227 (183).

(iv) Port Companies, R.C.A.S.C.

31. In another attempt to ease the labour situation but ignoring completely the reason for a "home defence army", the Deputy Minister of Labour revived his earlier scheme for a Labour Corps. In a memorandum of 5 Jul 43 he suggested two courses: convert what he termed the "home defence army" into a labour corps for employment on civilian projects essential to the prosecution of the War; give N.R.M.A. personnel a form of industrial leave once they had completed six months military training, provided they accepted the work assigned by National Selective Service officials and reported every 60 days (184).

32. These suggestions were discussed at Cabinet level, at the instance of the Minister of Labour, during the July days when it was obvious that the remaining manpower pool was not big enough for all and that compromise would be necessary (185). Thus, as well as directing the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the size of home defence commitments, the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 21 Jul instructed the Ministers of National Defence and Labour to work out a method of organizing and employing a "works" battalion (186).

33. Although a Port Battalion R.C.A.S.C. was authorized only two Port Companies actually were formed to meet emergencies created by dock strikes and temporary labour shortages on the east coast. Initial organization was undertaken at No. 2 District Depot (Toronto), with men supplied by the several District Depots across the country. On 16 Oct training got under way at Camp Niagara-on-the-Lake and the companies were completed with personnel from the recently disbanded No. 1 Garrison Battalion. The early winter was spent training at Owen Sound: during this period a number of men enlisted for general service and left, while others were found to be unsuitable for long-shoremen's duties and had to be replaced. From early March until the end of November 1944, No. 2 Port Company was stationed at Debert Military Camp, sending out work parties for specific tasks. On 1 Dec 44 this unit commenced longshoremen's operations at Saint John and remained there until 14 Nov 45, when it was disbanded. No. 1 Port Company arrived in Halifax on 27 Mar 44 and remained there until the end of Jun 1946, when it was disbanded. Unloading ships had been the principal work of these units, although their personnel had been employed as harvesters and casual labour locally (187).

(v) Railway Maintenance

34. Due to the need to maintain essential services Mobilization Boards had granted postponement of military service to 2739 of the 2807 railwaymen who had made application during the last six months of 1943 (188). The maintenance of railway track was falling behind badly and, following an appeal from the President of the Canadian National Railways, the Ministers of Labour and National Defence were instructed to provide assistance. Some 528 N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers were provided during the late autumn, split equally between the C.N.R. and C.P.R. They were paid civilian wages and provided with lodgings by the railway companies. After the project came to an end on 26 Dec the low category personnel were discharged from the Army. A number eventually returned to this type of maintenance work as civilians (189).

35. This request was repeated during the spring of 1944, it being hoped that the Army would provide 1000 soldiers for track maintenance work during the coming summer and autumn (190). However, with the invasion of North-West Europe pending nothing was done until 3 Oct when Order in Council P.C.

7429 authorized the employment of soldiers on Industrial Duty (see below). Le Régiment de Joliette, then supplied 100 men for maintenance work on each of the C.N.R. and C.P.R. railway lines between Toronto and Windsor until the freeze up (191). Similarly the 24th Anti-Aircraft Regiment which had gone to Manitoba for the harvest provided 150 men for track maintenance on each of the C.N.R. and C.P.R. lines in Northwestern Ontario (192). Similar assistance was given to the railways during the summer of 1945.

(vi) Industrial Leave

36. In the case of workers in the so-called essential industries a fairly liberal policy of postponement of compulsory military training had been adopted in 1940 and continued after the training period was lengthened to four months and its members retained for indefinite service on home defence. It was the need to increase the production of the weapons of war that had induced the C.G.S. to agree to members of the C.A.S.F. stationed in Canada being permitted to return to industry during the winter of 1940-1941, without pay or medical benefits (193). According to the instruction issued on 27 Nov 40 requests for such leave (and its probable length) were to be initiated by previous employers; and opinion as to whether such an industry was essential would be sought from the Department of Munitions and Supply; military authorities reserved the right to refuse or grant such leave and to cancel it on 24 hours notice (194).

37. From the outset, recruiting officers had been cautioned not to enlist tradesmen in excess of actual requirements but the increased demand occasioned by the rapid expansion in 1940 had resulted in these instructions being honoured more often in the breach (see Appendix "O"). Although the National Labour Supply Council's study of reserved occupations and "key men"* was primarily concerned with ensuring that war industry should not be impaired by withdrawals for compulsory military training, consideration was given to the case of skilled workers who wished to volunteer for active service. Arrangements were concluded with the Department of National Defence but only on 17 May were instructions issued that men in such categories were to be given leave without pay following medical examination until such time as the District Recruiting Officer should have discovered their status and the previous employer been given a chance to protect the individual's loss. The nearest National War Services Board would judge cases where the employer was not reconciled to the loss of a skilled man, who then might be continued on leave to industry until a replacement could be trained (196). All such leaves of absence were subject to the willingness of the recruit; if he wished to soldier he was at perfect liberty to do so and it would seem likely that most men voluntarily seeking enlistment in the Army did so from a desire to put civilian life behind them for the moment.

38. Clarification was given on 6 May 42 with the promulgation of Canadian Army Routine Order 1935. In addition to defining more clearly the procedure to be adopted when enlisting "key men" this Order made provision for soldiers of the Active Army (including N.R.M.A. members serving as Members of the Canadian Army (H.D.)) to return temporarily to war

*Key Man means any man employed by a war industry whose occupation, in the opinion of the National War Services Board, may not be interrupted without causing serious loss of effectiveness to his employer's activity (195).

industry on leave without pay or public liability. Once again applications were to be initiated by the previous employer and the District Officer Commanding was made responsible that such applications should be forwarded to the Divisional Registrar for hearing by the National War Services Board, together with the commanding officer's recommendation as to whether or not the soldier's retention was "operationally vital to the efficiency of the unit". Soldiers granted such leave were subject to recall on 48 hours notice. Although amended from time to time this Routine Order remained the basis for granting industrial leave to serving personnel.

39. With industrial employment reaching a peak during the early autumn of 1943 more urgent requests for assistance were forwarded by Mr MacNamara to the Vice Adjutant-General. The urgency of the request of 9 Sep from the International Nickel Company of Canada for the return of 32 former employees on industrial leave was strongly supported by the Metals Controller of the Department of Munitions and Supply (197). Investigation disclosed that four of the 32 men sought were serving in the R.C.A.F., three were at Goose Bay and one had been struck off strength as a deserter (198). Military Districts were instructed to grant six months leave to the remainder, with the following result: two soldiers had gone overseas, four did not wish leave, two were in medical hands pending discharge, one had been discharged and 15 took leave (199). The whereabouts of a second list of 20 former employees who had all written that they would like to return to civilian employment was checked. However, a letter from the Minister of Labour, dated 15 Oct and suggesting that since 3562 of the 12600 labour force employed by International Nickel had volunteered, or been enrolled, it would be desirable to grant six months industrial leave to all "B" men [i.e. "key men"] who so desired, brought an angry retort from Mr Ralston (200). The latter's reply of 19 Oct suggested that probably several times 12,600 had passed through International Nickel plants in the previous three and a half years and that a list of those who had left for other civilian employment during that period should be compiled: as it was the Army had got 1502, the Navy 280, the R.C.A.F. 814, the Corps of (civilian) Canadian Fire Fighters nine and the remaining 957 could not be traced*. Mr Ralston's letter further stated:

I am obviously not prepared to offer "every B man" who desires to take six months' leave the privilege of doing so to go back to International Nickel and I would anticipate that my Colleagues of the Navy and Air Force would not be prepared to do so either (202).

