

Evaluation of Arctic Operations

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Program Overview

The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces' (DND/CAF) activity in the Arctic has been guided by Canada's 2017 Defence Policy: *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE), which commits the CAF to enhancing its Arctic capability through several initiatives to operate in the Arctic and adapt to a changing security environment. These initiatives include direction to increase the CAF's mobility, reach and presence in the Arctic over the long term and to work cooperatively with Arctic partners.



Evaluation Scope

The Evaluation of Arctic Operations focused on evaluating the future Arctic operating environment, whether there are clear roles for CAF operations in the Arctic, as well as the effectiveness of CAF operations over the timeframe of 2018–2022.

Several events took place outside the evaluation period, including the 2023 Northwest Territories wildfires and the 2023 surveillance balloon incident, which have been considered due to their relevance. The main policy document throughout this evaluation was SSE; however, when possible, the recently released 2024 defence policy update, *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence* (ONSAF), is noted.

The evaluation was structured around three main evaluation questions, with a focus on the five operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain), when assessing the effectiveness of CAF operations. It further considered CAF presence in the Arctic and how well-positioned CAF operations are to address future Arctic threats.


For the purposes of this evaluation, the Canadian Arctic is defined as the Joint Task Force North's (JTFN) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The CAF Arctic Operations evaluation was undertaken in alignment with the 2016 Treasury Board Policy on Results. This is the first time Arctic operations have been evaluated.

There is minimal consensus on the future Arctic security threats facing the Canadian Armed Forces.

Evidence offers that there is no immediate military threat to the Arctic.

The evaluation found that, currently, there is no military threat to Canada's territorial sovereignty; however, it was noted that Russia does have military capabilities in the Arctic that it could employ against Canadian Arctic targets. Concerns were also raised that, as ice in the Arctic continues to melt, increased access could lead to increased foreign presence in Canada's Arctic. Adversarial states may seek to establish a foothold in Canada through covert investments, partnerships and interference in government decision making. Cyber attacks by foreign state actors on critical infrastructure in the Arctic were also identified as an emerging threat. Evidence notes that although these activities fall outside the sphere of military threats, they could serve as a means for foreign adversaries to secure control over strategic Arctic resources and assets.

Multiple lines of evidence show that the CAF's future role in the Arctic is not well defined because there is no clear guidance outlining the CAF's responsibility to respond to emerging threats in the Arctic. There are, however, threats to the Arctic that emanate from outside of the region such as environmental impacts from a foreign vessel running aground in Canadian Arctic waters. There are also threats that, while not targeting the Arctic, pass through it (e.g., intercontinental missiles). Threats in the Arctic emanate from within the region such as critical infrastructure (e.g., airfields) being threatened by the loss of permafrost. There are also threats, such as climate change, that stem from outside the Arctic region but have direct impacts on the region itself through extreme weather.



Without a well-understood, common perception of its future role and the future threats it faces, the CAF may not be making the appropriate investments needed for it to be able to defend the security and sovereignty of Canada's Arctic. Despite Canada's investments—including those announced through ONSAF—that may enhance the CAF's Arctic operational capabilities, residual gaps may remain (as discussed in *Concluding Analysis and Look Ahead*).

Canadian security and defence policy does not reflect the seriousness of increasingly severe climate impacts across the country.

Although climate change is one of the greatest threats facing the Arctic, many agree that Canada does not have a comprehensive security and defence policy to address these future threats in the changing Arctic environment.

Three quarters of survey respondents agreed that emerging environmental factors (climate change) may impact Arctic operations. Additional lines of evidence also highlight that climate change in the Arctic region is likely to act as a threat multiplier and is expected to impact the CAF's Arctic operational capacity in several ways. This could include more requests for assistance in response to natural disasters and degradation of infrastructure due to thawing permafrost, etc.



Key Findings

The lack of clear objectives leads to a fragmented approach to defence in the Arctic.

High-level guidance documents provide a framework of operations in the Arctic, but they are limited in providing clear, measurable and quantifiable Arctic defence objectives.

The CAF receives its Arctic strategic direction from the Government of Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework as well as SSE and the recently released ONSAF, which provide the CAF with objectives and roles in the Arctic. The framework has an objective for the Arctic, and it is through SSE and now ONSAF that the CAF is directed to work cooperatively with Arctic partners, as well as to increase CAF presence in the Arctic over the long term.

