

of 4 Cdn Armd Div, 30 Mar - 5 May 45). With the arrival in the bridgehead of the armoured division, Lt-Gen Simonds now had a powerful and highly mobile force ideally constituted for the wide open operations which would soon follow.

FIRST CDN ARMY TAKES 2 CDN CORPS UNDER COMMAND, 2359 HOURS 1 APR 45

138. Probably one of the most noteworthy sitreps on record is the one issued by First Cdn Army at 2400 hours, 1 Apr 45. It bears no striking title, just the number 503. Yet that situation report was historic in that it covered the activities not only of 2 Cdn Corps but of Lt-Gen Foulkes' 1 Cdn Corps as well. Now at long last we had an Army of two full Canadian Corps in operation together. 1 Brit Corps, which for so long had been associated with First Cdn Army was no longer under command; it had passed from under General Crerar's control at noon 1 Apr. (W.D., G.S. Ops, H.Q. First Cdn Army, April 1945: Appx 5, Folio 9, Sitrep No 503). On the evening of 1 Apr, 32 hours after the order had been given to the Chief Engineer to begin work, the sappers opened a bridge across the Rhine at Emmerich (W.D., Hist Offr, H.Q. First Cdn Army, 1 Apr 45). The rapid completion of the task made it possible for 2 Cdn Corps to return to General Crerar's command at midnight on the same day, since with his own communications now established across the river he could maintain and fight the Corps in its northward advance. (General Crerar's Despatch, para 14).

139. In his despatch of 29 May 45, General Crerar reviewed the situation existing when he took command of Canadian operations beyond the Rhine.

By the end of the month the battle of the Rhine had been won. The encirclement of the Ruhr, that great manoeuvre envisaged by the C.-in-C. in September, 1944, was almost completed. The Ninth U.S. Army, with patrols into Munster and Hamm, was driving on to link up with the First U.S. Army in Paderborn. Meanwhile, Lt-General Dempsey's forces had crossed the Ems at Greven and Mesum and were nearing Rheine, thus spoiling any chances which the 2nd Parachute Corps might have had of falling back to the line of the river. On the left flank, the 2nd Canadian Corps was attacking Terberg and along the east bank of the Rhine northwest of Emmerich had gained the summit of Hoch Elten from which the German guns had dominated the crossing places farther up the river. Our stubborn adversary, the First Parachute Army, was split in two: the 2nd Parachute Corps, reeling backwards on the north, had lost contact with the 86th Corps in the south.

(General Crerar's Despatch, para 13)

140. A most significant event also, at this time, was the cessation of the enemy's efforts with his long range V-Weapons. As the Allied forces drove deeper into Germany, the maintenance of his launching sites in western Holland became increasingly difficult. The advance of 2 Cdn Corps to the north, moreover, now threatened to cut the few remaining routes along which supplies must pass. The last rocket was fired against the United Kingdom on 27 Mar and the last flying bomb on 30 Mar 45. (Hist Sec, C.M.H.Q. Report No. 137)

141. East of the Canadians, Lt-Gen Dempsey's divisions had covered a good deal of enemy territory since crossing the Rhine. 30 Corps especially had made great gains against varying opposition to secure a firm flank for General Crerar's northward thrust. The Guards overran Groenlo on 31 Mar and by midnight had 5 Gds Armd Bde in Eibergen, while on the left 32 Gds Bde finding Borculo strongly held, swung north-east to Neede. Eibergen fell on the morning of 1 Apr and a passage was forced through Haaksbergen to within two miles south-west of Enschede at 1400 hours. On the same day 32 Gds Bde moving fast from Neede had reached, by 1100 hours a small bridge on the Twente Canal. Some tanks managed to cross the water barrier, but only to have the bridge blown up behind them. They became heavily engaged and were soon all knocked out. The Guardsmen then shifted to the eastern end of the canal and, by-passing Enschede, drove on towards Hengelo with the object of screening Enschede from the north-west. The Irish Guards Group entered Enschede during the afternoon of 1 Apr, and by last light had cleared the town, taking many prisoners. The enemy, however, still held on to the airfield north of the town, although this area was now almost surrounded by other elements (Welsh Guards) of the brigade. (AEF: 45/Second Army/C/D, Docket I; and First Cdn Army Ops Log, 31 Mar 45, Serials 60, 74, 102, 137, 140 and 142; 1 Apr 45, Serials 41, 76, 160 and 97).

