

B: One cannot talk about this, we must ...

W: There is no insight. All is lunacy. With one wing we are up in Finland with the other one down at Rhodes; in the center the enemy is in Germany. ... It is incomprehensible. There is an old farmers' saying that in an emergency everybody rallies around the flag. We do not even think of this. The enemy is in Germany, the war is coming to an end, but we are still up at Murmansk. Instead of rallying around the flag the wings are extended who knows how far. I cannot understand it any more.

(ibid, Appx 1570, tel cons 31 Jul 44)

74. At the turn of the month O.D.S.W still believed the next Allied move would be a sea and airborne operation against Liguria. But a landing in France was just as possible; at least 20 divisions were available for the purpose.* Calculations of Allied capabilities were based on the information shown on the "Enemy Situation Map" issued on 2 Aug. Photostatic copies of this document, as well as of the succeeding editions of 11 and 20 Aug appear as Appendix "H" to this report (981A10.(D196a, b,c)).** (G.M.D.S. - 61439/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 8, Int reps Aug 44). From the Canadian point of view it is interesting to note that the map for 2 Aug was the last one to show a Canadian formation in the Adriatic sector prior to the identifications resulting from the actual commitment of the Corps. On 2 Aug 1 Cdn Inf Div was still shown with the Italian Liberation Corps. At the end of July Lt-Col Pretzell was promoted from Ops Offr 71 Inf Div to Ops Offr Tenth Army. Pretzell is the officer who later prepared the study: "Material for the Presentation of the Battle of Rimini" (Original Text and Translation: H.S. 981.011 (D3)).

1 Aug

75. On the front of the Army Group the day was uneventful. A summary of Tenth Army's estimate of the situation was recorded in the form of an introduction to War Diary No. 8 (G.M.D.S. - 61437/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 8, 1 Aug - 30 Sep 44):

At the moment the enemy is inactive on Tenth Army's front. The focal point of the fighting lies in the Florence area where the British, following a visit of the King at the front, are endeavouring to obtain a prestige success by capturing Florence. In accordance with the withdrawal movement of Fourteenth Army the right wing of Tenth Army must slowly be taken back to a new line.

* For complete analysis see: Schramm, op cit, Translation, page 52

** The "Enemy Situation Maps" of Fourteenth Army carried identical information.

Deliberately weakening the Army's right wing in favour of the Adriatic sector, the unseasoned 715th Infantry Division was committed on the extreme right. 1 Para Div, relieved by 715 Inf Div, was deployed behind 278 Inf Div in and forward of the Green Line.

Its task is to back up the latter division which has suffered severe casualties in the Ancona battles and to prevent an early penetration of the Green Line at all costs. Enemy reconnaissance and artillery activity, as well as ship movements in the port of Ancona and the identification of 1 Cdn Corps (sic) on the left wing of 51 Mtn Corps lead to the expectation of an early attack.

In view of the increased tonnage and the arrival of warships in the Mediterranean an enemy landing is furthermore being expected either on the west coast of Italy or in southern France. In order to prepare for all contingencies, Tenth Army is readying suitable coastal defences, particularly in the area Rimini - Ravenna, with all available means and with the utmost dispatch. 94 Inf Div is en route to the area of Trieste while 98 Inf Div is on the way to the danger zone. In addition 15 Pz Gren Div and a Blocking Group from 162 (Turc) Inf Div are being held in readiness as a mobile reserve for commitment on shortest notice. At the present time the Army has the following formations under its command:

1 Para Div	Army Reserve
76 Pz Corps with	715 Inf Div
	334 Inf Div
	15 Pz Gren Div
	305 Inf Div
51 Mtn Corps with	44 Inf Div
	114 Jg Div
	5 Mtn Div
	71 Inf Div
	278 Inf Div
Corps Witthoeft with [*]	162 (Turc) Inf Div
	94 Inf Div
	Coastal Defence
	Area Venice.

* Corps Witthoeft had been under command of the Army since 17 Jul 44 (G.M.D.S. - 55291/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, 16 and 17 Jul 44)

2 Aug

76. With the tactical situation remaining unchanged in all other sectors, 1 Para Corps and the left wing of 14 Pz Corps came under severe pressure. After several telephonic requests for permission to withdraw, O.B.SW finally concurred at 1355 hours, and orders were given to fall back during the night 2/3 Aug on the "Bridgehead position Florence". Rearguards were to remain in the present positions. The right wing of 76 Pz Corps (astride the Arno, a few miles south of Pontassieve) was bent back accordingly.