40. Attempts were made to assist the meat packing industry during the same autumn, but the request was dropped in 1944 when only 25 soldiers out of the 226 former employees supposedly serving were found to be available for leave (203). On 26 Jun 44 the Deputy Minister of Labour was informed of the disposition of 24 ex-linemen that the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission was anxious to have returned: seven were serving overseas, 11 were of an age and category suitable for overseas service, four might be ineligible for overseas service because of age and category but still required by the Army in Canada and two had been discharged (204).

*Actually, the industrial Mobilization Survey Committees established during the preceding winter had established the fact that there was a large migration and wastage of industrial manpower. In order to maintain a labour force of 12,000 some 60,000 men had passed through the Aluminium Company of Canada's plants at Arvida, Quebec in the space of a single year. Workers became dissatisfied with the high cost of living and lack of recreational facilities and moved on, but without notifying the local National Selective Service officials. This was a problem common to all large companies operating plants in isolated communities (201).

41. By this time industrial employment had passed its peak and both National Selective Service and the Army were endeavouring to ensure that the first employees to be discharged should be physically fit younger men suitable for military service. However, the need for additional munitions for the Second Front had started an upward trend in the shell filling industry and necessitated the re-opening of plants which had been but recently closed down (205).

42. On 30 Jun 44 the Minister of Labour appealed to the Minister of National Defence for further assistance, pointing out that International Nickel would have to shut down one of its furnaces, producing 500 tons a month (the amount of nickel being shipped to Russia), because of a shortage of 1900 underground and 200 process workers. He requested that there should be no further enlistment of such miners and suggested that 500 ex-miners then in uniform should be given extended leave. According to Mr Mitchell's letter:

I do not think there is any single item vitally connected with the war effort for which Canada is solely responsible unless it be nickel. You may be assured that we have been working on a supply of labour for this employer by every method within the limits of our existing manpower controls over the past year without success in supplying the kind of labour that can do this job. These miners have been working thirteen out of fourteen days, and the problem is more than one of quality of manpower (206).

On 11 Jul Mr Ralston replied that the number of enlistments was not great enough to justify refusal to anyone: furthermore, it had never been the practice to detail soldiers for work of a civilian nature unless they volunteered. Of the 1502 former employees of International Nickel who had been found to be in the Army late in 1943 a spot check had revealed that, after deducting those that were overseas, discharged or otherwise unavailable, there would be only 450 from which to draw, even if these could be spared or wished to return to Sudbury (207).

43. Convincing industrialists, trade union officials and others that the provision of trained reinforcements was even more important at this time than worrying about production figures was an uphill battle and on 19 Jun the Deputy Minister of Labour sought Brigadier deLalanne's assistance before replying to the arguments being put forward by the National Selective Service Advisory Board in Toronto. As he pointed out in his request for help:

It is extremely important to us that we convince our Boards and Officials that the shortage of manpower is no easy solution such as "take the men needed out of the Home Defence Army" (208).

Brigadier deLalanne's reply of 29 Jun explained that:

Up to the present, we have been in the fortunate position of being able to meet reinforcement demands from overseas with voluntary enlistments. However, whether we continue to maintain the Army overseas on this basis depends on the unknown factors of recruiting and the casualties which we may suffer.

The NRMA soldiers are a strategic reserve against a fall in voluntary recruitment and against very severe casualties. Up to the present it has been considered advisable to conserve their numbers as much as possible and to keep them in a state of active training. Furthermore, there is a steady

turnover from NRMA to General Service status, which, although not large, would probably cease altogether were these men not kept in training. Such of these men who do "go active" after being fully trained are available almost immediately for overseas service, and it has been felt that the advantages, from the standpoint of morale, of maintaining the Army overseas entirely on a voluntary basis are such as for the present to override other considerations.

With reference to the argument put forward by the Toronto Advisory Board that "The need for a Home Defence Army no longer exists", you might point out that the defence of this continent and the adjacent territories is not a matter which affects Canada alone, but is considered jointly with the U.S. It is doubtful whether the persons advancing the argument referred to above could care to accept the responsibility of dismantling and disbanding all our Coast and Anti-Aircraft defences. G.S. personnel are being withdrawn from these units as quickly as is feasible and will be replaced by N.R.M.A. soldiers. The number of N.R.M.A. soldiers already is greatly in excess of G.S. so employed.

In the meantime, the approved policy of the Minister of National Defence is to discharge all men who are unable to meet the required standards of operational duty and who cannot be adequately employed within an approved establishment, or who are not required in the Army because of their technical, military or trades qualifications....

The policy which I have cited in the foregoing is that which has been in effect to date, but as you know, the whole question of size and composition of the Army in Canada and the employment of N.R.M.A. personnel is receiving serious consideration by our Minister and his advisors (209).

44. With the harvest nearing completion further demands were made that soldiers be employed on work "in the national interest". At the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 20 Sep Mr Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) proposed that surplus military personnel in Canada should be made available for civilian projects when the industrial conversion programme got under way. At the meeting of 22 Sep he stressed that men would have to be made available to get conversion started and make it possible to hire larger numbers later. The question was still under discussion on the following day when the Prime Minister ruled that, even though overseas personnel would have to be assured of rapid demobilization, there would be shipping delays and it would be necessary to release personnel in Canada in order to create conditions for post war full employment. After all, he argued, the country would not continue large numbers of N.R.M.A. soldiers in idleness when the need for home defence was past and their services were required by the civilian economy. The Minister of National Defence insisted that physically fit N.R.M.A. soldiers constituted an additional reserve of reinforcements for use overseas, if the need arose, and should not be discharged. The Committee agreed, however, that N.R.M.A. personnel might be given leave and directed to civilian employment depending on the military situation.

45. During Mr Ralston's visit to the Canadian Army Overseas, Order in Council (P.C. 7429) was passed, authorizing

the employment of soldiers in industry where recommended by the Minister of Labour and approved by the Minister of National Defence (210). Such approved places of work included brickyards, flour and feed mills, cold storage plants, sugar refineries, food processing plants and hospitals (operated by the Department of Pensions and National Health). In his letter of 2 Oct, however, Mr C.G. Power, Associate Minister of National Defence, cautioned the Minister of Labour that it was very unlikely that other than N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers ever would be detailed for such employment. Furthermore:

While every effort will be made by this department to meet demands for men who may be detailed for duty under the provisions of this Order, you will appreciate I am sure that the provision of men of any category or classification will be subject to the prior needs of the Army.

I would also suggest that it is extremely desirable that the provisions of this Order should be used as sparingly as possible, at any rate to start with, as demands for assistance will undoubtedly be heavy and widespread as soon as the plan starts to operate (211).