142. In 43 (W.) Inf Div's sector, progress had not been so spectacular, mainly on account of the cratering and demolitions encountered. All the bridges north of Varsseveld were out, but during the afternoon of 31 Mar 129 Bde crossed the stream and bridging operations over the Slingerbeek began. The following day saw 8 Armd Bde catch up to the leading infantry by sweeping in to capture Varsseveld after which the tanks pushed to clear Ruurlo. Lochem, the next objective, proved a much tougher problem. (First Cdn Army Ops Log, 31 Mar 45, Serials 59, 130 and 142; 1 Apr 45, Serials 27, 43, 62 and 133). 8 Armd Bde attacked Lochem at about 1730 hours, while 214 Bde pressed on north of Borculo to reach Diepenheim. (Ibid, Serial 146; and AEF: 45/Second Army/C/D, Docket I). Between the right flank of 2 Cdn Corps and the left of 30 Corps, 18 Cdn Armd C. Regt had been doing excellent work. "D" Sqn of this unit came under command 2 Cdn Inf Div at 1500 hours on 31 Mar and set about reconnoitering the region bounded by Halle - Zelhem - Doetinchem. The squadron left Terborg at 0930 hours 1 Apr with two troops up. From then their ability to get around is well illustrated by the entry in the Regimental War Diary:

"D" Sqn left Terborg 0570 at 0930 hrs with 2 tps up to do the task of gen recce of area east of Doetinchem. 19 and 18 tps were up. They found all the brs blown on the river line just North of Terborg. At approx 1300 hrs "D" Sqn's task was changed to dash up to Lochem and seize and hold the brs on the canal to the North. The sqn moved off up to Hengelo 0284 and met some of the Royals (Brit Armd C. Regt) who were supposed to be on their right flank. From Hengelo they moved to Ruurlo really fast, contacted more English tps. By 1830 hrs reached South portion of Lochem.

(W.D., 18 Cdn Armd C. Regt, 1 Apr 45)

143. It is evident that there was no lack of excitement for as the diary goes on:

Later just South of Lochem in the semi-dark, 16 and 19 tps had fun, they ran into Jerries laying rd blocks and put the coax and the 37 HE to them. H.77086 Sgt Beach, R.K., was comd 16 tp in the absence of Lt W.D. Rose (on leave). He was just starting his Stag rolling again after consulting his map when Panzerfaust artist let fly from the side of the rd nearby. He missed. The projectile landed about ten feet short of the car, Sgt Beach punched the Jerry full of holes with his coax, then hopped out of the car and relieved him of a fine P38 pistol. Both tps then returned to the area South of Ruurlo 1187 where the sqn bivouaced for the night.

(Ibid)

144. Needless to say the Dutch civilian population were amazed at the speed with which the reconnaissance men manoeuvred and indeed could hardly believe that their liberation was imminent (ibid; also Weekly Summary of Ops, 2 Cdn Inf Div, 25-31 Mar 45, as above). As the day ended the Regiment came under command 4 Cdn Armd Div, which was now about to enter the battle (2 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log, 1 Apr 45, Serial 2582).

THE ENEMY'S SITUATION AT 2359 HOURS 1 APR 45

145. Although it was still possible that the enemy might take some steps to slow down the advance of the Western Powers, there had been little evidence of it so far. The Allied spearheads continued to penetrate as much as 30 miles daily and there was every indication that soon the heart of industrial Germany would be completely isolated: furthermore, as our Intelligence Staff added:

On the fronts nearest to us, First Para Army has been irrevocably divided. 2 Para Corps on the North is reeling backwards and has no contact with 86 Corps to the South. At Emmerich a curious condition obtains, for 358 Grenadier Regiment is probably in Twenty Fifth Army and based in Holland rather than Germany. It may as a result withdraw to the Ijssel for there can be little profit in pulling troops out of Holland when British troops are cutting the roads to Germany.

The only troops NOT committed and in difficulties are those in Holland and particularly the paratroop reinforcements in the Groningen area. They are now too late to affect the present battle although they may distract forces to deal with them.

(First Cdn Army Int Summary No. 274,
31 Mar 45)

146. As a result it would appear that the Canadian battle was to be a fight on the Ijssel River against an enemy facing east (ibid). Indeed it was the only place where the Germans could afford to have offensive or defensive intentions at this time. For as the Intelligence Summary concluded:

...There he may be planning a position to protect his Dutch investments and to lure forces away from ranging across Germany.