It is unclear what constitutes sufficient Arctic presence. CAF Arctic operations and exercises demonstrate CAF visibility and transient presence. For example, there were on average 12 exercises and operations conducted per year in the Arctic over the evaluation period. In addition, the CAF's persistent presence in the Arctic has remained static during the evaluation period, with approximately 2,021 Reservists and 308 Regular Force personnel. Without measurable objectives, it remains unknown if the CAF is meeting its SSE direction.

This lack of strategic guidance results in unclear Arctic operational objectives for the CAF. Within the CAF command and control structure, Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) is the headquarters responsible for most operations both internal and external to Canada. While CJOC is responsible for planning operations, the lack of strategic guidance for the Arctic means that the CAF is challenged to establish operational objectives or to support a broader vision.



47% of survey respondents **disagreed** that the CAF has a clear and well-defined strategy in place to guide Arctic operations

Strategic guidance across individual CAF elements reveals a fragmented approach to Arctic operations, marked by outdated references and a lack of uniformity in their respective policies and objectives.



Observation

A benchmarking exercise, conducted for this evaluation, examining the eight Arctic states shows that the United States and Sweden have defence-focused Arctic guidance documents. Specifically, the United States has an Arctic strategy to clarify their military/defence priorities in the Arctic.

The lack of measurable CAF-wide Arctic operational objectives has resulted in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Canadian Army (CA) generating their own individual approaches to the Arctic. There is a lack of co-ordination between the elements on matters related to the Arctic; for example:

- The RCN and the CA have developed their own stand-alone strategies for the Arctic, whereas the RCAF has not.
- The RCN and the CA have self-defined and interpreted SSE guidance, which may not necessarily be informed by the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- Canadian Special Operations Forces Command released a strategy in 2020 entitled *Beyond the Horizon*, but it does not identify the Arctic specifically as unique nor specific areas of focus to succeed in operations.



Why It Matters

Without a comprehensive strategy for Arctic operations, the CAF is unable to identify a clear role, prompting ambiguity for CAF elements in shaping their strategic plans for the Arctic. Consequently, the lack of clear guidance hinders the identification and mitigation of current and future threats in the region, which perpetuates the insignificance of Arctic operations, exercises and capabilities within the CAF.



Recommendation: Address the gap in CAF strategic direction to develop clear Arctic operational objectives.

Key Findings




Command

Joint Task Force North faces unique command challenges that other Joint Task Forces do not.

Staffing JTFN is challenging.

Known CAF recruitment and retention issues are exacerbated in the Arctic due to region-specific challenges such as a high cost of living, prolonged wait times for northern benefits and the isolated nature of the region.

Additionally, JTFN's staffing priority is Category B, requiring between 90–95 percent staffing, while other operational headquarters' staffing priority is Category A, requiring between 95–100 percent staffing. JTFN is staffed for "working level" command tasks at 67 percent, which creates a greater dependence on contractors and augmentee requests to address the gap. This would be particularly problematic for unplanned operations as any personnel outside of JTFN would have a significant training or environmental familiarity delta to overcome before being considered operationally effective. Finally, as climate change intensifies, the need for unplanned operations may only increase, further exacerbating existing effects of personnel shortages.



*Thirteen percent below the CAF average

JTFN is not a force generator.

JTFN is the only task force headquarters not to have a force generator attached to it. The force generator can provide much needed operational support. For example, the Commander of Joint Task Force Atlantic is "double hatted" as Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic and has 6,345 military positions under their direct command from which the Commander may task as required; this is a stark contrast to the 160 personnel under the JTFN Commander. To compensate for this, JTFN relies upon CAF personnel temporarily assigned from other units to support the conduct of Arctic operations.



Sense

Collaboration with partners and allies helps to mitigate the Canadian Armed Forces' limited all-domain awareness sense capability in the Arctic.

There are issues with sensing/surveillance technology and equipment.

Domain awareness is a critical component of Canada's approach to Arctic security and sovereignty, and surveillance of the region is key to identifying and responding to threats in the Arctic. The evaluation noted that there are only 46 active North Warning System radar sites across all of Canada's North, which accounts for 40 percent of Canada's land mass. Radar satellites have limitations due to the earth's curvature in the Arctic, and some collected information is sensitive and cannot be shared with internal or external partners without appropriate clearance.