46. Arrangements were completed to send 351 French-speaking soldiers to No. 2 District Depot for industrial duty in the Toronto area and the balance of the 24th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (not detailed for railway maintenance) was held in Military District No. 10 for possible employment in Winnipeg meat packing plants (212). By the end of October 20 requests for soldiers to be employed on industrial duty had been forwarded by the Department of Labour to N.D.H.Q. (213). However, on 17 Oct Mr Power had further advised the Minister of Labour as follows:

I cannot emphasize too strongly the fact that contrary to the popular conception of the Army in Canada, the number of men available for duty in industry is strictly limited. A large proportion of the Army in Canada is employed on Service and Administrative duties and cannot be used otherwise, whilst many others have operational duties from which they can be spared only for short periods and for duties of extreme importance and urgency. It must be realized, therefore, that the inclusion of an industry on the approved list is no guarantee that men will be available for it (214).

On 19 Nov there were 925 soldiers on Industrial Duty, including 500 men engaged in railway maintenance which would cease with the coming of winter. Termination of employment by the remainder was visualized as (215):

1 Jan 45	- 55 men
1 Mar 45	- 15 men
15 Apr 45	- 20 men
1 Nov 45	-100 men
Indefinite	-235 men
	<u>425 men</u>

47. During the course of General McNaughton's initial appearance in the House of Commons on 23 Nov he announced that G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers who were not of an age and medical category acceptable for overseas service would either be discharged to civilian life or engaged on work of national importance as members of General Employment Companies (216). The

organization of such companies had been contemplated for some time as a means of finding employment for up to 3000 low category men who could not be absorbed in the Home War Establishment (217). There was the further point that N.R.M.A. soldiers should not be allowed to return to civilian life and have a pick of jobs while volunteers were still fighting overseas.

48. On 29 Nov 44 the Adjutant-General's Branch issued an instruction authorizing the formation of 13 such General Employment Companies, one for each Military District and Camps Borden and Petawawa (218). As of 8 Dec only 260 soldiers were employed on Industrial Duty; all in the Toronto area and they were absorbed in No. 2 General Employment Company which had an authorized establishment of eight officers and 439 other ranks, whereas the other companies were limited to a platoon of two officers and 92 other ranks (219). On 16 Dec the Adjutant-General reported to the Minister of National Defence that outstanding requisitions from the Department of Labour totalled just under 600 men but that many were in abeyance because of difficulties with local trade unions or the lack of accommodation (220). Furthermore, since there was little to indicate that the existing pioneer sections (R.C.E.) were not capable of handling military works projects, the Adjutant-General considered that there was no need to press the Military Districts to complete their General Employment Companies to authorized establishments (221).

49. On 7 Mar 45 there were General Employment Companies in nine of the Military Districts and Camp Borden, with an actual strength of 19 officers and 803 other ranks (329 G.S., 468 N.R.M.A. and six C.W.A.C.). No. 2 General Employment Company of 6 officers and 252 other ranks in the Toronto area had men working on hospital construction, in brickyards and malleable iron foundries. The other companies were engaged on such duties as maintenance of temporarily unoccupied military camps, unloading and distributing coal, transferring and loading Ordnance and Medical stores (222).

50. As time passed it became necessary to withdraw soldiers from such employment in order to supply reinforcements for overseas service and make good deficiencies in units which had been depleted for that purpose (223). On 23 Mar, therefore, instructions were issued to reduce all the General Employment Companies to nil strength by 15 Apr (224). An exception was made in the case of No. 2 General Employment Company, which was continued with a reduced establishment so that soldiers could continue to be employed on industrial projects (225). No. 10 Company was re-formed during May and a No. 3 Company was organized at Kinston to employ men on essential work until their turn came for demobilization (226).

APPENDIX "H" - THE FUNCTION OF THE RESERVE ARMY

1. During the winter of 1939-1940 the Non-Permanent Active Militia units which had not supplied a C.A.S.F. unit carried on much as before, although considerably greater enthusiasm was engendered and the ranks swollen by men considering the possibility of active service should the War take a more serious turn. During May and June further N.P.A.M. units were called upon to supply C.A.S.F. components but it was not until 18 Jun that the acting Minister of National Defence made a definite reference to a role for the Non-Permanent Active Militia and appealed to ex-soldiers to come forward and swell its ranks. Authority had been given to all N.P.A.M. Infantry units not yet mobilized, and certain units of other corps, to recruit to establishment and subsequently this authority was extended to permit those Infantry units which had contributed to the C.A.S.F. to form a "second" battalion. The creation of 26 reserve companies for the Veterans' Guard of Canada also was authorized. On 29 Jul the Minister of National Defence told the House of Commons that the 91 N.P.A.M. Infantry units had a total establishment of 88,000 but only 47,373 men actually enrolled. He went on to explain that recruiting would come to an end on 15 Aug and that after that the only entry into the N.P.A.M. would be through the 30-day compulsory military training scheme, which would be operated by members of the N.P.A.M. employed full time (227).

2. After recruiting had ceased, and all returns may be presumed to have been received at Ottawa (31 Aug), the strength of the N.P.A.M. stood at 107,219 all ranks (228). Although a good part of this increase may be credited to the desire of older men to "do their bit" there can be little doubt that a considerable number of young men enlisted to avoid the social stigma of being enrolled for compulsory military training. Actually these trainees merely were posted to N.P.A.M. units as supernumeraries unless they expressed a desire to participate in the local training programme. (As of 28 Mar 41 a total of 73,515 men of the three classes of 30-day recruits had been posted to the supernumerary strength of Reserve units but only 1193 were undergoing training). In November the Non-Permanent Active Militia became the Canadian Army(Reserve). The functions of its units were considered to be training for home defence, for active service if mobilized, and the provision of Officers, N.C.Os. and specialists as reinforcements for units already mobilized (229).

3. However, Major-General Hon. W.A. Griesbach (Inspector-General, Western Canada) summed up the actual position in a memorandum of 16 Jan 41, a good part of which is reproduced below:

I fear that the word "reserve" is misleading in that men are joining that service with no intention whatever of volunteering for overseas service; that our so called Reserve Army may degenerate into a sort of glorified funk hole where men get into a unit and lead themselves, and others, to think that they are doing their whole duty in the present emergency at little cost to themselves....

The evidence before me is that when recruits are called for the Active Force very few volunteers come from Reserve Army formations and that the few recruits that are being called for are being picked-up on the streets.

I have talked with a number of unit commanders of Reserve Army formations, most of whom are hopeful that their units will be called up as a whole. When I ask them how many of their present membership will volunteer in the circumstances they are vague. They think that all their junior officers would volunteer and that most of their older fit officers would do so, but as for the rest they can only guess what would happen.