The movement out of Holland has NOT yet been sufficient to prove evacuation, although it has been increasing. The concentrations of vehicles and the intense accurate light flak at Rijssen VII may well indicate some offensive intentions East of the Ijssel. It is difficult to see, however, how these can be entertained in the face of our advances, with the few troops available.

(Ibid)

147. Some light is thrown on the enemy's rearguard manoeuvres during late March by the statements of Lt-Gen Herman Plocher, Commanding 6 Para Div. That formation after its first commitment at Millingen was ordered to defend the line between Gendringen and Isselburg with 8 Para Div on its left and 346 Inf Div on its right. Plocher's men however were soon forced back in a north-easterly direction to face south from Terborg to Aalten. Due to the sustained efforts of 30 Brit Corps, contact with 8 Para Div was lost in a few days, and Plocher was left with orders to hold and delay as much as possible while 8 Para Div was withdrawn farther to the north-east. When Plocher was finally given permission to fall back, the Allied armoured columns had cut off his line of retreat into Germany proper and, as the Interrogation Report explains,

...He was then put under 88 Corps of Twenty-Fifth Army and told to withdraw to the Twente Canal. In a slow fighting withdrawal the division reached the Canal towards the end of March and there took up a line from Zutphen to Lochem to Hengelo. During this withdrawal 346 Infantry Division had crossed over the Ijssel River at Doesburg leaving Plocher to defend the east bank of the Ijssel by himself.

(Interrogation Report, as above,
Folio 24 - Lt-Gen Herman Plocher)

It was while taking up the defence of the Twente Canal that 6 Para Div received a welcome allotment of fresh troops. These came from 31 Reserve Para Regt, which though 1200 strong and accompanied by an artillery regiment, were small encouragement for the bloody trials ahead. As subsequent events will show the stop-over on the Twente Canal was short and costly. (Ibid)

148. The situation, as it existed at midnight on 1 Apr, proved beyond doubt that the enemy could never hope to re-establish a line that would hold the Allied avalanche. His only chance of delaying the overwhelming disaster which shadowed his every step backwards lay in a retreat to the National Redoubt which our Intelligence Staffs knew might be based in the Austrian Alps. At the same time the enemy might continue to resist in the so-called fortresses of Western Europe, such as the port of Dunkirk or in the Channel Islands or in Norway, a possibility on which General Eisenhower later made the following comment:

Knowing the Nazi mentality, I had little expectation of an immediate all-embracing collapse and an abrupt termination of the struggle through complete surrender while these outposts remained unsubdued.

(Report by The Supreme Commander to The Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 Jun 1944 to 8 May 1945, p.127)

149. However, on 1 Apr an event took place which brought victory to our doorstep. On that day 21 Army Group and Twelfth U.S. Army linked up near Lippstadt, and the physical encirclement of the Ruhr² was completed. This was an operation on which the Supreme Commander had placed the highest priority and which he had considered essential before launching any further thrusts to the east. In speaking of it later he said

The operation constituted the largest double envelopment in history. Inside the pocket we had trapped the whole of the German Army Group B and two corps of Army Group H, including the picked troops who had been massed in March to defend the southern approaches of the Ruhr against the immediate offensive which the enemy had erroneously expected us to launch northward from the Remagen bridgehead.

(Ibid, p. 128)

CONCLUSION

150. It is difficult to explain why Hitler's High Command imagined that it could carry on the fight. The German losses had been enormous and the signs of complete defeat were all too clear.^{**} Moreover it is certain that the most seasoned of his professional soldiers, those high-booted and self-exalted members of the Officers Corps, realized that disaster was imminent and were ready to accept defeat quite unconditionally, (though with the consoling thought of honourable surrender). The answer to the enemy's unwillingness to give in must be looked for among the fanatical principles of the Nazi-cult which decreed that according to the intuitions of one man, The Fuehrer, an entire people must triumph or fall. With speed and violence our attack had driven the enemy into a corner; escape was impossible. Hitler's army was on its knees, the knock-out blow was about to be delivered.

151. This report was prepared by Capt P.A. Mayer, R.C.I.C.

P.A. Mayer, Capt.
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director
Historical Section (G.S.).