To contribute to the CAF's limited Arctic domain awareness, the CAF regularly and continuously collaborates with partners/stakeholders and allies in the Arctic at various levels from strategic to tactical, as well as Arctic and northern Indigenous communities.



of survey respondents **disagreed** that existing surveillance capability provides the CAF with timely, accurate and relevant awareness of threats in the Arctic.

Many interviewees and survey respondents agreed that the CAF has established collaborative and ongoing engagements with partners and stakeholders in the Arctic, including northern and Arctic Indigenous communities. Canadian Rangers are a continuous military presence in northern and Arctic communities, and they provide the CAF with persistent on-the-ground situational awareness and assistance to CAF domestic operations.

The CAF's active involvement in numerous forms of engagement also includes collaboration with other government departments, allies, partners, and various committees and councils, focusing on matters of Arctic security and defence. A review of JTFN program data identified 198 engagements with northern and Indigenous communities/governments since 2018.

Since 2018 over 198 engagements have taken place, including...



21

engagements in support of Op NANOOK



144

annual letters



33

engagements in support of contingency activities not covered by annual letters



Key Findings



Act



Planned operations do not accurately reflect the Canadian Armed Forces' unplanned operational manoeuvrability requirements in the Arctic.

Operation (Op) NANOOK is the CAF's most visible training exercise in the North. The largest component of Op NANOOK occurs in late summer, a period that does not present the sustainment challenges associated with winter such as the absence of marine support and the need for equipment capable of withstanding extreme cold. This scheduling could potentially limit the CAF's operational capabilities in the Arctic during periods outside of summer.

Due to higher priority taskings and equipment challenges, Op NANOOK relies on contracting to support manoeuvrability.

Arctic operations are modestly resourced because they are competing with other CAF priorities. These resource constraints affect operations in many ways, particularly around the need for equipment when planning Op NANOOK. Specifically, program data shows minimal numbers of over-the-snow vehicles (58 serviceable out of a total of 102), which are used in collective training with the focus being preparation for support to domestic operations. CJOC mitigates these challenges by contracting additional support. While this aids in making Arctic planned operations a success, the CAF has generally not relied on contractors for rapid unplanned operations, in which case the CAF assigns assets and capabilities as needed.

The solution to these Op NANOOK challenges has been contracting, with over half of the NANOOK funds being expended on contracted airlift and equipment rental. Spending in this domain has been increasing over the evaluation period (except for 2020/21 due to COVID-19), from 47 percent in 2018/19 to 66 percent in 2022/23.

| Year | Contracted airlift and manoeuvre funds | Total NANOOK Funding | Percentage of funding allocated to contracting |
|----------|--|----------------------|--|
| FY 22/23 | \$6,494,100 | \$9,905,000 | 66% |
| FY 21/22 | \$5,885,360 | \$8,860,000 | 66% |
| FY 20/21 | \$1,411,403 | \$4,159,500 | 34% |
| FY 19/20 | \$3,914,365 | \$6,850,000 | 57% |
| FY 18/19 | \$3,083,696 | \$6,500,000 | 47% |
| | | Average | 54% |

Note: FY stands for Fiscal Year



Operation NUNALIVUT 2018 in Resolute, Nunavut on March 6, 2018. Photo: Petty Officer Second Class Belinda Groves, Task Force Imagery Technician YK01-2018-0018-0011

There is no evidence that lessons learned from previous Op NANOOK series are specifically incorporated into objectives for follow-on Arctic operations.

A robust lessons learned program is vital to retain institutional knowledge and to ensure that both planned and unplanned operations can be leveraged for essential information to improve future operations. Interviewees noted that the CAF is facing significant challenges in effectively capitalizing on Op NANOOK's lessons learned due to personnel challenges. A CJOC lessons learned report also noted that, "despite several years of conducting northern activities such as Op NANOOK and Arctic experimentation, every deployment to the next Op NANOOK seems to start from a zero-base knowledge of the Arctic." This has the potential to negatively impact the CAF's ability to adequately inform its future requirements.



Why It Matters

The CAF needs to train as it operates so it can identify relevant operational deficiencies for rectification. Without actions being taken on lessons learned, the CAF may not be positioned to improve its Arctic capabilities.