3 Aug

77. There was no longer any doubt that 1 Para Corps would have to fall back behind the Arno, and at 1020 hours O.B.SW gave his consent for withdrawal of the mass during the night 3/4 Aug to the Heinrich-Berg (Mountain) Line at the northern outskirts of Florence. In view of the imminent evacuation of Florence, Tenth Army now selected defence lines further north (Photostat D 981A10. (D196)). (G.M.D.S. - 61437/2, Tenth Army, W.D. 8, Appx 1-4 Aug, Appx 58, 3 Aug 44). A warning order for the exchange of the two Corps Headquarters was issued on the same evening (Photostat 981A10. (D197)); (ibid, Appx 59):

To take full advantage of 51 Mtn Corps' experience in mountain warfare and 76 Pz Corps' experience in operations with mobile formations

51 Mtn Corps to command:

715 Inf Div,
334 Inf Div,
305 Inf Div,
44 Inf Div,
114 Jg Div;

76 Pz Corps to command:

5 Mtn Div,
71 Inf Div,
278 Inf Div,
1 Para Div,

and upon reaching the Green Line
in addition:

162 (Turc) Inf Div and
98 Inf Div.

15 Pz Gren Div to go into Army Reserve east
of Bologna.

The exchange of headquarters became effective at
1800 hours 8 Aug 44. (G.M.D.S. - 61437/1, Tenth
Army, W.D. 8, 8 Aug 44)

4 Aug

78. Three rear-guard battalions of 1 Para Corps, with orders to remain south of the Arno on 4 Aug, were forced to cross the river early in the morning. The mass of 1 Para Corps was slowly moving to the Heinrich - Berg position. Rear-guards were stationed along the north bank of the Arno. East of the German inter-army boundary, in the area of Tenth Army the left wing of 4 Inf Div captured Monte Finetto in the morning and Monte Altuccio in the evening. The failure there of some companies of 576 Inf Regt (completely reorganized with remnants of 94 Inf Div) created an embarrassing situation for 305 Inf Div and caused some concern in higher quarters lest a deep penetration at this point force a premature withdrawal beyond the projected Green Line - forefield position. The responsible company commanders were warned for court of inquiry (G.M.D.S. - 61437/2, Tenth Army, W.D. #, Appx 1-4 Aug, Appx 83, tel cons 4 Aug 44). During the day Kesselring inquired about Allied dispositions on the Adriatic coast; v. Vietinghoff was unable to supply the desired information and said the divisions were trying to take prisoners for identification (ibid).

5 - 10 Aug

79. During these days there were no engagements of significance in the area of Fourteenth Army. Extensive reconnaissance activity failed to throw light on Allied changes in dispositions. On 8 Aug 90 Pz Gren Div was placed under command of the Ligurian Army. Most of the rear elements of 1 Para Corps seem to have left the city of Florence during the night 10/11 Aug.²² In the area of Tenth Army hurriedly brought up units had succeeded in stabilizing the situation at the Monte Altuccio and the withdrawal of the Army continued to proceed according to plan. At the headquarters of Allied Fifteenth Army Group it had been decided in the meantime to breach the Gothic Line in the Adriatic sector. Deceptive measures were now operating in reverse. As a consequence of this development a new and radically different picture of the enemy situation on the Adriatic coast was submitted to Tenth Army by 51 Mtn Corps on 7 Aug, a few hours before the transfer of this headquarters to the right wing of

* The opaque style of Fourteenth Army's War Diary makes it often difficult to evade misconstructions. Fighting at the time had died down and the withdrawal of 1 Para Corps to the Heinrich-Mountain Line had lost some of its urgency; the ever recurring references however to the withdrawal of the Corps to that line seem to be references to the movements of the "last", "the very last" and the "absolutely last" rear elements.

the Army. A photostatic copy and a translation of the document appear as Appendix "J" to this report (981A10. (D201)). (G.M.D.S. - 62297, 51 Mtn Corps, Int Repts 1 Jul - 31 Aug, 7 Aug 44). C. of S. 51 Mtn Corps now stated flatly that neither the previously reported enemy concentrations nor the presence of Canadian formations in the front had been confirmed and that there were no indications of an imminent large scale attack. On Tenth Army's "Enemy Situation Map" for 11 Aug (see Appx "H"), 1 Cdn Corps was shown in the reserve of Eighth Army. During the middle of August, when the Germans had finally become convinced that the Adriatic coast was very lightly held, Eighth Army was massing its divisions there for a surprise thrust through the Gothic Line.

80. This report has been prepared by Capt A.G. Steiger, Historical Section (G.S.).

A. G. Steiger, Capt
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director,
Historical Section (G.S.)

I

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ARMY GROUP "C"

CASUALTY STATISTICS

981A10. (D143)