I asked one of these unit commanders to put his views in writing. The following points emerged:-

- (a) He thinks that at least 75% of his men definitely enlisted for home defence only, and a good proportion of these only expect to be called out in case of a national emergency in Canada.
- (b) He notes reluctance on the part of men (with which he is inclined to agree) to go in driplets, on short notice, to an Active Force unit. He thinks that while his men might be willing to go in the Reserve Army unit to which they belong in some numbers they dislike the idea of going in small numbers amongst strangers. He also thinks that men in good employment are justified in examining the whole matter from all points of view.
- (c) He thinks that the younger men who refrain from volunteering for active service are not to be described as "yellow" but are doing a good deal of talking amongst themselves and consider the voluntary system unfair. They see no reason why they should volunteer for active service and another young man of their own age step into their shoes in civilian life or some foreigner establish himself in the position they formerly occupied. Mothers of sons who have enlisted and mothers of sons who have not enlisted take the same view.
- (d) This officer points out that there is no steady call for recruits, no policy of orderly steady recruitment, no suggestion of urgency, no popular clamour, no social pressure, in short no apparent real need for men at all.

This officer commands a battery of artillery which has no guns and has a strength of 150 all ranks. This battery and another battery of the same strength were asked recently for 50 volunteers for the Active Service Force. One man from each battery only volunteered and both were found to be in category "E". The 50 volunteers necessary were ultimately found without the frame work of the Reserve Army or any other military organization, in short they came in off the street.

I am told that when the South Alberta Regiment was raised the commanders of four units in

Reserve Army were asked to say how many men their units could contribute to this battalion. In reply they gave various estimates of from 400 to 600 men, each, from their then membership. Actually the four commanders produced about 200 men amongst them from their existing membership and the rest of the battalion (now up to strength) was brought in off the street.

Recently a draft of 28 men was called for from the 2nd Petrol Park Coy., R.C.A.S.C. (R.A.) which is at a strength of 430 all ranks. 33 men volunteered and 8 finally passed the medical examination. 2 more men came from the 2nd Reserve Bn. Edmonton Regiment and passed the medical board. The remaining 18 men were recruited off the street.

This raises the question of the medical examination for admission into the Reserve Army, the value of the same and the physical condition of the men in the Reserve Army. I am informed that recruits for the Reserve Army are examined by one medical officer who receives a dollar a head for the job. If a substantial number of these men are medically unfit, then it seems to me, we are wasting money and equipment, to say nothing of time and space on a number of men who would be no use to us upon mobilization for the defence of Canada and upon others who would ultimately appear in large numbers upon the pension rolls.

When I was inspecting the 2nd Bn. Irish Fusiliers (R.A.) I commented upon the good looking faces of the men in the ranks. I noticed also their maturity. Lieut.-Colonel K.A. McLennan, the O.C., assured me that they were indeed a fine body of men and that everyone of them had a job. In the light of subsequent experience I am now inclined to the view that scarcely any of them would volunteer for active service. There is nothing remarkable about this. In the whole history of raising armies upon a voluntary basis the economic condition of the individual has played a part, both for and against enlistment. This economic deterrent will only be swept aside in the face of a great patriotic urge, artificially produced or resulting from some terrible misadventure of military disaster (always a possibility) which, like a flash of lightning discloses the reality or by a form of social pressure that closely approximates compulsion. This, so far, has been completely absent in the raising of troops in this war in Canada.

The Reserve Army at the moment is partially clothed, without personal equipment and armed with American rifles for which no ammunition is issued. In the year ending December 31st, 1940, the units had achieved what was said to be approximately the equivalent of 30 days training, partly in camp and partly at local headquarters. A maximum of 30 rounds had been fired in musketry. In point of fact very little more had been accomplished than some arms drill, platoon and company drill.

The senior officers, in many instances, served in

the last war and while a bit rusty in their work should be steady and reliable. The junior officers are young men for the most part without any training except such as they were able to pick up in various ways in the latter part of 1940.

At the end of 1940 this force was unfit to take the field or to perform the simplest duties of an armed force. Not only was this so because of lack of equipment but also because of lack of training. The training actually given merely brought the troops within measurable distance of further training which would or might have fitted them to perform useful military service if called upon. At the moment these troops have not been trained to march, to provide for their own protection by day and by night at the halt or on the move. They have not been taught to advance under fire and to attack or fall back under mutually protecting fire. In other words they have not been trained at all in the principles and practice of fire and movement. For these reasons they could not be used usefully in action except as last ditch troops (230).

General Griesbach considered that, unless an alert and definite policy were adopted at once, the whole Reserve Army would be just so much wasted money and effort.

4. The C.G.S. still held the view, however, that "active" recruiting "off the street" should be kept to the smallest proportions and men passed through Reserve units even though they did not do much actual training. In a memorandum of 4 Feb he suggested to the Adjutant-General that D.Os.C. should be prodded to obtain their monthly quotas from local Reserve units (231). On 8 Feb a new policy for the Reserve Army was issued by the Adjutant-General:

- (a) As a general principle, Reserve units which have furnished an active component (2nd Battalions, etc.) will not be mobilized for Active Service overseas unless all other qualified and suitable organized Reserve units of the arm and type concerned and required, have provided an Active component.
- (b) It follows that the present primary responsibility of 2nd Battalions, etc. is the provision of reinforcements for their Active components. With this responsibility in mind it will be necessary for a high proportion of personnel of such units to be of proper medical category.
- (c) The primary responsibility of Reserve units that have not yet furnished an Active component is to prepare for subsequent mobilization. With this possibility in view, it will be incumbent on Commanding Officers to see to it that the officer and other rank personnel of their establishment are of such medical category that the change of the unit from Reserve to Active standing can take place with a minimum displacement of personnel. These units should also be prepared to find such reinforcement quotas as may be called for from time to time.

- (d) All Reserve units that have been authorized to organize are liable to be mobilized for home defence (including Aid to Civil Power) in the event of the situation overseas undergoing a sudden change. In addition, certain Reserve units in the Atlantic and Pacific Commands have been, or will be given a definite operational role in the defence of Canada plan (232).

As an initial step, Reserve units were authorized to resume recruiting in order to replace personnel recruited for active service.

5. On 25 Jul 41 the C.G.S. sought the comments of all D.Os.C. and G.Os.C.-in-C. before a further memorandum was issued on Reserve Army policy (233). He particularly wished them to discuss with representative Reserve unit commanding officers the advisability of raising the age limit and lowering the medical category for enlistment, training policy and the employment of other than Infantry units. Their comments and a copy of the draft memorandum were submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 20 Aug, together with an explanatory note from General Crerar emphasizing the increased importance which had been accorded since May to the possibility of "Aid to the Civil Power":

... The indications of possible unrest during the next few months are fairly ominous and should such circumstances arise, it would be very undesirable to allow active units to be diverted from their primary role of Home Defence or of fitting themselves to proceed overseas. Yet the probability of calls being made on the Army for such internal duties has recently been much increased by the passage on 28th July of P.C. Order No. 58304

Moreover, no matter how we may fare internally during the further course of this war, it seems certain that post-war conditions are more than likely to be even more critical than those we experienced in 1919. I should not be surprised if the Winnipeg strike of that year were to be repeated, and with more serious consequences, in a number of localities. We must therefore have a healthy and vigorous Reserve Army in being at that time, into which the best elements of the demobilized Active Army can be enrolled to assist in the maintenance of the civil authority (235).