* The Ruhr had been isolated by air action early in 1945. In addition to the direct damage to factories, the transportation system had been wrecked, and the coal and steel produced there, on which the German war economy largely depended, had been, for the time being denied the enemy. Before operations deep into the German interior could safely be undertaken, however, the Allies had, following the Rhine crossings to complete the encirclement of the Ruhr and the elimination of any danger from the pocket which would be thus created. With this vast armory in Allied hands, and the Russians in control of its Silesian counterpart, Germany's power of continuing to wage war would be destroyed even were her armies to be preserved intact. The essential weapons, ammunition, and fuel produced by the Ruhr would be denied to them, and even the local factories dispersed about Germany to escape the Allied bombs would be brought to a standstill through lack of raw materials, for the bulk of which they were yet dependent upon the Ruhr and Silesian resources.

** See Appx "B" to this report.

HQ 3 CDM INF DIV

TOP SECRET
Copy No 20

Confirmatory Notes

17 Mar 45

Conference 1600 hrs 17 Mar

Ref Maps 1/25,000

Sheet Nos - 4103, 4104, 4203, 4204.

GENERAL

Security

- 1 The fact that the Allies intend to cross the R RHINE in this general area is well known, and it may be accepted that the enemy may still have a means of comn from this area.
- 2 However every endeavour must be made to keep secure the date of crossing and the exact site of the crossing.
- 3 NO OR, except key pers (e.g. Clerks and Draughtsmen) will be briefed until D-1.

Topography

- 4 The area consists mainly of flat low country crossed by many drainage ditches and the undulations of the ALTER RHEINS, rising gradually to the NE, with the main HOCH ELTEN feature to the NW. Further Details - See 30 Corps Int DOSSIER NOT issued to all addressees.

Maps

- 5 This div will op from the 1/25,000 map.

Photos

- 6 Recent air cover of the area will be available shortly. Old cover taken last fall has been obtained and can be issued pending arrival of new photos.

Political

- 7 The initial stages of the op will take place in GERMANY but shortly afterwards the DUTCH - GERMAN border will be crossed again. The actions of the tps must be governed accordingly.

INFORMATION

Enemy

- 8 It is estimated that the enemy is holding the ARNHEM - COLOGNE sector with those divs which were driven across the RHINE by ops VERITABLE and GRENADE, stiffened possibly by certain res, between WESEL and ARNHEM. Four para divs, 2, 6, 7, 8, will probably be encountered with 116 Pz Div in the background as a layback div and possibly a regt of 346 Div available also in a counter-attack role. There are in the WEST seven inf divs (245, 361, 346, 198, 708, 716, div from NORWAY or ITALY) any one of which might be committed between WESEL or ARNHEM. It is expected that the paratps will fight with determination and if forced to give ground under pressure will adopt the policy of strong rearguard actions.

Own Tps

- 9 21 Army Gp is throwing three armies "trans fluvium RHENUM" with RIGHT NINTH US Army, CENTRE SECOND Brit Army, LEFT FIRST Cdn Army.
- 10 SECOND Brit Army is crossing with RIGHT 12 Brit Corps, LEFT 30 Brit Corps.
- 11 30 Brit Corps with under comd 3 Cdn Inf Div is crossing in the area of REES 0752. The initial brhead as per trace att, will be est by 51 (H) Div with under comd 9 Cdn Inf Bde.
- 12 43 (W) Div is then to cross and will take over the left sector of the brhead and will assume comd of 9 Cdn Inf Bde.
- 13 51 (H) Div is to adv NE toward BOCHOLT 2360 and 43 (W) Div towards AALTEN 2070.
- 14 When 43 (W) Div is complete across the RHINE, 7 Cdn Inf Bde followed by Tac HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div will cross over and the following changes in comd will take place.
 - 9 Cdn Inf Bde reverts to comd 3 Cdn Inf Div
 - 3 Cdn Inf Div reverts to comd 2 Cdn Corps.
- 15 Tps coming under comd 3 Cdn Inf Div will probably be:
 - One Armd Regt from 2 Cdn Armd Bde
 - Elements 79 Armd Div.
 - 6 Cdn Inf Bde (if required)
 - One coy lift of KANGAROOS.
 - Additional Arty - details NOT yet firm.

INTENTION

- 16 3 Cdn Inf Div will break out of the 30 Brit Corps brhead at REES with a view to securing a brhead at EMMERICH 9760 to protect bridging ops at EMMERICH by First Cdn Army.