Ref: para 15

German Army

Selected Progressive Casualty Totals from 22 Jun 41

To:	10 Army	14 Army	Armeegruppe v. Zangen	Directly under command Army Group "C"	Army Group "C"	All Fronts (Army)
20 Apr 44	208,420	28,880	737	547	238,584	4,242,806
30 Apr 44	209,024	30,103	816	597	240,540	4,294,030
10 May 44	209,626	31,339	888	662	242,515	4,318,600
20 May 44	212,085	32,605	966	701	246,357	4,386,942
31 May 44	215,481	38,351	1,028	772	255,632	4,466,504
10 Jun 44	218,293	38,351	1,118	823	258,590	4,496,077
20 Jun 44	221,782	38,351	1,277	866	262,276	4,528,641
30 Jun 44	224,639	38,351	1,492	955	265,437	4,554,219
10 Jul 44	226,042	54,974	1,555	1,038	283,609	4,604,067
20 Jul 44	229,396	65,596	1,568	1,237	297,797	4,715,941
31 Jul 44	233,059	81,090	1,612	1,384	317,145	4,816,766
10 Aug 44	234,893	84,112	1,658	1,510	322,173	4,951,265
20 Aug 44	236,397	86,434	Army Group Liguria	1,707	324,538	5,029,278
10 Sep 44(1)	242,579	88,459	4,384	1,894	337,316	5,305,722
20 Sep 44	248,595	90,225	5,867	2,003	346,690	5,381,133
30 Sep 44	255,194	93,610	6,946	2,179	357,929	5,632,697
10 Oct 44	259,104	98,091	7,307	2,313	366,815	5,707,778
31 Oct 44(2)	268,651	104,588	8,274	3,046	384,559	5,909,460
10 Nov 44	272,642	104,697	8,370	3,140	388,849	6,242,266
20 Nov 44	274,236	105,014	8,370	3,237	390,857	6,297,716
30 Nov 44	277,461	114,025(3)	-	3,346	394,832	6,420,700
10 Dec 44	280,029	114,376	-	3,395	397,800	6,474,250
20 Dec 44	284,333	114,622	-	3,467	402,424	6,531,388
31 Dec 44	287,018	114,985	-	3,720	405,722	6,608,501
10 Jan 45(4)	290,025	115,449	-	3,919	409,393	6,681,872
20 Jan 45	290,695	115,544	-	3,967	410,206	6,729,500
31 Jan 45	291,617	115,747	-	4,037	411,401	6,796,249
10 Feb 45	292,485	116,229	-	4,087	412,801	6,952,843
20 Feb 45	293,328	116,652	-	4,331	414,311	7,074,005
28 Feb 45	294,029	117,192	-	4,412	415,633	7,201,551
10 Mar 45	294,992	120,266	125	4,472	419,855	7,352,066
20 Mar 45	295,813	121,267	229	4,610	421,919	7,463,497
31 Mar 45(5)	296,460	122,074	350	4,731	423,615	7,620,323

- (1) Tabulation for 31 Aug 44 not available
(2) Tabulation for 20 Oct 44 not available
(3) For Army Group Liguria and Fourteenth Army
(4) Amended edition
(5) Army Group "C" surrendered on 2 May 44; April figures are not available

ARMY GROUP "C"

OPERATIONS ORDER

9 Jun 44

(Photostat and Translation)

981AZ. (D50)

Ref: para 18

Druck z. d. Gängen
10 Nr. 46/44 gr. Aufs.
18.6.44 14.00 la.
H. u., den 9.6.1944

Der Oberbefehlshaber Südwest
und
Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe C

Nr. 246/44 gräco. Chefs.

Chefsache!

Nur durch Offizier!

10 Ausfertigungen
4 Ausfertigung.

Handwritten signature and date: 10/16/44

Befehl für die Kampfführung.

A

Für die Gesamtkampfführung im Mittelmeerraum kommt es, vornehmlich in Hinblick auf die Abprungsöglichkeiten des Feindes aus Italien nach dem Balkan, entscheidend darauf an, möglichst weite Teile Italiens in eigenem Besitz zu behalten. Die Heeresgruppe hat daher den Auftrag, ein weiteres Vordringen des Feindes nach Norden zu verhindern. Sie verteidigt hierzu zunächst die Dora-Linie und wird nur gedrängt vom Feind sich weiter nach Norden absetzen. Bei weiterer Verstärkung des Feindes oder grundlegender Änderung der Lage kann jedoch ein allmähliches Absetzen auf die Gota-Stellung erforderlich werden. Auch diese Ausweichbewegung erfolgt sodann nur unter stetem Kampf über mehrere Widerstandslinien, die jeweils möglichst lange zu halten sind. Zwischen diesen Widerstandslinien sind durch die Armeen Zwischenlinien derart festzulegen, dass die Ausweichbewegung jeweils sich höchstens bis zu 15 km erstreckt. Widerstandslinien und Zwischenlinien sind umgehend zu erkunden und der Heeresgruppe laufend zu melden.

A) Kampf um und nördl. Dora-Stellung.

682

Während des Kampfes um und nördl. der Dora-Stellung kommt es darauf an, unter Erhaltung der eigenen Kampfkraft den Feinde

Handwritten numbers: 53/1 - 54

weiterhin möglichst grosse materielle und personelle Verluste zuzufügen. Hierzu ist es erforderlich, durch immer erneutes Vorlegen und Bildung von Panzerabwehrschwerpunkten an den Hauptangriffslinien, sowie Sperrern der Gebirgspässe das Feindvorgehen zu verzögern. Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist die rechtzeitige und ausreichende Sperrung der Wege von Orbetello, sowie engste Verbindunghaltung zwischen den inneren Armeeflügeln. Auf eine weitgehende Ausnutzung der abstossenden Feuerkraft der eigenen schweren Waffen, insbesondere der weittragenden Artl., wird erneut hingewiesen (siehe O.B.Südwest (Oberkdo.H.Gr.C) Chef Genst. Nr. 0126/44 gKdos.v.9.6.44).