6. Mr Ralston required certain changes (236), however, and it was 17 Sep before a revised policy could be issued, together with a covering letter signed by the Minister of National Defence (237). The role of the Reserve Army was now envisaged as follows:

*Order in Council authorizing active militia to be called out to suppress riots, etc., on request of Minister of Munitions and Supply. The need for such an Order would seem to have been precipitated by an illegal strike which began among the potmen at Arvida, Quebec on 24 Jul 41 and had embraced about 7800 employees working for the Aluminum Company of Canada. The situation having got out of hand, the Quebec Attorney-General took steps to have troops sent to the scene; they arrived on the morning of 27 Jul and at noon, the following day, the Riot Act was read. By the afternoon of 29 Jul, however, the Syndicate had regained control over its members, who went back to work after an absence of five days. The troops were withdrawn on 31 Jul (234).

- (a) Defence of Canada in Canada
Operational defence role wherever such may be required.
- (b) Aid of the Civil Power
Duty in Aid of the Civil Power in the event of subversive or other disturbances. Included in this duty will be aid to the civil authorities in the event of municipal disorganization, resulting from air or other attacks, of a nature beyond the power of local authorities and Air Raid Precaution Services effectively to deal with.
- (c) Reinforcement of the Active Army
The continued supply of reinforcements to Active counterparts must always be regarded as an important role of Reserve Army units (238).

None of the roles was given priority but, with the recognition that certain older men who were not available for overseas service might wish to participate in (a) and (b), the maximum age limit was raised to 50 years and the medical category for enlistment lowered to "C". It was suggested, however, that in order to meet (c) up to 60 per cent of the personnel should be aged 19-45 and in medical category "A"; moreover, 18 year old boys should be encouraged to enlist for preliminary training before they were old enough to volunteer for general service.

7. During the course of his statement of 6 Nov to the House of Commons on National Defence Mr Ralston pointed out that:

... the reserve army constitutes an important factor in the defence of Canada and in maintaining our active army overseas. In order to meet the situations as they arise in an ever-changing war it is essential that we have the reserve army well organized, well trained and, as far as possible consistent with other requirements, well armed. Present plans do not contemplate any extensive additional mobilization of reserve units, but that possibility must be kept in mind....

What they are doing is paying special attention to training, both basic and advanced and specialized. There will also be increased issue and distribution of equipment with regard to the reserve army, taking into account, of course, the needs of the active units. It is no lip-service I am paying when I point out what a valuable contribution the reserve army of Canada and its officers have made to this war effort through at first being the backbone of the active army, being in their places and endeavouring in every possible way to train men to make them ready to enlist in active units, and doing their best to induce them to understand what their duty is when the call comes.

... To some extent the reserve consists of men who because of financial or domestic or personal reasons are unable to take their places in the active army. In the reserve they are trying to do their part as best they can, so that we may release all the men possible for active duty (239).

8. The paper strength of the Reserve Army at this time (8 Nov) was 146,611 all ranks: however, 63,322 were N.R.M.A. 30-day recruits still carried on paper as supernumeraries (only 6144 had been absorbed into establishments) and 3151 were employed on full time duty with training centres under authority of General Order 13^o of 1940 (240).

9. The entrance of Japan into the Second World War resulted in a further change in policy. Further Reserve units were mobilized, including "second" battalions for a number of Infantry regiments, to complete the 6th and 7th Divisions, form three brigade groups of an 8th Division and provide additional units for coast defence. Effective 2 Feb 42, Maj-Gen B.W. Browne vacated the appointment of Adjutant-General to become Director General of the Reserve Army. Acting upon the recommendation of the several District Officers Commanding, units were selected for inclusion in a reserve brigade group to be formed in each Military District. A full time commander and nucleus staff were provided and sufficient equipment to enable these units to receive accelerated training. The remaining Reserve units either were to continue their existing training or become dormant, depending on their strength and efficiency. Since action was going to be taken to end the immunity from compulsory military training enjoyed by members of the Reserve Army, the units slated for the reserve brigade groups were directed to retain only men between the ages of 19 and 35, who either were medically unfit for active service (Medical category lower than "B") or postponed because of employment in essential occupations, and those who were either younger or older (241).

10. In an effort to ape the exploits of guerrilla fighters of other nations and satisfy public opinion the Canadian Government authorized the formation of Coast Defence Guards on both coasts lated in February. Units of what were to become the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were organized in 17 coastal areas from among trappers, loggers and fishermen who were supplied with sporting rifles, steel helmets and armbands, but not uniforms (242). By the end of 1942, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, which had become a corps of the Reserve Army, had a total strength of approximately 11,500 in its 130 authorized companies (243).

11. Instead of creating a similar organization within Atlantic Command, as originally intended, the situation was met by adding supernumerary companies to the existing Reserve units which were spread more evenly throughout the Maritime Provinces than had been the case in British Columbia(244). Nearly every village along the shoreline came to have either a platoon or coast watching detachment (245). Steps also were taken to organize a second reserve brigade group in Military District No. 6.

12. As a result of U-Boat activities in the St. Lawrence steps were taken during September and October 1942 to enlist the inhabitants of small coastal communities along the Gaspé peninsula into sub-units of Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent. The scheme grew sufficiently, with 56 communities participating, for the creation of an additional reserve battalion for Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent (246). By February 1943 the 2nd battalion had a strength of 22 officers and 1001 other ranks, while the 3rd battalion comprised 18 officers and 1604 other ranks (A.F.Q. Report No. 30).

13. The Reserve Army's recruiting campaign and the extension of the age limits brought results. Despite the number of units mobilized for active service during 1942 the strength of the Reserve Army increased to 100,045 all ranks. Although 35,941 non-effectives were not training there were

27,670 active members in the coastal Military Districts and 25,170 men who might be withdrawn from the interior as an operational reserve without disrupting essential civilian services and war industry (247). Training was increased from 30 to 40 days (15 days in camp, 10 days at week end schemes and 15 days (i.e. 45 evenings) at local armouries). An additional 15 days training was available for Officers, N.C.Os. and specialists (248).

14. By degrees the provisions of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations were extended so that other ranks of the Reserve Army (excluding warrant officers) were no longer exempt from compulsory military service if they fell within the callable ages. (Postponement of such service was still possible, however, for those engaged in essential occupations.) After 26 Nov 42 all enlistments in the Reserve Army were for the duration of the War and authority was given subsequently to extend for a further 12 months all three year engagements that should expire subsequent to 22 Oct 44. As the younger members reached the age of 18 1/2 years, however, they were encouraged to volunteer for general service. During the period 31 Mar-31 Dec 43 some 4682 men volunteered for general service. At the latter date the strength of the Reserve Army was 6033 officers and 82,324 other ranks (249). Apart from the re-location of certain units and sub-units during the year a number of the least effectual were permitted to become dormant (250).

15. With Germany and Japan definitely on the defensive by mid-summer 1943 and Canada's home defences being reduced so that more reinforcements could be despatched overseas public interest in the Reserve Army began to slump. Consequent upon a discussion with D.Os.C. on the future of the Reserve Army the C.G.S. advised the Minister of National Defence on 21 Oct that the role of the Reserve Army should again be defined. While there was no need to continue a Reserve Army of approximately six divisions, trained and equipped to participate in home defence, General Stuart considered that a post-war Army (Active and Reserve) probably would be based on a force of six divisions and four armoured brigades, with the necessary complement of corps troops and coast and anti-aircraft defences (251). The Minister of National Defence had proceeded on his autumn visit to the Canadian Army Overseas, however, before approving a revised role (252).