METHOD (Note: No disposition of any armour is yet made in the following allotment of tps)

- 17 The op will be undertaken in phases as follows:

PHASE I

- 18 9 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (under comd 51 (H) Div)
 - with under comd
 - 94 Cdn A Tk Bty RCA
 - "C" Coy CH of O (MG)
 - Two pls "D" Coy CH of O (MG)
 - 18 Cdn Fd Coy RCE
 - One coy 23 Cdn Fd Amb
 - One sec 4 Cdn Pro Coy
 - A mob coln - details later.

Tasks

- 19 (a) To provide one bn gp to under comd 154 Inf Bde.
- (b) To pass the remainder of the bde across under orders of 51 (H) Div.

(c) To pass a mob coln (details later) through with a view to securing the crossing at 9960.

(d) If this is successful and resistance is lt, to bring the remainder of the bn fwd and protect the LEFT flank of the brhead.

PHASE II

20 7 Cdn Inf Bde with under comd

105 Cdn A Tk Bty RCA
"A" Coy CH of O (MG)
One pl "D" Coy CH of O (MG)
6 Cdn Fd Coy RCE
One Coy 14 Cdn Fd Amb
One sec 4 Cdn Pro Coy

and in sp (under comd for move)

12 Cdn Fd Regt RCA.

Tasks

21 (a) To cross over and conc as ordered by 3 Cdn Inf Div.

(b) If 9 Cdn Inf Bde is successful in seizing the crossings at 9960, 7 Cdn Inf Bde will be conc immediately behind 9 Cdn Inf Bde.

If the crossings are NOT taken by 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 7 Cdn Inf Bde will pass through and secure a brhead area 9960 and enlarge brhead towards NETTERDORN.

(c) Enlarge brhead towards EMMERICH.

PHASE III

22 8 Cdn Inf Bde with under comd

52 Cdn A Tk Bty RCA
"B" Coy CH of O (MG)
One pl "D" Coy CH of O (MG)
16 Cdn Fd Coy RCE
One coy 22 Cdn Fd Amb
One sec 4 Cdn Pro Coy

Tasks

23 (a) To cross over, pass through 7 Cdn Inf Bde and capture EMMERICH

(b) If little resistance is met then 8 Cdn Inf Bde will occupy area 3 as per att trace.

(c) If this is NOT possible, to firm up in the EMMERICH area.

(d) To be prepared to adv in a NORTHERly direction WEST of the HOCH ELTEN feature.

PHASE IV

24 If hy resistance is met by 8 Cdn Inf Bde then 9 Cdn Inf Bde will capture area 3 and will exploit NORTHwards to the line of the obstacle, 930640 - 990650 as shown in Def Overprint.

PHASE V

- 25 In the event that hy resistance is met by 8 Cdn Inf Bde and 9 Cdn Inf Bde then 6 Cdn Inf Bde may be called on to attack and capture the SOUTH end of the HOCH ELTEN feature.

ARMOUR

- 26 Probable that one armd regt of 2 Cdn Armd Bde will be under comd and one sqn Crocs from 79 Armd Div. Further details will be passed on later.
- 27 7 Cdn Recce Regt will be prepared to either be phased in late as a recce regt or to be launched early in jeeps and carriers to take up a holding role on the RIGHT flank of the div. Will also provide Mob Coln under comd 9 Cdn Inf Bde.

ARTY

- 28 12 Cdn Fd Regt will be in sp of and under comd for move of 7 Cdn Inf Bde.
- 29 Arty Comd will move with Tac HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div.
- 30 Remaining two fd regts will remain on WEST bank and will be controlled by CRA 3 Cdn Inf Div through line comms provided by CCRA 2 Cdn Corps.

A TK

- 31 3 Cdn A Tk Regt less three btys will move fwd with residue of the div as ordered. It is possible that 94 Cdn A Tk Bty will be taken from 9 Cdn Inf Bde and move with remainder of 3 Cdn A Tk Regt.

AA

- 32 One Hy AA Bty and one LAA Bty from Corps or Army resources will cross over with 3 Cdn Inf Div coln. 4 Cdn LAA Regt will be emp in the Pepper Pots and will cross over with div residue as ordered by this HQ.

PEPPER POT

- 33 Two pepper pots will be org under comd CH of O (MG):
- (a) Under comd 3 Brit Inf Div to cover the initial crossing.
 - (b) To cover the adv of the Div NW along the RIGHT bank by fire from the LEFT.

ENGRS

- 34 6, 16, 18 Cdn Fd Coys will be under comd 7, 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes respectively for all purposes. 3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy will cross over with div residues.