J e d e s A b s e t z e n bedarf auch weiterhin der Genehmigung durch den O.B.Südwest. Daher sind Absichten für den nächsten Tag spätestens bis 12 Uhr des Vortages O.B.Südwest zu melden.

XIV.Pz.Korps, 90. und 29.Pz.Gren.Div. werden durch 10.Armee der 14.Armee auf das Westufer des Tiber zugeführt und ihr mit Beschreiten des Tiber unterstellt. 26.Pz.Div. ist als Heeresgruppen-Reserve durch 10.Armee an der Naht 14. zu 10.Armee zurückzuführen.

Soweit es die Kampf Lage -- ohne entscheidende weitere Schwächung der eigenen Kampfkraft -- irgend gestattet, ist die Dora-Stellung ~~zu~~ zu verteidigen, um das Vordringen des Feindes aufzufangen und den Ordnern der eigenen Verbände zu ermöglichen. 14.Armee sieht ungehend mindestens 2 angeschlagene Div.Verbände (möglichst 65. und 362.Inf.Div., später auch 92.Inf.Div.), 10.Armee wenigstens einen Verband (94.Inf.Div.) aus der Front und verlegt sie zur Auffrischung, möglichst als Sicherheitsbesatzung in die Dora-Stellung.

A - 3 - 87

Ausserdem ist durch 14. Armee Abtransport der 715. Inf. Div. nach dem Westen mit allen Mitteln zu beschleunigen.

B) Kampfführung nördl. der Dora-Stellung bis Coten-Stellung.

Falls die Entwicklung der

~~Schicksalsentwicklung des Frontabschnittes im Bereich der Kampflage es~~

erfordert, wird die Heeresgruppe das weitere Ausweichen befehlen.

Stichwort hierfür: A l a r i e h.

unbedingt

a) Auf dieses Stichwort treten folgende Armeegrenzen in Kraft:

1) 14. Armee zu Armeebtl. v. Zangen: Elba - Piombino - 5 km nördl.

Massa Marittima - Siena - 10 km südwestl. Monteverchi (Orte zu Armeebtl. v. Zangen).

2) 14. Armee zu 10. Armee: Verlauf des Tiber bis Flussgabel 10 km

südostwärts Orvieto - Strasse Orvieto, Chiusi, Montepulciano -
10 km südwestl. Monteverchi - Pontassieve (Strasse zu AOK 10) -
Viechio (AOK 10) - Cattala (AOK 10).

3) 10. Armee zu Armeebtl. v. Zangen: Zunächst unverändert.

Armeebtl. v. Zangen bereitet Übergabe ihrer Sperrverbände in Raum
Grosseto und ostwärts an 14. Armee so vor, dass sie bei Inkraft-
treten der neuen Armeegrenzen rasch von 14. Armee übernommen werden
können.

b) Das Ausweichen erfolgt abschnittsweise möglichst in überschlagen-
dem Einsatz über die in anliegender Pause festgelegten Widerstands-
linien und von den Armeen in einzelnen festzulegenden Zwischen-
linien. Die Anschlusspunkte zwischen den Widerstandslinien und
den Zwischenlinien an der Naht 14. zu 10. Armee sind in unmittel-
barem Einvernehmen durch die AOK festzulegen und O.B. Südwest zu
melden. Zur Sicherstellung des engen erforderlichen Anschlusses

beider Armeen sind ausreichend starke Nachkommendes ständig be-
reit zu halten. Beim Absetzen muss außer zu beachten werden, dass
die anweichende Truppe in ihrer neuen Stellung durch ausreichend
starke Kräfte aufgenommen wird. Auch für dieses Absetzen gilt,
dass jede Widerstandslinie nur nach hartem Kampf, bei dem der
Feind möglichst hohe Verluste erleiden muss, auf Befehl O.B.Süd-
west aufgegeben werden darf.

a) Besonders bedrohte Geländepunkte vorwärts der Götter-Stellung müssen
frühzeitig durch Einsatz von Sperrverbänden gesichert werden. Hier-
bei liegt der Schwerpunkt dieser Sperrmaßnahmen jeweils zwischen
der HKL und der nächsten Widerstandslinie.

X
d) Räumung der Insel Elba und der Insel Pianosa ist so vorzubereiten,
dass sie mit Beginn der Absetzbewegung aus der ^{Pischi-Viertel} Friede-Linie durch-
geführt werden kann. Befehl hierzu ergeht gesondert. Die hierbei
herausgelösten Heeresverbände sind sodann der Fest. Brig. zur Ver-
stärkung des Küstenschutzes im Abschnitt La Spezia zuzuführen. Ein-
zelheiten der Räumung sind unter Zugrundelegung einer Vorwarnung
von 4 Tagen sofort im Einvernehmen Armeebdt. v. Sengen mit Dt. Marine-
Kdo. Italien festzulegen.