Recommendation: Incorporate lessons learned from planned and unplanned operations into future operations.



Key Findings



Shield/Sustain



Canadian Armed Forces infrastructure in the Arctic region is limited and deteriorating; however, the exact status is unknown.

The infrastructure deficit in the Arctic hinders the CAF's ability to operate in the region.

The CAF's northern infrastructure is located far apart and can only provide limited support for large or sustained deployments. To further complicate the issue, the CAF's infrastructure assessment tool (Facility Condition Index) shows that the condition of Arctic infrastructure is well below the CAF average and, without intervention, will soon move to the "rust out" stage.

Evidence suggests the current airfield infrastructure is outdated, which can hinder the CAF's ability to operate. Of the 102 Arctic airfields, less than 48 percent can be used by the versatile CC-130 Hercules. Additionally, only 13 percent of the Arctic airfields can be used by the CC-177 Globemaster. These limitations are mostly due to insufficient runway lengths and having gravel runways that can only accommodate certain planes. Interviewees spoke to the need for infrastructure adaptation, mostly to paved runways to allow for bigger airplanes to operate in the North. In fact, 58 percent of survey respondents disagreed that existing CAF transportation infrastructure meets the needs of Arctic operations. Infrastructure development will be vital to sustaining northern operations and safeguarding Arctic security in the years ahead.

81% of assets are over 30 years old.

38% of buildings are over 50 years old.



45 years

Average age of infrastructure in the Arctic



Operation NUNALIVUT 2017 in Hall Beach, Nunavut, February 25, 2017. Photo: PO2 Belinda Groves, Task Force Imagery Technician YK-2017-014-002

The CAF's inability to construct and shield its own infrastructure negatively impacts its ability to shield, sustain, sense, act and command.

The CAF's ability to maintain and increase its presence in the Arctic region is also limited by its ability to shelter personnel. Over half of the survey respondents (56 percent) disagreed that the existing CAF buildings meet the needs of Arctic operations. The lack of adequate shelter and the scarcity of local resources has an adverse effect on the CAF's ability to sustain personnel in the Arctic for extended periods of time.



Why It Matters

The remoteness and extreme weather conditions of the Arctic magnify the central role of infrastructure in the CAF's ability to operate and sustain personnel in the region. Understanding the status of Arctic infrastructure supports strategic planning for defence as well as operational effectiveness by identifying gaps that could impact CAF operations.



Recommendation: To have a fulsome understanding of the status of CAF Arctic infrastructure, a comprehensive inventory and analysis is needed to inform future requirements.



Concluding Analysis and Look Ahead

Context

As previously noted, the Evaluation of Arctic Operations covered the period from 2018 to 2022. As a result, it did not initially consider future investments outlined in ONSAF, released in April 2024. Given the timeliness of the new vision for DND/CAF, a supplementary analysis was conducted after the conclusion of this evaluation. The goal was to highlight the investments related to the Arctic against the five operational functions to identify how these new investments have potential to mitigate some of the existing challenges and to detail the anticipated residual risks. Although ONSAF details many investments that could benefit Arctic operations over the next 20 years, not all these investments are directly related. The following analysis focuses solely on the capabilities that have the potential to directly enhance Arctic operations.



Command

Investment:

- Military Personnel Command has been requested to explore staffing challenges and create incentives to being posted to JTFN (JTFN initiative - no dedicated timelines).

Residual Gap:

- Without a definitive investment and timelines, there may be a continued shortage of staff assigned to JTFN.
- JTFN will continue to lack co-located force generator support, despite the proposed staffing changes.



JTFN faces unique command challenges that other Joint Task Forces do not, particularly as it relates to staffing. Personnel must be brought into the Arctic region to support longer-term CAF operations.

Due to a lack of CAF resources in the Arctic, personnel must be brought into the region to support the conduct of operations. As climate change intensifies, the need for unplanned operations in response to natural disasters and search and rescue operations may increase, further exacerbating existing effects of personnel shortages.



In the Arctic, the CAF faces issues with sensing/surveillance technology and equipment in terms of its limited number of assets with collection capabilities and the ability to share collected information with internal and external partners.