16. The new Director General of the Reserve Army (Maj-Gen F.R. Phelan) proceeded to visit each Military District in Canada, as directed by Mr Ralston, to attempt to restore interest in the Reserve Army. According to the report made to the C.G.S. on 28 Dec, however, he had found a general note of discouragement: recruiting had fallen off, there was only 50-60 per cent attendance at mid-week drills and there was a general air of complacency and belief that the War was nearly over. Such a view had been strengthened by the unguarded utterances of certain prominent public men and the opinions circulated to business men by certain "Market Letters". The latter suggested there no longer was a need for the Reserve Army and that a good deal of money could be saved by its curtailment. Unless something constructive were undertaken, General Phelan believed that the keen personnel would become discouraged (253). General Phelan's recommendations were incorporated in a press release issued on 10 Feb 44 at which time the role of the Reserve Army was stated as follows:

- (a) To maintain throughout the country continued interest in the Canadian Army and its activities and to set an example to all citizens of preparedness at all times.

- (b) To provide a continuing flow of reinforcements for the forces overseas by training young men of pre-enlistment age.
- (c) To back up the civil authority responsible for the enforcement of law and order if required.
- (d) As a trained reserve to support the Active forces available for the defence of Canada if the Military situation should deteriorate.
- (e) As a basis for expansion of the Active Army should the necessity arise (254).

17. Speaking to the House of Commons on the following day, Mr Ralston referred to the Reserve Army as "insurance against the uncertainties of War". He described its role as:

... maintaining throughout the country continued interest in the Canadian Army and its activities, and to set to all citizens an example of preparedness at all times. This is what they have done right through, and I do not think it was needed at any time more than it is now. Many of these men are perhaps working at work benches during the day in munition factories or in stores or offices or on the farm, but in the evenings they give their time to training, and to fitting themselves for a possible emergency, should the time come. They serve in two ways. I do not know any better example of "preparedness" than is found in the Reserve Army (255).

18. Due to the improved military situation, however, the period of training was being shortened from 40 to 30 days and the numbers of officers and other ranks employed on full time training reduced. This Reserve Army policy statement also had stated:

While no general change in the structure of the Reserve Army is contemplated, it is proposed that some measure of "streamlining" will take place to ensure that all units maintain a satisfactory standard of efficiency. Units unable to maintain a satisfactory strength and efficiency will become dormant for the duration of the war (256).

The several D.Os.C. were asked for recommendations as to whether weak units should become dormant or be continued on a reduced establishment, where local sentiment was strong (257). In the majority of cases they became dormant. The Reserve brigade groups in M.D. Nos. 7 and 12 were broken up (258).

19. Although considerable interest was displayed in the units which had been converted to an anti-aircraft role with a view to providing defence for certain industrial areas in Ontario and Quebec and the coastal regions (259), generally speaking there was decreased attendance at summer camps. Apart from the C.O.T.C., the strength of the Reserve Army dwindled. On 31 Mar 45 the total strength of the Reserve Army stood at 5535 officers and 77,729 other ranks (260).

APPENDIX "J" - "X" LIST

1. Retention of Canadian troops in the United Kingdom for a long period during the Second World War made it unnecessary to follow the procedure outlined in Field Service Regulations, Part I (1930) whereby an "X" List was to be maintained for every corps in order to account for all officers and other ranks who were not regimentally employed. According to the System of Providing and Maintaining C.A.S.F. Personnel in the United Kingdom, issued 8 Aug 40, an "X" List was continued only to show personnel posted to a headquarters or extra regimental unit and those who might become prisoners of war. This in turn was superseded by a pamphlet entitled System of Providing and Maintaining Personnel for the Canadian Army Overseas, 1942. However, a trial pamphlet entitled Canadian Unit Guide to Documentation in a Theatre of War (Overseas), 1943 and introduced during Exercise "SPARTAN", became the basis for the "X" List procedure introduced for the original Canadian Force which proceeded to Sicily (261). The Canadian Section, G.F.S. 2nd Echelon was instructed to maintain an "X" List for each corps* or battalion under the following headings:

- X-1 Verified Prisoners of War.
- X-2 All ranks under sentence of detention or imprisonment except in cases where the sentence is suspended.
- X-3 All ranks evacuated on Medical Grounds beyond Regimental Aid Posts.
- X-4 Unposted reinforcements in the theatre of war belonging to the Corps.
- X-5 All ranks on courses of three months or over in a theatre of war.
- X-6 All ranks posted as missing.

When reinforcements first arrived in a theatre of operations they were posted to the X-4 List: from that they could be moved to other Lists prior to being posted to an authorized war establishment.

2. During October 1943 this organization was modified by Part III of a new System of Providing and Maintaining Personnel for the Canadian Army Overseas. In practice, as the Canadian Force in the Mediterranean grew larger and expanded its activities it became necessary to increase the number of categories into which the "X" List was divided, although the tenth classification was added only with a further revision of this pamphlet in May 1944:

- X-7 All ranks seconded from the Canadian Army to other Allied Forces in the theatre of war.
- X-8 All non-effectives held at Base Reinforcement Units whose return to the U.K. has been authorized.
- X-9 All personnel held at Base Reinforcement Units, who, for one reason or another, are

*Later became branch in the case of C.A.C and R.C.A.

not available as reinforcements and whose disposition is still to be decided.

X-10 All reinforcement personnel attached away from reinforcement units under appropriate authority.

Henceforth, however, all ranks posted from units to fill vacancies in a headquarters or extra-regimental unit were to be carried on a special Corps List, NOT to be confused with the "X" List.

3. With effect from 15 Jan 44 the "X" List procedure had been adopted for the personnel of units remaining in the United Kingdom as part of First Canadian Army. Although only the breakdown given above was ever authorized, special conditions pertaining to North-West Europe resulted in the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, 21st Army Group introducing certain additional classifications.

4. In order to simplify the handling of reinforcements only those officers and other ranks who were attached out from the Base Reinforcement Group and those staff officers who were attached out for special employment and could not be recalled on short notice were left permanently on the X-10 List. The remainder were shown on an expanded X-4 List:

X-4 All unposted reinforcements who are physically present in 2 C.B.R.G.

X-4(a) All reinforcements who, under agreed policy, are not held in 2 C.B.R.G. but are attached out to units or formations in order that they may maintain their skill at their trade or specialty. This includes nursing sisters, officer reinforcements for C Int C, reinforcements for meteorological, survey and dental units. These personnel, although attached out, can be used at any time to fill vacancies as they arise in field units and will be replaced by additional reinforcements demanded from the U.K.

X-4(b) All reinforcements who are physically present in 2 C.B.R.G. but who are attached out temporarily, i.e., casual attachments such as working parties who can be recalled at short notice and used to refill reinforcement demands.

X-4(Staff) All reinforcement staff officers who are being held in 2 C.B.R.G.

X-4(a)(Staff) All reinforcement staff officers who are attached out for employment at various formation headquarters but who can be posted on short notice to vacancies in W.E.