O Gliederung und Kräfteinsatz für die Kampfführung in der Götterstellung.

X
Mit Berichten der Friede-Stellung ist beabsichtigt, den gesamten ober-
ital. Raum südl. des Po in 2 Armegebiete unterzuteilen, die von 10.
und 14. Armee zu übernehmen sind. Armeebdt. v. Sengen wird sodann wieder
als Gen. Kdo. LXXXVII A.K. eingesetzt werden.

a) Befehlsgliederung: Rechts 14. Armee
 links 10. Armee.

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4. September: Army, etc.

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Trennungslinie zwischen den Armeen: Pontasiove - Vicchio - Cattina - (Orto zu AOK 10) - Castenaso (ostwärts Bologna) - von dort nach Norden bis zur Grenze der Mil.Kdtr. Ferrara und Bologna (17 km west-nordwestlich Ferrara).

Rückwärtige Begrenzung der Armeegebiets: West- und Nordwestgrenze der Mil.Kdtr. Gonna - übergehend in West- und Nordgrenze der Mil.-Kdtr. Parma - von dort übergehend in West- und Nordgrenze Mil.Kdtr. Padua - Operationszone des Obersten Kommissars Adriatisches Kustenland.

[Erklärung dieser Armeegebiets zum Operationsgebiet ist bei O.K.W. beantragt.]

b) Folgender Kräfteeinsatz ist beabsichtigt und ist allen Vorbereitungen für das Beziehen der Goten-Stellung zugrunde zu legen:

aa) 14. Armee mit 3 Gen.Kdos. (darunter voraussichtlich II. Geb.Korps). Dazu 9 Div. und Fest.Brig. 135 in Fronteinsatz einschliesslich Kliste bis zur französischen Grenze, sowie 2 Pa.- oder Pa.Gren. Div. in Reserve. Späterer Einsatz der 5. Geb.Div. und der beiden Hoch.Geb.Btlc. ✓ in westlichen Teil der Goten-Stellung ist geplant.

bb) 10. Armee mit 4 Gen.Kdos. (darunter Befh. Venezianische Kliste und Befh. Adriatisches Kustenland). Dazu 11 Div. (ohne 188. Res. Geb. Div.) in der Front und anschliessender Kliste eingesetzt, sowie 3 Pa.- oder Pa.Gren.Div. in Reserve.

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ee) Zur Verfügung der Heeresgruppe, verantwortlich zugleich für die Ausbildung der Reserve-Verbände: 1 Pa.Gen.Kdo.

aa) 14. und 16. Armee melden beabsichtigte Kräftegliederung in der Götzen-Stellung (mit Angabe der Div.Nr.) bis spätestens 20.6.

^{z.Zt.} Die ²ten der ligurischen und tyrrhenischen Küste eingesetzten Div. sind durch 14. Armee für einen Einsatz in der Götzen-Stellung vorzusehen. *hinter sich genommen 42. Div. bis zum 14. 6. 44*

Gr. - H. Gr. 8 - Gr. Armee. 14/6 44. An Auftrag des Führers! Man? 20. 6. 44
c) Sicherheitsbesatzungen. *7. H. Gr. (Kern) 42. Div. in Götzen-Stellung*

Die abgeklappten Div. der Armeen (vergl. Abschnitt A) sind als Sicherheitsbesatzungen, zugleich zur Auffrischung dieser Verbände, in einer Lage in die Götzen-Stellung zu führen. Die entworfene Rückführung weiterer abgeklappter Div. bedarf der vorherigen Genehmigung O.B.Südwest.

Ab sofort sind ferner alle entbehrlichen Teile der Versorgungstruppen, Truppe, Feld-Ern. Batlne., sowie alle diejenigen Verbände, die infolge Verlust ihrer Waffen nur noch als Personaleinheit bestehen, unter behelfsmäßiger Bewaffnung als weitere Verstärkung der Sicherheitsbesatzung in die Götzen-Stellung zurückzuführen. Nach Eintreffen des Ersatzes sind die Feld-Ern. Batlne. so zu gliedern, dass sie notfalls als geschlossene Batlne. zur Verteidigung der Götzen-Stellung eingesetzt werden können. **73Z**

Die herauszuführenden Div. sind zur Steuerung der Ausführung der Heeresgruppe umgehend zu melden. Auch Heeresstruppen (z.B. A.A. 400 und Heeres-Artl. Verbände) sind bei der Ausführung zu berücksichtigen.

- 3 -

Soweit es nicht von Fall zu Fall befohlen wird, bleibt das Unterstellungsverhältnis der Heerestruppen auch für die Zeit der Auffrischung unverändert. Über die Durchführung der Auffrischung der abgekämpften folgt Sonderbefehl.

d) Um die Armeen möglichst frühzeitig mit dem Verlauf und dem Ausbau der Götter-Stellung vertraut zu machen, ist -- unbeschadet der Gesamtverantwortung der Armeebdt. v. Langen -- der Ausbau im späteren Abschnitt der 14. Armee durch XXXV. A.K., im späteren Abschnitt der 10. Armee durch Befehlshaber Venen. Klats durchzuführen. Die Armeen nehmen möglichst bald mit diesen Gen. Zos. Verbindung auf. An der jetzt festgelegten Linienführung darf jedoch nichts mehr geändert werden.

e) Vorbereitende Hauptquartiere.