SMOKE

- 35 A large scale smoke programme is in op now, and may be obtained to screen off the HOCH ELTEN feature.

AIR

36 Air programme is shown as Appx "A" att.

PROTECTION

37 In view of the large amount of AA deployed in the area and the likelihood of enemy air attack, it is imperative fullest attention be paid to, dispersion, cam, and wherever possible, overhead cover.

MIL GOVT

38 There will be NO evac of civs across the RHINE, but civs will be conc locally in bldgs and det Mil Govt advised.

ADM

39 Adm instrs will be issued separately.

INTERCOMN

40 Tac HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div will cross over immediately behind 7 Cdn Inf Bde and will assume control as soon as est on the "far shore", (location later).

Sgd M.K. Reed Capt.

for (NLC MATHER) Lt-Col
GS 3 Cdn Inf Div

DRLS

Time of Signature 1125 A hrs

DISTRIBUTION

7 Cdn Inf Bde	1
8 Cdn Inf Bde	2
9 Cdn Inf Bde	3
7 Cdn Recce Regt	4
CH of O (MG)	5
RCA	6
RCE	7
Sigs	8
6 Cdn Inf Bde	9
2 Cdn Inf Div	10
51 (H) Div	11
43 (W) Div	12
79 Armd Div	13
2 Cdn Corps	14
30 Brit Corps	15
Comd	16
G	17
AQ	18
File	19
War Diary	20 - 22

TOP SECRET

Appx "A" to Confirmatory
Notes of Conference
1600 hours 17 Mar. 45

Copy No 20

AIR SUPPORT

Pre-Arranged Targets

1. (a) HALDERN, ISSELBURG, ANHOLT and PRAEST have been submitted as targets to be dealt with immediately before the op.
- (b) The RAF have decided to attack HALDERN and PRAEST with a strong force of fighter-bombers during the last hour of daylight on D minus 1. It is considered that visual attack is better than attack on instruments, as these two villages are NOT good by bomber targets.
- (c) ISSELBURG and ANHOLT will be attacked D minus 1/D with a force sufficiently heavy to ensure their destruction. Last bomb will be not later than first light on D day and probably nearer to 0001 hrs.
- (d) Cratering has been accepted on all four targets.

Interdiction

2. A programme is now in operation designed to produce by D day the maximum paralysis of the railway network in the area -

ZWOLLE - ELBERGEN Bridge - RHEINE - NEUBECKUM - SOEST - SIEGEN - SIEGBURG.
3. This programme includes attacks on viaducts, (the BIELEFELD viaduct was hit by RAF Lancasters with 22,000 lb bombs on 15 Mar) bridges and rly centres both in the above area and leading to it.

Air Support Communications

4. (a) The FCP will be working centrally for the benefit NOT of 30 Corps alone but of the whole of Second Army. It will intercept (and can in suitable cases take on) targets submitted by any formation with a tentacle.
- (b) 51 (H) Div will have -
 - (i) A DD tk fitted with a VHF set and fwd and rearward comms. This will cross with Staffs Yeo and be available for use on the further bank as a contact tank and as a tentacle.

Fighter-Bomber Support

5. (a) Hostile btys are first priority as targets for D day. These will be pre-arranged as far as located and otherwise be dealt with on observation by Tac/R or by fighter-bombers themselves (also by Arty/R).

5. (b) Targets put up through tentacles will be dealt with in the normal way, either under control of Army/83 Gp or of FCP. The Contact Tk or Contact Jeep Outfit can where necessary take control of aircraft.

Recognition

6. (a) Fluorescent Panels will be worn by vehs moving on the EAST side of the river.
- (b) White 5-pointed stars will be cleaned.
- (c) Yellow smoke will be available for use to indicate fwd tps only to the air.

Arty/R

7. Four sorties per day for 4 AGRA and four sorties per day for 5 AGRA have been requested.

Tac/R

8. The area on 30 Corps front will be covered under Second Army control and the contact car with 51 (H) Div can request specific missions by a Tac/R aircraft which can keep in touch with the RAF controller at Div HQ and report to him from the air the results of the recce.

OP "PLUNDER"

CASUALTIES

Since "D" Day and up to 2400 hours 1 Apr 45, The Canadian, British and American Armies had, besides killing and wounding very large numbers of the enemy, taken approximately 1,261,826 prisoners (H.S. File 215Cl. 98(D305) Enemy Casualties. Total to 012400). In view of the results achieved so far, our own losses for the battle east of the Rhine (since the commitment of Canadian troops on 24 Mar 45) had been light. A near estimate can be drawn from the figures as they stood at 0600 hours 1 Apr 45.