5. Similarly, a new division was made under X-3 to handle:

X-3(a) All ranks who, by virtue of PULHEMS grading or medical grounds, are not suitable as X-4 personnel but who are not of sufficiently low category to warrant return to U.K. [Authorized to account for personnel held in Special Employment Companies in A.A.I. on 28 Jan 45].

6. A final classification, X-11, was employed to

account for military personnel employed with Civil Affairs Groups
and the Canadian Red Cross.

APPENDIX "K" - AVOIDABLE WASTAGE IN THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

1. The existence of a volunteer Army for Overseas service made it more difficult, particularly in the early months of the War when there were no adequate "screening" procedures, to refuse undesirable individuals who sought enlistment and too many men in the following classifications managed to get overseas:

- (a) Chronic alcoholics.
- (b) Drug addicts.
- (c) Persons having history of treatment in any mental institution.
- (d) Persons known to have repeated convictions for civil offences.
- (e) Incurable soldiers, i.e. those who have repeatedly undergone detention, either with their units or in special detention barracks.
- (f) Soldiers who are obviously much older or much younger than military age, even though of apparently good type (262).

According to the Clinical Volume of the Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945 there were enough such soldiers serving long sentences of imprisonment or detention in the United Kingdom, during the last two years of War, to more than equal the strength of an Infantry Battalion (263).

2. The 42 months of waiting in the United Kingdom were rather boring and undoubtedly led a number of men to go absent without leave, during which periods they obtained civilian jobs or became involved in petty rackets. Such absences were the most prevalent military offence, being better than 50 per cent of the total (264). Only 58 men were struck off strength during this period as deserters (265). It had been estimated at C.M.H.Q. that between four and five per cent of the Canadian troops in the United Kingdom became involved in military offences per month, with 60 per cent of the cases going to courts martial (266).

3. Documentary material is not readily available and "avoidable wastage" must be a subject for medical and sociological study. However, the following paragraphs will set forth the problems faced in actual theatres of war for the benefit of those who are reading this report.

(a) Battle Exhaustion.

4. The Canadian Medical History of the Second World War suggests that psychiatric disabilities account for approximately 30 per cent of all casualties invalided out of the Army: over 80 per cent of these showed "definite evidence of constitutional predisposition to psychotic or neurotic breakdown," or "had constitutional defects such as mental deficiency or psychopathic personality" (267). The problem had been met and faced in Italy. As early as 22 Jun 44 the war diarist of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion in Normandy reported:

... We now have considerable numbers of men returned from the front labelled "Battle

Exhaustion" cases. When the shells came over, the majority of these men sat in bomb craters and cried.

5. The question of who should be evacuated as a "battle exhaustion" case and who was faking the symptoms was never settled satisfactorily. The problem was summarized, however, in a memorandum on "Views on management of Exhaustion in a Forward Area":

In practice the policy both in holding cases and in returning convalescents to duty is one of compromise. There is no possibility of distinguishing "genuine" cases. The definitely unwilling man readily develops symptoms which are genuine even though they are a consequence of his lack of morale or moral fibre. While, for the sake of discipline, this man may be dealt with by immediate disciplinary measures, there is little hope of reclaiming him once he has been evacuated through medical channels or has gone through the formality of a F.G.C.M. [Field General Court Martial]. On the other hand the man of neurotic constitution may give a fair performance as long as his morale is bolstered up by a degree of external pressure and encouragement. The policy which we advocate for M.Os. and other officers is to judge a man by his record. If he has given good service and is now breaking, give him the benefit of the doubt and evacuate him. If he is new and jittery, encourage him but hold him to his job. If he is merely a useless type compel him to do his duty as long as it is possible to do so. (The exceptions to this rule are officers and N.C.Os. who, because of their responsibility for other men, must be relieved of their duties when instability becomes evident.) The cases which benefit most by treatment are the acutely fatigued, and those that benefit most by discipline are the young, scared, and uninitiated reinforcements, as well as the great borderline group which will be swayed by the general trend of morale in the unit (268).

Even apart from the fact that "battle exhaustion" cases represented a considerable loss of manpower, there was the fact that a considerable number of Medical and other personnel were required to look after them, rather than perform other duties.

6. Strong disciplinary measures had been adopted by General Crerar before he left Italy and these were repeated in North-West Europe to discourage self inflicted wounds and faking symptoms of battle exhaustion (269). On 29 Aug 44 General Simonds wrote his divisional commanders of 2nd Canadian Corps that commanding officers would have to adopt more stern measures to combat what was no longer considered a disgrace (270).

7. During April 1944 an ad hoc Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed in Italy to provide employment as far forward as possible for neuropsychiatric casualties whom it was considered might be salvaged by treatment (271). Seeking authority for a more permanent organization the Corps Commander requested, and C.M.H.Q. agreed, that it was "most essential that so called neuropsychiatric cases be not allowed [to] leave this theatre as any outward flow to U.K. would encourage slackers to feign psychiatric symptoms in hope of escape from theatre" (272). Genuine cases, of course, would be

treated on their merits. During June this ad hoc unit was replaced by three Special Employment Companies and provision was made for three similar units to serve in North-West Europe. Subsequently a fourth company was added for service with the 21st Army Group (273). Those who could not be rehabilitated for return to their original units were still able to perform useful service, loading and unloading lorries and railroad freight cars, repairing roads and as casual labour.

(b) Venereal Disease

8. The scourge of V.D. has plagued armies down through the centuries and would seem to be a continuing evil. More reliable treatments, of shorter duration, came into use but increasingly large staffs were required to combat the greater incidence of such diseases as the War progressed and a tremendous number of man-days were wasted by the men undergoing treatment.

9. The long months of waiting in the United Kingdom had demonstrated that the greater number of cases of V.D. had been contracted in the larger cities while men were on leave (274). Once Canadian troops became engaged in actual operations the venereal disease rate fluctuated in inverse ratio to the fighting. According to the Medical History:

While engaged in active operations, there was little opportunity, and probably less inclination, for exposure to venereal disease. Between operations, relaxation, fatalism, and "liberated" alcohol, accelerated the exposure rate with a resultant flare-up of venereal disease. Educational measures in such circumstances were difficult, and at best influenced only a small number (275).

10. This point is well illustrated by what befell 1st Canadian Corps. Following the completion of the Liri Valley offensive (11 May-4 Jun) it was withdrawn into Eighth Army reserve so that an opportunity might be given to train new reinforcements and give a much needed rest to the fighting troops in preparation for the attack on the Gothic Line (25 Aug) (276):

<u>Month</u>	<u>New Cases</u>	<u>Incidence per Thousand</u>
April	283	45.5
May	403	64.6
June	423	68.8
July	882	145.8
August	463	76.8

What the A.D.M.S. of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division very aptly termed "this deplorable offspring of the union of Venus and Bacchus" (277) had reached a peak during the first week of July and prompted Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps to adopt rigid control measures (278).