[Hauptquartier O.B. Südwest-Monaro (75 km nordwestwärts Verona), vorgeschobener Gef. Stand in Haus Reggio.

Armeehauptquartiere für 14. Armee: In Haus Parma, Ausweich-Gef. Stand hinter dem Klatsverteidigungsabschnitt Genoa oben in Haus Alessandria - Bertona.

Für 10. Armee: In Haus Ostilia, Ausweich-Gef. Stand in Haus nördl. Treviso.

[Nach Abschluss der Erkundungen melden die AGK die endgültig festgelegten Hauptquartiere und Korps-Gef. Stände.

f) Allgemeines. 742

a) S-Massnahmen. Alle militärischen Objekte, die für den Feind von Bedeutung sein können, einschliesslich der Hilfen an der West- und Ostküste sind in grösstmöglicher Umfrage zu zerstören. Einzel-

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Anordnungen sind durch die Armeen zu befehlen. Die Verantwortung für die Durchführung der Zerstörungen wird den Armeen übertragen, die ihrerseits die Berechtigung für die Ausgabe des Befehls zur Zerstörung ihren untergeordneten Dienststellen übertragen können.

In einem ganz anderen Umfange als es bisher geschehen ist, muss das Vorgehen des Feindes durch Zerstörung aller für ihn wichtigen Objekte aufgehalten werden. Keine Brücke, kein Tunnel, kein B-Werk oder ähnliche wertvolle Objekte dürfen dem Feind unzerstört in die Hände fallen. Der letzte Pionier muss für diese Aufgabe eingesetzt werden. Ich verweise daher noch einmal auf meinen Befehl, dass die Pioniere nicht im inf. Kampf, sondern für diese Aufgaben einzusetzen sind.

Hinsichtlich der Zerstörung wirtschaftlicher Objekte gelten die von U.B.Südwest / O. u. hierfür ergangenen Besonderen Anordnungen.

b) Gehaltszahlung.

Alle Vorbereitungen für die Ausweichbewegung klarich sind so zu treffen, dass diese Bewegung nach Eintreffen des entsprechenden Befehls der Heeresgruppe unverzüglich begonnen werden kann. Der Bearbeitungskreis für diese Bewegung hat sich auf den unbedingt erforderlichen Umfang zu beschränken.

Ferngespräche in Verbindung mit der Ausweichbewegung sind verboten.

75Z

Verewing
Generalfeldmarschall

93
44

1 Anlass.
Verteiler:

8

O.B.SW
and
Commander of Army Group "C"

9 Jun 44

Copy No. 4

No. 246/44, Secret

Operations Order

For the general conduct of operations in the Mediterranean area, it is of decisive importance, particularly in view of Italy as a potential spring-board for an enemy operation against the Balkans, to retain possession of as much of Italy as possible. It is therefore the task of the Army Group, by stubborn fighting to prevent the enemy from pushing on further towards the North. Thus, it will begin by defending the Dora line, and will only withdraw towards the North if forced to do so by the enemy. However, in the event of any further strengthening of the enemy forces, or if there is a basic change in the situation, a gradual withdrawal to the Gothic position may become necessary. This withdrawal movement too is to take place only after stubborn fighting and over several lines of resistance, each of which is to be held as long as possible. Between these resistance lines, the Armies are to form intermediate lines, in such a manner that the withdrawal movement does not exceed 15 km at any one time. Resistance lines and intermediate lines are to be reconnoitred successively, constant reports being sent in to the Army Group.

A) Fighting Around and North of the Dora Line

During the fighting around and north of the Dora line, it is important that, while conserving our fighting power, the heaviest possible losses in personnel and materiel be inflicted on the enemy. To achieve this object, the enemy's advance must be delayed by the constant formation and subsequent change in location of anti-tank concentrations at the main lines of attack, as well as by blocking the mountain passes. Of decisive importance is the timely and adequate blocking of the Orbetello defile, as well as maintaining the closest contact between the inner wings of the armies. Again extensive use of the repellent firing power of our heavy weapons, more especially of the long-range artillery, is indicated (see O.B.SW (Commander Army Group "C") C.G.S. No. 0126/44 Secret, 9 Jun 44).

In future, each withdrawal must be approved by O.B.SW. Plans for the following day are therefore to be communicated to O.B.SW by not later than 1200 hrs on the preceding day.

14 Pz Corps, 90 and 29 Pz Gren Divs will be transferred by Tenth Army to Fourteenth Army on the west bank of the Tiber, passing under command of the latter with the crossing of the Tiber. 26 Pz Div is to be taken back by Tenth Army along the boundary line between Fourteenth and Tenth Armies as Army Group Reserve.