Without timely and accurate information collection and sharing with partners and allies, the CAF risks a lack of sufficient domain awareness, compromising its ability to defend against threats in the region. To mitigate this risk, the CAF relies upon personnel on the ground such as the Canadian Rangers and collaboration with partners and allies, which are effective measures.



Sense

Investment:

- Canada intends to spend \$38.6 billion to modernize North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Select funding (\$6.9 billion) has been planned to modernize Canada's surveillance systems, including new Arctic (Full Operational Capability (FOC) 2031) and Polar (FOC 2033) Over the Horizon Radar systems and enhanced space-based surveillance systems (FOC 2036).
- ONSAF states that Canada will establish a new satellite ground station in the Arctic to improve the CAF's ability to detect, deter and respond to threats, and to communicate those threats with allies.
- In addition, ONSAF states that, in over 20 years, Canada will acquire specialized maritime sensors to be deployed by Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, as well as refurbish and modernize existing fixed marine-based sensors to conduct ocean-based detection and surveillance. They will be used to monitor Canada's maritime approaches, including the Arctic.

Residual Gap:

- Current radar stations in the Arctic lack Over the Horizon capability—which provides increased range at lower altitudes—limiting surveillance capabilities. This gap will remain until new systems are operational, including the ground station.
- Until the completion of the maritime sensor package, a lack of Arctic domain awareness capability may persist.



Act

Investment:

- ONSAF directs DND/CAF to explore options to acquire new vehicles adapted to ice, snow and tundra.
- ONSAF directs DND/CAF to explore modifications to the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels to enable the vessels to embark and operate maritime helicopters.

Residual Gap:

- The exploration of ONSAF options does not necessarily lead to the acquisition of a capability as there are no identifiable timelines or commitments.
- Until capabilities are identified and selected to address the manoeuvrability gap, the reliance on contracting to support Op NANOOK remains an unmitigated capacity and capability gap, which will also persist for unplanned operations.



Planned operations do not accurately reflect CAF unplanned operational manoeuvrability requirements in the Arctic. Due to higher priority taskings and equipment challenges (e.g., limited ground manoeuvrability and airlift support), Op NANOOK relies on contracting.

With unplanned operations, the CAF assigns assets and capabilities as needed, resulting in reduced reliance on contracting.

The difference in planned versus unplanned operations results in challenges with the coordination of airlift and sustainment, which may hinder the CAF's ability to effectively execute unplanned operations.



The remoteness and extreme weather conditions of the Arctic magnify the central role of infrastructure in the CAF's ability to operate (e.g., Arctic airlift challenges due to insufficient runway lengths and gravel runways) and sustain personnel (e.g., lack of adequate shelter and scarcity of local resources) in the region.

Arctic infrastructure is well below the CAF average and, without intervention, will soon move to the "rust out" stage. Further, without adequate infrastructure, there is the risk of adverse effects on Arctic operations by limiting the ability to sustain personnel in the Arctic.



Shield/Sustain



Investment:

- Through ONSAF, the Government of Canada intends to spend \$218 million over 20 years for Northern Operational Support Hubs to better ensure Canadian sovereignty by establishing a greater year-round presence across the Arctic.
- Canada is investing \$15.68 billion for infrastructure and support capabilities, including upgrades to NORAD Forward Operating Locations in Inuvik, Yellowknife, Iqaluit and Canadian Forces Base Goose Bay.

Residual Gap:

- The intent of the operational hubs is to increase military responsiveness and the ability to address challenges in remote northern regions on shorter notice and for longer periods when required.
- Arctic airlift, a separate capability, remains a challenge due to insufficient runway lengths and gravel runways that can only accommodate certain aircraft.
- The dependence on contractors is a significant risk to completing the identified Arctic infrastructure enhancements.
- The upgrade of Forward Operating Locations will not address operational support or Arctic airlift infrastructure shortfalls in other locations.