11. While First Canadian Army was cooped up in the Normandy bridgehead the incidence of V.D. was low and remained so during the period of the break-out and dash across France. The following statistics show, however, that as soon as the troops settled down to autumn campaigning and Belgium cities could be visited on 48 hour pass the V.D. rate climbed sharply (279):

The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment	21
The North Nova Scotia Highlanders	10
Le Régiment de la Chaudière	70
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve	9
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	23
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada	13
The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor)	10

Apparently there was not very much that could be done about it, however, for on 27 Jan 45 the Army Commander confided to General Sansom that the increased number of deserters and absentees was a worry. Only 10 per cent of the Canadian troops were French-speaking but they were contributing 50 per cent of the desertions (287). (This, of course, could be partly explained by the greater ease with which personnel speaking French could "hide out" in Liberated Europe, living off civilians or from the proceeds of a thriving "black market").

16. According to statistics compiled later the following apprehended culprits were tried by court martial for all types of offences during 1944 (288):

	<u>General Courts Martial</u>	<u>Field General Courts Martial</u>
United Kingdom	97	3162
France	6	391
Belgium	8	453
The Netherlands	5	492
Mediterranean	36	2118

It must be remembered, however, that Canadian troops served in the Mediterranean during the whole 12 months of 1944. Available statistics for 1945 are not broken down to show only the period leading up to VE-Day and it would seem likely that many of the following courts martial were for offences that occurred subsequent to the cessation of hostilities (289):

<u>1945</u>	<u>General Courts Martial</u>	<u>Field General Courts Martial</u>
United Kingdom	63	1585
France	1	54
Belgium	34	1339
The Netherlands	30	1332
Germany	11	322
Italy	15	937

In addition to the time and energy spent with courts martial, those subsequently held in detention in a theatre of war were rather unfairly classed as available reinforcements (100 per cent of the X-2 List).

17. In the months following the end of hostilities a considerable number of deserters were rounded up, due to the difficulties of avoiding police surveillance in countries where an identity card and ration cards were of prime importance. When a general amnesty was proclaimed in Canada by Order in Council PC 3264 of 14 Aug 46, however, there still were 199 listed as deserters from the Canadian Army Overseas: 10 in the Mediterranean, 47 in North-West Europe and 142 in the United Kingdom (290).

APPENDIX "L" -- FIGHTING STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION

Practically all success in war, which is won by the proper co-operation of all arms, must in the end be confirmed by infantry, which, by closing with the enemy, compels his withdrawal or surrender, and holds the objectives which have been secured or the points of importance which have to be protected, as a base for further action. It is the most adaptable and the most generally useful of all arms, since it is capable of operating over almost any ground either by day or by night and can find or make cover for itself more readily than the other arms.

1. Despite this dictum, so clearly stated in Field Service Regulations, Volume II, 1935, the successes achieved by the Wehrmacht in the early campaigns of the Second World War seemed to justify the claims advanced by the advocates of mechanized warfare. Undue importance was given to the creation of armoured and other specialized forces and the strength of the supporting services was increased, not only in the administrative "tail" proper but as far forward as the Infantry division. Much effort was expended to ensure that the personnel of all units, no matter how far to the rear, should be capable of defending themselves against attack by enemy parachutists or panzer columns. Such personnel came to believe that their role was just as important as that of the rifleman and, indeed, as long as the enemy possessed air superiority, casualties in the L. of C. and rear areas were high enough, justifying the provision of large pools of reinforcements.

2. As the War progressed, however, the need for more Infantry was realized, even within the armoured division. The 1942-43 operations in Libya and Tunisia resulted in repeated calls for more Infantry and these became even more urgent once the fighting was transferred to the mountainous terrain of southern Italy. Since the reinforcement training stream at home could not be quickly altered to produce the greater proportion of general duty infantrymen then required from the men available as recruits, it became necessary during the closing stages of the conflict to remuster and retrain reinforcements who had been intended for other corps.

3. Whereas two-thirds of the 1914 British division's 18,179 all ranks had served in its 12 Infantry battalions, the 1939 equivalent formation of 14,476 all ranks possessed greater firepower, even though it had only nine Infantry battalions of 662 all ranks each (A.H.Q. Report No. 57). Wartime experience soon demonstrated, however, that this organization was far from adequate and brought increases for all Arms and Services. By 30 Nov 44 the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division's authorized strength was as follows (291):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
Headquarters Units	40	126
Reconnaissance Regiment, CAC	43	777
Artillery	198	3230
Engineers	33	926
Signals	29	714
Infantry	434	8354
Army Service Corps	46	1250
Medical	50	895
Ordnance	2	78
R.E.M.E.	35	749
Postal	1	24
Provost	3	112
Intelligence	1	12
	<u>915</u>	<u>17,247</u>

Even here, the Infantry total included 55 officers and 315 other ranks belonging to the three brigade headquarters, the three brigade ground defence platoons and the divisional defence and employment platoon; another 37 officers and 707 other ranks of The Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.) provided close support for the division's nine Infantry battalions, where the heaviest casualties occurred and the replacement needs were greatest.

4. The Canadian Infantry Battalion (Cdn II/233/4) of the same period comprised 38 officers and 812 other ranks (plus six pipers for Highland Regiments) (292). Apart from the actual battalion headquarters of six officers and 54 other ranks there was a headquarters company of five officers and 94 other ranks to handle signals and administrative tasks. The support company with its 3-in. mortar, (universal) carrier, anti-tank and pioneer platoons accounted for a further seven officers and 184 other ranks. Each of the four rifle companies consisted of five officers and 120 other ranks, organized into a headquarters and three platoons, each of which was similarly divided into a headquarters and three sections (corporal, lance corporal and eight men).

5. Personnel of the support company normally were deployed across the battalion front, 3-in mortar-men and anti-tank gunners to provide close support and pioneers for laying or clearing barbed wire and mines. During offensive operations the carrier platoon also would be in an exposed position. Unit signallers of headquarters company serving forward and the 20 stretcher bearers attached to battalion headquarters would come under direct enemy fire on occasion but administrative personnel spent most of their time in the rear echelons, where they could become casualties only from enemy mines, bombing or longer range artillery fire.

6. It was the four rifle companies which took the brunt of the casualties, when dug in on the defensive as well as when attacking. Even here, however, it must be remembered that not all of each company's five officers and 120 other ranks were actually forward. Normally the C.Q.M.S., company storeman, two cooks and three drivers I.C. remained farther back. Then there was the "left out of battle" party of 15 all ranks per company, a nucleus of experienced personnel around which the fighting component would be rebuilt in the event of heavy casualties. Usually this L.O.B. group comprised the second in command, one platoon commander and one sergeant, three corporals and nine privates. Theoretically, therefore, a rifle company's attacking strength was three officers and 100 other ranks.

7. This was the ideal situation, existing at the beginning of a campaign, but due to delays and difficulties in replacing casualties among the general duty infantrymen the normal strength of a rifle company became considerable less. Indeed, 1st Canadian Corps reported from Italy late in November 1944 that:

72 men is the average strength for an infantry rifle company going into battle. There are only 110 fighting men in a coy and the rft situation as it is at present this number is almost never available except on the first day of an operation. Many times companies have gone into action with strength of 50 and on more than one occasion it has been necessary to reorganize on a three company basis of very often not over 50 fighting men per company (293).