Insofar as the battle situation allows - without decisively further weakening our own fighting power - the Dora line is to be defended, in order to intercept the enemy's advance, and to make it possible for our own formations to reorganize. Fourteenth Army is to withdraw immediately at least two hard-hit formations (if possible 65 and 362 Inf Divs; later also 92 Inf Div), and Tenth Army at least one formation (94 Inf Div) from the front line, and is to transfer them to the Gothic line for rejuvenation, where at the same time they will act as security garrisons. In addition, Fourteenth Army is to hasten the evacuation of 715 Inf Div, complete with supplies, to the West.

B) Conduct of Battle north of the Dora Position as far as the Gothic Line

In the event of developments in the situation making a further withdrawal absolutely necessary, orders for this will be issued by the Army Group. The code word for this operation is: ALARICH.

a) On this code word being given, the following army boundaries will become effective:

1) Fourteenth Army and Army Abteilung v. Zangen: Elba - Piombino - 5 km N Nassa Marittima - Siena - 10 km SW Montevarchi (villages in the zone of Army Abteilung v. Zangen).

2) Fourteenth Army and Tenth Army: Course of the Tiber as far as the river fork 10 km SE Orvieto - the highway Orvieto, Chiusi, Montepulciano - 10 km SW Montevarchi - Pontassieve (highway in zone of AOK 10) - Viechio (AOK 10) - Cattala (AOK 10).

3) Tenth Army and Army Abteilung v. Zangen: At first unchanged.

Army Abteilung v. Zangen is to make preparations for handing over its blocking formations in the Grosseto area and east to Fourteenth Army, in such a manner that, when the new army boundaries come into effect, these formations can be taken over quickly by Fourteenth Army.

b) The withdrawal is to take place by sectors, if possible by alternating (leap frog) commitment, over the resistance lines shown on the accompanying trace, and the intermediate lines are to be fixed in detail by the Armies. The junction points between the resistance lines and the intermediate lines along the seam of Fourteenth and Tenth Armies are to be decided on jointly by the AOK's, and the results communicated to O.B.SW. To ensure the requisite close contact between the two Armies, liaison groups in adequate strength are to be held in constant readiness. Furthermore, care must be taken during the withdrawal, that the retreating troops are received in their new position by sufficiently strong forces. For this withdrawal movement too, the principle holds good that each resistance line must be given up only on orders from O.B.SW, after hard fighting, in which the heaviest possible losses must be inflicted on the enemy.

c) Points which are especially threatened in the terrain in front of the Gothic position must be secured in good time by the commitment of blocking units. The core of these blocking operations must lie between the position constituting the main defence line at the time and the next resistance line.

d) Preparations for the evacuation of the Island of Elba and the Island of Pianosa are to be made so that this operation can be synchronized with the beginning of the withdrawal movement from the western Frieda position. A separate order for this operation is being issued. The G.H.Q. formations released hereby are to be transferred to the Fortress Brigade for strengthening the coastal defence in the La Spezia sector. Details for the evacuation are to be worked out immediately between Army Abteilung v. Zangen and the German Naval Command, Italy, subject to the basic principle of a four days warning.

C) Disposition and Commitment of Forces for the Conduct of Battle in the Gothic Position

With the occupation of the Frieda position, the intention is to divide the whole of northern Italy south of the Po into two Army Areas, which will be taken over by Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. Army Abteilung v. Zangen will then again be committed as 87 Inf Corps.

a) Disposition of commands. Right: Fourteenth Army
Left: Tenth Army

Boundary line between the Armies: Pontassieve - Viechio - Cattala (village in AOK 10 zone) - Castanaso (east of Bologna) - from there north as far as the boundary of Mil Admin H.Q. Ferrara and Bologna (17 km WNW Ferrara).

Rear boundary of the army areas: West and northwest boundary of Mil Admin H.Q. Genoa - passing into west and north boundary of Mil Admin H.Q. Parma - from there passing into west and northern boundary of Mil Admin H.Q. Padua - the operational zone of the High Commissioner of the Adriatic coast.

It has been suggested to the Supreme Command that these army areas be defined as operational areas.

b) The following commitment of forces is intended, and this is to be taken as the basic principle for all preparations for occupation of the Gothic position:

aa) Fourteenth Army with three Corps Headquarters (one of which will probably be 51 Mtn Corps). In addition, nine divisions and 135 Fort Bde in commitment on the front including the coast as far as the French boundary, as well as two panzer or panzer grenadier divisions in reserve. Subsequent commitment of 5 Mtn Div and the two High Mountain battalions in the western part of the Gothic position is planned.

bb) Tenth Army with four Corps Headquarters (including the Venetian Coastal Command and the Adriatic Coastal Command). In addition, 11 divisions (less 188 Res Mtn Div) committed on the front and the adjacent coast, as well as three panzer or panzer grenadier divisions in reserve.

cc) To be at the disposal of the Army Group, and responsible at the same time for the training of the reserve formations: One Panzer Corps Headquarters.

dd) Fourteenth and Tenth Armies will report their intended disposition in the Gothic position (giving the divisional numbers) by 20 Jun at latest. The divisions now committed on the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian coast will be committed in the Gothic position with Fourteenth Army.

c) Security Garrison

The exhausted divisions of the Armies (see section 'A') are to be transported to the Gothic position in one uninterrupted movement for rejuvenation and commitment as security garrison. For transport to the rear of additional exhausted divisions, previous approval by O.B.SW is required.