Annex A: Management Action Plan

| ADM(RS) Recommendation | Management Action |
|--|---|
| <p>1. Address the gap in CAF strategic direction to develop clear Arctic operational objectives.</p> | <p>Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) accepts this recommendation and has already undertaken steps to align strategic direction for the Arctic. SJS acknowledges gaps exist and that there is significant opportunity for improvement, particularly with regards to alignment and synchronization across Level One Organizations (L1) from a capabilities and resources standpoint.</p> <p>Management Action Plan 1.0</p> <p>The CAF is now developing a Strategic Campaign Plan (SCP), which will address National Strategic CAF objectives, including in the Arctic, from a pan-domain standpoint. SCP will include a section to specifically provide clear and strategic direction on operational objectives in the Arctic. SCP will provide strategic objectives for operational commands to develop their own regional campaign plans. Ultimately, SCP will align and synchronize CAF actions, capabilities and footprint in the Arctic.</p> <p>Key Interim Milestones</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mission Analysis complete – by October 31, 2024 2. Consultation with L1s and SCP drafting – November and December 2024 3. Draft SCP complete – February 28, 2025 4. L1 review of SCP complete – March 31, 2025 5. SCP finalized and issued – April 30, 2025 6. Ongoing production of operational-level campaign plans, monitoring and adjustment of SCP – based on an annual cycle/strategic battle rhythm. <p>Risk Statement: Without a comprehensive strategy for Arctic operations, the CAF cannot identify a clear role, prompting ambiguity for CAF elements in shaping their strategic plans for the Arctic. Consequently, the lack of clear guidance risks the CAF's ability to identify and mitigate current and future threats in the region, which perpetuates the insignificance of Arctic operations, exercises and capabilities within the CAF.</p> <p>Deliverable: Develop SCP.</p> <p>OPI: SJS OCI: N/A</p> <p>Target Date: April 2025</p> |



Annex A: Management Action Plan

| ADM(RS) Recommendation | Management Action Plan |
|---|--|
| <p>2. Incorporate lessons learned from planned and unplanned operations into future operations.</p> | <p>CJOC partially agrees. While lessons learned adoption is complex and multifactorial, CJOC fully agrees they could be more fulsomely incorporated into operational planning and execution of Arctic activities. CJOC acknowledges gaps exist and that there is significant opportunity for improvement, particularly with regards to the communication of results.</p> <p>Milestone 2.1</p> <p>CJOC will develop a lessons learned performance measurement framework (PMF) for CAF Arctic operations. Deliverable: Lessons learned PMF, by December 1, 2024.</p> <p>Milestone 2.2</p> <p>CJOC will develop training materiel for the lessons learned PMF and a standardized information brief to increase awareness and understanding of the importance of incorporating lessons learned in operational planning. Deliverable: Lessons learned PMF training materiel by March 31, 2025.</p> <p>Milestone 2.3</p> <p>CJOC will direct all personnel entering the JTFN AOR to receive a standardized information brief and lessons learned training materiel outlining the incorporation of lessons learned, including the application of lessons learned performance measurement. Deliverable: JTFN directive on lessons learned signed by September 1, 2025.</p> <p>Milestone 2.4</p> <p>CJOC will direct force generating elements participating in Op NANOOK to provide lessons learned staff to actively collect on assigned topics related to operational objectives and previous lessons. Deliverable: CJOC directive on lessons learned collection signed by September 1, 2025.</p> <p>Milestone 2.5</p> <p>To demonstrate that lessons learned have been successfully incorporated, CJOC will incorporate lessons learned PMF into the Arctic campaign plan framework, covering all Arctic activities for CJOC. Main Deliverable: CJOC Arctic campaign plan framework with lessons learned annex included by July 31, 2026.</p> <p>Risk Statement: If lessons learned are not adequately integrated into operational planning, it could have significant national security implications. The new defence policy highlights an increasingly complex and dangerous geopolitical climate, particularly in the Arctic. The proposed management action plan aims to incrementally improve the implementation of lessons learned for Arctic operations; however, adequate resourcing levels are essential to effectively address the deficiencies identified in the evaluation report. Without these resources, CJOC’s lessons learned program may not effectively correct or enhance operational activities.</p> <p>OPI: CJOC/Director General Readiness/Director Joint Readiness OCl: SJS, RCN, CA, RCAF, CJOC/Director General Intelligence Production/J5, CJOC/JTFN</p> <p>Target Date: All previously mentioned actions to be completed by July 31, 2026</p> |



Annex A: Management Action Plan

ADM(RS) Recommendation

3. To have a fulsome understanding of the status of CAF Arctic infrastructure, a comprehensive inventory and analysis is needed to inform future requirements.

Management Action Plan

Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment) (ADM(IE)) accepts this recommendation.

ADM(IE) will undertake a review of the real property (RP) assets in its AOR North with the focus upon those positioned in the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon.