Consolidated Casualties

	<u>Killed, Wounded, Missing</u>		<u>TOTALS</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
<u>3 Cdn Inf Div</u>				
7 Cdn Inf Bde	13	156		
8 Cdn Inf Bde	1	64		
9 Cdn Inf Bde	18	241		
C.H. of O. (M.G.)	0	0		
7 Cdn Recce Regt	0	2		
3 Cdn Inf Div Tps	4	22		
	<u>36</u>	<u>485</u>	36	485
<u>2 Cdn Inf Div</u>				
4 Cdn Inf Bde	0	1		
5 Cdn Inf Bde	0	2		
6 Cdn Inf Bde	7	100		
Tor Scot R. (M.G.)	0	0		
8 Cdn Recce Regt	0	4		
2 Cdn Inf Div Tps	0	2		
	<u>7</u>	<u>109</u>	7	109
<u>4 Cdn Armd Div</u>				
10 Cdn Inf Bde	0	0		
4 Cdn Armd Bde	1	5		
29 Cdn Armd Recce Regt	0	0		
4 Cdn Armd Div Tps	1	12		
	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>	2	17
<u>2 Cdn Corps</u>				
2 Cdn Armd Bde	1	9		
18 Cdn Armd C. Regt	0	1		
2 Cdn Corps Tps	0	3		
	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	1	13
<u>First Cdn Army</u>				
H.Q. First Cdn Army	0	0		
A. Tps Area First Cdn Army	0	4		
2 Cdn A.G.R.A.	1	12		
	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>	1	16

Consolidated Casualties

Killed, Wounded, Missing

TOTALS

Officers

Other Ranks

Officers

Other Ranks


Total Canadian Casualties

3 Cdn Inf Div	36	485		
2 Cdn Inf Div	7	109		
4 Cdn Armd Div	2	17		
2 Cdn Corps	1	13		
First Cdn Army	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>		
	<u>47</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>640</u>

Other Tps attached to First Cdn Army

21 Gp Brit Pnr Corps	0	2		
102 Gp Brit Pnr Corps	0	0		
14 Brit A.G.R.E.	0	2		
74 Brit A.A. Bde	0	0		
107 Brit A.A. Bde	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>		
	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>

(W.D., A. & Q., H.Q. First Cdn Army, April 1945; Appx 8, Consolidated C. and S. State as of 0600 hours 1 Apr 45, Sheet 252, pp. 3 and 4).




OPERATION "PLUNDER"
THE ASSAULT ACROSS THE RHINE
OPERATIONS BY 2 & 3 CDN DIVS
 23-31 MAR 45

Miles 0 1 2 3 Miles


CANADIAN UNITS —————→
 BRITISH UNITS - - - - -→
 PATROL ACTION ·······→

OPERATION "PLUNDER" THE ASSAULT ACROSS THE RHINE OPERATIONS BY 2 & 3 CDN DIVS 31 MAR-1 APR 45




- CANADIAN UNITS
- BRITISH UNITS
- PATROL ACTION
- ADVANCE TO CONTACT

NOTE: Auth for fm bdys
WD (G.S.) HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div
Ops Log Ser 2069 29 Mar 45




CLEARING OF EMMERICH

BY 7 CDN INF BDE
29-30 MAR 45




1 C. SCOT R. →
REGINA RIF. →
R. WPG RIF. →
Areas allotted to Coys for clearing. ●●●●●



RHINE RIVER

PORTION OF EMMERICH TOWN PLAN
GSGS 4480



EMMERICH

6 PARA DIV
LT GEN PLOCHER

17 Para Regt

18 Para Regt

16 Para Regt

115 PGR

24 Para Regt

104 PGR

REES

RHINE

22 Para Regt

20 Para Regt

19 Para Regt

21 Para Regt

394 Aslt
Gren Bde

REMNANTS
84 DIV

86
CORPS
GEN ERICH STRAUBE

Battle Group
Karst

116 Pz Recce

XANTEN

WESEL

LIPPE RIVER

LIPPE SEITEN CANAL

2
P A R A
C O R P S
GEN EUGEN MEINDL
ISSELBURG
15 PG DIV

BOCHOLT

8 PARA DIV

7 PARA DIV

20 Para Regt