Furthermore, all elements of the supply troops, trains, and field reserve battalions which can be spared, as well as all those formations which in consequence of loss of arms consist only of personnel, are to be withdrawn to the Gothic Line forthwith; armed with spare weapons, and committed to further strengthen the security garrison. Upon arrival of the replacements, the field replacement battalions are to be organized in such a way that in case of necessity they can be committed as complete battalions in the defence of the Gothic Line.

In order to permit a proper direction of the reinforcement stream, the divisions to be relieved are to report to Army Group without delay. The relief of G.H.Q. troops (such as 400 Recce Bn and G.H.Q. artillery formations) is also to be provided for. Where no orders to the contrary are issued in individual cases, G.H.Q. troops will remain under their previous commands during the period of rejuvenation. A special order follows concerning rejuvenation of the exhausted formations.

d) To enable the Armies to become familiar with the course and construction of the Gothic position as early as possible, without prejudice to the overall responsibility of Army Abteilung v. Zangen, construction work in Fourteenth Army's future sector is to be carried out by 75 Army Corps; in the future sector of Tenth Army by the Venetian Coastal Command. The Armies will establish contact with these Corps Headquarters as early as possible. However, nothing may be changed in the arrangements already made for geographic location of the line.

e) Headquarters to be prepared

Headquarters of O.B.SW: Recuaro (35 km NE Verona)
Advanced Headquarters in the Reggio area.

Fourteenth Army Headquarters: In the Parma area. Withdrawal Headquarters behind the Genoa coastal defence sector about in the Alessandria - Tortona area.

Tenth Army Headquarters: In the Ostilia area. Withdrawal Headquarters in the area north of Treviso.

After reconnoitring, the A.O.K.'s will report on the Headquarters and Advanced Headquarters which have finally been decided on.

D) General

a) Demolitions. All military objects which might be of value to the enemy, including the harbours on the east and west coasts, are to be destroyed to the greatest possible extent. Detailed orders are to be issued by the Armies. Responsibility for carrying out the demolitions will be passed to the Armies, who in their turn may authorize their subordinate commands to give the demolition orders.

In a very much higher degree than heretofore the enemy advance must be stopped by the demolition of all objects of value to him. No bridge, no tunnel, no railway installation or similar object of value must be allowed to fall into his hands intact. Every last engineer must be employed for this task. I draw attention once again to my order stating that the engineers are not to be committed for infantry fighting, but for duties such as these.

As regards destruction of industrial objects, the special orders for this already issued by the Quartermaster General/O.B.SW apply.

b) Security

All preparations for the withdrawal movement ALARICH are to be made in such a manner that, after the appropriate order has been received from the Army Group, this movement can be begun forthwith. The planning staff for this movement is to be limited to those absolutely necessary.

Telephone conversations referring to the withdrawal movement are forbidden.

(handsigned) KESSELRING
General Field Marshal

ARMY GROUP "C"

ORDER OF BATTLE

15 and 23 Jun 44

981A10. (D156)

Ref: para 22

Anlage 15 zum Beitrag Ia zum K.T.B.v.15.6.44
Gliederung der großen Verbände
 Stand: 15.6.44. Geheime Kommandosache

Geheime Kommandosache

O.B. Südwest

O.B. Südwest Ia/Id, Nr. 0350/44g. Kodex

45 Auswertungen
 45. Auswertung

Heeresgruppe unmittelbar	 283		K.T.B.		 16		 Armeegruppe v. Ziemer			
	 110	 12	Armeegruppe unmittelbar	 111	 11	Armeegruppe unmittelbar	 112	 113	 114	Armeegruppe unmittelbar
<p>745.</p> <p>65</p>	<p>102 (Tarn)</p> <p>20. Lw Feld</p> <p>19. Lw Feld Div. (in Zuführung)</p>	<p>20</p> <p>26</p> <p>4</p> <p>356</p> <p>10</p>	<p>92</p> <p>aufgegangen in</p> <p>362</p>	<p>40</p> <p>1</p> <p>15</p> <p>(H & D)</p> <p>70</p>	<p>21</p> <p>278</p> <p>5</p> <p>110 39</p>	<p>334</p> <p>34</p> <p>306</p>	<p>16 4</p> <p>42</p> <p>F. Fest Bndg 135</p> <p>Kat. Ebn</p> <p>14</p>	<p>188. Res.</p> <p>Rgt. 3 Brandenburg</p> <p>56</p>	<p>Beth Alpenvorland</p>	

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