Initial Action

The Facility Condition Index calculates the current condition of the asset by dividing deferred maintenance by the current building replacement value. The index will score each site according to the level of investment needed to return the asset to optimal level, or it will indicate where the level of investment has accelerated aging and shortened the life cycle and where the building is to be replaced. Information obtained here will show the amount of investment needed to fulfil the remainder of the CAF operational requirement and potential for continued future use.

ADM(IE) has an active Facilities Condition Assessment (FCA) program in effect for its AOR North RP assets. The current FCA cycle looks to complete this round of assessments in December 2025. The FCA program has been procured by way of contract with Defence Construction Canada. The assessment will establish at which stage in its life cycle each component of the asset is and where repair and recapitalization efforts should be focused. The project's delivery timeline may be impacted by the challenges associated with northern operations, which include but are not limited to remoteness, compressed summer season, weather, dependency upon air transportation and budgetary constraints.

Ongoing Engagement

The Real Property Portfolio Management Committee supports the implementation of the Defence Real Property Portfolio Strategy objectives and its alignment with CAF operations. The Real Property Portfolio Management Committee is a sub-committee to the Infrastructure and Environment Board and is a key part of DND ADM(IE)'s delegated RP authorities. Membership includes the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, SJS, the CA, the RCAF, the RCN and various L1s in the Department. The committee provides an enterprise-level support function to portfolio-level planning and programs that support Defence RP requirements. These include delivery, proposals, governance instruments, policies, and strategies tied to portfolio oversight and management.

Nationally, ADM(IE) has established Real Property Steering Committees in each of its seven regions. The committee's mandate is to prioritize and integrate RP support across the region and to provide performance feedback on the delivery of RP services. The Real Property Steering Committee identifies potential investments for the following infrastructure programmes: Minor New Construction Programme; Maintenance and Repair Programme; Environmental Programmes; Demolition Programme; Divestment Programme; Defence Lease Accommodation Programme; and Capital Assistance Programme.



Annex A: Management Action Plan

ADM(RS) Recommendation

3. To have a fulsome understanding of the status of CAF Arctic infrastructure, a comprehensive inventory and analysis is needed to inform future requirements.

Management Action Plan

These steering committees allow ADM(IE) to better understand the goals and objectives of its clients and lodger units to acquire, operate and maintain those assets necessary to the fulfilment of their respective missions and mandates. The goals and objectives are captured in a Statement of Requirements Infrastructure, which is the instrument that will permit ADM(IE) to commence the RP investment planning process.

Implementation Plan

The previously mentioned items are a requirement for ADM(IE) to develop the Master Real Property Development Plan (MRPDP), including Site Development Plans (SDP), for key centres in the region.

MRPDP North will assess current and future RP capabilities across the region and is anticipated to be completed by the end of FY 2025/26. This strategic document will examine current and future CAF operational capabilities and associated RP requirements over a 30-year period in three horizons: 1 to 5, 5 to 10, and 10+ years. The MRPDP is revisited every 5 years.

SDPs for the NORAD Northern Basing Infrastructure are in final draft stage, awaiting further input on the concept of operations from the RCAF. ADM(IE) is also working closely with all L1s to obtain additional information related to operational requirements that call for a northern footprint, which will be incorporated into a future iteration of SDPs. This feedback is necessary to conclude the full site evaluations for Inuvik, Iqaluit and Yellowknife. It is anticipated this work will be finalized by the end of 2025.

ADM(IE) will initiate an SDP for Canadian Forces Station Alert in 2024, with the goal to account for current and future CAF operational capabilities and associated RP assets. The completion date is slated for the end of FY 2025/26.

It is noteworthy that the completion of MRPDPs and SDPs validate the infrastructure requirements for northern sites; however, funding for this northern infrastructure remains to be identified.

Closure: The Management Action Plan will be considered closed once MRPDP North and SDPs for key centres in the region have been finalized and endorsed by ADM(IE).

Risk: The risks associated with not having a thorough understanding of the status of CAF Arctic infrastructure are significant and can impact various aspects of operations, security and strategic planning. A comprehensive inventory and analysis are crucial to inform future requirements and mitigate these risks.

OPI: ADM(IE)

OCI: N/A

Target Date: July 31, 2026